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Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world . . .
    




This essay is an exercise in reflection— worse yet, the reflection 
involves theology. There’s not much of new data in it. It revisits 
themes some may think have been worked to exhaustion. And 
even in taking up these themes, the writer will be disclosed as 
sometimes an amateur. That is, there are others whose mastery 
of individual facts clearly exceeds his. My interest however is not 
mainly in adding to our information about America, but in tak-
ing the weight of quite familiar information.
My concern is that we have not done this. While we have 
admitted to bumps along the road to progress and to some incon-
sistencies in our practice of principles, I believe we as a people 
have never acknowledged some underlying contradictions in the 
way we conceive our task and ourselves.
So I crave indulgence of the reader. I attempt a revisiting of the 
American story, and I can imagine time and again the individ-
ual reader will say, “Wait— he’s got it all wrong; this isn’t what 
I’ve learned at all!” At such points I ask the reader to hesitate 
and consider that it may not be sheer ignorance of the familiar 
story that guides me; rather I’m attempting to tell the story in a 
way that may shed light on why so many aspects of our current 
American experience are disappointing to us and seem to have 




We confront with wholesome skepticism those who say the 
sky is falling. People have been saying it since the invention of 
speech— and the sky is still there. Sound enough. Yet the danger 
of this skepticism can be that even when something is going awry 
systematically, we may tend to greet each indication as a mere 
oddity. True, one should not treat the first sneeze as a predictor 
of pneumonia. But when sneeze follows sneeze, and the throat 
clogs, and the lungs register congestion, one must at some point 
acknowledge the onset of illness. That moment of doing so is a 
positive one; without it one isn’t likely to take corrective action.
Today evidence of something going wrong shows up in many 
places. Consider education for instance. Granted, education 
is always problematic. Knowledge maketh a bloody entrance. 
And the effort to set aside immediate concerns for the sake of 
cultivating more general understandings has always been sub-
ject to thoughtful objection. A decision to postpone immediate 
improvements (say, re-tiling the kitchen floor) to seek a broader 
understanding of life is open to the charge of impracticality. Add 
to that that our nation, from the time of its first settlement by 
Europeans, has been always the site of urgency at some fron-
tier. Our sense of the urgency of things has contributed toward 
a specifically American form of anti-intellectualism. “He who 
hesitates is lost.” Let’s get this show on the road.” There probably 
aren’t many cultures in the world where “egghead” and “intellec-
tual elite” are such effective put-downs as they are here. 
All that notwithstanding, something new and worse has been 
happening lately to education in America. I will speak of “accel-
erating disinvestment,” and this disinvestment I argue is both a 
SECTION ONE
Signs of Accelerating 
Incoherence
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matter of morale and a matter of money (often in fact beginning 
as a matter of morale and becoming a matter of money). I speak 
of this as a sign of incoherence; the disinvestment runs contrary 
both to what we’ve said traditionally and what we say currently in 
our common discourse about education. So I begin by attending 
to education as a place that calls for reflection.
After that, I address the profit motive as it currently establishes 
itself to be the arbiter in America of all other valuation and enter-
prise. I suggest that here too we have matter for reflection, argu-
ing that our exclusive focus on profit is incompatible with many 
things we claim to believe in and care about. 
Thirdly, I examine our reliance on force as our guarantee of 
national security. I suggest our quest for a form of absolute secu-
rity, sought through intimidation, cannot co-exist with our ambi-
tion to become a beacon of light to the human race. 
At the end of this section I argue there’s a kind of coherence 
amid the incoherencies being identified. Just before that though, I 
turn to Nature, and suggest there’s an ominous contrast between 
our sense of America as the Promised Land and our actual treat-
ment of the land we inhabit.
3
Our galloping disinvestment in education doesn’t need to be 
proved. By reason of family members and friends— if not from 
personal experience —  everyone’s aware of it. On the surface of 
things it’s so obviously counterproductive it seems inexplicable. 
It’s as if a hungry farmer were to say in desperate times: “We’ll 
eat all the seed-corn this year, but as soon as we are again blest 
with bountiful harvests, we’ll start again to put seed aside for 
planting.”
Regarding education, Franklin, Madison, and— in his way— 
Jefferson were clear that, for government-by-the-people to work, 
the public would have to be well informed and able to think real-
istically about needs and prospects. Jefferson tells us “a people 
who would be both free and ignorant longs for something that 
can never be.” This is why free speech and a free press, along with 
freedom of religion, were singled out for protection in our first 
amendment to our Constitution.
Candidates for government office understand this so well that 
each of them campaigns to become the Education Mayor or 
the Education Governor or the Education President. Yet what 
we observe often these days is that the candidates are no sooner 
in office than they discover, alas, that now is not the opportune 
time — in our pressing circumstances, education must await more 
prosperous days.
Here, let me approach the subject matter in a twofold way: both 
by providing anecdotes that provide a plausible account of what’s 
happening, and by intervening with reflection as to underlying 
causes for these happenings. While the objection may be lodged 




if the anecdotes are typical and are set forth honestly, you can— 
and we do.
While anecdotes are subject to charges of being inaccurately 
presented, slanted, subjectively interpreted, unrepresentative, I 
claim that my anecdotes are accurate and exemplary. Whether 
this is the case is for the reader to judge.
It’s not surprising that the state put Socrates to death. States 
don’t like criticism. Our own early colonists, particularly those 
of Massachusetts Bay Colony, practically defined themselves by 
being critical and dissatisfied with the British state; but in the 
same breath by which they resisted British control, they regarded 
themselves as beyond the reach of criticism and as divinely 
assigned to control others.
In the 1630s the stresses and ironies of this situation come to 
light in Massachusetts in this first decade of the colony’s history. 
We look to relations between the Governor, John Winthrop, and 
the gifted pastor, Roger Williams. Winthrop acknowledged that 
Williams was sincere and charismatic, but found him a terrible 
nuisance. Winthrop thought Williams took the position of the 
Puritan dissenting church a step too far. For Williams argued 
that if the Anglican Church had not the authority to dictate the 
beliefs of the Puritan dissenting community, so neither had it— 
nor had indeed the British state — the authority to license the 
existence of that dissenting church. The dissenting church was 
a community of faith which, beyond gratitude for opportunity 
to set up shop in the New World, owed nothing either to the 
established Church of England or to the British civil authority 
which had done the establishing. Further, according to Wil-
liams, in the matter of land grants—  contrary to the position of 
the Puritan civil authority in Massachusetts— Indians as human 
beings had rights of possession which were more than equal to 
any rights of the white newcomers. How did the colony deal with 
this critical thinker? Much as John Winthrop, the chief author-
ity in the Puritan community, wanted his colony to be a jewel of 
enlightened thinking and a beacon of light to mankind, he found 
this too much, and he acquiesced in the banishment of Wil-
liams. Winthrop and his colony believed neither in free speech 
nor the rights of individual conscience. Is it a too great a jump 
to say one can discover here an early disinclination to promote 
education?
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This wasn’t a solitary instance, in the founding days, of a Puri-
tan attempt to curb freedom of thought and speech in America. 
Anne Hutchinson too had her way of drawing conclusions from 
the Puritan protest against Anglicanism. Puritans rightly, she 
taught, had no use for pope or bishops. But if these man-made 
offices encompassed no special license to teach the faith, what 
special claim on such teaching had the appointed male ministers 
of the Massachusetts colony? Did not the gospel tell us the Holy 
Spirit was the true teacher of the faith? And was not the Spirit 
free to blow where it would? One can imagine how the rigorous 
and humorless Winthrop regarded such a proposition. He saw 
it as mutiny, and endorsed Hutchinson’s banishment as he had 
Williams’s. Later when he heard of Anne’s death at the hands of 
Indians, he felt God’s honor and his own had been vindicated.1
So while America was brought forth in a protest against Eng-
land, it would be unhistorical to say this protest was a protest on 
behalf of tolerance or critical thinking. It was protest on behalf of 
intolerance, seeking radical limitations on critical thinking and 
educational development.
All too soon, there were other, glaring indications that Amer-
ica was not conceived in a burst of dedication to enlightened atti-
tudes, freedom of speech, and the advance of critical thinking. 
When Africans were brought to the shores of “the new world,” 
they brought with them the skills and stamina of people raised 
in agricultural communities. These traits made them valuable. At 
the same time, it was expedient that their social bonds be subser-
vient to the uses of those who claimed to be the owners of their 
labor. In being wrenched from communities in which they had 
operated familiarly and efficiently, the kidnapped Africans lost 
too their names, their tribal affiliations, their religions, and their 
1. Richard Hofstadter, in his treatment of American anti-intellectualism, 
uncharacteristically fumbles here. While he can correctly cite Anne as 
an enthusiast and therefore as unimpressed by book learning and college 
degrees, he would be entitled to see Winthrop and the Puritan divines as 
stellar examples of intellectualism only if he’s right in overlooking their 
misogyny, their prickly narrow-mindedness in their banishment of Anne, 
and their emotionally-destabilizing adherence to predestination which 
nurtured bigotry toward anyone notably different from themselves.
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languages. While they were taught the language of those who 
denied their freedom, the teaching was economical. 
Let the enslaved learn the gospel—  as it might reconcile them 
to their state. (And the notion they were creating Christians pro-
vided a soothing balm to the consciences of those who claimed to 
own them.) More urgently, no doubt, let these Africans hear and 
understand the voices of those who sought profit from their labor. 
Beyond that, not much. Aside from education for specific tasks, 
let the fetters of the mind bind ever tighter. Since reading was 
empowering and since writing enabled partnerships and organi-
zation for the pursuit of freedom, the teaching of literacy was for-
bidden. When misguided whites disregarded the restriction on 
teaching literacy, one got the likes of Nat Turner and murderous 
slave insurrections—  and who needed that? Such was the near 
universal perspective within the majority culture. Jefferson, so 
eloquent and diligent on the importance of education, was even 
more diligent— by reason of its power— in denying education to 
those under his control.
The colonial mindset was not promising for the future of edu-
cation in America. This mindset of the white majority toward 
denying education to blacks—  a mindset often coupled with 
indifference toward the education of children of poor whites— 
remained in place right into the start of the twentieth century; 
and it continues to be alive and kicking, and in fact growing, in 
blighted parts of America today.
In the middle of the twentieth century, when the Warren Court 
declared that separated schools are inherently unequal, the deep 
insight behind the ruling was that education is not some privilege 
to be earned, but a necessity— like mother’s milk— which soci-
ety must accord the individual if he or she is to grow up whole-
somely. For this reason, the situation of an ethnic minority or 
economic minority is vulnerable and poignant. Unless members 
of the majority culture open the doors of their schools to the 
members of a minority, the members of that minority cannot 
learn the levers and mechanisms, the understandings and style, 
the agreed-upon wisdom and traditions and linguistic usages by 
which the mainstream functions. It’s not that minorities need to 
adopt all these; but lacking an understanding of such things, if 
they do not simply despair, their members seem condemned to 
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become either tools in the hands of others, or resisters or wreck-
ers or mere waste products of an order which would reduce them 
to tools.2
Unanimous though the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education 
of Topeka decision was, from the day it was announced to the 
present moment there has been widespread resistance to its cen-
tral idea. White “flight to light” has been a continuing strategy 
among those whites who find the ruling distasteful. Those who 
don’t want their children rubbing elbows with children who 
belong to ethnic or class minorities simply move away and found 
new communities in suburbs where minorities find it difficult or 
impossible to follow. The cost of this to society as a whole has 
been steep. The draining from center to periphery of finances and 
civic stewardship has decreed urban decay at the core of some 
one-time thriving American cities. At the urban core of these 
cities, standards of beauty, health, prosperity have dwindled, or 
in some cases disappeared entirely; and crime has increased. Nor 
do we find in such places adequate responses to increase govern-
mental involvement and spending on education as a venture to 
ameliorate things.
Rather the fleeing population have preferred to take their gen-
erosity toward education with them, and spend their educational 
dollars on the places they come to rather than on the places they 
leave. It seems they’d sooner pay $50,000 or more a year to incar-
cerate an abandoned human product of urban blight than pay ten 
or fifteen percent of that amount per student to leave a semblance 
of good schools behind. As Brown v. Board said, the heart of 
the problem continues to be that separated schools are inherently 
unequal. If children of minorities are not to be stunted, it’s not 
enough that their schools have some of the amenities of suburban 
schools; rather they need to be in schools where they can interact 
with the children of those who run things. (Again, this doesn’t 
mean minorities must replace their culture with white culture, 
but it does mean they can’t afford to be ignorant of the inner 
workings—the levers and pulleys—  of white culture.)
2. It is not really as paradoxical as it may seem that some who are closed 
out seem to find their richest sense of freedom in activities likely to kill 
them during their youth.
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In 1978 in the case of Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, the Supreme Court said in effect that UC Davis could 
not engage in a crash program to increase the number of minor-
ity doctors in California unless it was willing simultaneously to 
open the same program on a competitive basis to applicants from 
the majority culture; anything less the Court said would violate 
equal treatment as provided for in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The gist of the decision amounted to a declaration that to provide 
special programs for the down-and-out was a matter of depriving 
the more well-to-do of the equal protection of the laws. It’s as if 
one were to say a mother would be acting unfairly if she gave an 
aspirin to a child of hers who was sick unless, at the same time, 
she offered aspirin to each of her other children. Or if she had an 
acutely shy son, it’s as if to say she couldn’t go to his room and 
read to him unless she invited her other children into his room 
as well. That they did not share his need was irrelevant. Or it’s 
as if to say that if there were a scarcity of some health-improving 
remedy like a vacation in the mountains, she could not make it 
available it to a sick daughter unless she allowed her vigorous and 
healthy children to compete with the daughter for its possession. 
That is a very awkward sense of “equal treatment,” and no decent 
mother has ever subscribed to it.
Carefully as it was penned by the gentlemanly Louis Powell, the 
decision in the Bakke case was insensitive to the urgent need to 
make medical information and guidance available to the deprived 
and afflicted amid the minorities of California. UC Davis medi-
cal school had wanted— by an effort to recruit from the ranks 
of minority communities people with skills to bring mainstream 
medical practice back to their communities— to alleviate one of 
the major adverse consequences of segregated living. If you can 
accept the analogy, in effect, Davis was trying to create a corps 
of medical missionaries, not for Africa or South America, but 
for Compton and parts of Oakland, Fresno, San Jose, East Palo 
Alto, and the like. Would it have worked? Powell and company 
decreed it would be un-Constitutional to try to find out.
Justice Thurgood Marshall, who had been the lead attorney 
for the plaintiff in Brown v. Board, was so unconvinced by the 
decision that terminated this minority-recruitment experiment 
that, in addition to joining the dissent of three other justices, he 
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wrote a dissent of his own. In essence, the majority who decided 
the case had missed the very nature of education. Rather than 
being some bauble or perk which society puts out there for its 
best and brightest to compete over, education is something a 
society owes to each and all its members, and the more deprived 
any of its members are, the more compelling is society’s obliga-
tion. His dissent included a withering rebuke to the Court in 
the form of a history lesson on the ways the law—  especially the 
Fourteenth Amendment— had been used and was being used to 
deprive blacks of the benefits the law was designed to provide. 
The fact, in this case, that we were dealing with descendants 
whose ancestors— with full support of the legal system of the 
time — had been brought here against their will, could not, Mar-
shall insisted, diminish society’s obligation, but could only add to 
it. Such was at the center of Marshall’s dissent.
The elegant language in which the court’s majority could “find 
no compelling reason” that would justify “imposing a burden” of 
exclusion on whites born into comparative privilege showed the 
court’s majority were indeed color blind. They lacked insight into 
facts on the ground in the lives of a great many suffering Ameri-
cans. Priding themselves on being color-blind, the gentlemanly 
Powell and company refused, on grounds of high moral principle, 
to regard either the color of deprived Americans or the painful 
burdens a color-conscious society imposed on it.
The situation of color-prejudice is still with us. And it works 
to dilute the liberating effects Brown v. Board might have been 
expected to provide. Eventually, our exercise of stinginess toward 
minorities and toward the white poor has come to provide a prec-
edent for moves toward pricing members of the white middle 
class out of opportunities for needed education as well. Karma 
isn’t just some whimsical notion. What has been going around is 
now coming around. 
Bad enough. Yet a tradition of blindness to the needs of our 
minorities and poor, abetted by increasing austerity toward our 
middle class, isn’t the only thing retarding and downgrading 
educational opportunity at present. 
Here are some anecdotes—  some glimpses of bits and pieces— I 
offer for consideration. Each is trivial in itself; and you may want 
to dismiss me as one who “tells tales out of school” and is simply 
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airing personal grievances over current educational practice. But 
I suggest the implication of these stories isn’t trivial at all. I vouch 
for the veracity of what follows; the first names I give are real. It’s 
up to the reader to judge whether I’m honest and whether the 
examples have relevance.
Picture an episode just before Christmas, on Guam, U. S. A., 
at a Christian school. Father James—  a young Anglican priest 
teaching in this American school— has given the third-grade 
class a kind of elaboration of his sense of Christmas. He’s said 
that amid the swirl of Christmas presents—  amid all the buying 
and selling that sets up this swirl— the real thing to concentrate 
on is the gift God has given us in Jesus. To say such a thing was 
pretty radical. Father James was taking on the lifestyle in which 
his listeners were being raised. But as he told me in his account, 
he took a further step. Warming to his subject, he said we should 
not get lost in the myth of the generosity of Santa Claus, but 
should celebrate instead the generosity of God— Who created us 
and showers us with love. 
Imagine the recklessness of such a message. And he is speak-
ing in a Christian school, which— being private —  depends upon 
the benefactions of the students’ parents for its existence! Father 
James, as I recall his story, did not reach his dinner table that eve-
ning before he heard from the headmaster. The owner of a local 
bank had called the headmaster, complaining that the rash and 
insensitive James had ruined the Christmas not only of his eight-
year-old daughter, but of himself as well. James had arrogantly 
used the indiscreet phrase “the myth of Santa Claus,” and so in 
his effort to explain Christmas, he had ruined it altogether. The 
headmaster communicated news of this outrage to James, and 
assigned him to write during the holidays a satisfactory apology 
to the irate father. James did as he was told. He did not show me 
the apology; but he left the school at the end of the spring term. 
Here’s another true story. In a middle school in Northern Cali-
fornia, picture a Muslim woman hired to teach social studies. I 
can’t remember her name now, but I liked talking with her. She 
told me she’d formerly been a paid consultant to some agency of 
the United Nations, and I believed her; for she impressed me as 
untypically well informed about current events. Well, one day in 
her social-studies class she was talking about the praying habits 
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of Muslims. She told her students that a devout Muslim is always 
aware where Mecca is in relation to his or her immediate circum-
stances. When they asked why, she said it had to do with prayer, 
and demonstrated by kneeling on the floor and bowing toward 
Mecca as if getting ready to pray. At least one interested student 
said “Let me try that!” and, not being forbidden to do so, knelt 
and bowed. The school had never, so far as I know, had a Muslim 
teacher before; and in the next term, it was back to normal. The 
principal told me: “I had to let her go.” Evidently a parent, or 
several parents, had complained she was trying to convert her 
class to Islam.
Then there’s Eric’s story. Eric was a colleague of mine in the 
philosophy section of the humanities department at a community 
college with mostly middle-class students in Northern Califor-
nia. I often talked with him. He loved philosophy, and his face 
would take on color when he discussed it. At the start of one term 
I noticed there was no more Eric. Later I ran into him at a college 
in Oakland where I also taught. 
The story Eric told me —  as best I can recall— is this. He was 
giving writing assignments at that first college, and he was grad-
ing the papers meticulously. He gave a C to a paper of a female 
student, and when she complained, he refused to change the 
grade, but told her he would work with her on future papers if 
she wished. Knowing Eric, I believe this; it fit with his sincerity 
and enthusiasm. He tells me the girl then went to the dean and 
told her that Eric had wanted to become intimate with her, and 
that when she’d refused, he’d punished her by giving her a C on 
her paper. Eric had no tenure — like myself, he was an instance 
of that great bargain in college education, an adjunct instructor. 
When the dean summoned Eric, she told him she did not know 
if the girl’s story was true, but that considering how unsavory the 
charge was, she could not rehire him after the end of that term.
Let me tell you my own story about an experience at the school 
in Oakland where I heard this story from Eric. I was not termi-
nated from that school, but was amazed when I ran into a dean 
problem of my own. It, too, was over the grading of a student 
paper. As I recall the circumstances, a disgruntled student, a 
black male, had complained to the dean that my grade on his 
paper was too low. The dean, a black woman— having failed to 
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persuade me to change the grade —  sought the high ground with 
me by asking: “Have you considered the possibility that read-
ing and writing may not be his preferred modalities of learning?” 
I’m pretty sure the last five words are verbatim or very close to 
verbatim because the jargon all but knocked me down. I hadn’t 
seen it coming. It seemed to abandon— in the case at least of this 
student— the long struggle for black literacy. Absolutely I knew 
my student’s “chosen modality of learning” was not reading or 
writing; that’s why I was there. Beyond that, the dean knew as 
well as I that the accreditation of the college was under review by 
the state. The state university to which we sent the bulk of our 
graduates was complaining that, while our students were won-
derfully articulate orally, they often lacked key skills in reading 
and writing. It’s significant I think that this same dean was even-
tually promoted to academic vice president of our college.
Wrangles between teacher and administrator over grades are 
actually commonplace, and I shouldn’t have been surprised at 
mine. A friend of mine, one of the most entertaining storytellers 
I’ve met, was Larry. Larry had taught math at a high school in 
Northern California for eighteen years. When I asked him why 
he’d retired two years short of a full pension, he told me that 
one day his principal called him in to discuss “the trouble” he 
was having with his students. Larry said he wasn’t aware of any 
trouble. The principal countered there was clearly trouble since 
students who were getting A’s and B’s in their social studies and 
English classes were often getting C’s in Larry’s math classes. 
Larry defended himself saying he kept close records of his stu-
dents’ work; when a student’s answers were right ninety percent 
of the time or more, the student got an A; when they were right 
eighty percent of the time but less than ninety, the student got a 
B; and so on. The principal said: “Ah! Now I see the problem. I 
want you to know, Larry, that any answer a student has worked 
on is a good answer for that student. Once you understand that, 
Larry, let’s hope your grades will come into harmony with the 
grades of our other teachers.” 
Larry told me he went back to his classroom and thought “I’d 
better get out of here before I lose my mind.” At the place where 
I met him and heard this story, he was a very popular tutor of 
students in math and other subjects; he had not lost his mind, but 
he had gotten out of there.
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I could add more of these stories from creditable, firsthand 
accounts, but what’s my point? When we talk about what’s hap-
pening in education, we do so usually in terms of “good students” 
and “bad students,” “good teachers” and “bad teachers.” We sel-
dom bring administrators into the picture. What though is the 
attitude toward education of the administrators in the stories I’ve 
told?
Is there a common thread running through how these admin-
istrators understand their role? There seems to be. Not to paint 
them as more designing than they are, I think the commonality 
is that each conceives their role as a role in public relations. They 
don’t so much support and provide education as apologize for it. 
They apologize for any pain involved, and they attempt to remove 
pain. In this I think they’re more representative of administra-
tors today than members of the general public— those who “don’t 
see the sausage being made”— would like to think. While the 
administrators I cite lack explicit malicious intent, the effect they 
have is corrosive and demoralizing. 
Let’s think over the stories. In each case but mine, a teacher 
left an institution. (And in my case, when I had to reduce my 
workload to two classes a semester in order to start collecting my 
pension, the Oakland college having the generously flexible dean 
was— perhaps to my shame —  among those I let go.) 
The fault of Father James was that he wanted to give his stu-
dents his version of the truth about Christmas. The headmaster 
might have reminded the irate banker that, when he placed his 
eight-year-old in a Christian school, he took on the risk that the 
Christian teachers there might try to tell his daughter the truth 
about Christianity as they understood it. To say that however 
would have been confrontational, and the headmaster preferred 
to leave James responsible to placate the father on his own. James 
was lost to the institution. One might say—  as the headmaster 
probably had calculated— “neat ending to an unfortunate inci-
dent.” Whether or not that’s how the headmaster saw things, the 
school lost a sincere and brilliant teacher, and there was also a 
message to the faculty who remained: never rile a parent— for no 
one will have your back if you do.
Let’s take the case of the teacher who was so rash as to dem-
onstrate the practice of Muslims at prayer. That her contract was 
not renewed manifests a craven sell-out by the principal involved. 
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As I’ve mentioned, it’s unlikely the school had ever hired a Mus-
lim to teach there before. Certainly the students weren’t over-
exposed to Islam. When the principal told me he’d “had to let her 
go,” he was implying she’d crossed a line — the implication being 
she was out to make converts.
Yet he and whoever had pushed him to take that position knew 
in their saner moments that wasn’t the case. Suppose the teacher 
had been a Catholic and had, in the course of a lesson on Catho-
lic practice, demonstrated the sign of the cross. Suppose some 
non-Catholic student or students had imitated the gesture to get 
the feel of it. Would that have led to a decision not to continue 
that teacher as an instructor in social studies? I think we know 
it wouldn’t. What seems to have been at work was not a gen-
eral principle but a mere yielding to prejudice against Muslims 
and Islam. Educational opportunity was sacrificed for the sake of 
smooth public relations. It’s a costly omission that our k-through-
twelve public schools offer so little instruction in the world’s 
religions. While religious views continue to be major forces in 
current affairs, America’s grown-up diplomats and policy-makers 
often seem woefully indifferent and ignorant regarding the tex-
ture of religious beliefs of those they deal with. Their education 
has done little to inform them. One fears in fact it has tended to 
confirm them in bigotry.
Let’s talk about Eric. The termination of Eric is a clear instance 
of denial of due process. Even if Eric had demanded access to 
a grievance procedure, he’d still have had a tough time keep-
ing his job. There was no contract regarding future employment. 
One can say he had a right in equity to expect continued employ-
ment; but equity rights aren’t easy to enforce. The dean who ter-
minated him was aware of this. Not unlike the headmaster in 
the Christian school who left James to twist in the wind, she 
terminated Eric because that seemed the easiest way to keep 
the peace. She placated the complainer by telling her the school 
would no longer employ the teacher whom the student said had 
given offense. Not only did the institution lose Eric as a result, 
but if other teachers under her supervision tended to be exact-
ing in the way they graded papers, her act notified them this 
was a form of self-indulgence she wouldn’t defend. I’d listened 
to this very dean claim her department maintained the highest 
standards. More accurate —  and this wasn’t lost on teachers or 
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students— would have been to say her department proclaimed 
high standards only up to the moment when someone challenged 
them.3
I mention my own confrontation over grading at a college 
in Oakland to underline how readily some administrators will 
undermine academic standards. A teacher who tries to hold stu-
dents to high standards is routinely regarded by some admin-
istrators as inviting trouble. Surely the dean in Oakland knew 
from her own experience the importance of literacy. She was very 
articulate. My hunch, based on the position she held, is that she 
was as sharp when writing as she was when speaking. I bet this 
competence had opened doors for her. Yet she was willing to 
humor students rather than go to the mat with them over their 
need for skills like hers. I think it would be no exaggeration to say 
she’d have been comfortable with a day-care-for-adults program 
so long as she could call it college. And she fit right in.
Students aren’t deceived. At that school in Oakland, it seemed 
black males in particular had a problem with attendance. In their 
life on the street, their experience had density; they lived with 
a vivid sense of their existence. There things had consequences. 
Dangerous and destructive as their lifestyle regularly was, it sus-
tained their interest and focused their attention. At an all-too-
real cost to longevity, they lived dramatically. My theory is that 
when they came to our place, seeking better opportunities than 
the street offered, the kind of college they found frequently reg-
istered as an anticlimax. They may have begun to wonder if they 
were they still living in the real world. On the street, failure to 
pay a dealer for drugs provided on consignment could cost one’s 
life. At the college, failure to meet a deadline, or complete an 
assignment, or show up for a final often seemed to cost nothing. 
For some, only the demands of coaches seemed to carry authority. 
(In hopes of a career in sports, they may have seen the coaches as 
their only authentic teachers.) 
3. I owe it to this institution— which I haven’t named— to add that when, 
to the relief of teachers like me, this accommodating dean retired, she 
was replaced by a dean who said he was concerned that teachers weren’t 
as exacting as they should be in the grading of student essays. Morale 
improved among students as well as among teachers by reason of his con-
cern. He was greatly missed when he retired.
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When we discussed, as we did in my classes (one can see why 
the dean didn’t like me) why their education growing up in Oak-
land had been so limited, a standard response was that it hadn’t 
been by accident. Analytical and articulate, some young males 
would claim their relative incapacity to empower themselves 
through education was regarded by society at large as a benefit. 
It meant (and I’m quoting here) there’d be inmates for our pris-
ons, recruits for our wars abroad, and cheap labor here at home. 
While I’d chime in endorsing much that I heard, it was black 
males who would initiate such statements. Shades of Malcolm! I 
thought it shameful that a college which provided these articulate 
young men with demanding athletic programs wasn’t willing to 
pair these programs with equally demanding academic programs.
Looking back on the case of Larry who, as I said, had taught 
high-school math for eighteen years, in this instance the con-
cern of the principal wasn’t about humoring minority students. 
Minority students were a distinct minority at Larry’s high school. 
The principal’s concern was that Larry’s conscientious grading 
and conscientious effort to raise the level of math skills was keep-
ing his, the principal’s, school from achieving the reputation of a 
place where nearly all the students were, as at Lake Woebegone, 
performing above average. Whether the students actually learned 
math wasn’t among the principal’s priorities. Larry, on the other 
hand, not only had a gift like Mark Twain’s for telling outland-
ish stories, but had— like Twain—  a disturbing streak of honesty. 
He felt compelled to tell students when their answers were wrong. 
Let’s grant there’s room for discussion here. In the early 
years of school— first, second, third grades— there’s a case for 
humoring one’s pupils more than correcting them. More often 
than not, schools assign these grade-levels to women. The hope 
is that the really considerable insecurity and vulnerability that 
nearly all young children experience (and that some young chil-
dren experience constantly) will be assuaged by a non-judgmental 
maternal presence. To me this seems quite proper. When a 
teacher instructs her first-graders to draw a tree, there should be 
no “wrong trees” held up for criticism at the end of the exercise. 
When an infant is learning to walk, there’s lots of celebration but 
it would be unimaginable to rebuke or ridicule any awkwardness. 
While kindness should always be in season, it would not however 
be a kindness to young people to treat them forever as infantile. 
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Good coaches know this. I’m surprised that administrators so 
often don’t.
I do not think Larry was in any way unpopular with his stu-
dents. Chances are they understood his concern and respected 
him for it. (After he left the high school and took up tutoring, 
it wasn’t unusual for former students of his to come to his new 
workplace to chat with him.) His crime had been that he did 
not subscribe to the version of political correctness his principal 
found convenient. This political correctness holds that no one 
should ever be made uncomfortable in a classroom. If political 
correctness like this sounds like a tolerant approach, we should 
learn to recognize it as a camouflage for indifference. It tolls the 
death knell of education. If every opinion a student has is “right 
for him,” if every answer a student gives is “a good answer,” there’s 
no need for institutions of learning. Much as he’d be surprised to 
hear it, the program of Larry’s principal for raising grades with-
out reference to achievement was roughly as friendly to education 
as Attila the Hun was to the Roman Empire. Recognizing the 
madness, Larry did well to leave.
Because it’s permeated our educational system, let’s delay a 
bit on political correctness. To do so is worthwhile if it’s worth-
while to reflect on what’s eviscerating our educational system and 
thereby making it easier to raise arguments against funding it.
Political correctness has roots in thoughts about equality and 
the role of tolerance in society— both of which it misunderstands. 
To say “humans are all created equal” is to say something won-
derful. To say “we should be tolerant of another’s opinions” is also 
a wonderful thing to say. To say “since we’re all equal, no one has 
any opinion better than anyone else’s” is a terrible thing to say. In 
effect, to say that is to deny the existence of expertise and thereby 
cancel the warrant for schools. If one person’s opinion is as good 
as another’s, why go to a person with a medical education for an 
opinion on your health? Why not just ask your postman, or a 
cashier at the supermarket?
We don’t really believe this equality-of-opinion business. Yet 
in the classroom, teachers are expected to pretend they do. Par-
ticularly in public schools, teachers shy clear of manifesting con-
victions or championing any particular viewpoint. When, by 
contrast, Aristotle taught ethics in Athens, the whole of what 
he taught was one huge opinion— namely his—  of what was 
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ethical. Today when a person teaches ethics in our public schools, 
it’s notably less likely the person will share personal thoughts, 
much less deliberately center the curriculum on personal convic-
tions. Rather the typical teacher sets up a kind of cafeteria of 
ideas.  “This is what Aristotle taught; this is what Kant taught; 
this is what Nietzsche taught.” He or she may end with: “And who 
am I to say which was right or wrong?” Or worse yet: “Should we 
not say that each was right in his own way?” It’s hard to imag-
ine anything more insipid. (Having had for my first nine years 
of education highly intelligent nuns of strong convictions who 
endlessly encouraged me and their other students to argue with 
them, I can’t help but feel sorry for young students who have to 
endure the bland dreariness of much that passes today for public 
education.) 
One time the head of a social-studies department in a pub-
lic high school bragged to me: “My students haven’t the fog-
giest idea what I think about anything.” I suppose I was sup-
posed to say: “How wonderful!” I didn’t. I held my tongue. But 
I thought: “How terrible. Here you are, supposedly encouraging 
students to practice critical thinking, but you resolutely refuse to 
model it yourself. How do you expect students to get the hang 
of it?” (My mother didn’t do that with her four children. Neither 
did any other teachers I’ve ever had who I thought were worth 
their salt.)
When I once asked the principal of a middle school: “What’s 
your stand on teaching controversial issues?” he said: “Teachers 
are free to teach any they want. They just have to be careful not 
to take a side.”
The case for this neutrality is that it does not “crowd” the stu-
dent. It does not confront any student in his or her comfort zone, 
or attempt to pull any students out of one. It avoids the danger 
of brainwashing. However it neuters—  de-vitalizes— the teacher 
and reduces her or him to someone fighting with both hands in 
their pockets. Sacrificed in the neutral approach is spontaneity 
and authenticity. There’s a world of difference between students 
and teacher actually arguing in the classroom (something I was 
very used to with the nuns who taught me), and a teacher con-
ducting with students a discussion about argumentation. More 
than two millennia after being written, Plato’s dialogs continue 
to command attention because they depict Socrates and the young 
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men gathered about him arguing with each other— not just talk-
ing about arguments. (If someone doubts this about how Plato’s 
Socrates behaved, and says, “No! Socrates never took a position!” 
let them refresh themselves by looking to book 1 of the Republic 
where Socrates takes charge of the premises of Thasymachos and 
turns them against him to the point where the cool and sophis-
ticated Thasymachos runs furiously from the room.) To borrow a 
bit from Mark Twain, the difference between engaging students 
in real argument and discussing with them merely the nature of 
argument is the difference between a lightning bolt and a firefly. 
To change the metaphor, the second approach— the politically 
correct one of laissez-faire —  aborts the educational process. It 
over defends against the danger of brainwashing and underesti-
mates or ignores entirely the power of Hegelian dialectic. Hegel 
tells us the social structure of thinking goes something like this: 
(1)  someone says John is a good man (thesis); (2)  this summons 
some other party to claim John is not really a good man after 
all (antithesis); (3) a third person is thereby prompted to say that 
John is a complicated man who demands further study (synthesis). 
The rebound effect (step 2) is at the same time both spontaneous 
and predictable. Step 3 is the transition to a general discussion. 
For the process to start however, someone has to say John is a 
good man. If the teacher won’t venture a thesis (preferably one 
the teacher believes), and simply begins: “Let us discuss John,” 
the process is stillborn. One gets a replay of Ben Stein’s classroom 
scene in Ferris Bueller’s Day Off. What makes the scene hilari-
ous is that the proceedings are so totally vapid and yet so totally 
familiar.
One of the reasons the study of religions is systematically 
avoided k-through-twelve is that religion is a hotbed of contro-
versial issues. Out there on the street, there’s been so much con-
tention over religion—  often lethal— that schools where atten-
dance is compulsory (i.e., k-through-twelve schools) feel obliged 
to tiptoe around religion—  as if the First Amendment forbade 
discussion of it. When in college a student elects to take a course 
in World Religions, a benefit from this delay is that almost all the 
course’s content is fresh territory and new horizons. 
That doesn’t of course mean the study will be without pain. 
Recently a Jewish student of mine spoke at length to a World 
Religions class of her grief that some of her ancestors had been 
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murdered in gas chambers by the Nazis. A non-Jewish student of 
German descent approached me after class and told me she had 
been deeply disturbed by the student’s talk. I replied I thought 
her choices came to about three. She could become a Holocaust 
denier; but that didn’t seem to promise much relief. Or she could 
seek comfort by saying to herself that the extermination effort 
was something the Nazis had done in spite of the resistance of 
most Germans; but that seemed a difficult case to make. Or she 
could as an adult accept that terrible misdeeds had been permit-
ted and perhaps carried out by people who were precious to her. 
Would this third option leave her in pain? Yes. (Admirably it is 
this third course that the German government endorses today.)
Education shouldn’t dodge these moments; they’re partly what 
it’s there for.
Before leaving the theme of political correctness, perhaps 
there’s a further point. Political correctness is usually associated 
with avoidance of stereotypes. In its extreme form, political cor-
rectness is ready to commit to the generalization that any gener-
alization about people is a mistake. The intent is to cut off stereo-
typing at the root by decreeing generalization regarding human 
affairs out of bounds. One can see the connection with what I’ve 
said political correctness promotes: namely that if generalizations 
can impinge on people’s comfort zone, why not ban them from 
the classroom?
The problem is that generalization is how human understand-
ing and science proceed. If you exclude generalization about peo-
ple from the classroom, there isn’t much left to say about them. 
This reduction seems to be going on. “Italians like spaghetti” is 
a perfectly legitimate statement if one is reviewing a menu for 
an Italian restaurant from which it’s been omitted. But try say-
ing it in a classroom. You’ll be lucky if the ceiling doesn’t fall 
on you.  “How dare you stereotype Italians like that!” “What’s 
wrong with you?” “What kind of American are you?” Such out-
rage bodes a loss to the classroom—  a part of the evisceration of 
content that’s been going on.
When Reagan ran for governor of California, he promised to 
clean up the mess at Berkeley. Perhaps he did. Certainly dur-
ing the eight years he was governor and then the eight years he 
was president, things became quieter at UC Berkeley and in col-
leges and universities across the land. The voice of Mario Savio, 
  w h y the center ca n ’t hold 21
the charismatic promoter of Berkeley’s free-speech movement, 
became a dim echo from the past, drowned out by the voice of 
the yuppy. Still later, when students’ eyes were sprayed with pep-
per spray at UC Davis, the school official who did the spraying 
was awarded $38,000 for the psychological stress he’d felt from 
responses to his act. 
The Chancellor at Davis kept her job on the ground that she’d 
given the official no permission to do what he did. She was sorry 
she had failed to exercise the supervisory role she was generously 
paid to perform, but things happen. So it was really no big deal. 
Evidently the spraying had been a good-faith effort to get the stu-
dents to stop protesting, to stop criticizing the way our country 
is being run, and to get back to their books. One could regard it 
as a timely warning: use your eyes to learn your assigned lessons, 
or risk having them sprayed. The real target was critical thinking.
The chancellor had acted—  or rather refrained from action— 
with the same disdain for the motives of students as had Ronald 
Reagan as governor. That Ronald Reagan remains immensely 
popular in memory indicates, among other things, the extent to 
which we’ve been accomplices in the decline of our educational 
system. The great agribusinesses of California (the businesses 
Carey McWilliams has called “factories in the field”) have always 
been scrupulously conscientious about paying as little as they can 
to the seasonal workers who bring in our harvests (these “lazy 
Mexicans”— whose labor feeds us Californians, a good part of 
the rest of the nation, and huge parts of the world at large). That 
among those workers are many who are in California illegally 
has made it easier to hold down wages to something about level 
with the costs of subsistence —  of staying alive. Often the owners 
have only grudgingly provided toilets and drinking water; they 
certainly have not been proactive toward medical care, day care 
for children, or education for children. 
So when Governor Reagan wanted to reduce funding for edu-
cation as a form of reprisal for student unrest, he already had 
on his side a large block of Californians who were sympathetic 
to lowering taxes and increasing profits by economizing on edu-
cation. (These Californians likely overlapped with Californians 
who approved his reduction of funds for the mentally ill. When 
Reagan “liberated” the mentally ill by closing institutions that 
housed and fed them, and sent them pouring out into the streets 
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of California’s cities to become the new homeless, many voters 
happily anticipated tax cuts and were grateful for his statesman-
ship.) Later there was a similar nationwide constituency in his 
favor when Reagan ran for president. He promised to do what he 
could to get rid of the Department of Education. Since “govern-
ment is not the solution, but the problem,” he was promising to do 
what he could to help education by distancing the federal govern-
ment from its support. As he’d liberated the students of Califor-
nia, so now he was for liberating students all across the nation.4
Constraints that began to be felt in education when Reagan was 
Governor and later when he was president can’t be construed as 
resulting from mere absentmindedness. The constraints weren’t 
limited to restrictions on spending. From the days of the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities, there had been an acute 
concern of powerful members of Congress to make sure the movie 
industry was telling The American Story. When Reagan was pres-
ident of the Screen Actors Guild, he shared this concern and sup-
ported the House Committee’s agenda. As governor of California 
(and later as president of the United States), Reagan believed that 
our schools, even more than our movies, should exemplify and 
teach The American Story. Out of this concern, Reagan worked 
to have Clark Kerr removed as President of the University of Cali-
fornia.  Eighteen days after Reagan took office, Kerr was fired 
The American Story is that America is the land of the free and 
the home of the brave, with liberty and justice for all; and that we 
are the last best hope for mankind; and that all our adventures 
abroad— the war in Vietnam included— have been inspired by 
our desire that others abroad may come to share the same demo-
cratic institutions that we Americans cherish here at home. Clark 
Kerr had allowed a cacophony of voices to challenge that story.
Reagan himself was very good at telling The American Story. 
Indeed, a key factor in his election to the presidency in 1980 is 
that he was far better at it than Carter was. Carter was not good 
at telling The American Story. Before the election, Carter had 
been saying that something was going awry in our souls, whereas 
Reagan in his campaign promised Morning in America.
4. The extent to which he had liberated his and Jane Wyman’s adopted son 
Michael can be read in Michael Reagan’s book On the Outside Looking In 
(New York: Kensington, 1988).
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Though it’s not much attended to, there’s an impact of all this 
on our school curricula. There’s a connection between all this and 
Student Learning Outcomes (or SLO’s, as their friends like to 
call them). Reagan did not invent Student Learning Outcomes. 
If any one person should be given more credit than others for 
these marvelous entities, it would be Harvard’s late behaviorist 
B. F. Skinner. 
Skinner did not believe there exist such things as autonomous 
human beings. We must, he said, transcend the mythic notions 
of freedom and dignity.5 Because all things are totally under the 
iron law of cause and effect, human beings are totally under the 
iron law of cause and effect. At any given moment, the appar-
ent choices you and I make are really just the inevitable outcomes 
of our genetic inheritance and the totality of circumstances in 
which we act and the contingencies that have formed us to be 
the individuals we are. Mother Teresa is not to be praised, and 
Charles Manson is not to be blamed. Neither of them has ever had 
any alternative but to act as they did. Mother Teresa had simply 
Mother Teresa’d. What else could she do than perform the acts of 
the person she had become? Charles Manson had simply Charles 
Manson’d. What else could he do than perform the acts of the 
person he had become? 
If for some reason you prefer a person who ministers to the 
dying homeless of Calcutta to a person who sends disciples into 
the Hollywood hills to murder rich people, know, says Skinner, 
it’s a sign of misapprehension to seek an increase in the number of 
the first (the ministers) and a decrease in the number of the second 
(the murderers) by some ladling out of praise and blame. While 
praise and blame may have some limited influence, they are rooted 
in ignorance. When you praise Mother Teresa, you imply she 
could have done differently. When you blame Charles Manson, 
you imply he could have done differently. In both cases, you imply 
that an agent acted freely. You may have to do so, says Skinner, 
because you don’t know any better. But the actual way to bring 
about the increase of the Mother-Teresa-type and the decrease of 
the Charles-Manson-type is to increase the operant conditioning 
that produces the first, and to decrease the operant conditioning 
5. See B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York: Bantam, 
1972), especially chapter 9.
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that produces the second. Praise and blame tend to confuse the 
issue; they tend to distract the praiser-and-blamer from where 
true leverage resides. There were happenings by which Mother 
Teresa happened, and there were happenings by which Charles 
Manson happened. Identify and control those happenings, and 
you can engineer a world in which there are only Mother Teresas 
and no Charles Mansons.
For all the fairy-tale character of this approach, there’s a modi-
cum of truth in it. Aristotle at one point says “the way one raises 
a child isn’t just one factor that bears upon his prospects for hap-
piness; rather it makes all the difference.” The statement seems 
to override Aristotle’s conviction that each of us is responsible 
for the adult we become, but he says it anyway. At that moment, 
Aristotle seems to be making Skinner’s point. Skinner’s denial 
that we make free choices also seems to get some confirmation 
from the way heroes quite regularly deflect praise. A man goes 
into a burning plane at great risk to himself and comes out bear-
ing in his arms a stranger’s child. Afterward, he’s asked why he 
acted as he did. The man’s face goes blank. He cannot process the 
question. When he composes himself, he replies, perhaps with 
notable irritation, “I did it because I heard a child crying in the 
plane.” He doesn’t seem at all to acknowledge a moment of deci-
sion. Likewise, at the other end of the spectrum, a serial killer 
is asked why he killed all those people. Again, the first reaction 
may be a blank face. When the questioner refuses to let the ques-
tion go, eventually the killer may reply: “I don’t know. It seemed 
like the thing to do.”
One salutary consequence of the Skinnerian approach is that it 
might make our criminal justice system abandon executions and 
some other punitive aspects. While it seems altogether necessary 
to keep Manson under lock and key, if a normal citizen is asked 
how guilty Manson is, an honest answer probably has to be: “I 
don’t know; I cannot imagine the inner state of Charles Manson.”
For all that, there’s something missing in Skinner’s behavior-
ism. As Sartre taught, the experience of freedom is as palpable 
as the experience of trees and rocks; the fact one’s experience of 
freedom isn’t directly observable by a second party is no reason 
to deny it. By and large, Americans agree with Sartre regarding 
the trivial decisions of their everyday lives. What’s strange then 
is that a nation which professes in all its public announcements 
  w h y the center ca n ’t hold 25
to value freedom has, nonetheless, taken to heart an educational 
approach whose central premise is that there is no freedom. The 
resolution to the paradox comes when one realizes that what is 
sought in our schools is not so much education as control. “By 
the third week, 65% of the students will be able to associate 45% 
of the states with the names of their state capitals.” As Skinner 
seems to suggest, many who support education (including many 
who administer it) seem to think: “If only we could teach our 
students to behave as well-trained pigeons, all would be well.” 
For all that, the SLO approach frequently can be appropriate. 
In a weight-training class, it may certainly happen that “by the 
fourth week, 90% of the weight-lifters will be able to press com-
fortably at least 10% more weight than they were able to press at 
the start of classes.” The trouble comes when one gets into areas 
where quality seems more at stake than quantity, where affect 
and sensibility seem more at stake than information, where con-
sciousness seems more involved than muscle. Try the plausibility 
of this: “By the fifth session in the study of Shakespeare’s Ham-
let, 40% or more of the students will have come to appreciate 
the ambivalence and ambiguity that typically accompany human 
decision-making, and 25% or more will also, by reason of their 
exposure to Shakespeare’s diction, have increased by 30% or more 
their sense of the creative opportunities which are provided by 
the English language.” The defenders of SLO’s will immediately 
holler: “C’mon, you’re not being fair; you’ve deliberately chosen 
to write an SLO where the intended outcome is not easily subject 
to confirmation by an observer.” Exactly.
The trouble with SLO’s is that they tend to rule out just such 
behavior as that cited in the SLO above. The operational rule 
seems to be: “Since that sort of behavior is not directly observable, 
it cannot be a legitimate goal of education.” According to some 
of the true believers, it’s not even a behavior. The consequence is 
that an immense chunk of human experience gets discarded from 
the educational project. A lobotomy occurs. My nagging hunch 
is it occurs in order to clear the way for agendas of control. If I 
may invent a seagoing metaphor, SLO’s have been employed to 
drive people from the deck and so make it harder for anyone to 
rock the boat.
Teachers will not rock the boat if their lesson plans are devised 
within the context of approved SLO’s. Students, it is hoped, will 
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not rock the boat if the lessons they receive systematically exclude 
all lessons on boat-rocking.
And indeed students seem generally docile. As students emerge 
from a class these days, they do not typically cluster into excited 
groups to discuss at greater length the content just presented in 
a class. Typically, they do not rush to the library to research fur-
ther the issues the class may have raised. They reach instead for 
the latest incarnation of their cell phone so they can re-inhabit 
their favorite place in cyberspace.6 They live em-bubbled lives. 
I’ve watched them walk right into one another and make no apol-
ogy, but simply grunt, move a bit to one side or the other, and 
continue down the road of their disengagement from immediate 
surroundings. 
Skinner devised a Skinner box for his daughter so he could 
increase his control of the inputs which would determine who 
she became as an adult. As an adult, she’s laughingly said he 
meant well and she’s forgiven him. Today, we do not have Skin-
ner boxes; rather we have schools scattered across America that 
aspire to become such. (Since, as I’ve indicated, these schools are 
outside the student-bubble-space, student feelings toward them 
are mildly aversive.)
The cost of our present condition is high. Aristotle, the Jew-
ish prophets, and Aquinas had said that we have rights— 
freedoms— by reason of natural law. The Enlightenment in the 
eighteenth century echoed this. A corollary of this teaching is 
that any civil law conceived in violation of our natural rights 
is, in fact, a mere pretense of law—  one that cannot rightfully 
command the obedience of the citizenry. Jefferson’s committee 
put this doctrine at the center of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. Yet it is unlikely you will find this revolutionary doctrine 
provided for in the SLO’s of today. Skinner denies that freedom 
exists. Human dignity is a myth, and the concept of rights is 
therefore, for him, an empty one. To follow up on an earlier sug-
gestion, the outcome often envisioned by our SLO’s seems to be 
6. Is this why students tend not to worry about climate change — that 
they are living in an alternate space-time continuum where the climate 
seems always improving?
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well ordered day-care centers, presided over by avuncular types 
who enjoy Reagan-like gifts for telling The American Story.
When we talk of someone “going postal,” we’re suggesting it’s 
not exactly that someone went berserk at a post office, but that 
work of the type done at a post office was conducive to the ber-
serk behavior. 
When one turns to think about similar events in our schools, 
one must tread softly. Children have been murdered. Terri-
ble wounds remain open. One must not casually and callously 
use cruel tragedies to score points. Yet— in an understandable, 
indeed inevitable, effort to draw a lesson from it all— we often 
turn in these tragedies to an examination of gun laws. That seems 
natural enough. It’s less often, however, that we turn to an exam-
ination of schools. A sense of fair play seems to forbid such a turn. 
On many occasions, school personnel have put their lives on the 
line, and some have died heroically, to mitigate or interrupt such 
tragedies. 
Nonetheless, there’s material here that invites inquiry. Around 
2014, I heard a talk show host say there had been over 175 out-
breaks of lethal violence in our schools since Columbine in 1999. 
I don’t know just where that count came from, but certainly the 
actual number, whatever it is, is high. 
Why at the schools? “Well,” comes an answer, “that’s where 
lots of vulnerable people are.” This may call forth a counter state-
ment: “But there are lots of vulnerable people all over the place.” 
That in turn can elicit the reply: “People in those other places 
have been targeted too.”
Still, why so many schools? There are enough instances to 
make a pattern, and patterns invite speculation. 
At our schools, most of our students find niches in a circle 
of friends. They find enclaves that support their emotional and 
intellectual lives sufficiently so that they are reasonably comfort-
able, and do not go off the deep end. As noted above, they are 
further nurtured and buffered by the extension of their enclave 
into cyberspace. Facebook and twitterings provide this. While 
their parents may both be working, and are, for older teen stu-
dents, more often divorced than not, and while family life may 
not be the support system it once was, most students find suf-
ficient compensation in make-do family arrangements and other 
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immediate social relationships, supplemented by social media, to 
get along.
The problem is when it comes to loners and misfits. Some of 
these are very bright people. In fact this may be why others often 
don’t see trouble coming. And it’s here that what I’m driving at 
can get very controversial. It is my hunch that the intensely intro-
spective, the sensitive and easily wounded, might perhaps be able 
to get by if the curriculum were rich enough to feed their curios-
ity and nurture their lonely souls. But the curriculum is all too 
sure they have no souls.
Too often the curriculum has internalized Skinnerian thinking 
that there’s “no autonomous person,” and in ignoring the free-
dom and dignity of the persons it’s supposed to nourish, not only 
does the curriculum not provide for freedom and creativity but 
in its actual performance too often works toward stifling these 
things. “In the fourth month of instruction, the student will be 
able to perform the following six operations, and perform them 
up to at least the third level of competence, as the levels are set 
forth in the schedule below.” SLO’s often sound like phrasing 
from Brave New World or 1984.7
While I don’t want to come across as more sure of what I sug-
gest than I am, it is my hunch that some of the violence we’re 
experiencing in our schools these days can be laid at the door 
of SLO’s and the Skinnerian behaviorism in which they are 
anchored. In an ironic way, Skinner is right: it’s a predictable 
behavior of human beings that when their freedom is disregarded, 
they become unruly and unpredictable. Operant conditioning 
works. Even whales revolt.
7. An analogy with recent events in Afghanistan comes to mind. Not long 
ago in Afghanistan, at an American base where American soldiers were 
supposedly training Afghan soldiers in how to make their people good 
Afghans, the American soldiers were experiencing so many violent attacks 
from their Afghan trainees that they had to build a high wall through 
the base to protect themselves from their nominative students. Violent 
attacks of Afghan “allies” continue as I write. On the evening news one 
can hear the bafflement of an American officer: “Why aren’t these people 
more grateful for all the things we’re doing for them?” The obvious answer 
is “these people” don’t see us as acting on their behalf.
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Lest this section itself slip out of all bounds, let’s make an end. 
We could go on. We could delay at length on the breathtak-
ing indifference of American businesses to the insufficiencies of 
American education. (“We bring in brains from abroad!” Alter-
natively: “We send our business overseas— where the people are 
better educated, and cost less.”) We could also discuss the obscene 
salaries many educational administrators command while they 
shed crocodile tears over the financial burdens of the students.8
Let’s close by returning to the kinds of questioning addressed 
by my former students in Oakland: “Is the dilution of content 
and the currently accelerating cost for education the result of 
a conspiracy?” The answer depends on how one defines a con-
spiracy. If “conspiracy” implies “something carried on in secret,” 
the disinvestment in education isn’t a conspiracy. The attack on 
education is carried on in broad daylight. If though, all that’s 
required for there to be a conspiracy is what the etymology of 
the term demands— namely, “an action or plan of action carried 
on by a number of people who share a common spirit”— then 
beyond all reasonable doubt there’s a conspiracy today against 
American education.
8. As I will elaborate on later, I once heard a well paid economics profes-
sor say: “It is not only desirable but a moral duty that an employer pay a 
worker no more that the lowest wage at which he can persuade the worker 
to work.” Taking my moral duty to heart, it was hard for me not to raise 
my hand and inquire whether we did not then owe it to ourselves to con-
vene a committee to see whether the professor himself could be persuaded 




“You didn’t land on Plymouth Rock; Plymouth Rock landed on 
you,” Malcolm X used to say in his sermons to black males. It 
was a way of guiding them toward a revision of The American 
Story—  a story they must always have found incredible. An 
admirable thing about Malcolm’s statement is that it doesn’t take 
the Fourth of July, 1776, as the birth date of America. To run 
with his metaphor a bit, let’s note the rock’s first target wasn’t the 
black Americans who came eventually to feel its crushing weight; 
the first target was the Native Americans of New England. Let’s 
note too, the rock’s first truly asteroid-like impact wasn’t on those 
Indians who helped the Pilgrims through their first winter at the 
start of the 1620s; rather it was on Pequot Indians to the west of 
them in 1637. 
We often speak of Washington as the Father of Our Country. 
He was in a number of ways our homegrown exemplar of the 
Enlightenment, and in a number of ways he acted with disinter-
ested wisdom in our behalf. Still, America wasn’t conceived in 
the closing years of the Enlightenment; it was conceived a hun-
dred and fifty years earlier in the time of our Puritan ancestors. 
If one looks back for a Father of Our Country in the days of our 
conception, it wasn’t Captain John Smith or John Rolfe; the most 
plausible candidate is the John Winthrop spoken of in the first 
chapter, for it’s his DNA we find flowing in our veins today— 
and, as already suggested, if we take freedom of thought and tol-
erance as earmarks of the Enlightenment, Winthrop was neither 
the Enlightenment’s forerunner nor its child.
The Growing Ascendance  
of the Rich2
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By reason of our highly principled separation of church and 
state, while we may know something of Winthrop as Governor of 
Massachusetts, most of us have successfully evaded any inquiry 
into his religion. His religion was, as his label as a Puritan sug-
gests, a subset of Protestantism—  one which found most Protes-
tantism insufficiently pure. Perhaps a secondary reason why our 
teachers have had so little to tell us about his motivations is that 
Puritanism is a notoriously difficult mentality to objectify— not 
the least because we have all inherited it. 
When we arrived at Massachusetts Bay in 1630, we may have 
wished to establish a new Eden. We quickly found ourselves 
scrambling however for a place in the sun. There were impedi-
ments. They presented themselves as “wilderness.” More existen-
tially, they came to be personified as “Indians” or “savages.” In 
order to tame the wilderness, we had to tame, subdue, or exter-
minate the savages.
Beyond that, we brought with us special sources of internal 
tension. It wasn’t just that some of us who affirmed we were 
God’s people found amongst us others— Roger Williams, Anne 
Hutchinson, Quakers— who, though thinking differently from 
us, claimed inconveniently to be God’s people as well. For beyond 
that, each of us was confronted by a highly personal problem of 
such a nature it couldn’t be resolved this side of the grave. No 
problem could be more urgent and no problem more impossi-
ble to solve. It presented itself in the question: Am I who count 
myself among God’s people truly one of them? Am I actually 
among the Elect?
No decision of mine, no baptismal ritual, no imitation of Jesus 
nor approval of me by the Christian community could put the 
question to rest. As Luther had protested, indulgences in the form 
of contributions to the church were the shabbiest of scams—  as 
if some fellow mortals could sell us the grace of God. Likewise, 
for that matter, it was blasphemous to say any other work I might 
perform could merit that grace of redemption which was alto-
gether in God’s hands to bestow or withhold. What human has a 
right to think he or she can force the hand of God? How incred-
ibly lacking we must be in a true awareness of our state if we 
think we can oblige God to let us share in the eternal bliss that 
is God’s life.
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In this matter, Calvin was particularly clear. If as said we knew 
the decision about our salvation did not reside with us, he said we 
knew precisely where it did reside. It resided in the eternal and 
inscrutable decree of God. From all eternity, as Paul’s Epistle 
to the Romans teaches, God has elected a few of us to the life 
of grace and salvation; the remaining majority, by an equally 
irrevocable decree, He has destined to burn in hell forever. Nor 
should we ask why. To ask “why?” is to presume. It’s to respond to 
God with blasphemy. For in asking, we presume we can call God 
to account. We’d have missed the infinite qualitative difference 
between our mere selves and God. We’d have assumed God must 
abide by our trivial human contrivances for justice. Rather the 
truth is, in this most important matter of life, we have resources 
neither on earth nor in heaven. Such had Calvin made clear.
Awesome! Breathtaking! Where does it leave us? 
It leaves us hoping we are among the Elect, but with no way 
of finding out. In this Puritan predicament, if we are willing, 
we can glimpse the remarkably intense motivational context 
for the whole founding and development of Massachusetts Bay 
Colony— the colony that laid down the paradigm for the Puritan 
nation that continues into the present. If the economic and politi-
cal development has proved spectacular— unparalleled in human 
history—  a part of the explanation is in the drivenness of us who 
have carried it out.
Max Weber writes, “The Father in heaven of the New Testa-
ment, so human and understanding, who rejoices over the repen-
tance of a sinner as a woman over the lost piece of silver she has 
found, is gone.”1
It’s noteworthy that Weber cites a passage where Jesus com-
pares God to a woman who has found a lost treasure. This pas-
sage, and the passages like it, has disappeared from the con-
sciousness of the devout Puritan. One way to speak of Calvin’s 
accomplishment is that he has quite de-feminized the tender 
God of Jesus. Recognizing what Calvin has done, Weber speaks 
1. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958), 103. See Weber’s deliberate and scholarly 
exposition of Calvinism, 98–128.
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of “the extreme inhumanity” of the predestined state our ances-
tors felt they and everyone else had been born into.2
That a majority of us found it unbearable brings us to the 
paradox at the center of Puritan development. Terrible as was 
the prospect of damnation, and helpless as one was to change 
the decree of damnation if one was part of the human majority 
doomed to it, it occurred to countless of us Puritans that one 
could perhaps shelter oneself against the paralyzing fear of such 
doom if one could find signs one lived, here and now, in God’s 
friendship. This thought inspires the unending search for “the 
signs of election.”
In the book of Deuteronomy, there is a long list of the blessings 
Israel will enjoy if it is obedient to God. “The Lord thy God will 
set thee on high above all the nations of the earth. Blessed shalt 
thou be in the city, and blessed shalt thou be in the field. Blessed 
shall be the fruit of thy body, and the fruit of thy ground, and 
the fruit of thy cattle, the increase of thy kine, and the flocks of 
thy sheep.” The list continues for another ten verses. Then there 
is an even longer list of curses that will fall on Israel if it is not 
obedient. “Cursed shalt thou be in the city, and cursed in the 
field. Cursed shall be thy basket and thy store. Cursed shall be 
the fruit of thy body, and the fruit of thy land, the increase of thy 
kine, and the flocks of thy sheep. Cursed shalt thou be when thou 
comest in, and cursed shalt thou be when thou goest out.” The list 
continues for another forty-eight verses.3
Among us Puritans, if one was to take these verses to heart, 
one must put them through the purifying filter of predestination. 
In truth, man’s obedience or disobedience could not be the deter-
mining factor in one’s eternal lot. God was in charge of every-
thing, and certainly this meant God and God alone made the 
decision as to our salvation as vessels of election, or our damna-
tion as vessels of wrath. But could not one use these blessings and 
curses as so many indications of which way God had decided in 
one’s individual case? Could not purity of conduct, and the har-
mony and prosperity flowing from such, be a sign that God had 
eternally befriended one? In general, could not the success of an 
enterprise in which one immersed oneself be a sign here and now 
2. Weber, Protestant Ethic, 104.
3. Deut. 28:1–68.
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of God’s commitment to one’s wellbeing? And so commenced 
our great game of using prosperity as a scoreboard on which were 
registered eternal victory for the few and eternal failure for all 
the others. 
Living for a mission could provide a kind of reassurance twice 
over. Let’s suppose one had as the governing goal of all one’s 
enterprise the establishment of God’s kingdom in the new world. 
Was not such a human already clearly in alignment with God? 
Further, if that mission was successful, was it not clear that God 
was both approving toward the mission and accepting of the per-
son engaged in it?
From the beginning, the Puritans conceive their activity as a 
mission; and this category “mission” provides a powerful theme 
for explaining and integrating the moments of our subsequent 
history. It was our mission to become a city on a hill. As we 
turned the savage wilderness into God’s country, it was our mis-
sion to set up a form of government that would constitute the last 
best hope of humankind. Accomplishing that by our Constitu-
tion, we took on in the Monroe Doctrine the mission of being 
the exemplar and protector and arbiter of good order throughout 
the entire Western hemisphere. At home it was our manifest des-
tiny to achieve the winning of the West by extending our borders 
to the Pacific Ocean. After that, it was our God-given duty to 
bring the Philippines under our Christian control, and then, by 
holding open the doors of China, to take our rightful place on 
the planet as the first among equals in the politics and commerce 
of the world.
Looking back to our Puritan forefathers for the beginnings 
of all this, notice how “mission” is taken as the implicit prin-
ciple governing Puritan relations with Indians in the following 
description by Segal and Stinebeck:
The Puritan struggle against sin was, in part, a struggle 
against Satan as personified by the Indian. It was a life-
and-death struggle and the Lord directed the Puritan 
forces in New England. Therefore, what the Puritan did, 
he did because God urged him to do it. Since the Puritan’s 
relations with the Indians were dominated by his impor-
tance as a messenger of God, his gain in a transaction 
with an Indian was a commensurate victory for God over 
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Satan. While New Plymouth authorities declared “there 
was no dealing with Indians above board,” these [under-
the-board] dealings were justified because they were car-
ried out according to the dictates of God. In the very same 
manner, the Jews had fought the Canaanites for posses-
sion of the Promised Land.4
In this comment by Segal and Stinebeck, there’s opportunity 
to reflect on the tensions in our ancestors’ project. The Puritan 
mission was a war against sin. Yet Calvin had insisted it was by 
God’s eternal decree that sin existed. Before the creation of the 
world, Calvin reasoned, God had willed that there be sin. The 
logic of his position ran like this: since nothing on earth had an 
existence in spite of God, if something did exist, it was because 
God willed it. (Many Muslim theologians say the same today.) 
The inconvenience however of this splendidly logical doctrine 
was that it seemed to drain sin of its essential character, its char-
acter of being contrary to God. Rather when one sinned, one was 
performing God’s will. Further, if it is by God’s irresistible will 
that His creature sins, it was difficult to find a meaningful way 
to hold the creature responsible. One is responsible for what one 
chooses; regarding sin, according to Calvin, the creature had no 
choice —  as indeed (in a way anticipating Skinner), he had no 
freedom.
This rather stark theological paradox invites us to reflect on 
another anomaly. Bear with me while I try to elaborate it. Here 
were we Christians in New England seeking to found a new 
Eden in which Christ would reign as the restorer of harmony, 
as the atonement [at-one-ment] with the Father, as the Messiah 
who would reign as Prince of Peace. To establish this was our 
Puritan mission. And the open land was our opportunity. Yet, as 
said, there was an impediment. The land wasn’t quite open after 
4. Charles M. Segal and David C. Stineback, eds., Puritans, Indians & 
Manifest Destiny (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1977), 49. That this work 
edited by Segal and Stinebeck has been marketed by its publisher as “ juve-
nile non-fiction” baffles explanation. While I’ve known bright juveniles, I 
doubt I’ve ever known one who would, without abundant tutelage, be able 
to comprehend the message of this book.
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all. Once again Satan had intruded himself in what was sup-
posed to be God’s garden. And the minions of Satan were the 
Indians. Quickly therefore the mission we took upon ourselves 
in 1630 in service to the Prince of Peace became in 1637 a matter 
of killing Indians. The mission, so brought down to earth and 
fleshed out, could not easily discover in the four gospels a tex-
tual endorsement for the murder of Indian women and children, 
and—  since the provoking of adult Indian males was a conscious 
strategy of the Puritans— the deaths even of adult Indian males 
were a problem. But while the gospels provided little help here, 
fortunately the Bible provided Puritans a whole book of Joshua 
exemplifying a single-minded readiness on God’s part to annihi-
late Canaanites; and from here we drew biblical justification and 
warrant. For we were the chosen people of the new order Jesus 
had come into the world to establish.5
There still remained, to be sure, a problem in seeking a war-
rant in the book of Joshua. Supposing the Israelites had had a 
divine warrant to kill Canaanites, who was to say that meant 
we Puritans— freshly chosen people though we be — had such a 
warrant regarding Indians?
As we try to step outside our Puritan heritage and look to prob-
lematic aspects of the Puritan viewpoint, one can wonder how 
well our ancestral non-Jewish, Anglo-Saxon American forefa-
thers understood the book of Joshua. Having taken Joshua liter-
ally, the Roman Catholic Church had quite confused itself by 
condemning Galileo for saying that night and day are caused by 
the earth’s rotation rather than a daily journey of the sun; the 
Vatican decreed that if the sun miraculously stood still at the bat-
tle of Jericho, that proved the sun at ordinary times was revolving 
around the earth. Ordinary speech however— including biblical 
speech— is routinely indifferent to matters of science. We con-
tinue to say, without a second thought: “The sun rises in the east 
and sets in the west.” As for accounts of genocidal annihilations 
that make up most of the book of Joshua, modern archeology 
5. Characterization of sword as instrument of peace wasn’t, of course, an 
invention peculiar to Puritans and ancient Israelites. Catholics had repeat-
edly invoked it as they promoted the Crusades. “God wills it!” Catholic 
jihadists had cried as they scurried eastward pillaging across Europe and 
hurled themselves into the Holy Land to slay Infidels.
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has been unable to find physical evidence of such destruction. To 
cite the Jewish Study Bible: “intense archeological investigation of 
virtually all the places mentioned in Joshua that can be identi-
fied with current sites reveals no pattern of destruction that can 
be correlated, in either chronology or location, with the period 
of early Israel.”6 The scholarly consensus today seems to be that 
what actually took place in Joshua’s time — although it may well 
have involved friction and conflict— was not annihilation but 
settlement in unoccupied places in the central highlands, leading 
to gradual accommodation to and merging with native Canaan-
ites. If so, the book of Joshua was far less an historical narrative 
(in the sense we currently conceive “history”) than poetic cele-
bration of God’s power (He can make the sun stand still) and 
of God’s generosity to the Israelites—  a celebration constructed 
from numerous folk traditions and set down long after the time 
of the putative events, having as its motivating purpose the main-
tenance and promotion of Jewish morale (including, if one reads 
it carefully, a kind of “commercial” for observing the rite of male 
circumcision). 
When Protestants split decisively from the authority of Pope 
and Rome, they reached out for something to provide the sturdi-
ness and unity which previously a centralized Catholic teaching 
authority had provided. Quite in line with the evolving Refor-
mation as it emerged from Renaissance humanism, they sought 
this in a return to sources, specifically a return to the Bible. A 
hurdle of understanding of which they seemed only peripherally 
aware was that they were not Jews. It is undeniably true that Jews 
yield nothing to Protestants in their reverence for that part of 
the Bible Christians call the Old Testament. Contrary however 
to the practice of many Protestants— including, certainly, the 
practice of Puritans— Jews in general have maintained a sense 
of their Bible as a compilation from many sources, a compila-
tion including a variety of genres: of histories it is true, but also 
of poems, fables and other fictional stories, anthologies of say-
ings, prophetic warnings, and the book of Job. After all, it was 
Jews who had put it together. They’ve maintained a sense that 
the theological convictions and perspectives flowing through this 
6. Adele Berlin and Marc Zvi Brettler, eds., The Jewish Study Bible (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 463.
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great array of writings were diverse. The book of Job with its non-
stop debate between Job and his friends is a microcosm of Jew-
ish intellectual life. This kind of pitting of biblical verse against 
verse and theme against theme is what has kept the rabbis in 
business for the last two thousand years. They see the Bible as an 
inspired invitation for a great argument about God and His crea-
tures. Short of a messianic culmination of human history, these 
rabbinic scholars do not anticipate an end to this argument. (The 
statistically improbable prominence of so many Jewish intellectu-
als and professional men and women— many of them declared 
secularists— in so many fields of human endeavor can, I think, 
plausibly be traced in part to the Jewish tradition of originality 
and creativity in biblical argument; to be raised in such a tradi-
tion is to live one’s life amid questions regarding the context of 
everything.)
Protestants, looking to the Bible as the secure and sole anchor 
of their faith, seem to have required a less complicated, less open-
ended, approach. For some, not only is each word in the Bible 
directly chosen by God, but each word is to be taken literally. 
This helps explain how Protestants (along with, to be fair, literal-
minded Catholics and literal-minded Jews) can find marching 
orders in the Bible where others may find symbolic statements, 
allegories, and matter for reflection on the human predicament.
By reason of their strong tendency toward literalism, the notion 
of being among the Elect easily becomes associated among our 
Puritan forefathers with the notion of achieving possession of a 
Promised Land. A doctrine of Divine Real Estate seems alto-
gether plausible to them. “Pure Christians like ourselves,” they 
reasoned, enjoy land by reason of divine promise. John Cotton, 
an eloquent Puritan preacher, exhorts Winthrop and company 
before they leave for America to have no scruple about encroach-
ing on the lands of others. For in the case of people like them, 
God’s chosen, the appointment of land is by specific divine 
decree —  as it was for the Israelites. God apportions land to them 
by “some more special appointment, because God tells them it by 
His own mouth; He does not so with other people.” Cotton con-
cludes his argument saying “others take the land by His provi-
dence, but God’s people take the land by promise.”7
7. Segal and Stinebeck, Puritans, Indians & Manifest Destiny, 54.
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It’s easy to see what a powerful idea this idea of a special dis-
pensation can be. If we’re looking for it, we need no other source 
for American exceptionalism. This specific exceptionalism is 
not one that speaks simply of us Americans being exceptionally 
blessed. That may be part of it; but centrally, it is a belief and 
claim that we are exempt from law. We do not need to abide by 
the laws with which we would encumber others. We who place 
laws on others are, ourselves, outside those laws. As noted, a 
pilgrim leader had said “There is no dealing with Indians above 
board.” In the immediate situation of the Puritan settlers this 
meant Christians could hold the Indians to the letter of the trea-
ties forged with them while the Christians themselves remained 
unbound. Indians could be punished, stripped of their lands, 
exterminated even, for violations. On the other hand, Indians 
could not hold “God’s people” to any standard at all. Puritans 
anticipated the statement of a recent American president: “I will 
never apologize for the American people.” The tradition endures. 
International law is less something that we are bound by than it 
is something of which we are in charge.
Some have found it strange that we who sometimes say we 
came to the new world to establish a rule of “laws, not men,” 
should have so routinely set to one side nearly all our treaties 
with Indians. The basis for this behavior lies here. It lies in our 
sense that when we aggrandize ourselves, we win a victory for 
God. To borrow from the wordplay in Hamlet ’s graveyard scene, 
it is a sense that both lies deep and deeply lies. It constitutes a 
pre-emptive triumph by us over Enlightenment thinking about 
human equality by establishing for us a Puritan division of 
humankind into the Elect and the Damned. (Our great spokes-
man for the Enlightenment, after he accepted “all men are cre-
ated equal” into his declaration against the British, preferred for 
daily use a Puritan practice; to actually treat all humans as equal 
was quite alien to Jefferson’s lifestyle and mindset.)
What though has all this to do with the growing ascendency of 
wealth in America?
The template of thinking which we inherit from Puritan forefa-
thers includes a kind of moral somersault. Getting ahead, acquir-
ing wealth, “winning”: this kind of thing demonstrates that one 
is beloved by God. From this it follows that one should devote 
oneself without restraint to acquisition— but from an altogether 
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otherworldly motivation. (Beyond all wink of sarcasm, there 
really is a genuine ideological core to the American pursuit of 
wealth. The most virtuous among us, we think, are those most 
utterly in thrall to this pursuit. This is an important chunk of 
what Weber was teaching, and explains why Benjamin Franklin’s 
aphorisms figure importantly in Weber’s analysis. It helps explain 
why, so long as government is seen as facilitating the unrestricted 
pursuit of wealth, we tend to have no objection to it; it’s only 
when government attempts to place restraints on that pursuit that 
we seem to remember to complain of it as Big Government.) 
I call this Puritan mindset a “somersault” because it’s a kind of 
leap of faith over a familiar objection presented by so many time-
honored sages— by Aristotle, the Buddha, and Jesus, among 
others. The objection states that one condemns oneself to slav-
ery if one pursues wealth as life’s organizing goal. Aristotle had 
argued that to undertake such pursuit is a strategic error, since 
it takes something whose essential nature is to be instrumental 
(wealth) and attempts to make it the goal. Such a pursuit, he says, 
never “arrives;” you can never get enough of what isn’t what you 
really want and need. The Buddha and Jesus posed similar objec-
tions. Jesus asks, “What does it profit a man if he gains the whole 
world, and suffers the loss of his soul?” The Buddha tells us it is 
open-ended desire that makes human life miserable. The Puritan 
somersault over such traditional objections consists in regarding 
achieved wealth as a sign of divine favor. This perspective lifts 
all restraints, since for the Puritan, there’s no such thing as being 
too confident that God is on one’s side. Since one lives always 
under the shadow of doubt, further acquisitions are always wel-
come. Indeed they are necessary with an urgency like that with 
which the addict regards cocaine. (Today, one can note a neurosis 
of this sort at work in our Puritan selves as we seek “absolute 
national security.” Security of that degree is an ever-retreating 
horizon; it’s unreachable. Each time that we find new means to 
intimidate our enemies, we find we have both new reasons to fear 
them and have more enemies to intimidate; daily we intensify the 
enmity of others toward us and recruit newcomers to their ranks.)
What saves the Puritan orientation from descending immedi-
ately into pure economic narcissism, greed, and chaos is partly 
that the first generation of our Puritan ancestors was, as noted, 
preoccupied by a sense of being called to a mission. A century 
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and a half before we were “a nation,” the seeds of American 
nationalism were germinating. 
A kind of closed loop in the dynamics of faith was operational 
in this Puritan nationalism: “Our godly mission shows we are 
God’s people; and the fact we are God’s people shows our mis-
sion is godly.” With this as the operating conviction, commitment 
can be unqualified and, in fact, selfless. The begging of a ques-
tion here doesn’t necessarily indicate invalidity. An elderly couple, 
for instance, may explain the longevity of their marriage:  “Our 
mutual love has been sustained by the goodness each finds in the 
other; and the goodness each finds in the other has been fostered 
by our mutual love.” It’s quite possible this is true even if it doesn’t 
much help an outsider to grasp the inner dynamic. When Hei-
degger lapsed into a worship of German destiny and embraced 
Nazism, it wasn’t exactly a surrender to selfishness or some mere 
lapse of logic he was involved in, but a lapse into uncritical senti-
mentality and nationalism. Because this lapse was not a lapse into 
selfishness, Heidegger could never quite find a way to repent of 
it after the war, or to apologize. Nationalism can anesthetize one 
to humane ethics, as it does today. We Americans resist social-
ism—  or at least the label of it—  as big-government tyranny; but 
look at all the holidays every year on which we celebrate and 
ratify our national militancy.
The Puritans’ commitment to mission can be regarded as a 
kind of closed loop, and while some closed loops may be virtuous, 
there is in these neat and rigid systems the possibility of things 
going wildly awry. Chesterton remarked: “A madman is someone 
who has lost everything but his reason.” The true-believing that 
goes on in the Puritan loop may have a simplicity and internal 
consistency so compelling that it pays no attention to counter-
evidence. It was this hunch that led Max Weber to posit some-
thing obsessive at the center of the Protestant work ethic. Even 
Lutherans sometimes charged that the unending search for 
“signs of election” by Calvinist Puritans had led to a betrayal of 
the Reformation’s great insight into the nature of grace. Were 
not the Puritans busily scurrying about, some Lutherans asked, 
in a frenzy to earn grace after all? These Lutherans charged that 
the Puritans had bootlegged the heresy of salvation-by-works 
into the Reformation by a back door. They charged that in the 
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actual psychology of Calvinist Puritans, works had become 
everything.
This gospel of justification-certified-by-acquisition had, as 
noted, trouble with the Jesus of the gospels. There we find Jesus 
speaking dramatically of the difficulties of the Rich Man. For all 
their belief in literal interpretation, the pastors of the first gen-
eration of Puritan settlers had in hand a mechanism by which to 
somersault over this text. Jesus, they said, was speaking of the 
dangers of wealth sought in a spirit of self-indulgence. Wealth 
resulting from single-minded efforts to establish God’s kingdom 
here on earth was quite a different matter. Such wealth needed 
no justification; such wealth was in fact here and now the princi-
pal sign granted to us that we are justified.
A negative implication for one who holds this view is that the 
poor are not justified. This too was believed. The immense epi-
demics that drastically reduced the numbers of Indians in the 
early years of Puritan migration were a confirmation to Puri-
tans that Indians were not justified— had never been intended 
by God for heaven. The miraculous success of us Puritans in a 
pre-dawn attack on the Pequots as we burnt them alive in their 
tents demonstrated that we were God’s friends and they were not. 
Clearly these burnt offerings were pleasing to God. Regarding 
widows and orphans, in the face of everything Jesus and earlier 
Jewish prophets had to say on their behalf, the sufferings and 
misfortunes of Pequot widows and orphans provided a thought-
ful Puritan with opportunity to question the virtue of these vic-
tims of our power. Did not Deuteronomy offer us a reason to 
question the godliness of those who suffer? Were not then these 
civilian misfortunes signs? And if God manifested by their suf-
ferings that He had no part with them, why then ought we to 
befriend them in any way? We hunted and slew nearly all the 
surviving Pequots we could find. (Later the miserable conditions 
in which God allowed Jefferson to keep his kidnapped blacks 
were a reassuring sign to Jefferson that Providence intended them 
for exploitation.)
So, to sum up yet again: a paradoxical ethos was established. 
The trademark of godliness was to be sought and captured in 
an open-ended pursuit of worldly success. That is to say, certi-
fied godliness (a deep sense of reliable and comforting personal 
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justification) was a confirmation and guarantee of election to 
grace that only a successful acquisition of wealth could deliver.
If one says, “Well, sure; that’s the way people have always 
thought,” Weber would direct one back to the phrase “open-ended 
pursuit” and call attention to the weight a relentless theological 
context added. Weber speaks of the systematic rationalization of 
work dictated by the Protestant ethic. The humane context had 
dropped out. One can argue —  as contemporary critics of capi-
talism do — that an unrestricted and unwholesome simplification 
had taken place. One can argue that things had gotten unwhole-
somely schematized, and that a great many important human 
concerns had been abandoned in the process. One can argue also 
that the true sign of the times was in the murder of Indians, and 
that we had disastrously misinterpreted it.
America’s story, whether good or bad, can be told as one about 
acquisition. In its romanticized version, we tell this story as a 
story about our hunger for land and the preciousness we felt for 
the land we hungered for. We do this in our rich literature of 
the West. We have our cowboy stories and our little houses on 
the prairie. Not only in our novels but in our movies this theme 
has been nearly inexhaustible. One of our all-time favorite stage 
shows is a musical dramatization of how Oklahoma was opened 
to homesteading. The first performances of this musical boosted 
our morale during the Second World War. In all seasons since, 
there have been multiple performances across America. A few 
years before that musical play, in the depths of the Depression, 
we found ourselves gripped by a novel about how troubles in that 
same Oklahoma had led some to migrate to California in relent-
less determination to find new opportunity. In the course of the 
novel, the Joad family comes to personify the indomitable spirit 
of the American people. To this day, the story resonates with us 
and its ending can bring tears.
One can say then, our theme has been land, and the plot of our 
story has been the winning of the West.
But there’s a way to de-romanticize the story and say it was 
about the acquisition of property—  and to say that property mat-
tered because it has been a way of keeping score. Considering 
how we’ve actually treated the property we’ve acquired, this ver-
sion of the story is the more plausible version. People who love 
the land do not treat it as we have. They do not do to the land the 
things we are doing as I write.
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Also this version can better accommodate the way individual 
groups have been treated as the story’s unfolded. The Oklahoma 
that was opened to homesteading had been designated earlier as a 
last refuge for Indians whom our federal government had driven 
westward from east of the Mississippi. Now, with the “opening” 
of Oklahoma, the children of those Indians were put under fresh 
constraints and suffered new losses of land that we’d guaranteed 
was theirs in “perpetuity.” Later, when in the wake of rapacious 
farming techniques, Oklahoma ceased to nurture the children 
of these homesteaders, and many were forced to migrate, the 
California to which numbers of them came had been wrested 
at gunpoint from Mexico less than a century before. Beyond, 
then, the wide-eyed wonder at the beauty of nature, and beyond 
the adventure of turning the wilderness into God’s country, was 
something else. Across the map of what had become the United 
States a kind of banner had been carried westward which read: 
“Claims of the sons of Puritans prevail over all counter-claims.” 
The dictum required no legal theory to back it up. It was manifest.
Introducing Adam Smith
Before we try to calculate Adam Smith’s influence on our devel-
oping Puritan nation, let’s look at Smith himself in the latter part 
of the eighteenth century. The temper of Adam Smith’s writing 
is sweet. His professional career opened with lectures on rhetoric 
which he delivered in Edinburgh in his mid-twenties. They must 
have been very good. For what one finds later in The Wealth of 
Nations is a wonderfully considerate pedagogy. While the goal of 
his writing was theory and prescription, his technique was gently 
to share with his reader the sources of his convictions. Conscien-
tious about these convictions, he wishes to make available to the 
reader the experiences and considerations by which he’s come to 
them. Aristotle’s advice in his own work on rhetoric can perhaps 
be summed up: Do not get in the way of the truth you want 
to disclose. Whether it was from Aristotle, or Francis Bacon, 
or by his own intuitive sense, this seems to have been Smith’s 
rule. One can open almost any page of The Wealth of Nations and 
understand details there of an argument in progress— even if one 
is quite unversed in the grand theoretic generalization toward 
which Smith is working.
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The temper of Smith’s writing is also benign. While still in 
his twenties, he passed from being a lecturer on rhetoric to being 
a lecturer on morality. As such, he was particularly interested 
to discover the sources and nature of moral sentiments. One 
can imagine his students were fortunate in the instruction they 
received. For time and again later in his pages on The Wealth of 
Nations, the reader can find a compassionate, gently Chaucer-like, 
regard for human affairs. His teacher Francis Hutcheson had 
taught him to think habitually in terms of what would provide 
the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Smith argues 
for generous wages for workers—  on grounds similar to those 
W.  Edwards Deming uses in the twentieth century (i.e., good 
morale of the worker tends to promote high quality in goods and 
services being provided). Smith celebrates the division of labor 
not only for its efficiency, but because he sees it as permitting 
an individual (or a country) to discover what his or her (or their) 
natural proclivities are and to concentrate on developing those 
to a point of expertise. The individual and society would benefit 
mutually—  or at least that is what he intended. (Even today, the 
real work being done in America— I mean the work that sus-
tains us still as a society, not the pseudo-work of financial manip-
ulation— is being done by ordinary people who have achieved 
precisely the kinds of technical expertise Smith envisioned. So 
while Smith discourses famously on pin-making, perhaps he’d 
had insufficient occasion to observe the extreme inhumanity to 
which the division of labor—  as eventually materialized in the 
assembly-line —  could be pushed. I’m willing to grant him that 
he couldn’t foresee the degree to which a worker could be reduced 
to a cog in the industrial process.)
Smith opposed slavery. Two concerns listed above — main-
tenance of morale and development of expertise — indicate 
why. He says the savings one envisions from the work of a cap-
tive laborer are illusory; the quantity produced by such a worker 
will be meager, and the quality poor. (This was not because the 
captive was incompetent, but because the captive was smart— 
something an exploiter of captive labor like Jefferson found it 
inconvenient to admit.)
Smith’s argument against the exploitation of colonies—  a 
routine occurrence in the reigning mercantilism—was simi-
lar. If colonists are exploited, they will know they are being 
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exploited. They will resent this and will not be willing to pay 
even those taxes necessary for their upkeep and defense. Smith 
thought England should let the American colonies go; but he 
thought also England was not wise enough to know this. Out 
of pride —not from good economics—England, he thought, 
would hold on till there was war. His great work, published 
in 1776, was prophetic—  confirmed on this point in the year it 
appeared.
Not only, in Smith’s opinion, was England over-regulating the 
American colonies; he thought it was over-regulating the people 
of England. The center then of Smith’s program was laissez-
faire —but in a far more humanely contextualized sense than the 
term is defended today. Let the people, acting freely in exchanges 
with one another, decide the prices of things. Let the workers, 
freely negotiating with the managers, arrive at wages they’re 
willing to work for. (Unions, Smith says, are a natural exercise 
of freedom, and laws prohibiting them are instances of govern-
mental excess.) Let the marketplace determine what goods and 
services will be provided, and in what quantity, and of what qual-
ity, and at what price. Let there be no tariffs, protective or other-
wise, on goods crossing borders (except perhaps in the infancy of 
a newly founded industry). If there must be colonies, let them be 
treated as equals in matters of trade; and let them participate in 
their own governance.
All this seemed a wonderful prescription for freeing up the 
energies of the human race at the time of writing. The emphasis 
was not on the benefits of capitalism but on the democratization 
of economics. Parties privileged in the traditional mercantilist 
system had, of course, reason to resist it. A majority of govern-
ment officials could be expected to resent it. The tendency of 
Smith’s program was to reduce their influence, their numbers, 
and their compensations. One finds here anticipations of Tho-
reau’s preference for a government that governs least. It was this 
tendency that made Smith’s message popular. (Tellingly, in his 
effort to divide labor into “productive labor” and “unproductive 
labor,” Smith was inclined to cite court officials, ecclesiastics, 
and military personnel as instances of the latter. One can assume 
these parties were not amused.)
Given this brief summary, let’s see what affinities there might be 
between Smith’s prescriptions and the earlier, pre-Enlightenment, 
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thinking of our Puritan forefathers. We may have to meander a 
bit as we go.
Our Puritan forefathers were nurtured, as we’ve seen, in a Cal-
vinism that led each believer into a state of stark loneliness. One 
could not, as perhaps in medieval Europe, belong to the “one true 
Church” and thereby think oneself saved. Rather our Puritan 
ancestors situated each person alone before God. One’s eternal 
destiny remained inscrutable. The only thing to reach out to — 
the telling, comforting sign— was success here and now.
Smith, though clearly an agent and citizen of the Enlighten-
ment, was raised in a place with a history steeped in Calvinism. 
In attempts to gage the effect of this on Smith, it can be help-
ful to note his lifelong friendship with David Hume, a fellow 
Scot. Hume, raised in the same dour environs, toyed all his life 
with what’s sometimes called the Egocentric Predicament. The 
controlling question for the Egocentric Predicament is: how do 
I know I’m not the only being there is? Hume’s answer: I don’t. 
Noteworthy about that question is how it lands Hume —  and any 
disciple of his—in an isolation that parallels the isolation and 
quandary arising from the Puritan question: how can I assure 
myself I’m among the Elect?
While their writings make clear that both Hume and Smith 
managed to slough off most constraints of the Calvinist mind-
set, one can wonder whether either was ever entirely free of the 
heightened individualism that Calvinism stimulated. In Hume’s 
case, I’d say this individualism surfaces in the unrelieved subjec-
tivism for which he makes claims in his most deliberate passages. 
As indicated, a fair phrasing of the predicament he argues for is 
that so far as any individual can know, the entire universe is sim-
ply a projection of his or her personal subjectivity.
Hume’s friend Smith is much more grounded in the extra-
mental world, and his case is more complicated. Historians tell 
us that, in his and Hume’s time, “old light” Calvinism was on the 
wane in Scotland. Also, we’re told by Smith’s biographers that 
his mother was a very devout Christian, and that she —  a widow 
almost from the time of Smith’s birth— was the mainstay of her 
bachelor son’s life. It’s interesting then to ask what religious con-
tent Smith may have drawn from his relationship to her and to 
the times.
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The question isn’t easy to answer. “Old Light” Calvinism is 
often associated with “covenanters.” Among its major aspects, 
the theological emphasis of covenanters can alleviate the hor-
ror of predestination by channeling it into activity on behalf of 
God. This indeed is what Perry Miller believes happened early in 
American Puritanism. While God is utterly free, God has freely 
bound Himself to work within covenantal relations with His 
Elect; belief in this becomes in turn a strong motivation for His 
Elect to work hard. A waning of that theological emphasis as the 
Enlightenment gained ground among the professors and other 
writers and intellectuals of Scotland could plausibly mean that the 
doctrine of predestination retreated yet further— moving toward 
a vanishing point. If this was happening in the Scottish Chris-
tianity of Smith’s day, that was a substantial alteration. Smith’s 
Calvinism, supposing some traces of Calvinism remained with 
him, would then have been quite different from that of our first 
Puritan forefathers. I take this to have been the case. 
It is not a stretch to hypothesize that both Smith’s mother and 
Smith himself maintained some confidence in a divine provi-
dence, but without any accompanying thought that God had pre-
determined all outcomes in the world God created. Such seems in 
fact the informal theological backdrop that provides context for 
Smith’s reflections on moral sentiments and for the consequences 
of these reflections in his economic theory. There are routine ref-
erences to “nature,” to “the plan of nature,” to the “divine plan,” 
and to “providence” in Smith’s writing on moral sentiments. 
Providence, he says, has installed in us the capacity to empathize; 
yet the use we make of that capacity occurs in the arena of our 
freedom.
What makes it difficult to be definitive here is that Smith 
seems not, at least when writing as an economist, to insist on 
some precise theological context. This lets some interpreters say 
his references in his moral writings to a divine plan are just win-
dow dressing, a mere concession Smith makes to the residual 
religious thinking of his time. Since however Smith was neither 
a sloppy writer nor a timid one, the simpler interpretation is that 
he believed in some version of divine providence but felt he had 
enough on his plate not to argue about it. He felt no impulse 
to reignite religious wars of the previous century. When the 
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Scottish Enlightenment arrived, its spirit was to allow its par-
ticipants a fresh start. One neither had to square oneself with all 
the old traditions, nor identify oneself in terms of the old labels. 
What I take to be implied in the way Smith phrases things is: 
1) there is a divine plan written into nature — which would 
mean the atheists were wrong; but 
2) there is no predestination— which would mean the origi-
nal Calvinists were wrong. 
This would leave Smith somewhere along the line stretching from 
a deist to a person of devout temper (like perhaps Darwin’s wife 
in the next century) who believes there is an ongoing and daily 
divine providence.
Allowing the murkiness here, it seems one can find still a hold-
over from attitudes of original Calvinist individualism at the 
center of Smith’s thinking. Smith’s is, to be sure, a transformed 
individualism. Unlike the individualism of original Calvinism, it 
celebrates freedom; but it’s still an individualism, and this indi-
vidualism supplies the motivational theory basic to The Wealth 
of Nations. Just as Hume couldn’t see any way out of his ego-
centric predicament, so Smith couldn’t see any other scaffolding 
on which to construct a desirable economics than upon an ines-
capable and indispensable self-interest of the human individual.
Make no mistake. He intended to construct; and he didn’t see 
the limit of his labors to be merely in constructing a theory. He 
intended a revolutionary document. While many an economist 
has claimed to do nothing more than describe how things are, 
Smith (like Marx in later days) knew that— beyond providing 
a diagnosis— he was prescribing. As noted earlier, he intended 
a prescription to counter mercantilism. No mere spectator, he’d 
chosen sides and wanted to recruit the reader to the side he’d 
chosen; for he thought mercantilism attempted, counterproduc-
tively, to promote national success at the expense of individual 
freedom and happiness.
One can imagine, then, the exhilaration Smith felt when he 
was first visited by the “invisible hand”— by which I mean when 
this marvelously convenient metaphorical conception dawned on 
him. (The metaphor makes its first appearance in his writing on 
morals when he is discussing empathy.) To appreciate what this 
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meant to him, it’s necessary to see him as more complicated than 
either his friends or foes of later times have often allowed him to 
be. Anticipating utilitarians to come and echoing Aquinas and 
the scholastics’ concept of “the common good” from the medieval 
past, Smith passionately sought to promote the greatest happiness 
for the greatest number. Just as we’d lose sight of the Puritans 
and be substituting some fabrication of our own devising were we 
to deny the genuineness of their obsession to get right with God, 
so we’d lose sight of Smith were we to deny the passion of his 
humanism— the sincere humanitarianism out of which he acted. 
He was anything but a cold-hearted and disinterested party.
As noted, like the American revolutionaries who were his con-
temporaries, Smith saw British mercantilism as exploitation and 
The Wealth of Nations of 1776 was written to provide an alternative. 
An argument can be made that his book has been as influen-
tial on American life as the Declaration of Independence of that 
same year. While Smith’s phrases haven’t been memorized in the 
rote manner some of Jefferson and company’s phrases have, one 
can argue that Smith’s program, albeit in a garbled version, has 
been more deeply internalized than our July 4th document has.
The key statement of the Declaration is that all men are created 
equal. The canonical statement in The Wealth of Nations, occur-
ring in book 4, chapter 2, paragraph 9 is as follows:
He [every individual], indeed, neither intends to promote 
the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting 
it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign 
industry, he intends only his own security; and by direct-
ing that industry in such manner as its produce may be of 
the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is 
in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is 
it always worse for the society that it was no part of it. By 
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of 
the society more effectually than when he really intends to 
promote it. I have never known much good done by those 
who affected to trade for the public good.
Some exegesis of this central statement is required. Some have 
claimed that the passage should never have been conceded the 
52 tom o’neill
key position it’s usually accorded as a source for understanding 
what Smith is about. They point out that the passage is part of 
a case for demonstrating how a nation’s wealth is built from the 
labor of individuals within its national confines, and that the pas-
sage’s field of reference should be restricted to making that point. 
But this will not do. Smith clearly intends a wide reference; he 
inserts “as in many other cases” to underscore his intention. He 
reinforces that in the next sentence: “Nor is it always the worse for 
the society . . . ”—  suggesting what he says at this point is offered 
as enunciation of an underlying principle of wide application. 
The last sentence I included here (“I have never known . . . ”) 
is as close to sarcasm as one is likely to find in Smith. It may 
not be as gratuitous as it seems. Even though Smith speaks of 
merchants in the sentence that immediately follows (which I 
have not included above), it could be Smith intends a carom-
shot with his sarcasm— a way to take a passing swipe at the 
bureaucratic mercantilists of the government. In Smith’s view, 
while they pretended to be governing trade for the public good, 
what they were really doing was getting in the way of honest 
exchange (and probably getting rich in the process). Still I regard 
this sentence as unfortunate. It’s arguable that his witty dismissal 
of “those who affected to trade for the public good” was a mistake 
on Smith’s part— opening a door to much misinterpretation in 
times to come. He can too easily be interpreted as saying “anyone 
who engages in business from humane and idealistic motives is 
simply getting in the way.” A conscientious disciple of Francis 
Hutcheson would not say this. Smith did not say this. He had 
good reason not to.
Most noteworthy, but mostly unnoted, is that the whole argu-
ment is an argument on behalf of the public good. Smith is mak-
ing a case for a better way than mercantilism to promote the pub-
lic good—the common good, if one will allow an affinity in Smith 
for Aristotle and Aquinas. He’s saying if each participant will 
merely be conscientious about his or her particular task so as to 
provide goods or services that will command the approval of buy-
ers, everything will be fine; the marketplace is self-organizing, 
and “the public good” will be secured without the interference 
of government officials. But note the regularly unnoted underly-
ing implication of making this argument. The underlying impli-
cation is that, whatever the personal economic enterprise of the 
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reader, the reader-as-citizen is interested in promoting the public 
good. As a shoemaker, one should concentrate on making good 
shoes; but the same person as a citizen is regarded as able to stand 
back and concern himself or herself with seeing to it that the way 
shoes are provided is conducive to the wellbeing of society. The 
shoemaker as citizen, Smith assumes, is quite concerned about 
the public good after all. Otherwise, Smith’s argument would 
have no traction— would not be addressing the shoemaker and 
other potential readers on anything they cared about. If people 
did not care about the public good, there were no potential read-
ers for The Wealth of Nations. The book was intended as a manual 
for those who cared about the public good. 
Grasped in the fullness of this context, Smith’s argument is 
astoundingly paradoxical: the public good will be most effectu-
ally achieved if people forget about it!
As one can infer, though, from the foregoing considerations, 
the argument cannot really be that stark. The famous passage 
on the “invisible hand” is hyperbolic. Joseph Schumpeter faults 
Smith for this. He says that had Smith schematized things less 
sharply, and had he qualified his statements more, Smith would 
not have become so famous, but his writing would have had a 
more salutary effect. There may be something to this.
A way to put the matter more sympathetically than Schumpeter 
does is to say that we, Smith’s fellow mortals, have proved too 
much for him; we have outmaneuvered his good intentions. In 
his moral discourses Smith discusses at length the role he thinks 
our capacity for empathy plays in our behavior. He says we learn 
to think of what is best for others by exercising a wonderful gift, 
which a benevolent providence has provided to us, of putting our-
selves in another’s place. Then— quite legitimately I’d say— he 
doubles back, and says we spontaneously arrive at a correct sense 
of what our own behavior should be by trying to see ourselves 
through others’ eyes— by imagining, that is, how different activi-
ties open to us would look to others. (Is there a shrewd anticipa-
tion of Kant’s Categorical Imperative here? So it would seem, and 
of Sartre’s reflections on the shame principle, too.)
This review of the nuances in Smith is needed, I believe, for 
an accurate assessment of what Smith intends in the canonical 
passage when he employs the word “interest.” Smith does not 
speak of “selfishness,” but he does speak of the “interest” of the 
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individual human being. In Francis Ford Coppola’s Wall Street, 
Gordon Gecko says, “Greed is good.” Smith does not say, “Greed 
is good.” He does however say the self-interest of the individual 
promotes the public good.
Our mistake has been to define this “interest” of his too nar-
rowly. For Smith, a shoemaker’s interest extends to having the 
customer walk out of the shop with a satisfying pair of shoes. 
If that does not happen, what pride can he or she take in being 
a shoemaker? If there are employees, a shoemaker’s interest 
extends to having employees of high morale. A shoemaker’s 
interest extends to maintaining a culture in which debts are paid 
on time and without fraud. Honesty is the best policy, not just 
because it will yield returning customers and promote word-of-
mouth advertising and establish good credit against which the 
shoemaker can borrow, but because it provides the conditions 
under which the shoemaker can work with a sense of responsibil-
ity and predictability. Again, it’s the shoemaker’s interest to have 
a good walkway leading to the shoe shop, to have a good fire 
department to protect his place of business from burning down, 
to have a police force adequate for the security of the shop and 
the merchandise and the customers and the person of the shoe-
maker and for any employees of the shoemaker. A well-to-do 
society in which the people generally are decently educated and 
reasonably prosperous, and care about good-looking and reliable 
shoes, is also in the shoemaker’s interest. 
Unfortunately, when Puritan descendants of the late eigh-
teenth century were ginning up the spirit of capitalism as a way of 
systematizing and maintaining momentum for their acquisitive 
activity, they were blind to much of the generous humanitarian 
concern that was taken for granted as context in Smith’s presen-
tation of an individual’s “self-interest.”
One of Weber’s theoretical hurdles was to explain why he 
thought it proper that Benjamin Franklin should land smack in 
the middle of his— Weber’s—  exposition of the Protestant Ethic. 
Franklin was hardly a Protestant, much less a Puritan Protestant, 
in any conventional sense of the terms. He had a well earned rep-
utation as a bon vivant during his days in Paris from 1776 to 1785 
(where, incidentally, he met and conversed with Smith). When, 
however, Franklin was still in his proverb-writing days, he wrote 
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eloquently and with a quasi-religious fervor of the virtues of liv-
ing to generate income, and of living frugally and re-investing 
one’s savings as one went along. These writings were immensely 
popular and much quoted here in the American colonies. Weber 
cites Franklin to make the point that, once the capitalist spirit 
was brought to a boiling point by Puritan anxiety, it acquired 
a self-sustaining character. Eventually a capitalist approach had 
restructured the human context sufficiently that capitalism was 
taken as a feature of the landscape. In the first fervor of Ameri-
can Puritanism, clerics writing on Puritan ascetic practice had 
often warned that the pursuit of worldly goods might become an 
end in itself. In successive generations from 1650 to the second 
half of the 1700s (a period, say, of more than a hundred years), 
this seems in many cases to have been accomplished. By the end 
of that process an ethos of virtue-by-acquisition was rooted in 
the South as well as in the North. Yet even amid that secular-
izing of Puritanism, humans needed a sustaining story. They 
required some sense that the lifestyle they led had a meaning 
that stretched beyond themselves and ministered to some larger 
good. They needed to believe that in some way they were acting 
in harmony with the universe and conformed to its destiny. For 
this, Adam Smith could prove useful.
To utilize him in our evolving American society would require 
tinkering. As has been argued— for anything some words of 
Smith may suggest to the contrary— Smith is presupposing a 
contextualizing decency and good will in the individual upon 
whom his prescriptive economics is based. He is innocent of any 
Puritan fear of “fellow feeling” as a potential distraction from 
God’s work; rather he calls such feeling “empathy,” sees it as 
coming from God, and he views our human gregariousness with 
Enlightenment optimism. Empathy of one human for another 
is a victory for the divine plan. Perhaps a too-optimistic agent 
of the Enlightenment, Smith is presupposing in his “individual” 
an internalized context in which law is respected, adulteration of 
content in a good or service is a disgrace, contracts are honored, 
and honesty is more the rule than the exception. (Until recently, 
and maybe still, Japanese society in its intra-national relations 
has exemplified something of the manners Smith ascribes to 
Englishmen— who believe in doing what’s “cricket”—  and to 
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people in general.) An ethos in which caveat emptor —let the 
buyer beware — is a ruling maxim (cited as it is today as an 
excuse for anything and everything) is unimaginable to Smith. 
Certainly, he never envisions a scenario in which individuals will 
routinely and unapologetically seek personal aggrandizement at 
the cost of the whole order they share with others; in his think-
ing, it’s only within a context of honored routine decency that a 
focus on individual acquisition can ensure the emergence of “the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number.” 
So Smith’s theory is not about getting away with things. That’s 
a preoccupation of contemporary corporate lawyers, but it is not 
his preoccupation. He is far from advocating the emergence of a 
new mercantilism, one not of nations but of corporations. (Can 
we stipulate that our current corporatocracy engages in a new 
mercantilism—  one antipathetic to the democratic principles 
Smith championed—  and that the resemblance of this corpora-
tocracy to the theocracy envisioned by our Puritan forefathers is 
neither accidental nor unimportant?) According to Smith’s theory 
the market will act to reward self-interest only in those instances 
where the needs of consumers are being genuinely served. Con-
sumers routinely deprived, he thought, will seek out other pro-
viders—  or, in a monopolistic oligarchy, will eventually wither 
and die. Without consumers, there is no market. (Smith may still 
be right. If, today, we say the market no longer disciplines banks 
and corporations, we may be speaking too soon. Plausibly, the 
market may yet discipline banks and other corporations through 
responses and strategies of consumer disapproval, or by descend-
ing into catastrophic dysfunction and collapse. Something of the 
latter seems rumbling on the horizons of several national econo-
mies as I write.) To conclude: it’s highly unlikely Smith would 
ever have endorsed a neo-mercantilism of corporations which 
nurtures many of the impositions on individual liberty he wrote 
to protest against.
Yet one can see how Smith’s model could facilitate a gradu-
ally secularizing Puritan quest for justification by way of mission 
and success. One has only to strip away the civilizing context in 
which he wrote, and one can meld Smith’s acceptance of indi-
vidualism with a Puritan sense of isolation. Smith can be made 
to chime with the latter-day Calvinist Jonathan Edwards. Just as 
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for Edwards, the “hands of an angry God” work toward a godly 
purpose, so too one can claim does the “invisible hand” of Smith. 
Being descendants of Puritan forefathers, many business people 
today seem to feel it makes no more sense to appeal against the 
workings of the stock market than it would make sense to their 
Puritan forefathers to appeal against God’s eternal decrees.
(Of course this doesn’t keep those same business people from 
doing all they can to manipulate our allegedly autonomous and 
self-governing market. A notion of fatalism about the stock mar-
ket provides in fact a cover for all kinds of free-wheeling subter-
fuge. Virtually indestructible cockroaches are put to shame by 
the banksters and other financial manipulators who emerge from 
the gutters of America today bearing the flag of “too big to fail.” 
As for a sense of those who currently fall by the wayside, the new 
Puritan is just as ready to regard them as damned by an invisible 
hand as were earlier Puritans to find desperate and defeated Indi-
ans doomed by the hand of an angry God. No less than our fore-
fathers, our contemporary Puritans are ready to regard those who 
suffer as having no just claims on the successful. That this was 
not Smith’s attitude — nor, for that matter, the attitude of Benja-
min Franklin in his maturity— is of no interest in our latter-day 
capitalism. Smith’s readiness to decrease the role of government 
has been adopted and reformulated by a Puritan sense that this 
world’s governments belong more to Satan than to God—  and 
we’ve now come to regard it as the task of the godly to restrict the 
power of government to the service of our self-aggrandizement.)
So the Enlightenment thinking of Adam Smith was co-
opted by the narrower and less humane thinking of secularizing 
Puritans. Though Smith’s schematization and prescription was 
intended benignly and rooted in wholesome sensibility, when 
the model he offered was further schematized and reconfigured 
to merge with a Puritan mission to seek worldly success, it was 
felt that a license for selfishness had been granted— indeed that 
an obligation to aggrandize oneself had been decreed. A door 
opened widely to a world-wasting reduction that destroys not 
only forest and animal, but great swaths of the working poor 
both here and abroad, and which tends toward an incremental 
dissolution of social bonds in general. It’s a reduction that tends 
to leave the world a wrecking ground for the richly demented.
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Introducing Milton Friedman
While a reduced and distorted version of Adam Smith had 
become a standard feature of American thinking well before 
Milton Friedman, it took Friedman to endow it with that charac-
ter of the “one true faith” that’s a trademark of Puritanism. If the 
business schools of America today teach a bottom-line scorched-
earth approach to economics, he more than anyone else can claim 
the credit.
The late Friedman, of the University of Chicago, and later of 
the Hoover Institute at Stanford University, is regarded by some 
as America’s foremost expositor of “the conservative philosophy.” 
His position is called “conservative” because its controlling con-
cern is said to be to clarify and promote the laissez-faire principle 
set forth in Smith which says government should leave the mar-
ketplace free of its intrusion. Friedman himself then is called “a 
conservative” as one thought to be dedicated to conserving this 
principle —  a principle he thinks modern-day liberals have a ter-
rible habit of diluting or betraying.
One can catch the flavor of his conservatism in an article 
Friedman published in the New York Times in 1970. Chastising 
some business men, Friedman writes:
The businessmen believe they are defending free enterprise 
when they declaim that business is not concerned “merely” 
with profit but also with promoting desirable “social” ends; 
that business has a “social conscience” and takes seriously 
its responsibilities for providing employment, eliminating 
discrimination, avoiding pollution and whatever else may 
be the catchwords of the contemporary crop of reformers. 
In fact they are —  or would be if anyone else took them 
seriously— preaching pure and unadulterated socialism. 
Businessmen who talk this way are unwitting puppets of 
the intellectual forces that have been undermining the 
basis of a free society these past decades.8
8. Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase 
its Profits,” New York Times Magazine, September 13, 1970, 32–33.
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What Friedman objects to is the doubleness of vision that a con-
cern for social goals introduces into the thinking and behavior 
of a businessman. Sitting in a classroom a couple hundred yards 
from the Hoover Institute during Friedman’s residence there, I 
remember hearing a very orthodox Friedmanite economist warn 
us that, in the event we become businessmen, we must not sen-
timentalize the workforce; rather we must remember always to 
regard “it” purely and simply as “a factor of production.” If, by 
laying off half our employees, we can increase the profits of our 
company, it is our duty to the stockholders to do so. Not to do 
so would be an act of theft—  of stealing from the stockholders. 
(And if there are no stockholders? No doubt then, it would be a 
crime against ourselves to spend more money on the workforce 
than we had to.) 
I remember thinking how sublimely surgical this was. Two 
thousand five hundred years of Hellenic and Judaic humanism 
out the window with a single toss! In its place: “Always treat a 
fellow human being as a mere means; never allow fellow feel-
ing or a regard for the person to confuse your thinking; realize 
always that for all practical purposes the employee is a thing.”
Years later I was in a college workroom running off handouts for 
an ethics class I was teaching when an economics teacher came 
upon me. He asked what I was up to. When I said I was prepar-
ing for an ethics class, he replied that ethics was good for Sunday 
afternoons but that the rest of the week was controlled by the 
discipline he taught. I loved him for his unvarnished arrogance. 
I reflected how completely Friedman’s sense of what was central 
and what was peripheral had prevailed— with this instructor at 
least (but probably, in truth, with a majority of the students to 
whom I was attempting to teach ethics).
Friedman’s sense, to be sure, of “reformers” and their “catch-
words” (catchwords about providing jobs, working to diminish 
gender and race discrimination, attempting to reduce pollution 
of the environment) is not— for all the ease with which he pre-
tends to dismiss them—  a sense that these constitute a harm-
less Sunday-afternoon diversion. Rather he’s afraid people are 
genuinely paying attention to these catchwords and these false 
prophets—  else why the essay? At the end of the short excerpt 
above, he says that those businessmen who listen to the reformers 
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are “unwitting puppets of the intellectual forces that have been 
undermining the basis of a free society these past decades.” In 
Friedman’s view, we’re not talking about pleasant ways to 
spend Sunday afternoons. Anyone, he’s saying, who attempts 
to introduce into the workplace an ethics distinct from the dis-
cipline of the free market itself, as elaborated by Friedman, is 
undermining America. In fact, his free market is ethics. Those 
attempting reforms betray our free way of life (betray, presum-
ably what we send our young overseas to die for). Images of 
executions of  “traitors” Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were not a 
distant memory as Friedman was writing. They’re context here, 
and Friedman’s use of the phrase “intellectual forces” was meant 
to convey that some intellectuals (people like the Rosenbergs 
and other fellow-travelers) were the agents of forces out to ruin 
us all.
Friedman was serious toward his political opposition; for this 
reason Friedman— notwithstanding an inclination to smirk 
disarmingly—  should be taken seriously. Today when we hear 
echoes of his rhetoric on Fox News and talk radio, we shouldn’t 
dismiss these voices as mere chatter; according to the argument 
I’m building, they express beliefs in which our tradition is rooted. 
In exposition of this tradition, a few paragraphs later comes 
Friedman’s effort to elucidate how the profit motive provides the 
one and only responsibility of a corporate executive in a typical 
business:
In a free-enterprise, private property system, a corporate 
executive is an employee of the owners of the business. He 
has direct responsibility to his employers. That responsi-
bility is to conduct the business in accordance with their 
desires, which generally will be to make as much money 
as possible while conforming to the basic rules of society, 
both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical 
custom. Of course in some cases his employers may have 
a different objective. A group of persons might establish 
a corporation for an eleemosynary purpose — for example, 
a hospital or a school. The manager of such a corporation 
will not have money profit as his objectives but the render-
ing of certain services.
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The two passages here candidly place Friedman’s cards on the 
table. His candor shouldn’t disarm us but rather engage us to 
examine critically the game he is playing.9
1. Doesn’t it seem a bit quaint, even if charming, to describe 
a CEO as an employee of the stockholders? It suggests 
that CEOs are like assembly-line workers, spending their 
days in carrying out the orders of their managers. Or 
again, it suggests CEOs relate to stockholders like a maid 
to the mistress of the house —  a mistress who might say: 
“Today, Hilda, I want you to dust the windowsills.”
2. Doesn’t some of this quaintness reside in Friedman’s impli-
cation that the CEO spends his or her day consulting with 
stockholders in order to do their bidding? Friedman might 
counter: “The CEO doesn’t have to consult his employ-
ers; he already knows what they want. They want—  as I 
said—  as much money from their stocks as they can get.”
3. Again, though, one wonders about the accuracy of charac-
terization. In the name of schematization, has Friedman 
perhaps reconfigured and oversimplified?
4. Corporations get started for purposes. There’s a ratio-
nale for the corporation before there is any rationale for 
stockholders. Unless one’s an out-and-out scam artist, one 
doesn’t just say: “I’d like to make a lot of money; I think 
I’ll get a lot of people to invest in a corporation.”
5. Isn’t what really happens more likely to be that, say, a 
Theodore Judah— living in the 1850s in a promising but 
remarkably isolated new state of California—  comes along 
and says: “There ought to be a transcontinental railroad”? 
9. For the seminal ideas here, I’m indebted to a brilliant article 
by Christopher Stone (“Why Shouldn’t Corporations Be Socially 
Responsible?” from Where the Law Ends (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1975), 80–87). I hope I have not stolen his very phrases.
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Only when that’s been said does Judah venture forth in 
search of investors.
6. One might counter: “Well, the motivations of the investors 
can be very different from the motivations of the vision-
ary.” Suppose though Judah had lived to become — as he’d 
hoped— the CEO of the Central Pacific. Would his moti-
vation have been simply to make money for his investors, 
or would it have been to construct and run an excellent 
railroad? Quite probably his original vision would have 
carried through into his career as CEO.
7. Would he then have been defrauding his investors as he 
attempted to find the best steel, lay the best track, and 
provide the finest service he could? His answer would 
probably have been: “How so?” He’d say they must have 
known the purpose of the man and project they’d invested 
in.
8. The cynics may reply this didn’t happen— not in Judah’s 
case. But Judah puts us in mind of how money— in the 
best cases— is facilitator and consequence of well consid-
ered projects.
9. So it’s partly Friedman’s reduction of everything to money 
that one finds uncritical. It is this which disqualifies him 
as a disciple of Adam Smith. Smith understood the func-
tion of money was to facilitate life. This understanding 
runs through his thousands of anecdotes and arguments. 
Friedman on the other hand seems to take it for granted 
that people invest simply to make money. He doesn’t take 
seriously the possibility they invest in things they believe 
in— that they invest to make particular things happen. 
When they do, he seems inclined to say, as in the second 
half of the second excerpt: “Well, this is no longer actually 
business we’re talking of; now we’re talking about hobbies.”
10. To structure things thus— to turn things around in the 
way he does—  converts his model of what business is into 
a Procrustean bed. To protect this model, he’s willing to 
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lop off the areas of human endeavor and human interest 
the model cannot neatly accommodate, implying there’s 
something about them that’s un-businesslike.
11. To consider an example: surely Pope Julius II did not 
invest in Michelangelo in order to make money. Nor was 
Michelangelo’s aesthetic sense dictated to by some com-
pulsion to see that his patron got a maximum return of 
profit. Friedman’s objection is predictable. He’d say: “I’m 
not talking about THAT!” He might add: “See, the word 
‘profit’ doesn’t even come up in such transactions!” Exactly.
12. And that should alert one to be thoughtful about how long 
a list one could generate of other “THATs” about which 
Friedman isn’t talking.
13. Friedman speaks of the executive as making for his bosses 
as much money as possible “while conforming to the basic 
rules of society, both those embodied in the law and those 
embodied in ethical custom.” This seems like a good and 
necessary concession—  surely a concession that was the 
very context for Adam Smith’s reflections on how free 
markets would operate to produce the greatest good. But 
one has to wonder what weight Friedman can actually 
allow this concession. After all, he’s arguing that business 
motivated by the profit-motive is sufficiently disciplined by 
the free market. The role of government and presumably of 
government law is to leave it alone. He tells us the execu-
tive should not worry, for instance, about pollution of our 
habitat. Either Friedman’s position is that there is no ethi-
cal custom of taking care of the environment, or— if he 
finds that unpalatable — that to attend to it and make it 
normative would be nonetheless to advocate “pure unadul-
terated socialism” and would be to enter among the ranks 
of “the unwitting puppets of the intellectual forces that 
have been undermining the basis a free society these past 
decades.” So much for ethical custom.
14. We arrive then at one of Friedman’s more troubled moments. 
The government issues a charter for a corporation. This 
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charter confers on a corporation a fictitious personhood, 
and the government endows this “person” with certain 
privileges so it can achieve goals which the government 
approves as conducive to the general welfare. Yet govern-
ment should not, according to Friedman, intrude upon the 
operations of that which its law has created.
15. The reason for thinking Friedman’s intentions about 
conforming to law and ethical custom are so vague as 
to dwindle to a null set— to a category that contains no 
instances— is that, taken seriously, they work against the 
rest of Friedman’s argument.
16. The article is titled: “The Social Responsibility of Business 
is to Increase its Profits.” But corporations are not char-
tered to increase their profits; governments charter them 
to build bridges, mine coal, feed the hungry, cure the sick.
17. Friedman then is in a bind. For in terms of contractual 
obligation and responsibility, the CEO has not simply to 
look over his or her shoulder to stockholder-bosses, but 
to look back before that to the particular purposes for 
which the corporation was chartered. Yet in Friedman’s 
presentation of his model, this dimension of corporate 
concern would seem to have dissolved with the issuing of 
the license; once it exists, the purpose of the corporation 
seems to have become totally internalized.
18. This is not good even for the corporation. For it moves 
thereby toward the world of the schizophrenic. Enron, on 
the eve of its implosion, was such a totally internalized 
corporation. So was the enterprise of Bernie Madoff. 
19. One cannot claim the endorsement of Adam Smith for 
a doctrine of unfettered corporations. Unlike Friedman, 
Smith sees the chartering government as there at the 
creation, and as responsible therefore for outcomes. This 
incites in Smith a cautionary concern. He regards with 
apprehension the special privileges government confers in 
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chartering and licensing things and sees how these privi-
leges act as a restraint on the freedoms of those outside 
the grant. It would not have occurred to him to claim as 
Friedman does that once such privileges are in place, gov-
ernment has no responsibility for the impact their exercise 
has on the freedoms of those who have no share in them. 
While Friedman is concerned for the freedom of fictitious 
persons called corporations, Smith is concerned for the 
freedom of actual persons. 
20. Friedman’s corporation is a corporation born of Fried-
man’s capacity to abstract. It’s not connected to things out-
side itself by real-world relations. It’s not beholden to the 
fire department or the police department for its safety. It’s 
not beholden to a public water supply. It doesn’t use roads. 
It makes no demands for protection against foreign inva-
sion. It owes nothing to ends for which it was instituted. 
The educational system that has provided it with quali-
fied workers is not entitled to its support. Only on such 
assumptions is Friedman able to find that the corporation 
is without social responsibility other than to increase the 
profits of it stockholders.
21. In other words, Friedman’s corporation is a fantasy. He 
is serious in claiming benefits and opportunities for 
it, but when you ask him of its corresponding responsi-
bilities, he wanders off into a denunciation of socialism. 
It’s especially noteworthy how, in the earlier of the two 
excerpts above, Friedman dismisses “avoiding pollution” 
as among “the catchwords of the contemporary crop of 
reformers.” Grown-up businessmen, he seems to say, don’t 
concern themselves with avoiding pollution; avoiding pol-
lution is not their responsibility. In tribute to Friedman 
and the tradition for which he speaks, one can’t help but 
be impressed at how thoroughly this lesson has become 
imbedded. Whether Friedman is teaching this lesson 
because it’s simply the rule in play, or whether it’s the 
rule in play because he and like-minded economists have 
taught it is, I suppose, subject to debate.
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22. My hunch is that the dispensation granted here by Fried-
man and “conservative” predecessors and current disciples 
contributes hugely to our current problems.
23. A couple years ago, uncalculated amounts of oil were 
pouring into northern waters of the Gulf of Mexico from 
a pipe in the water below a structure called Deep Hori-
zon where British Petroleum drilled for oil. At that time 
a guest-expert on the PBS NewsHour cautioned watchers 
of the show against “hysterical reactions.” From the gen-
eral tendency of his remarks, it was clear it would not be 
an “hysterical reaction” to be deeply concerned about the 
future of BP. All adult persons know BP is important and 
must, at all costs, be preserved. What would be “hysterical” 
would be to so worry about the Gulf as to put the future of 
BP in jeopardy.
24. To recast the expert’s sentiment in the vocabulary of 
Friedman: It had never been the function of BP to “pro-
tect the Gulf ”—  a “catchphrase” if ever there was one. The 
function of BP was—  and is— to deliver oil. Yet even that 
is perhaps too romantic a description. The real function of 
BP has always been to deliver money to stockholders. That 
is why BP is right not only to drill for oil, but right to drill 
for it in as quick and cost-cutting a way as it can get away 
with. (The PBS-expert must feel happy; we’ve recovered 
from hysteria, and the future of off-shore drilling remains 
bright.)
25. One can hear Friedman muttering from his grave: “That’s 
just the way it is. If you’re looking for someone to blame, 
this looking about is itself a sign of your childishness—for 
this is the lifestyle you’ve been lucky enough to get born 
into. To think otherwise —to load BP with concerns about 
the environment and attempt to shame it for not living up 
to those concerns—is to be among the “unwitting puppets 
of the intellectual forces that have been undermining the 
basis of a free society.”
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26. As we’ve seen, Friedman does acknowledge this isn’t the 
whole picture. He speaks of “eleemosynary” pursuits. That 
the adjective is rare enough to function as a stumper in a 
spelling bee is instructive. Friedman registers by its use 
that we pass at this point outside the purview of serious 
business. Earlier we looked at relations between Pope 
Julius and Michelangelo. Examples Friedman gives are 
hospitals and schools. He acknowledges that here the pur-
pose may be other than to maximize profits. He makes 
a conscientious concession that not everything fits his 
model.
27. What he’s not about to consider is that these business 
enterprises may actually be excellent models for recon-
figuring our thinking on business in general. Notice the 
attributes of what we consider here. Both for hospitals 
and for schools there’s a fairly undeniable need. In both 
there is organization to meet the need. Both require funds 
to operate. But the purpose of neither is reducible to the 
making of a profit. What if one were to take hospitals and 
schools as a paradigm for businesses in general? Let us 
say legitimate institutions in general are founded to fulfill 
some wholesome function. Well and good. Yet income in 
excess of daily expenses is necessary if these institutions 
are to survive. Again, well and good. The “profit” if you 
want to call it that goes toward maintenance and renova-
tion. It is “instrumental,” not goal setting. (For just this 
reason, Friedmanites are presently doing all they can to 
convert schools, hospitals, prisons, and all health care into 
for-profit enterprises.)
28. Recently I complimented a doctor working in the emer-
gency room of a public hospital for bringing my son back 
from a coma that could have ended in death. I added to 
my remark—thinking perhaps like Friedman— “but you 
don’t get paid adequately for the work you do!” She replied: 
“Oh, I get paid enough.” I persisted, “How so?” She said: 
“What I get paid permits me do the job I live for.”
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29. The doctor declared a truth. The contented doctor (who 
may today be an endangered species) does not go into 
medicine to make a lot of money; she/he goes into it to 
cure people. The happy lawyer (if there is such today) goes 
into law to protect rights, curb wrongdoing, secure justice. 
The happy teacher is sustained by the experience of seeing 
people learn.
30. Aristotle, who perhaps would have gotten an F in any eco-
nomics course taught by Friedman, endorses what my son’s 
doctor said. As mentioned earlier, Aristotle insists “money 
is means” and adds: “One who lives for money lives the 
life of a slave.” Finally he says: “Happiness is in doing— is 
achieved in action performed in accord with virtue.” The 
doctor exemplified this. (Many an ethics student, feeling 
things have gotten a bit mystical with Aristotle, wants 
at this point to return to “money,” but having declared 
it “pure instrumentality,” Aristotle’s not about to back 
down.)
31. As a consequence of simplifying and schematizing, the 
world with which Friedman ends is schizoid. He’d have 
the father of children feel affection for those children and 
concern that they live well in times to come; yet Friedman 
would have that same father go off to work and labor each 
day simply to increase the return to stockholders without 
exercising any regard for the impact his corporation might 
have on the society his son is to live in. True, Friedman 
might respond: “Well, that’s just the way people behave.” 
But he complains rather that they don’t behave this way 
enough. He wants this schizoid behavior— has done his 
best to dictate it to the business schools of the land, and 
thinks people are behaving unethically when they don’t 
practice it. More insistently than Adam Smith, he’s a mis-
sionary. It turns out after all that Friedman is not just 
about money; he’s about his doctrine about money. And 
this is what makes him a Puritan. Not only is the world 
that’s generated by his thinking an alienated one, but he 
insists we enter that world as a destiny—  as our ticket into 
adulthood. To our misfortune we often do.
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There is nothing in nature that requires a businessman to shed 
his responsibilities as citizen when becoming a CEO. Somehow 
though, Friedman feels a businessman can and should do this— 
should suspend his humanity on the ground that he is owned by 
stockholders. 
Further, while Friedman speaks of the restraints of law, there’s 
nothing in his system to keep corporations from using their 
money to buy law-makers and insist they provide a maximum 
of privileges for corporations and a minimum of responsibilities. 
(Some were surprised when Friedman offered himself as a tutor 
to General Pinochet, the dictator in Chile, after President Sal-
vador Allende was, with assistance from our CIA, ousted and 
then assassinated in 1973. No one should have been surprised that 
Friedman pitched in. Fully provided for in Friedman’s conception 
of freedom is the freedom of a dictator to control all the laws and 
to be accountable to none of them. He had already done what 
he could to secure that kind of freedom for American corpora-
tions. In this way have we extended the reach of our Puritanism 
to Latin America.)
To be fair though, in asking us to join his world, Friedman 
is—  as I’ve tried to show earlier— playing to some of the most 
deeply entrenched tendencies of our history and culture. (This 
is why “liberal” Democrats are such lame critics of “hard-line” 
Republicans. The Democrats emerge from the same history and 
culture, and have the same values.) Routinely, when it’s been a 
matter of actual practice, our Puritan heritage has trumped our 
Enlightenment heritage. When we want to feel noble about our-
selves, we put on the rhetoric of the Enlightenment; but when 
it’s time to act, we regress to the behavior of forefathers earlier 
than Washington and Hamilton. Before moving on to discuss 
what these tendencies mean for our attitude toward the use of 
force, and for our attitude toward habitat (both already touched 
on), let’s try to draw our observations on the ascendency of the 
rich to a close.
When bankers, stockbrokers, and laissez-faire economists 
find themselves confronted by ethicists or by people whom these 
financiers’ policies have impoverished, the financiers tend to 
lapse into “don’t blame me; I’m just telling you how it’s done” 
mode. They’ll claim their economics is merely descriptive. They’ll 
say in defense of some action they’re taking: “The stock market 
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requires this of me.” Or they may say of a past action: “Had I not 
acted as I did, I’d have been fired— and someone else would been 
brought in to do exactly the thing I wouldn’t do. I had to do what 
I did. It was inevitable.”
Such talk is instructive. With a good ear, one can hear echoes 
of Calvinist predestination. In place of an inscrutable God-Who 
is often angry, we have here a stock market whose decrees are 
absolute and predictably unpredictable — its decrees are beyond 
appeal. It’s a fool’s business to complain about this stock mar-
ket; one can only attend to it closely and do what one can to 
accommodate to it. Any suggestion the “free market” is actually 
a market that humans freely manipulate is heresy. This somehow 
remains true in the face of contrary evidence coming in from all 
corners. A charge that the free market is a game rigged to serve 
the interests of its major players, the privileged rich, is not only 
blasphemous, it’s subversive blasphemy, bordering on treason. For 
it fosters “class warfare” and unpatriotically is “undermining the 
basis of a free society.” One who makes charges disrespectful to 
the market can be assumed to be an infantile person, isolated, 
aberrational—  one who rejects reality. (Such a one is by no means 
entitled to chat with Charlie Rose, or be interviewed on the PBS 
NewsHour.)
This is instructive. The angry God in whose hands we found 
ourselves at the beginning of America’s story was a God who 
had at once agents who could be depended on to dispense His 
wrath (the Puritans, for instance) and had also objects of His 
wrath (the “savages,” for instance). Agents of His wrath could be 
presumed to be destined for heaven; objects of His wrath were 
all destined for hell. One of the best ways to reassure oneself one 
wasn’t destined for hell was to enlist definitively as one of God’s 
avenging agents against the objects of His wrath.
Something similar has happened in the twenty-first-century 
update to our story. The path to security and prosperity is to 
accept the ultimacy of the free market and its oracular decrees as 
the stock market reveals them—  and then to respond in obedi-
ence — by engaging in the market, serving it, preserving it. This 
is true, whether one is by ethnicity “majority born” or “minority 
born,” and whether one is born a U. S. citizen or is an immigrant. 
Regardless of which category you are in, the inclination is to sell 
out. This is so whether you are president, or secretary of state, or 
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law professor, or justice on the Supreme Court, or journalist, or 
pundit, or portfolio analyst. If you wish to avoid being a target 
of the agents of wrath, your best course of action is to join their 
ranks.
Short of this maneuver, one remains among the market’s more 
vulnerable. People living in other countries run special risks. If 
for instance in Central America, people don’t show respect for 
the market in the manner and form in which we’ve shaped it, 
their country can be invaded, their leaders can be executed, and 
their land can be destroyed.
Yet even here at home, in ways that irritate those who insist 
on the profit motive, we find that the doctor, the lawyer, and 
the teacher are likely to perform at their best when outside our 
paradigm of orthodox bottom-line market economics. So also 
do other providers of public service —  our police officers and 
fire fighters, our paramedics and nurses. It shouldn’t surprise us 
therefore that some politicians win popularity by waging cam-
paigns against such people. The strategy for a true-believer and 
wannabe-victor in today’s economic world is, it seems, to move 
as far from these fuzzy-statused do-gooder types as one can— 
and to tame such do-gooders in the process by constricting their 
funding and belittling their dedication. (Sure, there’s room for 
legitimate criticism of people in the fields of public service; but 
there are popular recent political campaigns against them as a 
class that can hardly be explained except by envy and resentment 
for the example they give.)
The newest discovery of the economic realist is in fact that 
in seeking a profit, no genuine good or service need be pro-
vided. One can make money off of money. Manufacturing can 
be shipped overseas. Service industries can go too. Sustained 
for years by influxes of loans from China and from our appar-
ently inexhaustible federal reserve, financiers can play among 
themselves ruinous games with other people’s savings—  and be 
rescued with funds and rewarded by bonuses paid out against 
future taxes when it seems their failures might otherwise bring 
the entire money system crashing down.
The world we enter thereby is not altogether as alien and 
unprecedented as we sometimes protest. Puritans and Friedman –
no mere icons of the past, but living mentors— have labored hard 
to bring this world to birth. The bleak model they’ve perfected for 
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us tends toward a self-reinforcing and enduring efficacy. Today 
the elites among us see no real boundaries to profit-taking; nor 
do they see any real alternatives to it. They see it as the one land-
scape into which we all are born. Righteously, and with Jesus 
well domesticated, they march us forward. It’s God’s plan: to the 
extent we can make it happen, and though the heavens may fall, 
our acquisitions and opportunities must be maximized.
Hermann Gossen (a German economist of the nineteenth cen-
tury deeply impressed by what he saw as a connection between 
God and laissez-faire economics), wondering that anyone should 
be seeking an alternative to this principle of self-aggrandizement, 
asked: “How can a creature be so arrogant as to want to frustrate 
totally or partially the purpose of his Creator?” Gossen meant 
God had sentenced us to pursue riches, and our duty was to do so. 
A majority of us in America today subscribe to this; and as we do, 
our rich grow richer, our poor grow poorer, our debts grow bigger, 
our use of habitat becomes more unrestricted, our infrastructure 
crumbles, and our society tumbles in the direction of terminal 
incoherence.
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When the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in 1941, I was seven 
years old. In the early years after World War II, it became a part 
of American folklore to say: “We’re a peaceful people, slow to 
take up arms—but once we’re aroused, look out!” I think state-
ments along those lines accurately capture both the mood of us 
Americans at the moment Pearl Harbor was bombed and the les-
son we took from the way hostilities ended some three years and 
eight months later.
I remember my parents were isolationist on the issue of the 
war up to the very day of Pearl Harbor. Their generation had 
been children at the time of the First World War; and as they 
grew older, they and most all of their generation in America had 
come to a collective judgment, endorsed by their own parents, 
that it had been a mistake for Americans to participate in the 
First World War.
To say as much leaves questions open of how isolationist regard-
ing economics we had been in 1941 as we approached December 7, 
and questions also of whether our government had ever been gen-
uinely isolationist even politically in the years between the Treaty 
of Versailles and Pearl Harbor. Putting on hold these complicat-
ing issues, it remains fact that we Americans by and large had no 
desire to enter the Second World War up to December 7. With 
regard to whether, once aroused, we committed ourselves to vic-
tory, there can be no doubt. Everyone living through those days 
has vivid memories of how hostilities were abruptly concluded 
less than four years later with gigantic clouds over Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, followed by the unconditional surrender of Japan. 
Our Tenaciously Expanding 
Belief in Force3
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Hence, the generalization: Americans are a peaceful people, but 
dangerous when attacked.
The problem with taking this generalization as a paradigm 
by which to view the American character in general is there’s 
so much in our history that won’t fit. (Historian John Toland, 
among others, has argued that the lead-up to World War II itself 
doesn’t fit very well; and historian William Appleman Williams 
titles his discussion of American participation in the Second 
World War as “the War for the American Frontier.”1)
In fact, to accommodate the paradigm that finds us a peaceful 
people, we’ve had to forget huge chunks of our earlier history, and 
retain in memory to fill its place a story we began to nurture near 
the earliest days of our arriving here. In this devised story, the 
Puritans who arrived at Massachusetts Bay in 1630 were a peace-
loving people who wished simply to be left at liberty to worship 
God according to their conscience. While they themselves were 
tolerant, back in England their English neighbors had been intol-
erant toward them. (Here there may be some memory-conflation 
of Plymouth Rock Pilgrim Separatists with Massachusetts Bay 
Colony Puritans. While one can accurately see the two groups 
as “cousins,” there were significant differences between them.)
The facts on record for Puritans tell us that Charles the First, 
who gave the Puritans a charter to colonize New England, was 
desperate to be rid of them. He gave them their charter in 1629; 
and twenty years later, their fellow Puritans in England— with 
some New England Puritans returning as reinforcements— 
beheaded Charles. In the view of Puritans, King Charles had 
become an impediment to God’s kingdom, so it was appropriate 
he be removed.
Similarly, as mentioned earlier, when Indians in the New 
World proved resistant to conversion and to Puritan governance, 
they too had to be removed. In 1637, about seven years after the 
Puritans arrived, when Puritans looked upon the Connecticut 
1. John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 
1936–1945, 2 vols. (New York: Random House, 1970); William Appleman 
Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland: World Publish-
ing Company, 1959), chapter 5.
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River Valley and saw its rich agricultural possibilities and saw 
also that it was native habitat for Pequot Indians, they did what 
they could to persuade the Pequots to become a “protectorate,” a 
people protected by the Bay Colony and subservient to it. When 
the Pequots made clear they had scant interest in letting the 
Puritans control their lives and land, the Puritans did what they 
thought natural for those serving in God’s army. After much 
mutual denunciatory interpretation of each others’ motives, and 
following upon bloody skirmish, a rumor, and a Pequot refusal 
to accept a Puritan ultimatum, as noted earlier the Puritans con-
ducted a surprise attack on the offending Pequot village at Mystic 
Fort:
Thus were they [the Pequots] now at their wits end, who not 
many hours before exalted themselves in their great pride, 
threatening and resolving the utter ruin and destruction 
of all the English, exulting and rejoicing with songs and 
dances. But God was above them, who laughed his ene-
mies and the enemies of his people to scorn, making them 
as a fiery oven: Thus were the stout-hearted spoiled, hav-
ing slept their last sleep, and none of their men could find 
their hands. Thus did the Lord judge among the heathen, 
filling the place with dead bodies.2
As recounted in the chapter on wealth, the Puritans killed all 
the Pequot men, women, and children they could lay hands 
on. Later they sought out the survivors— Pequots who had not 
been living at the massacred village — who were seeking to hide 
themselves, and— with few exceptions— killed them too. Subse-
quently, if some other Indian tribe found a straggler from among 
the Pequots and took in that straggler, this was regarded by the 
Puritans as a hostile act against themselves, and body parts were 
required by the Puritans as proof the straggler had been executed.
The mindset portrayed here is worth pondering. It must 
have gone something like this. “Here we are, good Christians, 
2. John Mason, commander of the Puritan forces, qtd. in Segal and 
Stineback, Puritans, Indians & Manifest Destiny, 111.
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attempting to establish God’s Kingdom. In God’s Kingdom, to 
be sure, everyone is free — for the truth will set you free. But 
these Pequots are resisting the advent of God’s Kingdom. If they 
would behave as we tell them to, we would treat them with the 
full measure of charity that it behooves a Christian people to 
exercise; but they will not behave. Therefore, resolute in defiance, 
they have sealed their doom.”
John Mason’s account helps us see that by the time the Puri-
tans got around to attempting genocidal action toward the 
Pequots, Puritans had reconfigured the scene to see their act 
as defensive. They saw themselves as potential victims. Though 
historical evidence provides good grounds for thinking it was 
Puritan land-greed and desire for control that led to bad feelings 
between the two groups, the sleeping Indians were seen by Puri-
tans as “threatening and resolving the utter ruin and destruction 
of all the English.” It seems in fact it was this ability to recon-
figure the attacking Puritan as victim that was needed to make 
their act influential— that is, to turn it into a precedent. Had the 
killing of Pequots been viewed as aberrational rampage or gross 
surrender to greed on the part of the Puritans, its importance 
for America’s development and for the souls of future Ameri-
cans would have been negligible. As actually retained in Puritan 
memory (that is, in our memory) as something unrepented and 
celebrated, it’s been able to become a template for like action in a 
long series of later encounters.
In my youth in the thirties of the twentieth century, we roman-
ticized the nineteenth-century imperiled homestead on the prai-
rie in our story of westward development. Our version ran along 
these lines. Here, as they founded western outposts of civiliza-
tion, our people were domesticating the land, attending church 
on Sunday, and conducting folk dances and pie-baking contests 
at the time of harvest. What more sacred image of Christians at 
peace could one ever hope to see? Yet all was in jeopardy. For sav-
ages, half-naked and godless, lurked in the vicinity. These were 
savages bent on desecration. They were encroaching. Once the 
harvest party was over, and the happy and celebrating crowd of 
friendly settlers had dispersed to their several homes, each little 
house would stand in isolation, defenseless against an immoral 
and near-invisible enemy—  and, yes, the enemy was closer and 
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more menacing than the industrious settlers might think. Sud-
denly came the unprovoked and maniacal attack. Thankfully, in 
the eleventh hour of our romance — in the last chapter or the 
last reel—  our cavalry would arrive, federal guardians of law and 
order. The savages would be shot down, and civilization could 
take one further courageous step westward.
That little westward house requires study. I was nearly an adult 
before it ceased for me to be a symbol of peace and became instead 
a symbol of violence. I was slow to acknowledge any Indian right 
to a land they loved as their land of the free and the home of 
their braves.
Making that acknowledgement, one need not be arguing 
to  “give the land back to the Indians”— nor be claiming immi-
grants from across the Atlantic should never have ventured 
here — in order to cast about for an alternative to what we did. 
Both Roger Williams and the Quakers had in fact conceived an 
alternative.
Let’s consider again the beginnings. In 1635, a few years after 
the earliest encounters between Puritans and Indians, Roger 
Williams was banished from Massachusetts Bay Colony. As 
mentioned, he was banished in part for insisting Puritans had 
no warrant to appropriate land from Indians just because they 
wanted it or just because England’s king had granted it to them; 
he insisted colonists were bound rather to negotiate in good faith 
with Indians for it, and to abide by agreements made. This meant 
the Puritans, as newcomers, were morally bound to seek an hon-
est accommodation with those already using the land— were 
obliged to recognize Indians as people holding prior title. 
To Williams’ fellow Puritans this seemed an extravagantly 
troublesome position. It wouldn’t just bring Puritans down to the 
level of Indians, as equals dealing with equals; it would— in a 
sense — place them lower than Indians. The Puritans would be 
the petitioners; and it would be in the competence of Indians to 
grant or deny.
Williams’ appraisal of the facts was rejected by the Puritan 
leadership; and we can assume a majority of the Puritan com-
munity shared in rejecting it. While Massachusetts Colony did 
require that land purchases from Indians be recorded, the way 
the matter played out suggests this was more to determine which 
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Puritan had title to which land than it was a measure to protect 
Indian rights.
A half century later, in Pennsylvania, Quakers—  despised and 
even hanged in Massachusetts Bay Colony— would take up a 
position close to the position Williams had taken. While Wil-
liam Penn’s successors in Pennsylvania often ignored the policy 
he’d laid down, one has to wonder what the history of America 
(and of the world) would look like if the attitudes of Roger Wil-
liams and of William Penn had prevailed. The objection is that 
the development of the West would have been greatly retarded. 
As it was, two years after Williams was banished from Massa-
chusetts Bay Colony, the Pequots were massacred. One must ask, 
would it have been some kind of catastrophe for America’s future 
if the tempo had been less frantic— if time to reach accommoda-
tion for mutual benefit had been allowed.
Rather than allow for organic maturation, what was taken 
to be an efficient template for dealing with Indians was estab-
lished. The Puritans regarded their action as defensive. They were 
defending the right of God’s people to live in God’s country. This 
Puritan perspective of entitlement became, through repetition, so 
well installed that two centuries later, when a house was raised 
on a prairie, there was no question about whether the house was 
entitled to be there, and no question either as to the criminal 
violence and savagery of anyone who would attack it. (In terms 
of current vocabulary, it was clear for all to see which party were 
the terrorists.)
Two habits of mind became embedded. First, in dealings 
between us innocent, purified and god-serving Americans and 
other people, what ought to set the premise for the dealing was 
the plan of us, the servants of God. The other party revealed itself 
as good, indifferent, or bad depending on how they responded to 
our plan. Second, in cases where our plan was rejected or disre-
garded, it became a premise that we descendants of Puritans were 
right to think ourselves the injured party. Our plan became The 
Plan, self-evidently just; it became in fact the very standard of 
Justice, incarnated and brought down to earth by us. From then 
on, its defense and promotion have not needed justification. An 
obstructing party should know better than to oppose it; one who 
does oppose comes to deserve whatever the god-serving defend-
ers of peace deal out.
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This psychological aspect needs underscoring. In later times, 
as we legitimate offspring of Puritans employed force, it became 
practically invisible to us in its character as violence. It wasn’t we 
who acted aggressively; ours was action in the service of law. 
Remarkable is the habituation to unacknowledged violence 
that ensues. One regrets this habituation not simply for havoc 
it visited on others; one regrets what it did to us. Let’s trace this 
expanding process of habituation throughout the nineteenth 
century (leaving, for a time, events closer at hand to speak for 
themselves).
The Revolutionary War in the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century deserves perhaps a pass. Fought against a force deemed 
a superior power, let’s grant to the Patriots who fought it their 
sense that it was defensive. Even though an interest in moving 
into Indian lands in the Ohio Valley was among Patriot motives, 
and even though Canadian relations with Britain present an 
interesting counterexample to feisty American relations to Brit-
ain, let’s say the Revolutionary War was mostly motivated by a 
desire to resist the mercantilist policies, provided for in British 
law, that the British had unwisely decided to impose more fully 
in the aftermath of the French and Indian War. Let then the 
war’s character as defensive stand. (Its negative value lay, para-
doxically, in the way its success has resounded among us. With 
its David-and-Goliath aspect, once won, the Revolutionary war 
nurtured among us a celebratory regard for war. Every American-
born American has been raised on legends from it which tend 
to legitimize and dignify wars—  at least those in which we find 
ourselves engaged.)
In addition to the Revolutionary War of the eighteenth century, 
there were two wars in the nineteenth century, one minor and 
the other momentous, which don’t readily lend support to a case 
that we are a war-prone people. One was the War of 1812; the 
other was the Civil War.
Though existence of American “War Hawks” complicates the 
issue, the War of 1812 can be explained as resulting from an ill-
advised British effort to re-impose a modified form of mercantil-
ism on an American people who had already irreversibly shaken 
off British control. At war with France, the British seemed to 
think they could require their former colony to forgo its own eco-
nomic interests and act economically as Britain’s ally against the 
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French. The choice they offered us was either to do that, or retire 
from trade on the high seas altogether. (The latter choice was 
something the Francophile Jefferson— to his credit—  attempted, 
but which only postponed the war till Madison was president.) 
True, there were side issues—  ones the ever-thoughtful historian 
Herbert Agar says in fact were controlling issues.3 Among some 
Americans was a desire to annex Canada. Contributing to Amer-
ican restlessness too was a desire of some to move more rapidly 
into westward territory still comfortably held by Indians, and to 
do so unencumbered by Canadian land claims. Writing about 
1812 though, Henry Adams comes to the conclusion we Ameri-
cans were at this time generally pacifist, documenting at length 
that, once war was declared, we seemed woefully unprepared to 
wage it. Theodore Roosevelt, in a book he wrote on the war while 
he was a student at Harvard, writes along similar lines. Let’s con-
cede then that the War of 1812 doesn’t offer much that reveals us 
as an aggressive people.
As for the Civil War, Lincoln never wanted it to be a raw mat-
ter of the North imposing its will on the South. He had enough 
roots in Southern ancestry, and his wife had even more, to sense 
how the South viewed the war as a monumental overreaching by 
the North. While Lincoln’s consistent sense of the war was that 
the North’s motivation was to save the Union, what had made 
him a viable candidate for the presidency was his speech at Coo-
per Union in which he declared the institution of slavery should 
not be permitted to move westward. Significantly, he left it to 
the South therefore to “draw first blood” at Fort Sumter; and 
when eventually he issued an Emancipation Proclamation, he did 
not see it as providing the war’s motive, but issued it rather as a 
measure he hoped would give the North an advantage in ending 
the war. Once the war’s end was in view, it’s true he hoped the 
terrible loss of life on both sides could achieve something more 
than a restoration of the status quo at the war’s start. He wanted 
an end to slavery, but saw this as possible only through an act of 
Congress— not as something he could do as commander-in-chief. 
Famously, he rejected the consolation many on the Northern side 
3. Herbert Agar, The People’s Choice: From Washington to Harding (Safety 
Harbor, Fla.: Simon Publications, 2001), 76–77.
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offered him that “God’s on your side,” and replaced it with a 
wistful expression of hope that he and the Union army might be 
on God’s side. This seemed to be — was in fact—  an un-Puritan 
way to think. For these reasons (no doubt with many Southerners 
dissenting on this), it’s problematic to use the Civil War as evi-
dence for a case we are an aggressive people. All things consid-
ered, and while allowing room for a pacifist dissent, let’s concede 
a defensive —  or at least “unchosen” character— to the Civil War, 
not only from the Southern perspective, but from the Northern 
as well.4
Taking the War of 1812 and the Civil War off the board (while 
acknowledging this may seem quite arbitrary to some), there 
remain, among others, four representative and instructive uses 
of force in the nineteenth century deserving our attention. Each 
use has the double character of being (1) highly deliberate (chosen 
rather than imposed), but (2)  deliberate in such a manner that 
our collective opting for violence goes almost unacknowledged. 
Because these cases seem not to have been logged into collec-
tive memory in an accurate way, it would seem they continue to 
fester like an undetected virus within the body politic. They are: 
(1) the removal westward to Oklahoma of the Cherokee Indians 
of Georgia; (2) the Mexican War; (3) the War on the Plains; and 
(4) the war that ended with American hegemony over Cuba and 
with the bloody annexation of the Philippines—  a war we rather 
inaccurately call the Spanish-American War.
4. I admit this may be seeing the war too much through Northern eyes. 
What makes the Civil War such a difficult case is its aftermath. View-
ing the war from its aftermath, it’s no easy matter to provide a coher-
ent account of what the root of Northern motivation was. As remarks 
by Howard Zinn suggest, the mayhem and the wounds inflicted on the 
spirits of Northerners and Southerners alike, and the vitriolic hatred that 
ensued among defeated Southern whites toward “emancipated” blacks 
makes one wonder if the matter of slavery could not have been ended 
better by slave insurrections, relentless shaming of the South by abolition-
ists, and by economic factors and the general inconvenience of holding 
in bondage a huge population— rather than by full-scale federal invasion 
of the South by the North. Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United 
States (New York: HarperPerennial Modern Classics, 2005), 186–89, 198.
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Cherokee Removal
In the War of 1812, some Cherokee led by John Ross had fought 
on the American side against the British. Among his eight great 
grandparents, Ross seems to have had only one Indian, so his 
sense of himself as affiliated with white plantation culture is 
perhaps not surprising. What is remarkable is that the Cherokee 
among whom Ross was a chief seem largely to have shared Ross’s 
sense of affiliation. These were Cherokee who wrote and read in 
a Cherokee script of their own invention, who printed a newspa-
per in Cherokee and English, who imitated white landowners in 
the cotton plantation economy, slaves and all. Also they set up 
schools as a path toward further assimilation into the surround-
ing white society, and they welcomed Christian missionaries into 
their midst and welcomed intermarriage of their women with 
whites. 
At times, whites had said to Indians: if you would be like us, 
there would be no problem, and we could live together in har-
mony. Here was a test case of that olive branch.
Unfortunately for them, the Cherokee lived in a northeast-
ern section of Georgia where gold was discovered. To fortify 
themselves against the acquisitive interests of their neighbors, 
the Cherokee wrote themselves a constitution modeled on ours; 
and they passed a law that no one of their citizens could sell any 
land to a non-Cherokee without the consent of their Cherokee 
government.
Their thriving ways stuck in the craw of white neighbors. Not 
only did Cherokee presume to do as whites did, but they did so 
so well as to become envied rivals. The Cherokee constitution 
was itself an affront; they seemed thereby to present themselves 
as the equals of whites. Clearly though, most obnoxious of all was 
simply that Cherokee lived on lands the whites wanted.
The great champion of white enterprise was Andrew Jackson. 
No one in America could rival Jackson’s well-earned celebrity as 
a killer of Indians. That John Ross had fought in 1812 under Jack-
son’s command was no matter. When Jackson was not killing 
Indians, he was negotiating with them for their land. He was 
very accomplished at it. As early as 1817, he’d written to Presi-
dent Monroe: “I have long viewed treaties with the Indians an 
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absurdity not to be reconciled to the principles of our govern-
ment.” An elegant turn of phrase. Indians were not to be taken 
seriously. As a negotiator, Jackson felt free to beguile them, lie to 
them, intimidate them. He behaved in full accord with the con-
venient maxim adopted by earlier Puritans: “there’s no treating 
with Indians above board.” 
Wiley though and stubborn as Jackson was, not all Indians 
succumbed. Having failed as government agent to remove the 
Cherokee through negotiation, once Jackson was president he 
withdrew federal protection from them, leaving them to the 
mercy of the State of Georgia. He then used the vulnerability of 
the Cherokee as a pretext. In his first State of the Union message, 
Jackson observed disingenuously that since it wasn’t likely their 
neighbors would leave at peace such Indians as lived east of the 
Mississippi, it should be the policy of the federal government to 
do what it could to protect Indians by moving them to a territory 
west of the Mississippi “to be guarantied [sic] to the Indian tribes, 
as long as they shall occupy it.”
In response, Congress passed the Removal Act of 1830. In 1832, 
in the case of Worcester v. Georgia, John Marshall wrote for the 
Supreme Court an opinion upholding the Cherokee as “having 
territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive,” 
and Marshall said these were boundaries “in which the laws of 
Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have 
no right to enter, but with the assent of Cherokees themselves, or 
in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress.”
Perhaps Jackson felt the Removal Act, as an act of Congress, 
blunted the force of Marshall’s decision. At any rate, he despised 
Marshall’s assertion of Indian rights, and pushed ahead with the 
policy of removal. In practice this meant Georgia was licensed to 
use every means of bribery and harassment to force the Chero-
kee off Cherokee land, while the federal government did what 
it could to negotiate new treaties to nullify old ones. Even then, 
many Cherokee stood resolute in principled resistance. Finally, in 
1837 Martin Van Buren, Jackson’s successor, sent General Win-
field Scott to remove the Cherokee by force:
Families at dinner were startled by the sudden gleam of 
bayonets in the doorway and rose to be driven with blows 
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and oaths along the weary miles of trail that led to the 
stockade. Men were seized in their fields, or going along 
the road, women were taken from their [spinning] wheels 
and children from their play. In many cases, on turning 
for one last look as they crossed the ridge they saw their 
homes in flames, fired by the lawless rabble that followed 
on the heels of the soldiers to loot and pillage.5
Why is this episode significant? Its significance is in how little it’s 
been noticed. Three weeks before Christmas in 1838, on Decem-
ber 3, President Van Buren informed Congress: 
The measures [for Cherokee removal] authorized by 
Congress at its last session have had the happiest 
effects. . . .The Cherokees have emigrated without any 
apparent reluctance.6
The use of force was invisible. Certainly, that was as Van Buren 
wanted, and the atrocity hasn’t left a discernible mark on the rep-
utation of Jackson. The memory entertained of Jackson’s prone-
ness to violence is not that it was cruel but that it was effective. It 
cleared southern land of Indians, and rendered that land available 
for the righteous spread of plantations and slavery. We remember 
Jackson as one of the great American presidents—  as one who 
5. Quoted in Gary B. Nash, Julie Roy Jeffrey, et al., eds., The American 
People: Creating a Nation and a Society, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 
1990), 417. This may strike us as an eerie foreshadowing of the intern-
ment of Japanese residing legally in America— many of them American 
citizens—  during the Second World War. In the case of the Cherokee, 
though, the extenuating circumstance of an America reacting in shock 
and irrational fear was not a factor. The Cherokee case bears a closer 
resemblance to the rounding up of Jews by Nazis. In both cases the legiti-
mation was simple racism, and in both cases the outcome for many was 
death. We have no neat census of the Cherokee dead. Estimates suggest 
that about 14,000 were coerced onto the “Trail of Tears, and that of these 
about 4,000 —  somewhere between one-fourth and one-third—  died 
along the way.
6. Cited in John Collier, The Indians of the Americas (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1947), 123.
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opened the West to the uses of democracy. Only in the second 
decade of the twenty-first century have there been rumblings of 
criticism concerning the long-standing custom of the Demo-
cratic Party to gather yearly in the separate states for Jefferson-
Jackson Day dinners during which Democrats commemorate 
“the good old days” and nerve themselves to meet the challenges 
of the present in the same splendid spirit these men met chal-
lenges of the past. Howard Zinn remarks that in historian Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr.’s prize-winning salute to “the Age of Jackson,” one 
finds no mention of the Trail of Tears.7
One must wonder what logical consequence such complacency 
should have for our claim to be “the land of the free and the 
home of the brave.” Surely our complacency requires us to con-
tract Francis Scott Key’s sparkling phrases to mean: “we’re a land 
for the right kind of people to be free,” and “for those of the brave 
who have white skins we’ve become a home.” It doesn’t scan as 
well as the original, but cuts closer to the truth. When we pledge 
allegiance to our “one nation, under God, with liberty and jus-
tice for all,” we have to understand that, while we may aspire 
to be such a nation, what our past has achieved so far is a less 
perfect union, one in which the liberty of some has meant— in 
the gestures and lifestyle modeled by Jefferson and Jackson— 
the freedom to trample on the liberty of others. When we lose 
awareness of this poignant disservice to principle, we reduce the 
aspiration of our truly beautiful phrases down to the level of mere 
propaganda and cant.
The Mexican War
It would be impossible to find another presidential administration 
to match the record of James Polk. He entered the presidency to 
fulfill four goals during what he said would be a one-term presi-
dency. In one term, he achieved those goals, after which he left 
the White House, went home, and died.
In the course of his time in office, Polk added, by reason of 
the Mexican Cession, two-thirds as much land to the U. S. as 
7. Zinn, People’s History, 130.
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Jefferson had by the Louisiana Purchase; and if one counts Texas 
(added in response to Polk’s election) and the Oregon Territory 
(whose boundary he settled), he added considerably more land 
than Jefferson had. If one rates presidents by how much real 
estate they acquired for their fellow Americans, Polk comes out 
at the top of the list.
When they hear such things, students ask: “Well, if he did all 
that, why isn’t he famous?” Polk is overdue for a close look.
He was a man of moderate height and prickly disposition. He 
was thought to have neither charisma— the ability to command 
spontaneous devotion— nor a capacity to intimidate. What he 
had was his Presbyterian/Methodist faith, and a stubborn sense 
of personal mission. He was a protégé of Andrew Jackson, whom 
he sought to imitate. The four goals he brought to his presidency 
were: (1)  to settle the boundary with England over the Oregon 
Territory; (2)  to lower the tariff; (3)  to institute a new banking 
system for the federal treasury; and (4) to acquire California from 
Mexico. The first three he achieved with relative ease during the 
first half of his one term. The fourth required a war.
In early May 1846, after a year and two months in the White 
House, Polk addressed Congress requesting that Congress 
acknowledge existence of a state of war between the United 
States and Mexico. Polk wrote:
The cup of forbearance had been exhausted even before the 
recent information from the frontier of the Del Norte [the 
Rio Grande]. But now, after reiterated menaces, Mexico 
has passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded 
our territory and shed American blood upon the American 
soil. She has proclaimed that hostilities have commenced, 
and that the two nations are now at war. As war exists, 
and, notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists by 
the act of Mexico herself, we are called upon by every con-
sideration of duty and patriotism to vindicate with deci-
sion the honor, the rights, and the interests of our country.
The United States, Polk was insisting, was the victim. Mexico 
was the relentless invader. It was more or less on this premise that 
for almost twenty-two months, and at the cost of some 13,000 
American men and a greater but not well counted number of 
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Mexicans, that the United States invaded Mexico, took control 
of its capital, and wrested from it the cession of “Alta California” 
and the larger area sometimes called “New Mexico.”
That we were the defending party was—  as we saw— Polk’s 
story. To an extent, he may have taught himself to believe it. It’s 
possible he never let himself regard the war as an exercise in con-
quest. If one squints one’s eyes, stands on one’s head, and looks 
at the whole thing just right, one may catch a glimpse of Polk’s 
angle. For one thing, the territory at issue —  California and “New 
Mexico”— was sparsely populated and barely governed. After 
having won independence from Spain, Mexico had spun into a 
swirl of shifting governments; amid the turmoil, outlying north-
ern districts were often given little or no direction from Mexico 
City. In these circumstances, perhaps Polk was able to conduct a 
self-persuasion; he may have persuaded himself his policy was a 
mere effort to occupy vacant territory and settle boundary issues.
In the case of the Oregon Territory, in truth it was an issue 
about boundaries that Polk’s diplomacy addressed. In this case, 
after some fairly standard threats, counterthreats, and near-
ultimatums, the issue with Britain was settled peacefully, and the 
settlement produced no lasting discord.
The case of California was different. Conflicted as Mexico was, 
we can be sure there resided in the back of the minds of Mexico’s 
contending parties the notion that Mexico was a nation of vast 
land-wealth— that Mexico was rich in northward prospects for 
prosperity in the not-distant future. Who would manage such 
prospects was in fact a significant part of what the Mexican fac-
tions were squabbling about. Events leading to the de facto loss of 
Texas had to seem a naïve mistake to Mexicans, and only quick-
ened the sense of urgency among Mexican officials not to repeat 
such mistakes at the threshold of Polk’s administration. Polk may 
have thought however that, having lost Texas, surely Mexicans 
realized they must also lose California. He may not have under-
stood how the loss of Texas enhanced for Mexicans the precious-
ness of what northern land remained.
As to Mexico’s title to California, Polk did not really have 
genuine doubts. He’d sent Thomas Slidell to Mexico City for the 
express purpose of buying California. Understanding the pur-
pose of Slidell’s mission, no Mexican official would meet with 
Slidell. Reaching for any excuse handy, Polk was getting ready 
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to treat this diplomatic snub as itself a “casus belli”—  a violation 
of American rights sufficient to justify war. Such a pretext was, 
however, transparently weak—  as if nations have some obligation 
under international law to meet with others whenever those oth-
ers wish to make a purchase of their land. So Polk sent General 
Zachary Taylor south through Texas to stake out a position on 
territory just north of the Rio Grande about which there was 
a running boundary dispute. (We claimed that Texas extended 
south to the Rio Grande whereas Mexicans claimed it was 
bounded by a river to the north.) Polk’s hope was that Taylor’s 
presence in disputed territory would provoke an incident with 
Mexican forces situated on the Rio Grande’s southern bank.
It did; and the consensus of commentators then and now is that 
Polk was greatly relieved when it did.
Therefore, when Polk said in his request for a declaration of 
war that the war had come “notwithstanding all our efforts to 
avoid it,” he was lying. He had to be aware of his own efforts to 
provoke the war. From then on, an issue that continued to divide 
Congress and ordinary people as well all through the war was 
between those who were content to allow the lie as being in a 
good cause, and those who weren’t.
The fact the lie “succeeded” and the U. S. gained immense real 
estate as a consequence has had two effects. First, Polk and the 
actual war have sunk below the visible horizon for most Ameri-
cans. Since the war ended in “success,” we haven’t needed to think 
about it. Secondly, for those who do think about such things, the 
war allowed one more experience from which to argue that force 
used in the service of America’s destiny can be a good thing.
The harm in this is hard for most Americans to discern. A truly 
masterful book on the Polk administration, A Country of Vast 
Designs by Robert W. Merry (of the Wall Street Journal and the 
Congressional Quarterly), after it provides a fascinating record 
of the to-and-fro-ing, the conflicts, manipulations, and duplici-
ties of the war effort, concludes with the following exoneration 
of Polk:
The moralistic impulse, when applied to the Mexican War, 
misses a fundamental reality of history: it doesn’t turn on 
moralistic pivots but on differentials of power, will, orga-
nization, and population. History moves forward with 
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a crushing force and does not stop for niceties of moral 
suasion or concepts of political virtue. Mexico was a dys-
functional, unstable, weak nation whose population wasn’t 
sufficient to control all the lands within its domain. The 
United States by contrast was a vibrant, expanding, exu-
berant experiment in democracy whose burgeoning popu-
lation thrilled to the notion that it was engaging in some-
thing big and historically momentous.8
As an expression of what was the general sense among politi-
cally conscious Americans (at least once the treaty ending the 
war was in place and memories of the dead had begun to recede), 
the passage cited above may be accurate. It has however obvi-
ous inconveniences. When, in the mid-1930s, Japan looked again 
to the Asian mainland (having already stationed itself in Korea), 
no doubt what the leaders of Japan beheld in China was a “dys-
functional, unstable, weak nation” unable “to control all the lands 
within its domain.” When these same Japanese leaders looked to 
their own country, no doubt they beheld “a vibrant, exuberant 
experiment” (if not in democracy, at least in something that had 
far-reaching patriotic endorsement— the Emperor, after all, was 
divine) by a “burgeoning population thrilled to the notion that 
it was engaging in something big and historically momentous.” 
One might say Japan paid the United States a compliment—  a 
kind of homage to the Monroe Doctrine9— by proclaiming as its 
ambition a “Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.”
Simultaneously, when Hitler was looking to the east of Ger-
many for Lebensraum for the German people, what he saw were 
Slavic countries, ill-governed and dysfunctional. Looking to 
the German and Austrian people, he saw a “vibrant, exuberant, 
experiment”— in a kind of populist democracy— by a “burgeon-
ing population thrilled to the notion that it was engaging in 
8. Robert W. Merry, A Country of Vast Designs (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2009), 476.
9. The Monroe Doctrine, penned by the always sagacious J. Q. Adams, 
was intended as an instrument of peace, taking the Western Hemisphere 
out of the turmoil of European politics and allowing the U. S. to live in 
separate harmony with itself and its neighbors. Already by the time of 
Polk’s administration, it had been flipped and rendered toxic.
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something big and historically momentous.” He would entirely 
have agreed with Wall Street Journal writer Merry’s conten-
tion that history “doesn’t turn on moral pivots but on differen-
tials of power, will, organization, and population.” Further he’d 
have claimed no one believed more firmly than he that “history 
moves forward with a crushing force and does not stop for nice-
ties of moral suasion or concepts of political virtue.” The point 
being argued here isn’t that the Mexican War caused these other 
aggressions, but that it forfeited in advance the moral ground 
from which we professed to criticize Japan and Germany. Though 
I can still recall the outraged denunciations of Japan and Ger-
many I heard as a boy during the Second World War, I came to 
see as I grew older how opportunistic they were. Our premise 
for the Mexican War and Merry’s rationalization for it made it 
clear we would not be restrained by the principles we demanded 
of others.
That we Americans found ourselves inconvenienced in the 
twentieth century by these might-is-right agendas of other coun-
tries, is moral karma. We vigorously denounced “imperialist 
behavior” in the most moralistic terms, but the actions against 
which we protested (and went on to reverse by war) were actions 
for which we’d provided paradigm and advertisement. Our Mex-
ican war was a “success,” and we’ve never repudiated it. If one 
wants to, one can say that the Japanese and Germans didn’t need 
our example for their attempt to grab other peoples’ land— but to 
do so misses the point. If the actions of Japan and Germany were 
so contemptible, what then of ours?10
Surely, the principle of expansion, as internalized by Ameri-
cans and accurately expressed by Merry, was self-contradictory 
and deeply damaging to our internal accounting system. As 
noted earlier, in our American formulation, the case for expan-
sion has routinely invoked the notion we were expanding the 
domain of democracy. We’ve presented Democracy as our ster-
ling goal; its goodness was that it enlarged the domain of human 
10. In the case of the Japanese, I think there are in fact plausible histori-
cal reasons suggesting our example toward Mexico and the rest of Latin 
America was a motivating factor in the development of their Greater 
Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.
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rights. To trample on human rights in the interest of enlarging 
their domain involves no minor instance of cognitive dissonance; 
one needs to shut down one’s mind to pull it off.
It adds to the irony of things that in this pell-mell effort sup-
posedly to maximize opportunities for human freedom, we’ve 
often portrayed ourselves as having no choice. We were acting 
as servants of Manifest Destiny. Held in its grip, we could do 
no other. So in our mission to bring human freedom to an ever 
wider sphere, it seems the denial of our own freedom— made 
when we said: “The matter is out of our hands!”— was a price we 
were willing to pay.
I’ve mentioned Polk as partly Presbyterian; his father was one. 
Of the Christian sects, Presbyterians were the most directly 
descended from Puritans and were the most enduring of Prot-
estant sects in maintaining a Calvinist sense of things that reso-
nated echoes of predestination. We’ve noted earlier how the 
Puritan sense of an obligatory American mission to promote 
God’s reign could transform itself into a mere secular impulse to 
pursue goods compulsively. It could do this without undergoing 
a loss of momentum or foregoing any of Puritanism’s constrain-
ing demands for aesthetic deprivation, deferred gratification, or 
bigotry toward others. (Weber invites his reader to find particu-
larly the first two demands in Ben Franklin’s days of producing 
aphorisms by “Poor Richard.”) The vivid presence of such Puritan 
demands on us as we waged the Mexican War manifests that 
Puritanism was alive and well as we fought.
Beyond other evils consequent upon this war though is this 
one that can be invisible —  enabled therefore to be enduring and 
potent. It’s the hidden evil implicit in Merry’s eloquent rational-
ization: The Mexican War “worked” and therefore inquiries into 
the means by which it worked are irrelevant. To believe that is to 
believe in evil— to believe in entrenched evil of the kind Jesus 
may have had in mind when he said “sins against the light” are 
satanically tenacious.
The War on the Plains
There’s really no name for this war. That makes it easier to dis-
miss. Perhaps it was no war at all, we’re inclined to say. We’ve 
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re-cast it in our folklore as “the Winning of the West.” As I sug-
gest, typically the folklore memorializes valiant efforts on the 
part of white settlers and the federal troops who protected them 
to subdue mindless acts of domestic violence by those resisting 
the westward march of civilization. It confuses things, we tend 
to think, to call this activity a war; it was a policing operation. It 
was law enforcement of duly negotiated treaties— made neces-
sary by faithless Indians who refused to abide by these treaties. 
It was action— to use a term popular in my youth— necessitated 
by “Indian-givers.”
Such at least we have preferred to think, and so — until 
recently— many of our teachers would have us believe.
The heroes of this campaign in the West counted among their 
ranks some of the foremost heroes of the Civil War. Recall 
that right up into 1865, federal soldiers were marching coura-
geously into hostile territory, risking their lives— losing their 
lives in great numbers— to liberate blacks held in bondage on 
the slave-labor camps that were the “peculiar institution” of the 
South. No sooner had these soldiers succeeded in their selfless 
venture than they turned their faces westward and marched 
out across the plains in a new effort at liberation— this time in 
an effort to liberate the lands of the West from the bondage of 
non-use or imperfect-use imposed by the savages who inhabited 
them.
The story won’t work, will it? It ends in anticlimax. Yet it’s true 
that many of the protagonists in this War on the Plains were from 
the victorious northern ranks of our Civil War. Some three years 
after the Civil War, General William Tecumseh Sherman wrote 
John Sherman (a brother, and a future secretary of state):  “The 
more [of Indians] we can kill this year, the less will have to be 
killed in the next war, for the more I see of these Indians the 
more convinced I am that they all have to be killed or be main-
tained as a species of paupers.” In January of the next year, 1869, 
another great hero of the North’s liberating army, General Philip 
Henry Sheridan, is reported to have said at Fort Cobb: “The only 
good Indians I ever saw were dead.”
Until recently there have been writers who admired the candor 
of such words, seeing Sherman and Sheridan as realists willing, 
surgically, to make the task of Indian extermination as quick and 
painless as possible. They were men who manned up —  saddled 
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up, John Wayne might say— to do the dirty work that needed 
doing. They acted as mercy killers.
It’s a defense few can now stomach. But then we find our-
selves re-directed to an issue we addressed earlier. If these once-
honored soldiers were not humanitarians, what are we to make 
of that Civil War which brought them to the forefront of our 
affairs?
(Before the Civil War, back in the 1850s, politicians and citi-
zens had spoken of “Free Soil” in the West. California and John 
C. Fremont were prominent in the Free-Soil movement. When 
one first hears the phrase “Free Soil,” one is likely to conclude — 
since the phrase clearly intended to exclude slavery from the 
West— that the phrase envisioned a West where blacks, among 
others, could work the land in freedom. Yet after the war, the 
West did not soon see any large migration of blacks. Looked at 
more closely, the phrase “Free Soil” seems not to have intended 
a West that was free for blacks, but a West that was free from 
blacks. Envisioned by the victorious North was a West in which 
whites would be free to seek their fortunes without competition 
either from the institution of slavery or from the people once 
afflicted by that institution.)
Even though America was convulsed in the middle of the 
nineteenth century over the issue of slavery, one should be slow 
to conclude slavery was the century’s central theme. The readi-
ness after the war with which Reconstruction was shunted to the 
side demonstrates it was not. The organizing focus of mainstream 
America in the nineteenth century was, as the Mexican War sug-
gests, the expansion westward of our white and Christian way 
of life. How to accommodate emancipated blacks in that expan-
sion was given little attention—  even by Lincoln. As for Indians, 
there really was no interest at all in how to accommodate them. 
In language of today, what expansion meant for American Indi-
ans is that, indiscriminately, they’d be discounted as its collateral 
damage.
Once one had chosen to persist— by adopting this accounting 
system— in denying personhood to Indians, once one had risen 
to the heights of Merry’s “big and historically momentous” forces, 
one may have felt in a safe position (as some writers still do) to 
shrug and re-personalize as it were —  and to do so on behalf of 
both sides. One can say: “Well, we must be fair; just as it was 
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wrong in the nineteenth century to say all the wrong was on the 
side of the Indians, so today it would be wrong to romanticize the 
Indians and say all the wrong was on the side of the whites; the 
truth is, there was good and bad behavior on both sides.” 
How we love that kind of thinking. It seems to excuse us 
from ever making sense of anything. Writing as recently as 1995, 
Charles M. Robinson III, after describing the white/Indian 
encounter as a “basic conflict between a technologically-advanced 
society and a primitive, tribal society,” informs us: “In such a sit-
uation, where both occupy—  or wish to occupy— the same area, 
the less advanced society must yield.”11
To posit this is an adroit maneuver. It abstracts from the con-
text of oppressor and victim, and of moral evaluation. Social 
problems reduce thereby to merely technical ones—  a kind of 
extension of Newtonian physics. “He with the most technology 
wins.” The account-giver is thereby freed to recount the War on 
the Plains as a kind of sporting event—  one in which some on 
each side showed valor and agility in tactics, while others on each 
side showed the lack thereof. Morality isn’t at issue —  and the 
outcome is foreseeable by anyone with common sense.
Trouble is, such “balanced treatment” requires a near total sus-
pension of aesthetic sensibility and empathy. The Nazi holocaust 
can be defended by one willing to argue this way; the Nazi Party 
had more technological competence in hand than had the Jews 
of Germany. We recognize spontaneously how banal and empty 
the argument is. In the War on the Plains, on the one side, the 
contestants were soldiers invading lands to which their most 
plausible claim was, “We bought this land from Napoleon!” On 
the other side, the contestants were husbands and fathers fighting 
to protect wives, children, and a place in the sun. An observer 
genuinely free from bias cannot see the issue here as one in which 
the merits and grievances on one side are more or less matched 
by those on the other—  cannot use the type of “balanced” his-
torical commentary one will still find commentators attempt-
ing who nonetheless regard themselves as fair-minded and 
liberal.
11. Charles M. Robinson III, A Good Year to Die: The Story of the Great 
Sioux War (New York: Random House, 1995), ix.
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To achieve the resetting of scales needed to provide this com-
forting sense of equilibrium (to give, that is, a measure of legiti-
macy to federal soldiers and the settlers on whose behalf they 
fought and killed), one has no option but to continue with our 
traditional undocumented and unhistorical demeaning of Indian 
husbands and fathers. This balancing act requires that Indian 
husbands and fathers be viewed as devoid of dignity. Unless they 
can be found unworthy of respect, there can be no balancing act. 
The phrases for the un-dignifying of Indian braves have been 
ready-to-hand for generations now. “See how they hang about 
the trading posts and agency offices!” “Look at them: alcoholic, 
suicidal, shiftless, waiting for handouts, quarreling pointlessly 
among themselves.” “Red devils, snakes, vermin, half-naked sav-
ages!” “Altogether untrustworthy!” 
In the good old days, this denial of status was relentless and 
uncriticized— indispensable in fact to maintain the morale of us 
Puritans. Even today, if one is somehow out to sanitize God’s 
Elect for their attempt to exterminate their rivals, these notions 
are needed as a thumb on the scale.
One demeaned these husbands and fathers so one could view 
their destruction with equanimity. An alternative to destroy-
ing them— that of reaching an accommodation— was always 
regarded as too inconvenient to be taken seriously. It would have 
placed intolerable restraints on white liberty. It would have meant 
we were no longer the land of the free. We were free to fight 
Indians because Indians were worthless. 
A tortured argument for sure; for both whites and Indians fully 
understood that the point in fighting Indians was to render them 
worthless. It was not alcoholic, suicidal, shiftless, impotent Indi-
ans against whom the War on the Plains was fought.
Was this genocide? The question perhaps is just semantic. If 
“genocide” looks to extermination of the last member of a race, 
perhaps not; for the intent was to move Indians out of the way. If 
however one means by “genocide” a systematic effort to deprive 
a people once and finally of all agency, I’d say this effort of our 
recent ancestors was as good an example of genocide as anything 
history offers. The influence of Indians on white purposes— the 
agency of Indians to influence and impede white purposes— was 
to be annihilated. We settlers shouldn’t have to worry about Indi-
ans any more. As the legitimate children of white Puritans, we 
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intended to secure total security by withholding all security of 
free action from our Indian predecessors and rivals.
Effective federal efforts to stop the sun dance and the ghost 
dance, and to take Indian children into Christian schools so as to 
extinguish in them the beliefs of their parents were as totalitarian 
and intolerant as anything the Chinese government has done in 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries against Tibetan Bud-
dhists or the Falun Gong. The successful attack on the buffalo 
herds— the staple and focus of Indian life on the plains—  sets 
some kind of record in the annals total war.
Among the events in this war, the most famous was the cam-
paign toward the end against some Lakota, a resistant federation 
led by the Sioux among whom Sitting Bull emerged as the para-
mount leader. One should be mindful of course that this episode, 
sometimes given recognition as “the Great Sioux War,” doesn’t 
name an initiation of hostilities between whites and Indians; as 
we’ve seen, hostilities date back nearly to first encounters. Fur-
ther, without conceding “moral equivalence,” it can be conceded 
there’d been acts of cruel violence perpetrated by both Indians 
and whites in the long chain of bitter relations that preceded this 
final episode on the plains. (Both then and now, whites found 
barbaric and reprehensible the Indian custom of mutilating the 
dead bodies of their opponents— yet some whites engaged in it 
too, and some local white governments paid bounties for Indian 
body parts.)
So, yes, grievances and outrages on both sides provide context. 
If though one wants to use the words “massacre” and “terror-
ism,” it seems one shouldn’t reserve them simply for the deeds 
of one’s opponents. Further, use of such special terms should be 
warranted by special circumstances.
To refer to an episode on December 21, 1866, at the start of the 
Great Sioux War, as “the massacre of Fetterman’s party” seems 
unwarranted. A group of seventy-nine federal soldiers and two 
civilians, led by William Fetterman, had intended to pacify 
(whatever that entailed) a band of Oglala Sioux but instead were 
outmaneuvered and killed by them. 
Sherman used the phrase “the massacre of Fetterman’s party” 
in a letter to Grant (not yet president), and then Sherman 
added:  “We must act with vindictive earnestness against the 
Sioux, even to their extermination, men, women, and children. 
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Nothing less will ever reach the root of the case.” In a more con-
scientious use of words, it would seem what the Sioux accom-
plished in the Fetterman incident was the ambush of a pursuing 
force; it was what Sherman advocated by way of retaliation that 
can properly be called a massacre.
“Massacre” and “terrorism” are terms which share each others’ 
connotations. In the case of a “massacre,” a large number of non-
combatant people — “innocent civilians” if you will (though Sher-
man, with his concept of “total war,” seemed to deny civilians 
can be innocent) —  are indiscriminately killed. This is a condition 
that general usage seems to imply by use of the term “massacre.” 
Similarly, it is annihilation of non-combatants for the purpose 
of sending a message, that can meaningfully be called  “ter-
rorism.” To shrug off these constraints in the use of terms 
seems then to leave these terms in the category of mere name 
calling. 
In the subject-matter under consideration here, even in look-
ing to the issue of civilian innocence, one can argue there was 
in the Indian/settler comparison, a lack of moral equivalence 
between the two sets of civilians. One population, as we noted, 
was an intruding and expanding population, instigating an ever-
renewed breach of treaties; the other population was a population 
residing in traditional habitat. The argument made then and now 
by apologists for our side has been that the second population, 
being the weaker of the two and making the less intrusive and 
exhaustive use of the land, had no genuine right to live in any 
place where we whites wished to live instead. 
To strengthen their case, some partisans for our inherited sense 
of entitlement have added: “Surely these very Sioux had them-
selves displaced other native populations in earlier generations.” 
To attempt though in this way to dismiss justice from the dis-
cussion is to make an argument that’s clearly a bridge too far. 
Alleged injustices among native Americans can’t exempt white 
Americans from all obligation to treat native Americans justly. 
To say otherwise is to make a mugger’s argument. (The argu-
ment goes like this: “No doubt there have been times when you’ve 
acted unjustly; therefore I have no obligation to treat you justly. 
Give me your watch and your wallet.”) Also, there’s a matter of 
scale. Native Americans had engaged in skirmishes with each 
other; we whites intended a war whose only limit was extinction.
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The immediate circumstances leading to the Great Sioux 
War had to do with transportation, and involved a trespass on 
land occupied by Indians traditionally and guaranteed to them 
by treaty. Federal troops tried to defend whites who, trespass-
ing through this Indian territory, were building a trail to con-
nect white mining operations near the towns of Bozeman and 
Virginia City to the Oregon Trail. Some Sioux who were guided 
by Red Cloud and Crazy Horse recognized that this intrusion 
could lead to much greater intrusions, and they found the means 
to create endless trouble for the road-builders and their protec-
tors. This can be regarded as the beginning of the Great Sioux 
War. The killing of the party led by Fetterman—  sent to subdue 
Sioux troublemakers— was an early and important episode in 
this conflict. Since the conflict had started with white trespass 
on land guaranteed to Indians, our federal government thought 
a good remedy following the killing of Fetterman and his troops 
was to revise and contract our guarantees to Indians. A federal 
invitation was sent out for all parties to meet and negotiate at 
Fort Laramie in 1868. In light of what Sherman wrote Grant, one 
can judge of the degree of good faith our side would bring to the 
meeting.
The negotiations were problematic. For one thing, Indians had 
only fragmentary knowledge of the language in which conclu-
sions were written down. Another problem was that such Indians 
as were present were not empowered to speak for all their fellow 
tribes-people. Still another is that Red Cloud and many other 
chiefs boycotted the meeting. Far and away the most serious 
problem was (as earlier we saw both early Puritans and Andrew 
Jackson admit) whites wouldn’t feel bound by any agreements 
they negotiated.
Negotiations at Fort Laramie ended with a treaty-signing on 
April 29, 1868. Red Cloud didn’t come to Fort Laramie to sign 
the treaty until November 6. By then, treaty provisions regarding 
a removal of federal forts had been implemented as an indication 
of federal good intentions. Red Cloud and one hundred twenty-
five other chiefs signed; but Red Cloud remained suspicious of 
federal intentions.
The treaty itself contained clauses sounding very beneficial to 
the Lakota-Sioux. Noteworthy was Article 16: “The United States 
hereby agrees and stipulates that the country north of the North 
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Platte River and east of the summits of the Big Horn Mountains 
shall be held and considered to be unceded Indian territory, and 
also stipulates and agrees that no white person or persons shall be 
permitted to settle upon or occupy any portion of the same . . . ”12 
Article 2 listed, significantly, most of the Black Hills (regarded 
by the Sioux as particularly sacred ground) as an integral part 
of the Sioux reservation. This meant this territory would remain 
under complete control of the Sioux.
But Red Cloud was rightly suspicious. Less than seven months 
after the day Red Cloud signed, Sherman issued a general order 
saying Indians found on the “unceded lands” mentioned as Indian 
territory in Article 16, “as a rule will be considered hostile”— 
which meant they were subject to being captured or, if prudence 
suggested it was safer, shot. This annulled Article 16.
Further, when the economy dipped five years later (due in part 
to mismanagement, corruption, and greed in the Grant admin-
istration), whites began to lust for the gold rumored to be in the 
Black Hills. Yielding to temptation, in 1874 the federal govern-
ment authorized Civil War hero George Armstrong Custer to 
conduct a “scientific” expedition into the Black Hills—  an expe-
dition joined by two professional prospectors. The next year, after 
exculpatory words about the importance of observing the 1868 
treaty with the Lakota, President Grant wrote, “Efforts are now 
being made for the extinguishment of the Indian title, and all 
proper means will be used to accomplish that end.”
If a presidential wink had been needed, it was given; “all proper 
means” were intended to be along lines of an offer one could not 
refuse. The door was opened to the second and terminal stage of 
the Great Sioux War.
What could have been done here? Most writers falter in answer-
ing; they end by deferring to Merry’s and Robinson’s (and Cal-
vin’s) “irresistible” laws of history. Suppose though the gold had 
been just north of the border with Canada. Suppose Canadian 
Mounted Police —  Canada’s warriors— had been on the border 
and had attempted to push trespassing American prospectors 
back onto U. S. territory. Would American federal troops then 
12. Treaty of Fort Laramie (1868), available at https://www.ourdocuments.
gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=42.
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have taken up a war to the death against the Canadian Mounted 
Police? It’s unimaginable. Having a treaty-line with Canada, 
American troops would— had they been engaged at all— have 
been engaged to hold back the American prospectors.
Perhaps it’s too much to ask of us white and profoundly puri-
fied Americans, even in the twenty-first century, to imagine our 
federal soldiers joining forces with the Sioux to protect a feder-
ally guaranteed Sioux right to some Sioux territory. (As the event 
made clear, when push comes to shove, we leave “equal justice for 
all” to the “impractical” among us— the Roger Williamses, the 
Thoreaus, the Martin Luther Kings. Once we recover our breath 
from the insolence of an “outsider” who claims rights, we tend to 
shout as one man: “What about us? Don’t we have rights?”—  as if 
any recognition of others’ rights diminishes our own.) 
Consider then a lesser case. Is it really outlandish to think, 
in this matter of Sioux land, that U. S. federal troops, feeling 
disinclined to block white trespassers from entering Sioux ter-
ritory, might have just stood to one side and told the trespass-
ers that the risk of entry was all theirs? Could not American 
soldiers have honored the clear implication of the Laramie 
Treaty that the Sioux were within their rights to defend land 
the treaty had guaranteed as theirs? (Federalists of honor like 
Alexander Hamilton and John Marshall would have understood 
this.)
Had we honored our promises, perhaps federal coffers, squan-
dered in the greedy days of the Grant administration, wouldn’t 
have been replenished quite so quickly for further squandering. 
Were gold-mining profits and fresh land so indispensable to our 
prosperity that a more legal and accommodating method and 
tempo would have been an unsustainable national loss? (That to 
this day, white writers’ imaginations frequently draw a blank at 
this point tells us much about the damage such episodes have 
done to us and why our diplomacy continues to be such a far-
rago of contradictions today. What kind of “success” was it that it 
required us to violate our own word so starkly?)
As it was, our readiness to overstep negotiated boundaries led, 
first to an effort on the part of federal commissioners to insist 
that the Sioux sell the Black Hills; then, when the Sioux simply 
said no, the Department of the Interior demanded that all Indi-
ans who still roamed freely on territory the Treaty of Laramie 
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had guaranteed as theirs must report to the Indian agencies by 
January 31, 1876. When some Indians— looking increasingly to 
Sitting Bull for leadership — refused, our government officially 
declared them “hostiles.” Federal expeditions against the Lakota-
Sioux intensified; and the Great Sioux War moved toward what 
proved its climax and end.
There was an inconclusive battle at the river Rosebud on June 17, 
1876 —  one from which General George Crook and his command 
were thought lucky to escape alive. A week and a day later, enter-
ing the valley of the Little Bighorn, George Armstrong Custer— 
famous for his dashing spirit in the Civil War, and encouraged by 
what now seems in hindsight a string of gambler’s luck— broke 
ranks from an elaborate, multi-pronged battle plan, and led an 
entire cavalry contingent to their death.
Departure from the battle plan may not have been intended; 
yet it seems most everyone in the federal command had seen it 
coming. Custer had moved with great speed. General Gibbon, 
the commander of a major prong, had been delayed. In Gibbon’s 
absence, General Terry, commander of the Seventh Cavalry, 
was to move with a large contingent from north of the Sioux’s 
expected encampment, and Custer was to come up from the 
south; together they were to catch the Sioux in an inescapable 
pincher.
On June 25, once Custer surmised that scouts of the Lakota 
Sioux had discovered his presence, he seems to have decided he 
had no alternative but to engage — whatever might be the where-
abouts of Terry. It seems he did so with no proper estimate of 
the size of the intended victim. While he may have intended a 
massacre at the immense camping ground of Lakota-Sioux and 
other Indians assembled near the Little Bighorn, he and all two 
hundred and ten men under his direct command were outnum-
bered in direct combat by one or two thousand Indian warriors 
and destroyed.
This was not a massacre. It was defense against massacre —  a 
defense only temporarily successful. Too many Indians were 
killed or wounded in the event for it to be celebrated at length 
among those who survived. As for white Americans, the year 1876 
was our nation’s first centennial; and the shock of such a reversal 
at the hands of “savages” was almost more than we whites could 
take in. (One wonders what we whites expected. Did we think 
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the thousands of Indians present should have just lain on the 
ground while Custer and his troops executed them one-by-one?) 
The press was full of cries for retribution and vengeance and for 
a final solution to the Indian problem. The reconfiguration of 
Custer into a martyr for the American way tells us a great deal, 
not just about Custer’s skills as a showman, but about ourselves 
and our romantic tendency toward necrophilia.
With intensified effort on the part of the federal government, 
and with virtually unlimited authority now granted to Sherman 
to deal with Indians as he saw fit, what remained was a mopping 
up. Indian resistance continued but with ever-diminishing hope 
and confidence during this period when exhausted and resource-
less Indians were being corralled into reservations hardly distin-
guishable from prison grounds. High percentages perished in 
federal custody.
How relentless the white will was to destroy all remnants of 
Indian life can perhaps be comprehended by the event at Wounded 
Knee, twelve years after Custer’s death, when two hundred or 
more Sioux men, women, and children were slaughtered— with 
the help of Hotchkiss repeating guns—  after they came together 
to celebrate the Ghost Dance. Twenty medals of honor were 
awarded to federal troops who participated in the slayings. At 
least two medals seem to have been awarded for outstanding 
conduct in searching out and killing those who were hiding in 
ravines to escape the massacre. 
One might continue from here, and go on to attempt the 
story of Chief Joseph. If ever in the nineteenth century a man 
evolved toward becoming a kind of American Gandhi, it was 
Chief Joseph. The tragic story of his long effort to hold the Nez 
Perce together against relentless persecution distinguishes him 
as one of the noblest heroes of our history. (It’s ironic that so 
many Americans are taught the story of Gandhi’s heroic resis-
tance to the English, and so few Americans are taught the story 
of Chief ’s Joseph’s heroic resistance to white Americans. Do we 
commemorate Chief Joseph on the Fourth of July? Why we don’t 
might provide an interesting reflection for that day— perhaps a 
welcome relief from the predictable romancing of violence that 
precedes our firecrackers.) 
Enough though may have been said of the War on the 
Plains. Finally, let’s turn to what we call the Spanish-American 
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War— which occurs a decade after the Massacre at Wounded 
Knee.13 
War Against Spaniards (and Cubans?) and Filipinos
From early on, our “successful” way of treating Indians had 
accustomed us to deal with others from a sense that the moral 
high ground was permanently ours. When we’d reached out in 
the 1840s to take Northern Mexico from Mexico, such dealing 
was one to which our continuing seizures of Indian land had 
habituated us and had anesthetized us to intrusions of ethical 
concern; the issue of Northern Mexico had seemed much like 
business as usual. 
That’s to say, the seizure of Mexican land had had much in 
common with earlier land seizures: (1)  in this confrontation 
with Mexico too the land was contiguous with “the land God 
had given us”; (2)  it was land within the westward trajectory of 
our Manifest Destiny— manifest that is when looking out to 
that huge rectangular plot of real estate that a glance at any map 
clearly showed God meant us to have; (3) this Mexican land was 
but sparsely settled by the people claiming title; (4) our U. S. citi-
zens were already settling there (in the case of Texas, and to a 
lesser extent in California, good white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, 
cleansed in the fires of Puritanism, were already in possession of 
land deeds); (5) we knew much of the indigenous population of 
the other party, less pure than us, was contaminated by Indian 
ancestry; (6)  an added aspect was that, though this land had 
slipped from Spain’s control, it had an Hispanic and Catholic 
culture in a hemisphere the Monroe Doctrine had already unim-
peachably declared to be in the keeping of us Americans—  a 
13. My concern as we move on from this is that those among us who are 
non-Indians and who fancy ourselves decent participants in the American 
mainstream continue to speak of “the Winning of the West,” and in the 
confused complacency of that phrase, conceal from ourselves an addic-
tion to force that makes it difficult for us to get our bearings and find 
our balance in all the years that have followed. We’ve been wounded by 
that “Winning” more than we imagine. The untended infection from that 
wound continues to fester.
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people with an enduring, if increasingly subterranean, purified 
brand of Christianity. Romanism was something against which 
we were maintaining a principled stand.
Later then, some fifty years following the Treaty of 
Guadalupe-Hidalgo and the Mexican Cession of 1848, when 
the West had been “won” and continental expansion westward 
had been achieved, our mindset was firmly defined and was in 
control; American settlement reached from sea to sea, and we 
were ready for fresh adventure. The first episode of this adven-
ture is routinely called “the Spanish-American War.” Revi-
sionist historians think it might more properly be called “the 
War to Thwart Cuban Independence and to Gain a Foothold 
off the Shores of Asia.” Not surprisingly, the shorter label has 
prevailed.
To dispense with the tone of sarcasm though, when I speak 
here of an “adventure,” I hardly take the measure of the urgencies 
besetting us amid our successes as the nineteenth century drew 
toward a close. We must look to those urgencies; and we should 
proceed in an awareness that the interaction and proper weigh-
ing of the factors in play at the time remain at issue today. There 
remains much murkiness as to details, and we should be tentative 
and cautious.
Still, were we able to look on from outer space, it might seem 
our next move was well prepared by our past. Just off our south-
eastern shores was Cuba, a holdout in the Western Hemisphere 
of what we regarded an anachronistic and dying Spanish Empire. 
In words John Quincy Adams wrote as secretary of state in 1823, 
Cuba was “a ripe fruit”— waiting to fall into American hands. 
The words fit well the spirit of J. Q.’s Monroe Doctrine. While 
we’d grandfathered Spain’s western colonies into our conception, 
we should be the arbiter of order in the Western hemisphere. 
Spanish administration of Cuba had always been mercantilist: 
it had been organized for deliberate, full-scale exploitation of 
Cuban resources and labor, and had been reliant on slavery and 
cruel measures from its earliest days. 
In the 1890s, by no means for the first time, Spain’s rule 
was being challenged by local Cubans. As had been the case 
in prior instances, Spain sought to control such opposition by 
brute force. Though slavery had been officially abolished in 
the 1880s, the blacks of Cuba didn’t live in the status of a free 
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people; and as part of a fresh crack-down, much of the workforce 
of Cuba— black and black-Hispanic— were now being herded 
into reconcentrados by Spain’s General Weyler. In these concen-
tration camps it’s estimated a third of Cuba’s population died 
of hunger and disease. Predictably, much of the Cuban popula-
tion became resolute for independence. Was there not, then, an 
American opportunity—  or rather, an American “obligation”— 
 here? 
The makeup of the rebel population may be beyond an accu-
rate accounting by now. Without being tutored by archival 
research, let me share my conjectures as to how things stood. It’s 
likely some in the ranks of the rebels were peninsulares— people 
born in Spain but critical of Spain’s cruel management of Cuba. 
Less speculatively, we know some of the rebels (José Martí, at 
least from his father’s side) were from the “Hispanic” or criollo 
class: native-born Cubans with a claim to pure Spanish descent 
(at least for a parent if not for oneself). In the manner that we 
American colonists in the century before had taken issue with 
England, many from the criollo class probably took issue with 
Spain’s refusal to give Cubans official representation at Madrid. 
More than that, as people who prided themselves on being Span-
ish, one can assume many of them had to resent Spain’s gen-
eral and amorphous contempt for the human rights of Cubans. 
Criollos then were likely the yeast for the rise of revolutionary 
feeling. As for Cubans of mixed Spanish and African ancestry 
(anywhere from 25 to 50 percent of the population) and Cubans 
of pure African ancestry, they had suffered physically more than 
the criollos, and it’s plausible to assume these groups were ready 
to be recruited by criollo revolutionaries when offered a promise 
of racial and economic equality in a liberated Cuba. Remaining 
groups can be assumed to be recruitable in like manner. As for 
Indian ancestry: in the course of the island’s earlier history, it 
had been reduced by inhumane work and inhumane living condi-
tions to the point it remained mostly as mere traces in the blood 
streams of some who were of mixed Spanish and African ances-
try. Indian ancestry did survive more recognizably perhaps in 
some quite limited groups of people of Indian/European ancestry 
without an African component. Finally, it seems there remained 
some few small settlements of pure-blood Indians. I suspect that 
even a very talented and diligent Cuban ethnologist of today 
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would have trouble with all this, in that issues of ancestry may 
have been delicate enough so that in many cases it was thought 
best to leave them unexamined. 
To conclude this tentative consideration of parties, it’s likely 
that by the late 1890s, a high majority of those who could legiti-
mately be called Cubans were at least in spirit rebels against 
Spain, although there were, as in our revolution against England, 
no doubt some prominent loyalists who held out for continuing 
with the way things were.
As for us Americans, we were on all sides of this struggle 
between Cuban rebels and the Spanish. Present among us were 
fresh sponsors of the sugar economy of Cuba who wanted Cuba 
to enjoy good order for the sake of predictable production, trade, 
and profits. Some probably were of double minds: in support of 
a Spanish crackdown from business motives, but opposed to its 
actual brutality from humanitarian motives. More widely, cel-
ebration of our own official abolition of slavery three decades ear-
lier was still fresh in the minds of abolitionists and of Republi-
cans in general, and this inclined these people to a humanitarian 
concern for the blacks of Cuba— blacks whom they accurately 
saw as still deprived of freedom and, in fact, in current danger 
of extinction from abuse and starvation. Further, and prob-
ably extensively, we Americans felt that the struggle of Cubans 
against Spain paralleled our own struggle for independence from 
England in the previous century.
From the desire our business men had for the protection of 
American property rights and opportunities, we tended to bal-
ance our concern for freedom among Cubans with some wariness 
about Cuban independence. “If we don’t control Cuba, who will?” 
was a question on American minds of those who anticipated an 
imminent end to Spanish rule — with the spiritual boundary, as 
suggested, between self-interest and humanitarian concern some-
thing of a blur. (This was the time when robber barons first came 
to the fore, and no doubt some of them wondered, “Why should 
the mercantilist Spanish exploit Cuba when our anti-mercantilist 
corporations can do the job so much better?”)
Considerations of these sorts occupied our minds in 1898, with 
our yellow press—  especially the Hearst side of the Hearst/
Pulitzer competition—  doing what it could to heat things up. 
Responding to this array, chroniclers have sometimes presented 
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our eventual engagement against Spain as simply a matter of 
humanitarian concern, whipped to frenzy by the newspapers of 
Hearst and Pulitzer, finally overflowing into war when our bat-
tleship Maine exploded in Havana Harbor.
The trouble with leaving our war with Spain to such an expla-
nation is that it leaves more general, strategic interests unat-
tended. While the explosion of the Maine, for instance, was 
unquestionably an event of immense public interest in the United 
States, how one interpreted it depended on prior dispositions. 
The explosion of the Maine constituted for us Americans a kind 
of Rorschach test. 
Some Americans seemed quite sure the Spanish government 
had done it. Their argument depended on circumstantial evi-
dence: the whereabouts of the Maine when it exploded and the 
context of Spain’s growing hostility toward the U. S. The major 
problem for those who took this view had to do with motivation. 
It was manifestly contrary to the interests of the Spanish govern-
ment to have our battleship explode in “Spanish waters” at this 
delicate moment. Even the Maine’s captain, Charles Sigsbee — 
interested to show that no neglect of good order in the interior 
of his ship had led to the tragedy— nonetheless veered off away 
from Spain toward a notion the ship had been sabotaged by free-
lance terrorists.
Some, then, have come forward with “false-flag” theories. 
Such theories say that anti-Spanish agents who wished to pro-
voke the U. S. into war with Spain blew up the battleship in the 
expectation that Spain would be blamed. The actual provocateurs 
could have been either Cuban rebels or interested Americans. But 
if it was Cubans, this would be cool treatment indeed toward 
a potential ally. The “interested American” part also faces this 
problem of who and why. It seems implausible such Americans 
could have been government agents. For one thing, the adminis-
tration could have achieved a declaration of war from Congress 
without this loss of American lives and treasure. Secondly, in 
those days before the Cold War and the black ops of the CIA, 
it’s a stretch to finger (even in the office of Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy Theodore Roosevelt) a sector of our government with 
the stomach for so treasonous an action. So if it was Americans, 
it’s more plausible to think it was Americans acting on their own. 
Whether then one looks to Cubans or to Americans, one seems 
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left with individuals, acting in the shadows and invisible, as one’s 
explanation.
The major alternative to inconclusive saboteur hypotheses 
was the natural-combustion hypothesis. Stored coal could have 
ignited spontaneously, and the fire could have spread to a muni-
tions magazine nearby which then exploded. Other accidents can 
also be imagined.
What’s noteworthy for our purposes is that those who wanted 
war with Spain gravitated quickly to the interpretation that Spain 
was the culprit, whereas those concerned to avoid war were open 
to alternative explanations.
If so, this incident can’t be seen as the decisive cause of the war. 
Predispositions each person brought to interpreting the incident 
played too large a role for that. Even factoring in an irresponsible 
use of the incident by the newspapers won’t go the distance to 
explain why we declared war. One would need to explain why 
this journalism resonated as forcefully as it did. Still further, 
while acknowledging the intensity and legitimacy of humanitar-
ian impulses, one can say when these are fully acknowledged and 
given due weight as context, we still lack a sufficient theory. Cru-
elty was happening in many places, near and far. Why did this 
particular instance of cruelty against Cubans lead to a war? Most 
important of all, why did this particular instance and the ensuing 
war have the aftermath it did? To explain the Spanish-American 
War we seem to need to add a backdrop of other, more strategic, 
considerations.
Let us look then for explanations in the wider context of 
America’s situation at the time. Marx had said in the mid-1800s 
that capitalism has a tendency to implode. His argument was 
that, as the capitalists economized on labor costs to meet the 
requirements of their ideology (paying laborers the lowest pos-
sible wages in a kind of auction toward the bottom), capitalist 
enterprise would eventually outproduce the purchasing power of 
their own society—  composed as it was mostly of laborers. At 
that point, the workers— if there still were any— would be stuff-
ing the warehouses with manufactures and agricultural produce 
they were too poor to buy. Lacking domestic consumers, the 
market would collapse from surplus product unless—  and here’s 
the heart of the matter— the capitalists could unload the surplus 
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abroad. (Marx presciently wrote of efforts to tear down Chinese 
walls.)
By the depression of 1893, this problem of surplus was not 
only being openly discussed by Marxists but by businessmen 
and politicians all over America— people whose reputations 
for being  “sound” and patriotic were beyond reproach. To be 
sure, unlike a Marxist, a preponderance of these profit-oriented 
spokespersons did not focus on a need for a more equitable dis-
tribution of purchasing power in America (a concern of William 
Jennings Bryan and other populists) but rather, as Marx pre-
dicted, they focused on a concern to find purchasing power in the 
hands of non-Americans abroad. Even though we had reached 
our Pacific shoreline, we continued our tradition of looking west-
ward. Predictably, it was there that we hoped to find that “larger 
pie” or that “rising tide” which would ensure the continuation of 
American prosperity.
It’s not as if America had never before ventured beyond our 
western shoreline. We’d long been involved economically with a 
west beyond the border of our continent, and we’d become even 
more engaged there in acts of imagination. Secretary of State 
William Seward had persuaded Congress to purchase Alaska 
for the United States in 1867 —  envisioning Alaska as a bridge 
to Asia. Seward had also ambitioned a reciprocity treaty with 
the Hawaiian Islands; and this came to pass when, in 1875, a suc-
ceeding secretary of state, Hamilton Fish, negotiated a strong 
pact regarding mutual trade benefits between Hawaii and our-
selves—  a pact providing an American veto over any Hawaiian 
plan to cede territory to other countries. It’s amid such predis-
positions we can hope to find what deeper roots there may have 
been for a war with Spain.
Introducing Turner, Mahan, Brooks Adams, Hay, 
Theodore Roosevelt, and McKinley
Each of these men was in some way an architect of our interven-
tion against Spain and of the expansion which that intervention 
served. Without some grasp of the context for that intervention as 
reflected in their motives, the further development of American 
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foreign policy into the twentieth century and up to the present 
is likely to be misunderstood. In particular, it seems helpful to 
identify here in 1898 the characteristic way an American reliance 
on force slips past us unacknowledged. It’s helpful, that is, if we 
wish to arrive at a realistic understanding of who we are now, and 
of how we’re currently perceived by others.
Let’s start with the historian Frederick Jackson Turner. Turner 
didn’t of course cause the closing of the American frontier with 
which his name is ever associated. And there are American his-
torians who subsequently have argued that his announcement 
in 1893 of its closing was premature, or that the event was un-
identifiable or at least less momentous than he claimed. A more 
basic criticism is one that questions whether his flattering assess-
ment of the American character is accurate.
Such qualifications notwithstanding, in depression year 1893 
Turner framed and explained our general sense of crisis in a 
way that resonated with prominent policymakers—  contributing 
thereby toward a consensus about our predicament and its res-
olution. Even if his thesis was somewhat “unhistorical,” it was 
historic— for it functioned to shape our future. The West, he said, 
had been the horizon of the American people. It was the reposi-
tory of our hope. It was the cutting edge at which our democratic 
spirit had been honed. His thesis could be elaborated by a cluster 
of generally held notions. The West was where one had gone to 
give oneself a second chance. It was the room in which America’s 
expanding population has been able to find a home, an escape 
valve for energies that might otherwise have turned rancid. “The 
Wilderness” had from the beginning provided our setting for The 
American Story: the story about the mission of God’s people to 
plant God’s kingdom here by taming a continent. The West was 
a storehouse of boundless resources. The challenges it offered had 
provided us with something we could mobilize against and come 
together over. It had been both an outlet for American feistiness 
and a motive for American union. It had been, Turner claimed 
by way of conclusion, a nurturing ground for the American spirit 
of independence, a test of manhood, a continuing inspiration for 
American ingenuity, a breeding ground for raw unspoiled instan-
tiations of democratic spirit, and a source of national pride.
And indeed the popularity of the slogan “Manifest Destiny” 
demonstrates how central the movement westward was to our 
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sense of identity. Turner saw the closing of the frontier as prob-
lematic since he took our westward momentum to be the conserver 
of our values, providing challenging experiences indispensible to 
the renewal of American character in each successive generation. 
This momentum had become indispensible to American coher-
ence, for we could hold together only by moving forward. The 
urgent implication of his message was that America must find a 
fresh frontier if it was to go on being America.
Turner wasn’t alone in his forebodings and his prescription. 
Brooks Adams, grandson of John Quincy Adams and great-
grandson of John Adams, was— like his articulate and sardonic 
older brother Henry—  convinced America was in trouble. Writ-
ing The Law of Civilization and Decay, Brooks Adams traced a 
path similar in some respects to the path suggested in earlier 
pages here. Adams saw “Imaginative Man”— poet and soldier, 
deeply motivated by religious conviction—  as the builder of civi-
lizations; he saw the success of this type leading dialectically to its 
own morphing and replacement— leading that is, eventually to 
the emergence of “Economic Man” as the new type at the center 
of things. Economic Man arranges everything for the enhance-
ment of Economic Man, reducing his fellows to opportunities 
and victims in his arrangements. In so doing, he thereby guar-
antees the decay and collapse of the society that nurtured him. 
Economic Man is not unlike the protagonist in an Ayn Rand 
novel—  only where Rand casts her protagonist as hero, Adams 
sees him as harbinger of pending disaster.
Written in Mark Twain’s Gilded Age, Adams’ account seemed 
an account that had abundant confirmatory evidence. The thing 
that marred the account—  or at least was off-putting about it— 
was its easy acquiescence in a form of fatalism. Adams purported 
to be setting forth immutable laws of history. He’d have it that 
he was doing science; the pattern set forth was one for which 
he claimed inevitability. In the backdrop, one can hear echoes 
of Hegelian, Darwinian, and Marxist determinism. If one has a 
good ear, one hears the ghost of Calvin.
Were this all Adams had to say on the subject, he couldn’t have 
been among the architects of expansionism. Even Adams himself 
however found his doctrine dreary beyond bearing; and, for at 
least a time —  and when it counted— he seems to have allowed 
the possibility that heroic human agency might break free from 
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the doom his theory foretold. Appalled at the vision of its own 
approaching decay, America could turn and invent itself once 
again after the model of Imaginative Man. Quickened by some-
thing of the religious sensibility of its forefathers, it could draw 
again from its heritage of poetic and soldierly qualities. (Martin 
Heidegger’s thought takes a similar turn in the twentieth century, 
leading him into a romantic and uncritical sense of German des-
tiny.) Bolstering such optimism, Adams had discovered an addi-
tional law, a kind of mystic blend of Isaac Newton and Freder-
ick Jackson Turner: “civilization moves westward.” If our nation 
could place its interests at the center of that westward movement, 
and if Americans could place national interest at the center of 
their individual lives, perhaps America could postpone or even 
escape the onset of decay.
Brooks Adams’ acquaintance with Theodore Roosevelt (with 
whom Adams maintained an intermittent conversation for 
more than a decade, and at a time when it could make a differ-
ence) probably had much to do with the rejuvenation of Brooks 
Adams; it likely also had something to do with the phenomenon 
of Theodore Roosevelt. Specifically, in prescribing that we center 
ourselves in westward movement, Adams seems to have contrib-
uted toward our intervention against Spain and our acquisition 
(though Adams first opposed our use of force) of the Philippines.
Adams couldn’t of course have played such a part were it 
not that he was giving definition to ideas already vaguely dif-
fused across America. As Roosevelt wouldn’t have been popular 
and able to exercise leadership had he not been representative 
of much that Americans were already feeling and thinking, so 
Adams’ contributions to Roosevelt’s thinking wouldn’t have mat-
tered had they occurred outside a generalized context—  a spirit 
of the times—  open to plans for expansion. (While it’s become 
the fashion among many to view nations as moving according to 
supra-personal laws of their own, a less mystical alternative is, I 
think, to see society as a place shaped by interaction of multiple 
freedoms and ambitions overlapping and confirming each other.)
A more direct, quasi-physical impact upon policy came from 
Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan was a maverick in a profession 
that favored ordered and predictable behavior. In the heyday of 
his naval career he was never promoted beyond captain. Shining 
through his writing is an almost quaint desire to use language 
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accurately, backed up by an engaging transparency of character. 
To employ a non-naval metaphor, Mahan marched to his own 
drum. Perhaps his disinclination toward typical careerist behav-
ior (he seems not to have been a notable ship captain) explains 
how his mind was free for matters of theory. The paradox is that 
few American navy men have had more influence on practical 
matters than this man who seemed disengaged from them.
In Mahan’s mental ramblings on the role of the navy in the 
big picture of America’s future, he began at a conventional place. 
From the start he saw trade as important for America’s wellbeing; 
and the role he first saw for the navy was a defensive one, protect-
ing such trade from predatory action by foreigners. The preda-
tory action could be anything from outright piracy to a long-term 
effort of some other nation to commandeer trade routes. To dis-
courage such action and protect against it, coast-hugging cruisers, 
lightly armed, which could move and maneuver quickly, would 
seem the appropriate instrument.
As he continued to ponder these matters, however, Mahan’s 
thinking developed along a line familiar to military theorists— 
namely, it embraced the logic that says one defends best who 
commands an offensive position. Gradually his reflections moved 
to a specific, but global, question: “Have those states which have 
been notably successful been possessed of more than ordinary 
sea power?” Once posed, the question practically answered itself. 
Though he considered himself more a theorist than an historian, 
Mahan presented an abundance of data suggesting the correla-
tion between “success” and “sea power” was, in current jargon 
of statistics, remarkably robust. “Successful” nations turned out 
to be nations possessing superior sea power. Taking Britain and 
the British navy as his prime example, this is the case Mahan 
presented in 1890 in his widely read, much translated, very con-
sequential The Influence of Sea Power upon History.
Self-evident as this thesis may seem for the long era before 
air-power, Mahan’s thinking had undergone a notable stretch. 
His new thinking came to entail the principle that territory far 
from America’s coasts must be secured if America’s future was to 
be secured. While conquest was not an end in itself, control of 
land was necessary so that America’s freighters could be, not just 
close to places where resources are, but close also to places where 
markets are. Short of that, America would be at a disadvantage 
114 tom o’neill
in the great trade fair our globe was becoming. Further, if there 
were to be great freighters, there must be great battleships to 
protect them and to maintain the control of harbors and coaling 
stations— the infrastructure of naval system.
In a masterful paragraph, Warren Zimmermann sums up the 
vision in which Mahan’s thinking culminated:
For Mahan, there were many reasons why America had to 
abandon isolationist thinking and look outward: its grow-
ing production, public sentiment, a geographic position 
between two old worlds and two oceans, the growth of 
European colonies in the Pacific, the rise of Japan, and 
the peopling of the American West with men favoring a 
strong foreign policy. He was not a warmonger; in fact 
he had a highly sophisticated view of how to prevent war 
through deterrence. Preparing for war, he wrote, will 
help prevent it. He urged upon the United States a three-
pronged naval policy: short-range warships to protect the 
chief American harbors, an offensive naval force to extend 
influence outward, and a national resolution that no for-
eign state should be allowed to acquire a base within three 
thousand miles of San Francisco. In his writings Mahan 
was introducing core concepts—  deterrence, sufficiency, 
détente, globalism— that were to return as principles of 
American policy during the Cold War.14
Mahan had come to see in the Monroe Doctrine far more than 
a mere defense for present American security and influence; he 
saw it as a template for the future, the source of a forward-leaning 
strategy, a proclamation of unilateralist intent which could not be 
deduced as some mere corollary to international law. While it’s 
by no means implicit in international law that the Monroe Doc-
trine should be reinterpreted as a global agenda, such an agenda 
was, in Mahan’s view, a legitimate American agenda harnessed 
in the service of a decision for a strong international presence, 
one which could only be secured by extraordinary unilateralist 
14. Warren Zimmerman, First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made 
Their Country a World Power (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2002), 115.
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exertion— particularly, that is, by a strong navy. As such, Mah-
an’s vision was irresistible to eventual Under-Secretary of the 
Navy, Theodore Roosevelt.
Mahan became a highly effective champion of a canal through 
the Isthmus of Panama, a champion of some form of control 
over Cuba as the eastern guardian of that canal, a champion for 
annexation of Hawaii as a westward station from which to pro-
tect and service the trade routes which the canal opened, and 
a champion for retaining ports in the Philippines as a stepping 
stone and westernmost base for our conduct of trade in Asia. 
(Mahan eventually joined the consensus position, that Provi-
dence had— in spite of ourselves— intended the whole of the 
Philippines to become our colony.) 
As suggested, Mahan’s vision owed much to his study of the 
British Empire. He envisioned however an improved version. He 
wanted a stripped down, bare-bones-and-muscle version—  one 
which realized the benefits of empire but without its encumber-
ing administrative responsibilities. What makes his vision so 
significant is that it reached out toward, and brought together, 
and became a point of convergence for the visions of many 
Americans— that of Brooks Adams included—  and became the 
vision at the center of the Open Door Policy to be promulgated 
by John Hay, Roosevelt’s secretary of state, after the conclusion 
of the Spanish-American War. (It is in fact the vision which 
endures to this day at the center of American foreign policy. Tac-
tical dependence on the navy has somewhat yielded to air-power 
and rocketry, but the strategic vision is the same.)
Let us speak then of John Hay. In the sixty-six years and some 
months of his life, undoubtedly the most memorable and intense 
years were not those when he was secretary of state but those 
from 1861 to 1865 when, with John Nicolay, Hay served in the 
White House as one of Abraham Lincoln’s two personal sec-
retaries. Those years began when Hay was twenty-two. At that 
time, he was altogether unfamous, yet he lived in the shadow of 
Abraham and Mary Todd Lincoln, helped Nicolay manage Lin-
coln’s appointments, penned correspondence in the president’s 
name, romped with Lincoln’s children, reluctantly accompanied 
Mary Todd on some of her manic buying expeditions, and was 
at the bedside of Lincoln throughout the long night as Lincoln 
lay dying.
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Later, Hay said of Lincoln: “As republicanism . . . is the sole 
hope of a sick world, so Lincoln, with all his foibles, is the great-
est character since Christ.”15 Hay never got over that encounter. 
You could say he never recovered from it. Some historians conjec-
ture Hay became a kind of surrogate son to Lincoln, a consola-
tion after the death in the White House of young Willie Lincoln. 
In Hay’s later years, with a long string of accomplishments, well 
received writings, and illustrious friendships to his resume, it was 
remarked of Hay that he sometimes seemed inexplicably melan-
choly. This may have been largely due to temperament. It’s plau-
sible though to think some of it was the residue of the momen-
tous four-year episode of his life in his mid-twenties when he 
was Lincoln’s everyday gopher in the titanic struggle to hold the 
country together.
Hay never again felt so close to a center of absolute ethics as he 
had in the Lincoln years. The secret at the core of it all was not 
divulged, and the great task of the Lincoln years remained, as we 
know, unfinished— in fact, in some crucial aspects, it remained 
undefined. The reference to “republicanism” indicates the direc-
tion of Hay’s mind. As Richard Hofstadter has remarked, the 
death of Lincoln spared Lincoln any participation in what, in 
the rest of the nineteenth century, evolved out of the republi-
canism Lincoln had helped bring to birth. Hay was not so 
spared; and he labored through his remaining four decades to 
salvage for the nation something of what he’d glimpsed in his 
youth.
If, as I and others think, the Civil War was primarily con-
cerned with how the West was to be incorporated into the Union, 
it’s useful to remark that Hay’s career, initiated with such unique 
personal involvement in that bloody argument, reached its peak 
a third of a century later with notes he penned regarding the Far 
East—  a Far East which had by then become in our imaginations 
the new West.
I’ve claimed an instructive way to look at the Open Door Pol-
icy is to see it as a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Like the 
Monroe Doctrine, it was a policy that enjoyed the tacit approval 
of England; and like the Monroe Doctrine it ambitioned a sphere 
15. Zimmerman, First Great Triumph, 46.
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of influence modeled on the British Empire while avoiding—  so 
at least it intended— the inconveniences of colonialism.
The Monroe Doctrine had said in effect it would be regarded 
as action unfriendly to the United States if any European power 
were to attempt to curtail the influence of the United States in 
the Western Hemisphere.16 Similarly the Open Door Notes 
said in effect it would be regarded as action unfriendly to the 
United States if any power— Japan and Russia included— were 
to attempt by colonization or spheres-of-influence in China 
to close markets there to the United States. While couched in 
diplomatic language (as was the Monroe Doctrine), and while 
actually encouraged by a British bureaucrat assigned to China, 
the underlying statement of the Open Door Policy was “Don’t 
attempt to close doors in China to the United States.” Moreover, 
what some foreigners surely discerned as implicit here would in 
subsequent decades be made explicit by action: that the name of 
any place in the world could be inserted for “China.”17
On the surface, this policy may look benign and pro-Chinese. 
Just as the United States had presented itself as the natural and 
rightful protector of the nations of Latin America, so now we 
were stepping forth as the protector of China against the kind of 
division into colonial sections that Europe was already imposing 
on much of Africa.
If though one looks at the policy from, say, the position of Japan 
or Russia (or, for that matter, of China), it can look quite differ-
ent. When, by the Monroe Doctrine, the United States claimed 
16. I speak here and elsewhere of the Monroe Doctrine as it has func-
tioned in American foreign policy. As actually written by J. Q. Adams, it is 
clear the intent was to keep the Western Hemisphere from being Europe’s 
oyster; however, we soon came to interpret it as meaning the Western 
Hemisphere was America’s oyster. (J. Q. was a man of peace, and even 
when he wrote of Cuba’s falling into our hands as a ripe fruit, it now seems 
clear to me that he envisioned an organic and peaceful development.)
17. In his lecture on “American Diplomacy: 1900–1950,” George Kennan 
correctly states that other nations— including Britain— paid little atten-
tion to the Notes when they were first circulated; what he merely glances 
at, and seems to sell short in some texts is the immense influence the notes 
had on us, the source country, as providing the framework in which future 
American policy was formulated.
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Latin America as a kind of protectorate, it raised over that vast 
region an umbrella of hegemony—  a vague claim of American 
sovereignty; it implied that throughout most of half the planet, 
our word was law.
Let’s ruminate on this. Though the claim expressed by the 
Open Door Notes with regard to China was more nuanced and 
less strenuous, it wasn’t lost on attentive and interested foreign 
parties that the scope claimed for the Monroe Doctrine was 
being significantly extended. Our sphere of national concerns 
had abruptly bulged westward to include the largest country 
in Asia. Implicitly, as just suggested, the Open Door Notes 
meant that in the view of us wilderness-conquering Ameri-
cans, the legitimate and sovereign interests of America were 
unbounded.
Between the original announcement of the Monroe Doctrine 
early in the nineteenth century and the publishing and distribu-
tion of the Open Door Notes at its end, occurred the Spanish-
American War. Without that war and the physical shift in power 
it achieved, the Open Door Notes would not have been noticed 
at all. Indeed, they would probably not have been written. So it 
may seem John Hay is being introduced too early in the story. It 
may seem he is less an architect of the war than an inheritor of 
opportunities it provided. Hay was after all across the Atlantic as 
Ambassador to England (and actually vacationing in the Middle 
East) at the time the war was coming on.
But this is to think unhistorically. Better to think as Aristo-
tle invites that the end (in the sense of “goal”) operates at the 
beginning. Throughout the early 1890s, at their adjacent homes 
in Lafayette Square — with Hay’s home looking out at the White 
House — John Hay and Henry Adams were conducting on and 
off, as referenced earlier, an informal but influential seminar on 
American foreign policy. This was not what we usually call a con-
spiracy, for it wasn’t clandestine. The ideas they discussed and 
criticized were the common coin of the realm; many of their ses-
sions were no doubt paralleled by discussions in the barber shops 
and front parlors of quite ordinary people. But it happened that 
the attendants at this seminar had more access to the levers of 
power than most. The logic that emerged eventually as a state-
ment of policy in the Open Door Notes was the logic emerging 
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in this seminar; here, if you will, were mechanics who could 
manufacture a war with Spain as a means to advance that policy.18
What the Notes told the world at large —  albeit sotto voce — is 
that we intended the “mission” of the United States to go forward 
unimpeded; we had banished longtime holdings of the Span-
ish empire from both hemispheres to show ourselves in earnest. 
From this larger context we can conclude then, regarding Hay, 
that— both before it was waged and afterward— this war with 
Spain had his attention, and that his sense of policy helped bring 
it about.
Beyond Hay however, our quest to understand why the 
Spanish-American War happened requires us to fix attention on 
Theodore Roosevelt. In him the previous strands come together 
and find a champion. It’s not so much that each of these other 
strategists and planners endorsed Roosevelt (though, in some 
measure, they did) as that Roosevelt heartily endorsed relevant 
things from each of them, and took the sum of their work as 
a platform to be implemented— was the chief mechanic who 
regarded their aspirations and plans as something to make real.
Roosevelt had been writing his four-volume work The Winning 
of the West when Frederick Jackson Turner first put forth his thesis 
on the closing of the frontier. Roosevelt recognized immediately 
18. Today, to elaborate an earlier point, some American historians and 
policy-makers dismiss, to their discredit, Hay’s Notes as trivial and 
wishy-washy. Even the circumspect and articulate George Kennan seems 
at times to think the Notes were more in the order of window dressing 
and decoration than actual engines of policy, not recognizing that his 
own “containment policy” is the Open Door Policy up-dated and outfit-
ted with a new name. Containment is neither more nor less than the other 
side of the coin to a policy for keeping the door open; those who would 
close the door must be contained and isolated; to quarantine them is a 
logical corollary to maintaining an open door. Equally lacking in insight 
are historians who say the rest of the world simply dismissed the Notes. 
It would be more accurate to say the British saw them as one strand in 
their own policy (one of maintaining Anglo-Saxon dominance in world 
affairs) while other countries held them at arm’s length as something to 
be regarded with distrust. The hidden agenda of the Notes was never very 
hidden; indeed, to thoughtful people, it was likely transparent.
120 tom o’neill
how Turner’s view invited his own expansionism, and he wrote 
Turner offering enhancing arguments.
With regard to Brooks Adams, the connection has already 
been mentioned. Adams communicated to Roosevelt something 
of Adams’ own dark sense of urgency (alarming Roosevelt suf-
ficiently that at one point Roosevelt commented: “I wonder if 
Brooks is not quite mad”).
Regarding Alfred Thayer Mahan, the connection with Roo-
sevelt was very direct. Mahan had been impressed by that book 
Roosevelt wrote as a college student which described the navy’s 
insufficiency in the War of 1812, and Mahan had incorporated 
Roosevelt’s thinking into his own. In 1887 when Mahan was 
teaching at the Naval War College, he invited Roosevelt to come 
as a guest to lecture on the War of 1812. A few years later when 
Mahan published his own foundational work on sea power, Roo-
sevelt strongly complimented Mahan in a letter, and also wrote 
a glowing review of the book for the Atlantic Monthly. Further, 
on occasions when either Mahan or the existence of the Naval 
War College seemed in jeopardy, Roosevelt volunteered to run 
interference. When Mahan was in Washington, he and Roos-
evelt would meet at the Metropolitan Club or at John Hay’s 
house — where Brooks Adams, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Henry 
Adams were engaged in their intermittent but unending seminar 
on America’s future.
With regard to John Hay, Roosevelt’s connection went back to 
the days of his childhood. As a boy Roosevelt had been intro-
duced by his father, the senior Theodore Roosevelt, to Hay. John 
Hay, along with Henry Adams, and Brooks Adams, had all 
become, from the time Roosevelt arrived in Washington as Civil 
Service Commissioner in 1889, informal tutors in Roosevelt’s 
ongoing political education. Hay it’s true maintained something 
of Henry Adams’ amused detachment at the spectacle of Roos-
evelt’s countless enthusiasms (even as Roosevelt, in private com-
ments in later moments, had a tendency to downgrade Hay as 
more a dreamer than a man of action like himself). So while both 
Hay and Adams recognized in Roosevelt an agent more prone to 
action than they were, they worried—  and in Adams’ case some-
times complained starkly—  about the form the action could take. 
For all the currents and cross-currents, when Roosevelt became 
president after the assassination of McKinley, one of his first acts 
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was to retain Hay as secretary of state. Roosevelt understood the 
aggressive dimension of Hay’s Open Door Notes and kept Hay 
on as Secretary until, in Roosevelt’s second term, Hay became 
exhausted and died. It’s helpful for understanding Roosevelt’s 
connection to Hay to remember it was the calm and sometimes 
melancholy Hay who referred to the Spanish-American War 
as “a splendid little war.”
At the time the war broke out, Roosevelt was Assistant Sec-
retary of the Navy. While others among the more economically 
motivated expansionists wondered whether the price of a war 
over Cuba was too great, Roosevelt— who seems never to have 
met an expansionist argument he didn’t like — regarded the pos-
sibility of war as an enticing prospect. War, he thought, was good 
for people. It set them in motion; and if ever a human maintained 
equilibrium by moving forward, it was he.
His forward momentum was a trait well understood by those 
closest to him. During his life it was remarked that while Theo-
dore fulminated and celebrated, his second wife Edith stood by, 
interested and helpful, but sustained in her own center-of-gravity. 
She was somehow insulated from being swept off her feet by each 
new gust. It seems it would’ve had to be that way if the mar-
riage was to endure; while truly a friend, she was never merely a 
fan. The same can be said more emphatically for Roosevelt’s first 
daughter, Alice. At once caustic and affectionate (and perhaps 
more caustic than affectionate), it was she who remarked that her 
father wished to be “the bride at every wedding, the corpse at 
every funeral.”
Theodore’s restlessness had no doubt many personal circum-
stances that help to explain it. Of more interest is why this rest-
lessness made him so acceptable to America as a leader. He’s like 
Stephen Leacock’s knight who “ jumped on his horse and rode off 
in all directions.” We noted Henry Adams’ misgivings; he spoke 
of Roosevelt as “pure act” (something like the medieval scholastic 
concept of God) — but Adams’ intent was not particularly com-
plimentary. Like an accomplished lawyer who could make a case 
for anything, Roosevelt could become a cheerleader for any cause. 
He performed as one celebrating the achievements of America’s 
big businessmen, and as champion of the need to control them; 
as ardent seeker after world peace, and as one who could think of 
no higher exercise of the human spirit than to be engaged in war; 
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as a great believer in democracy and the equality of humans, and 
as one who saw nothing wrong with the resolute extermination 
of Indians in order to provide white men with a larger arena for 
the exercise of virtue.
Here, in fact, would seem the key to Roosevelt’s popularity. 
Like Americans in general, he did not brood over inconsistencies. 
He was moving so fast that no keen awareness of inconsistency 
could overtake him. In this, he served and intensified our aspira-
tions while he allayed our misgivings.
For there were at least two major fault lines in the American 
psyche. One had to do with the identification of our national 
mission with the purposes of God. Nothing seemed more natu-
ral. Our mission was imposed by God; therefore what served the 
mission, served God. Debates, newspaper articles, memoirs, ser-
mons, letters, and diaries of the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries are studded with references (as we still find often 
enough today) to “mission,” “the destiny of America,” “the fulfill-
ment of America’s promise,”—  along with reference to America 
as “God’s Country” and “the land of the free and the home of 
the brave.” 
One can say of course, this is a way of speaking. Of what 
though is it a way of speaking? What have we been talking about? 
Why could these phrases volley forth, over and over, as so self-
evident as to render further discussion unnecessary? How did 
these phrases get to be “clinchers” in debates regarding national 
policy? While every society is held together by an ethos of sorts, 
ours seems to have been suspended in mid-air, held up by noth-
ing more than our fervent say-so. There is latent anxiety in all of 
this. We protest too much.
The trouble with our Puritan ethos and shared dream of a New 
Eden in our New World is that, as noted, it immediately gener-
ated immense tension in the lives of those dedicated to it. We 
were, as we continue to be, bible-bearers. In 1899 we founded 
Gideons International with the purpose of making this book 
always accessible. Yet much of our activity seemed radically out 
of step with significant biblical teaching. The book of Job pictures 
a good man suffering. The weakest and most despised among us 
can be, the book of Job seems to teach, closer to God than all 
who criticize and despise him. Again, in the latter part of Isa-
iah, we find Isaiah describing a “Suffering Servant.” The servant 
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is regarded with contempt and cast out; but Isaiah seems to say 
this weak, vulnerable, and disfigured servant will be, quintes-
sentially, the chosen instrument of God’s redeeming love. At 
least this is the way Isaiah was interpreted in the four Chris-
tian gospels. In other places, the prophets had spoken of God’s 
unwavering solicitude for the widow and the orphan, and had 
proclaimed our treatment of them as the test case of our rela-
tion to God. And all this comes to a culmination for Christians 
in the gospel portrayal of Jesus as the special patron of the poor, 
the orphaned, the diseased, the Samaritan. The New Testament 
story is about a man who accepted crucifixion in solidarity with 
outcasts. 
If the purpose of the New Eden was to be a place where the 
spirit of Jesus would reign, clearly it could not be a place where 
might makes right. Unless, from its foundation, it was instituted 
as a place with a tender regard for the weaker party, it could not 
be anything like the Kingdom of God that Jesus proclaimed. Yet 
in the New World, who among all was more vulnerable —“savage” 
gestures and desperate stratagems notwithstanding— than the 
American Indian?
Unwillingness to entertain this question meant the mission 
carried forward by our Puritan ancestors could never be the mis-
sion they intended—  could never be the justifying mission in 
imitation of Jesus by which they sought to live meaningfully. For 
all that—  or perhaps because of it— there was a desperate need 
to find in such deeds as were actually being carried out a reassur-
ing manifestation of God’s approval. Great awakening followed 
great awakening. Our need to identify the lives we actually lived 
with some conception of divine will became the stronger and 
more compulsive as our brooding sense of our behavior’s failure 
to measure up became more undeniable.
Tension was enhanced when this original fault line in our Puri-
tan legacy was quickened from a second source of values. Perhaps 
we inherit this too from the Bible; but its more immediate history 
dates from the Enlightenment— from the thinking that surfaces 
in Rousseau and Kant, and closer to home, in Adam Smith and 
Thomas Paine. Here we find shining proclamation of the equal-
ity of persons and fervent witness to the unalienability of human 
rights. If America was to be the city on a hill envisioned by Puri-
tan John Winthrop, it would— in the constituting ambitions of 
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our political founders a century and a half later—  achieve this 
exceptional place only by becoming the world’s exemplary society 
where equality had become palpable and human rights were not 
only professed but were respected and manifest in the events of 
daily life.
The reason this enhanced our tensions was that it conflicted 
directly with our Puritan sense of being an Elect. The divinely 
endorsed self-aggrandizing of the Puritan was incompatible with 
the egalitarian ideals to be found in our Declaration of Inde-
pendence, our Bill of Rights, and some other major amendments 
to our Constitution. Therefore, Puritan urgencies drew us away 
from Enlightenment thinking, and when push came to shove, it 
was routinely our Puritan urgencies that prevailed.
Startling is the degree to which, from the very start, the 
commitment to equality was diluted and ignored. Ironically 
and beyond all logic, Enlightenment waters were quickly con-
taminated by a convenient sense that we who understood human 
equality so well were, by that very fact, superior to other people. 
Readily we came to see ourselves as better than those we thought 
incapable of our inspired insights. This mindset characterized 
frequently enough the leaders among our best and brightest— 
those whom we honored as architects and inheritors of Enlight-
enment thinking. In affirming human equality, we violated it; 
and the enthusiasms of the Enlightenment were redirected into 
Puritan channels. Enlightenment came to be regarded as a source 
of prestige —  as a distinction and claim to privilege among the 
Elect.
So co-option of Enlightenment rhetoric was successful, and 
the doctrine of the Elect survived advocacy of egalitarianism 
and secularization. To state the irony as starkly as possible: we 
Americans were entitled to treat others inhumanely because our 
sense of humanity was more enlightened than theirs.
It’s in embodying this contradiction that Roosevelt strides 
forth in the 1890s as an ideal leader for the generation of our 
great-grandparents. In the third volume of The Winning of the 
West Roosevelt tells us:
The conquest and settlement by the whites of the Indian 
lands was necessary to the greatness of the race and the 
well being of civilized mankind. . . . Such conquests are 
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sure to come when a masterful people, still in its raw bar-
barian prime, finds itself face to face with a weaker and 
wholly alien race which holds a coveted prize in its feeble 
grasp.19
Note the word “necessary.” In it sounds that theme of Mission—  of 
a divine calling— which resonates through all our history.
That Roosevelt is deliberately thinking in racist terms is made 
still more evident from an earlier passage in the same volume:
The most ultimately righteous of all wars is a war with sav-
ages, though it is apt to be also the most terrible and inhu-
man. The rude, fierce settler who drives the savage from 
the land lays all civilized mankind under a debt to him.20
Here the paradox smacks one in the face. The “most terrible 
and inhuman” behavior is entitled to receive praise and honor 
from “all civilized mankind.”
Even a moment’s pause here —  as it were to take a breath— 
provides the opportunity to wonder how such a dreadful means 
can be conducive to such a glorious end. Neither Roosevelt nor 
the American people had the appetite for such a pause.
Lest I seem to be wrenching his words out of Roosevelt’s con-
text, here’s a passage from a page just before the last citation:
Whether the whites won the land by treaty, by armed con-
flict, or . . . by a mixture of both, mattered comparatively 
little so long as the land was won. It was all-important 
that it should be won, for the benefit of civilization and in 
the interests of mankind.21
All of this is the language of the Elect. It is language poisoned 
by the bigotry of the Elect. It coats the poison over with silvery 
19. Theodore Roosevelt, The Winning of the West, vol. 3 (New York: G. P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1889), 174–75.
20. Roosevelt, Winning of the West, vol. 3, 45.
21. Roosevelt, Winning of the West, vol. 3, 44.
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phrases from the Enlightenment such as “the benefit of civiliza-
tion” and “the interests of mankind.”
As suggested earlier, war against the Indians required a 
demonizing of the Indians if whites were to kill Indians with 
a good conscience. Warren Zimmermann, who culled together 
the passages cited above, writes of Roosevelt’s attitude toward 
Indians:
Roosevelt’s picture of Indians was a stereotype of inferior-
ity. They were “filthy, cruel, lecherous, and faithless,” and 
their life was “but a few degrees less meaningless, squalid, 
and ferocious than that of the wild beasts with whom 
they held joint ownership.” In describing them, Roosevelt 
habitually used words like ferocious, treacherous, blood-
thirsty, duplicitous, and skulking.22
One thinks of Indian-killers as having the status in Roosevelt’s 
imagination that we assign to Walter Reed and those other heroes 
who drained fever-bearing mosquitoes from the swamps of Cuba 
and Central America. Indians were there to be exterminated. (So 
too, evidently, were “wild beasts” whom Roosevelt visited other 
countries in order to put down by the crate-load.) In celebrating 
racism, Roosevelt writes with a purity and eloquence not even 
Jefferson could match.
With perfect candor Roosevelt helps us to situate the place the 
Spanish-American War had in his thinking. A year after the war, 
in a new forward to his four-volume work on the West, Roosevelt 
writes:
The whole western movement of our people was simply 
the most vital part of that great movement of expansion 
which has been the central and all-important feature of 
our history—  a feature far more important than any other 
since we became a nation, save only the preservation of 
the Union itself. It was expansion that made us a great 
power. . . . At bottom the question of expansion in 1898 
22. Zimmerman, First Great Triumph, 219 (citing Roosevelt, Winning of 
the West, vol. 2, 147–48).
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was simply but a variant of the problem we had to solve at 
every stage of the great western movement.23
Regarding Roosevelt’s important, on-the-ground, real-time con-
tribution to the war with Spain, we must look away from his 
cowboy performance in Cuba to the time immediately preceding 
when he functioned in Washington as Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy. There, he was an indefatigable member of the McKinley 
administration and a vociferous participant in meetings with 
cabinet members, arguing at every opportunity that there was 
no alternative to war. He proceeded from at least three mutually-
reinforcing premises: (1)  the United States needed to expand; 
(2) War would be good for the character and morale of the Amer-
ican people; and (3) the Spaniards did not deserve an empire.
When the Maine exploded, Roosevelt went on public record as 
certain the Spanish had done it, and questioned the patriotism of 
those who presented theories to the contrary. When McKinley 
wavered as to whether war was necessary, Roosevelt was bluntly 
pro-war to McKinley’s face, and was even more blunt, adding 
sarcasm about McKinley’s wavering, behind his back. Of most 
importance: when his immediate boss John Long took a half-day 
off on Friday afternoon, February 25, 1898, Roosevelt sent a cable 
to Hong Kong to his crony Commodore Dewey that included the 
words: “In the event of declaration of war Spain, your duty will 
be . . . offensive operations in Philippine Islands.” This was a star-
tling usurpation of power on Roosevelt’s part. That this cable was 
not countermanded by McKinley when he caught wind of it is 
instructive. The act had a rash character; but the mindset behind 
it had to have been generally shared, had to be within the bounds 
of the consensus that was forming. 
So, finally, we must turn to McKinley to see how the consensus 
forming at that time led finally to war with Spain. McKinley has 
sometimes been seen as weak and vacillating. When he’s viewed 
from a distance, this appraisal can appear plausible. Viewed 
closer up, he comes across more positively. Career politicians who 
dealt with him at close quarters seem mostly to have found him 
kind and straightforward. He seems not to have been inclined 
23. Roosevelt, Winning of the West, vol. 2, xxxiv–xxxv. 
128 tom o’neill
to nurture grievances, and in the tumbling free-for-all of Ohio 
politics, those who were his rivals at one turn often emerged as 
friends at the next. He was conscientiously devoted to Ameri-
can prosperity, and throughout most of his official career tried to 
promote it by promoting high tariffs. The booster spirit Sinclair 
Lewis would later portray in his character Babbitt seems to have 
come naturally to McKinley, but in McKinley’s case it seems it 
was free from pettiness. Perhaps he left the more sordid details 
of backroom deals to his self-designated manager Mark Hanna. 
It can be reckoned a part of his constancy that, in his pursuit of 
prosperity for the nation, he’d always aligned himself with the 
business class and had kept its interests at the fore of his attention 
as he wended his way through the complexities of foreign policy. 
For just this reason, promotion of business can’t fairly be charged 
against him as a hidden agenda. In matters of personality, he was 
attentive to his invalid wife, and seems to have been unburdened 
by narcissism or undo sensitivity. It may be that from the start of 
his career he’d spontaneously and genuinely thought of himself 
as a mediator, a smoother of ruffled feelings, a builder of consen-
sus. This might help explain why rivals did not often turn them-
selves into enemies. This was so predictable that even in defeat 
he seemed to float upward. Having acquitted himself bravely and 
with distinction in the Civil War, he’d seen the carnage of war 
and had conceived a visceral repugnance for it. Humane feeling 
figured in his rhetoric about Cubans, and there’s no reason to 
doubt the concern he expressed for them was authentic. A man 
whose life was guided by uncriticized platitudes, in the inner 
circle of officials forming policy prior to the war with Spain, he 
may well have been the least (explicitly anyway) ideological and 
dogmatic. Later, as he lay wounded from a bullet he’d received 
while trying to shake hands with his assassin, he’s reported to 
have said of him: “Poor man; I’m sure he had no idea what he was 
doing.”
In most of the three months and some days in 1898 that led to 
his April 11 request for a declaration of war, McKinley should 
be called consistent rather than vacillating in his desire to find 
a peaceful end to the turmoil in Cuba. If he can nonetheless be 
seen as vacillating during those days, the vacillation was more 
about means than purposes. Could the U. S. buy Cuba from 
Spain? If so, let that be the end of the crisis. Could the U. S. 
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intimidate Spain into granting Cuba a kind of autonomy (simi-
lar to that for instance which the British were in the process of 
granting Canada)? If so, let that be the end. Could the Cuban 
insurgents against Spain prevail in battle and win their indepen-
dence? If so, well then, more power to them— though here there 
were to be sure reservations and forebodings among his advisors 
and within the business community, and these probably entered 
into his calculus.
The trouble for McKinley was that each of these courses 
seemed a dead end. That may not actually have been the case; 
but this probably was the way McKinley saw things. The Spanish 
government, fragile in Spain itself, was unwilling to enter nego-
tiations for the sale of its colony, knowing how unpopular such 
a sale would be in Madrid and among the Spanish people. Sec-
ondly, “autonomy,” while it had all the nice-sounding attractions 
of a compromise, was not actually acceptable either to the Span-
ish government or to the Cuban revolutionaries. It was unaccept-
able to the Spanish government for the same reason the sale of 
Cuba was: the home front— including the military— wouldn’t 
abide it. But—  at least by the start of 1898— it was unacceptable 
also to the Cuban revolutionaries: their sufferings had led them 
past the point where they could regard even the best of recon-
ciliations with Spain as tolerable; independence had become the 
goal that held them together as a revolutionary force. Further, to 
tell the truth, we weren’t ourselves sure how we would adjust to 
autonomy. Finally, leaving the Cubans to win independence on 
their own didn’t seem a realistic policy. Weak as Spain was, it 
had dedicated over two hundred thousand Spanish soldiers to 
suppressing the Cuban insurrection. It had suppressed Cuban 
insurrections before. Perhaps Spain had the power and quite 
possibly the will to annihilate all Cubans who opposed it sooner 
than grant Cuban independence. And, anyway, were Cubans 
really ready for Cuban independence? And were we?
Along such lines, one more gambit, short of all-out war, seemed 
open to an American administration burdened by genuine con-
cern for the Cuban people. This was to play a part similar to the 
part France had played in the American Revolution. The United 
States could recognize the Cuban revolutionaries as the legiti-
mate government of Cuba, and then do what it could as an ally to 
protect that government.
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Perhaps this kind of tightrope walking could have worked; but 
in fact it was probably the least discussed of the options available. 
Not only was there a high likelihood it would provoke a conflict 
with Spain rather than avoid it, but— more importantly— this 
option didn’t fit the prevailing ethos of the American expan-
sionist movement. It was outside the architecture of American 
political thought. The Monroe Doctrine wasn’t a principle of 
international law; it was, as clarified by Mahan’s advocacy of a 
strong navy, a proclamation of American intention—  saying in 
effect America’s word was law in the western hemisphere. While 
Spain’s hold on Cuba had been, one might say, “grandfathered” 
into the American proclamation, clearly the writ permitting 
that unruly exception was running out. It was widely felt it was 
time for America to take Spain in hand. Further, had the United 
States enrolled itself merely as the ally of a Cuban struggle for 
independence, the tactical consequences would have been unac-
ceptable to American policy-makers and military leaders. Our 
military maneuvers would have needed to coordinate with, and 
be subject to, initiatives of Cuban revolutionaries whom we knew 
very imperfectly— persons whose motives were anything but 
transparent to us. These were “untried” leaders, often squabbling 
among themselves. For all we knew, some were quite hostile to 
our ever-expanding participation in Cuba’s economy. For tactical 
as well as strategic reasons therefore, one can assume this par-
ticular alternative had few backers in Washington.
I’ve argued that McKinley’s vacillations concerned means to 
avoid war. Even in most of March 1898 (following the explosion 
of the Maine in February), McKinley seems to have been con-
sistent rather than vacillating in his search for a peaceful resolu-
tion; it’s only when the moment arrives when he’s convinced that 
things he does want can’t be obtained without the war he doesn’t 
want, that he yields. 
And only at that point, when he came to see war as inevitable, 
does it seem the real vacillation of McKinley came front and cen-
ter. It wasn’t clear, even by the time McKinley requested war on 
April 11, what kind of Cuba he envisioned as the outcome of the 
war. He requested war because he became convinced it was nec-
essary for his larger plans regarding American commerce abroad, 
and because he had been persuaded by Elihu Root and others 
that if he did not request it, his administration would fall apart. 
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Probably he hadn’t decided what he intended for the future of 
Cuba. On the surface at least, he left the matter to Congress. 
With its Teller Amendment (foreswearing annexation of Cuba), 
Congress attempted to clarify American intentions as it declared 
war. Even then, the matter remained ambiguous. (One can see 
why some Cubans have said with sardonic humor that Cuba lost 
the war for independence not to Spain, as some feared it would, 
but to the United States, as all Cubans should have feared it 
would.)
Regarding McKinley’s decision to ask for war, a fair summary 
statement is Warren Zimmermann’s: “McKinley was driven by 
inertia rather than design.” The inertia, to be sure, wasn’t that of 
immobility but of Newtonian forward momentum. While Hearst 
and (to a lesser extent) Pulitzer, and the Maine, and humanitarian 
sensibility are not by themselves sufficient to explain the decision 
for war, nonetheless when these are seen as forces drawn up into 
the groundswell of American expansionism, the war acquires an 
aspect of inevitability. While the expansionism itself was, one 
ought to conclude, a product of our collective freedom as peo-
ple enjoying a form of self-rule, we preferred to see the matter 
differently. The war came to seem unavoidable as a step toward 
implementation of a destiny somehow imposed upon us. In this 
context as mentioned, McKinley came to feel—  as both Henry 
Cabot Lodge and Elihu Root had warned him and as Roosevelt 
had relentlessly insisted— that if he wanted to maintain a mea-
sure of control over events (if, that is, he didn’t want to lose all 
public support and all confidence in his administration and in its 
plans to rescue our economy through an expansion of trade), he 
would have to opt for war.
In retrospect, both the critics of the decision and the defenders 
of the decision have tended to emphasize its novelty. I think they 
would do better to notice how unoriginal it was— how totally in 
keeping it was (as Theodore Roosevelt claimed) with the overall 
flow and momentum of American history. That we maintained 
this momentum in denial that it was we who were maintaining it 
was, we should notice, something that reinforced our continuity 
with our Puritan past. Manifest Destiny made us do it.
In the case of our Indian wars, it’s true we’d had on our side a 
kind of legal fiction in international law. This helped us feel our 
forward march was in the path of justice. Jefferson, for instance, 
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had bought the Louisiana Territory from Napoleon; therefore 
Indians who encumbered that territory and interfered with our 
plans for its development could be seen as infringing on our 
rights; they could, in effect, be cited as “trespassers.” In the case 
of Cuba, we lacked that legal cover.
Yet even a moment’s reflection on the Indian case must reveal 
how shallow that cover was. When, in the case of Cuba, we 
couldn’t claim even that legitimacy, the Monroe Doctrine sup-
plied the lack. Here too though the stubborn problem remained. 
Neither could kingly grants nor could Monroe Doctrine really 
serve to anchor our policy. An axiomatic conviction, expressed 
eventually in that slogan “manifest destiny,” had been operating 
all along. It was our ethereal sense of privileged assignment— 
our sense of a divinely-directed mission— that gave the Monroe 
Doctrine its authority in our eyes. The mere fact Cuba (unlike, 
say, California) was not contiguous land was hardly a sufficient 
reason to require, beyond such exalted doctrine and destiny, any 
further invention of legal principle.
Thus did Cuba, in the anticipation of the war, and in the course 
of it, and in its aftermath, become, unofficially, something analo-
gous to an American state. While the Teller Amendment had 
renounced annexation, the Platt Amendment (which declared an 
American right to intervene in Cuban affairs) effectively coun-
tered the sovereignty the Teller Amendment seemingly guaran-
teed. We mandated that the Platt Amendment be recognized in 
the Cuban constitution. The amendment provided to our federal 
government a veto power analogous to the power our federal gov-
ernment has exercised over our states (especially since the end 
of the Civil War) —  a federal power, that is, to annul or restrict 
state laws when it finds them in conflict with American federal 
law and purpose. Garry Wills examines this evolution of federal 
supremacy in his work on the Gettysburg Address.24
24. Garry Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words that Remade America 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992). The special relationship thereby 
established with Cuba goes a long way toward explaining something that 
can be puzzling to non-Americans: the outrage felt by many Americans 
over the seizure of power in Cuba by Fidel Castro —  a man who surprised 
us by resolutely turning his back on Washington. Many an American 
has felt toward Castro something similar to what the typical northerner 
may have felt toward Jefferson Davis at the outbreak of the Civil War. 
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In coming so far, we’ve surveyed the complex motivations for 
the Spanish-American War. What remains for further discus-
sion is examination of what motives led to the annexation of the 
Philippines.
Here too let me suggest there’s less mystery than meets the 
eye. If one is asking simply why the seizure of the Philippines 
got  “added” to our effort to establish stability on the island of 
Cuba, the problem may appear beyond solution. But the wrong 
question has been asked. The Philippines was never just an add-
on. It was, from before the war with Spain, a key piece in the 
scaffolding of our strategy.
That Roosevelt was not countermanded in his Friday telegram 
to Dewey is a clue. Unlikely as it seems, from early in McKinley’s 
first term there had been lengthy afternoon carriage-rides of Pres-
ident McKinley with his irrepressible and insubordinate young 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt. What did 
they talk about? It’s likely they talked about Manila among other 
things. They talked of Mahan’s grand scheme, in which America 
could not thrive without foreign trade (foreign trade being, as 
noted, a subject McKinley had concerned himself with through-
out his whole career); and it seems likely, at Roosevelt’s instiga-
tion, they talked of how, in accord with Mahan’s scheme, trade 
required (1) pacification of Cuba, (2) a canal through the Isthmus, 
(3)  annexation of Hawaii, and (4)  possession of a far-east port 
like Manila.
We’ve noted it was the lure of Chinese markets (and our wish 
to settle the Cuban issue quickly so we could address this “larger” 
issue) that generated urgency and impatience in the last days of 
Castro, they have felt, is a secessionist and impostor, a violator of Ameri-
can sovereignty—  one whose usurpation should not stand. This in turn 
helps explain, among other things, the extreme animosity toward John F. 
Kennedy— the sense in fact of sacrilege — felt by some in America’s high 
command and in the CIA over Kennedy’s alleged failure, first during the 
Bay of Pigs Fiasco and then during the Cuban Missile Crisis, to reaffirm 
our traditional jurisdiction where Cuba was concerned. Kennedy, they 
would have it, was the un-Lincoln— was in fact a traitor who let secession 
go forward. (James Douglass among others has regarded this high-level 
outrage at Kennedy— who had seemed in his campaign to promise he 
would do something about Castro —  as an important factor in motivating 
the assassination of Kennedy.)
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our negotiations with Spain, and that led McKinley finally to 
terminate discussion and issue an ultimatum that led to war.
Once we’d terminated Spain’s military hold on the Philippines, 
the expansionists (Roosevelt, Mahan, Hay, McKinley, etc.) could 
ask critics in America who opposed them (critics sometimes 
called “anti-imperialists”) what was to be done with the Philip-
pines other than to hang onto it. The anti-imperialists had no 
good answer. We seemed to have a hot potato in hand. Were 
we to drop the potato and run, it seemed there would be mas-
sive confusion and lethal civil unrest in the Philippines; and it 
seemed likely the islanders would soon become the victims of 
new European powers and/or Japan. We’d shattered what order 
there’d been for the people of the Philippines, and the respon-
sible thing was to remain and do what we could to establish new 
order in its place.
But to have framed the discussion this way seems to have been 
to pretend the acquisition of the Philippines was accidental— 
was something that happened to us. It takes up the annexation 
after the fact, which as I’ve said above is a mistake. Granted soon 
after in the early 1900s, the Philippines and our urgent desire to 
maintain and increase our share in the “China market” slack-
ened some; yet it’s in just such matters that time, with its shifting 
frames of reference, can trick us. In 1898 the desire to take the 
Philippines and hold it can’t accurately be judged to have been a 
minor concern. That would be to ignore history as it was being 
made, and to note it only as it settles into a fixed place in the past.
McKinley may have given a group of Methodist clergymen to 
understand the Philippines had fallen into our lap from heaven, 
but that’s not how it happened; an administration is more than 
one man. What happened is that within a week of our declaration 
of war, Commodore Dewey (acting in accord with Roosevelt’s 
pre-war telegram) entered Manila Bay and altogether destroyed 
the Spanish fleet. This was no act of God or gods. Though we 
subsequently came to regard our acquisition as something of a 
liability, the logic of our program in 1898 seemed to require this 
acquisition. Without it, the Open Door Policy (which, as I argue, 
has provided us with our sense of what we’re about ever since) 
would most likely never have become the charter for American 
foreign policy it did. The assertion of a right to an open avenue 
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of trade with China would have been abstract and meaningless 
had we not been fore-positioned in the Philippines to exercise 
it.
If anywhere, it is in the Philippines that our reliance on naked 
force for the achievement of our “destiny” should have become 
evident. Many Filipinos simply did not acquiesce in our assertion 
that we were their new masters. Yet it wasn’t possible to portray 
the local freedom-fighter Emilio Aguinaldo, and the insurrec-
tos whom he led, as aggressors against the people of the United 
States. With some pushing and pulling and blinking, we’d man-
aged to do that with American Indians— had done it with the 
likes of John Ross, Sitting Bull and Chief Joseph. Here though 
the vast geographical separation of the two peoples left that psy-
chological maneuver out of bounds. Instead, the whole context 
had to be reconfigured mentally (and without aid of some mani-
fest geometric rectangularity to feed our imaginations) to make 
our cruel war against Filipinos palatable.
The new configuration in our thinking was along these 
lines: “Here are us Americans—  selflessly attempting to provide 
the Filipinos with a share of those blessings with which God has 
abundantly blessed us. In their benighted and un-Christianized [!] 
state however, many of the Filipinos lack the wisdom to grasp the 
motives that inspire us. Unfortunately therefore it’s necessary to 
fight a goodly number of Filipinos to the death— until such time 
as a majority of the survivors come to see the light. At that point, 
we can begin to treat Filipinos as a people possessing all those 
rights of human beings which our traditional values require us 
to respect.”
For all that, not surprisingly, our government preferred not to 
be too explicit regarding the particulars of what was taking place.
Five years after we’d managed in 1901 to capture our former 
ally Aguinaldo through a pretense of having been captured by 
his troops, and long after Roosevelt’s proclamation of general 
amnesty in 1902 that was supposed to end hostilities, there was 
under General Leonard Wood (buddy of T. R. during the cam-
paign in Cuba) a massacre of roughly 600 Moro Filipinos. These 
were Muslims, and it was thought, because of their recalcitrant 
ways, to be a kind of economy of energy to kill them all when the 
opportunity presented itself. That’s what the American soldiers 
under Wood’s command did.
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We’re told in the official report to Washington that every man, 
woman, and child of these Moro villagers, trapped in the crater 
of a volcano to which they’d fled, was killed by Wood’s well-
armed American troops shooting from the crater’s rim.
On Monday, March 12, 1906, three days after reports of this 
incident had been published in American newspapers, Mark 
Twain attempted to dictate a satirical reaction to it. He resumed 
the effort two days later on March 14. One can say of this 
writing endeavor that it was one of those rare occasions when 
Twain’s voice deserted him. Later in the year when Twain was 
marking writings for inclusion in his autobiography, excerpts of 
which were being published in the North American Review, he 
marked this dictated material on the Philippines “not usable 
yet.”
Twain’s problem was he couldn’t maintain the satirical dis-
tance which might have made the piece work. He gave it his best 
shot, speaking with mocking praise of “the brilliancy of the vic-
tory” and referencing the official report as registering the “hero-
ism” and “gallantry” of our troops as they murdered the helpless 
Moros. But Twain was altogether unable to harness his despon-
dency and outrage into a disciplined work of satire. When he 
remarked on a commendation of the incident by President Roos-
evelt, Twain bluntly said:
His whole utterance is merely a convention. Not a word of 
what he said came out of his heart. He knew perfectly well 
that to pen six hundred helpless and weaponless savages 
in a hole like rats in a trap and massacre them in detail 
during a stretch of a day and a half, from a safe position 
on the heights above, was no brilliant feat of arms—  and 
would not have been a brilliant feat of arms even if Chris-
tian America, represented by its salaried soldiers, had shot 
them down with bibles and the Golden Rule instead of 
bullets.25
25. Mark Twain, The Autobiography of Mark Twain, Vol. 1 (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 2010), 405.
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You can hear Twain reaching back toward a tone of irony as he 
approaches the end of that long third sentence; but it’s too late. 
His temper is already lost, and the piece has simply the flat char-
acter of a white-hot denunciation. The gross necrophilia of TR is 
too much for Twain’s stomach. A further two days later, recount-
ing a going-away party of the previous day for his friend George 
Harvey, Twain remarks how all the guests were condemning the 
behavior of Wood and company. Twain comments:
Harvey said he believed that the shock and shame of this 
episode would eat down deeper and deeper into the hearts 
of the nation and fester there and produce results. He 
believed it would destroy the Republican party and Presi-
dent Roosevelt. I cannot believe that the prediction will 
come true, for the reason that prophesies which promise 
valuable things, desirable things, good things, worthy 
things, never come true. Prophecies of this kind are like 
wars fought in a good cause — they are so rare that they 
don’t count.26
Again, one can see Twain reach for wit and irony, but the charac-
ter of the whole is bleak anger.
One can imagine history teachers encouraging their students to 
write essays about heroic Patriots holding off the British at Bun-
ker (or Breed’s) Hill. One can’t imagine any history teacher ever 
inviting students to write essays about how we heroically killed 
Philippine Moros in 1906. (Surely no teacher has ever given such 
an assignment; instead the incident has been let gently disappear 
from The American Story and from American memory.)
The question those insisting on annexation asked anti-
imperialists in 1899 and 1900 was: “How do you propose we han-
dle with honor our current predicament of being the only source 
of order in the Philippines today?”
It was, again, the wrong question. It’s like the fellow whose 
loving and trusting wife has found him in a compromising rela-
tion to another woman. Suppose he asks you, his friend, how he’s 
26. Twain, Autobiography, 407.
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to extricate himself from the situation with honor. The error of 
the question is that it presupposes there’s a way to come out of 
such a situation with honor.
There was no answer to the question about the Philippines 
once the question was so framed. The condition we were in was 
dishonorable. To treat it subsequently as something destiny had 
dropped on us from the sky (as even the realist Mahan tried to 
do) was simply to compound our guilt by adding denial. It was 
quite in the Puritan mold: we don’t do things; God does them 
through us.
Honor would have been not to present ourselves as a conqueror 
in the first place. Once we’d compromised ourselves thus, it 
wasn’t incumbent upon those who’d opposed the project to come 
up with an honorable way out.27
There was no honor in staying; and there was no honor in leav-
ing. We should simply have extricated ourselves. An apology 
might have helped.28
The argument that we felt Filipinos were not ready to govern 
themselves should have had no traction. There were people all 
over the world whom we felt were not ready to govern them-
selves (as there continue to be to the present moment). And the 
argument that “if we don’t rule the Filipinos, some other power 
will,” seems specious too —  even if touched by realism. For if, as 
27. Brooks Adams became so confused on this point that even though 
he’d opposed the conquest, regarding annexation as the wrong way to 
expand, he nonetheless reversed himself once the Filipinos engaged in 
lethal resistance, saying, “Now our honor requires that we fight them to 
the finish.”)
28. While Roosevelt lusted for the Philippines and acted coolly and cru-
elly toward Filipinos, the portly presence of William Howard Taft as a 
benign administrator there in the opening years of the twentieth century 
provided some Filipinos a cushion against the sense of being oppressed. A 
generation later a romantic with an off-the-scale ego to rival Roosevelt’s, 
Douglas MacArthur (perhaps in an effort to expiate the cruelty towards 
Filipinos of his own father) seems to have forged a lifelong bond with the 
Phillipine people which went far toward assuaging the insult of annexa-
tion. Whatever the faults of this later man, clearly he had gifts of intel-
ligence and empathy that exceeded Roosevelt’s.
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it pretends, the argument looks to the interest of Filipinos, surely 
that was their risk to take. Had they wished to dodge that risk, 
they could have invited us to protect them. Their fierce resis-
tance showed they did not so wish. If the argument for annexa-
tion looked to our interest (and this is where the real argument 
resided), its premise was that we were entitled—  at whatever cost 
to others— to do whatever we thought would secure us advan-
tages or protect us from disadvantages. On such a pretext, all 
men can become robbers.
Conclusion Of Discussion On Force
My purpose in this survey focusing on four uses of force (against 
the Cherokee, Mexicans, Plains Indians, and, lastly, against—  or 
to the disadvantage of— former subjects of Spain) has been an 
attempt at demonstrating how our uses of force are typically 
invisible to us. We tend to think all our wars have been defensive, 
or at least humanitarian. Thus, when the internal logic of capi-
talism (“pay the laborer as little as possible”) began to contract 
our market, and we began to feel a more urgent need for mar-
kets abroad, we simultaneously came to feel that anyone in the 
world who didn’t serve as a means for advancing that purpose 
of ours was, by that fact, a self-designated enemy—  deserving 
whatever retribution we saw fit to mete out. Such people were no 
more than obstacles to a rightful ordering of the planet. For the 
sake of order, we would punish and incapacitate them. Repug-
nant as the task might be, God or destiny had assigned it. Once 
those others submitted, they could begin to participate in the 
benefits of the order we were establishing. History would justify 
us.
The special convenience of the “Open Door” is that its humani-
tarian aura was ideal for blinding us to the brute force required by 
our method. We said we wished only to set in place the rightful 
rules of the road. We wished only to take our place among the 
nations of the world— to stake out, among the peoples of the 
world, our place in the sun. We wished to be a city on a hill, and 
to exercise from there our God-given right to compete on equal 
terms for the opportunities and riches the world had to offer. 
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Doing so, we would be a beacon of light to all, and humankind’s 
last best hope.29
Lest it seem I’ve gratuitously ascribed to the Spanish-American 
War a selfishness and racism which weren’t really a part of the 
picture, it might be helpful to grant the last word to Senator 
Albert Beveridge. While his was not the only voice in the long 
debate over acquisition of the Philippines, his was a voice of the 
party that prevailed. On January 9, 1900, speaking in favor of the 
majority consensus in the Senate, Senator Beveridge proclaimed:
Mr. President: the times call for candor. The Philippines 
are ours forever. . . . And just beyond the Philippines are 
China’s illimitable markets. We will not retreat from 
either. . . .We will not renounce our part in the mission 
of our race, trustee, under God, of the civilization of the 
world. . . .The Pacific is our ocean. . . .Where shall we turn 
for consumers of our surplus? Geography answers the 
question. China is our natural customer. . . .The Philip-
pines give us a base at the door of all the East. . . . My own 
belief is that there is not 100 men among them [the Filipi-
nos] who comprehend what Anglo-Saxon self-government 
even means, and there are over 5,000,000 people to be 
governed. It has been charged that our conduct of the war 
has been cruel. Senators, it has been the reverse. . . . Sena-
tors must remember that we are not dealing with Ameri-
cans or Europeans. We are dealing with Orientals.30
29. Surely this kind of Puritan acquisitiveness proceeding under the 
umbrella of Enlightenment rhetoric has only grown in the century and 
more since the Spanish American War, and is very much with us today— 
relying on ever more lethal technology, and ever more sophisticated means 
of monitoring and intruding, to smooth its path.
30. Quoted in Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States (New 
York: HarperPerennial Modern Classics, 2005), 313–14.
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We’ve looked at signs of accelerating incoherence with regard 
to disinvestment in education, with regard to ascendant greed 
and growing inequality in our accumulation and distribution of 
wealth, and with regard to our increasing reliance on force to 
serve an expanding mission. Let’s now turn our attention to our 
treatment of nature.
As Americans we hold as a generalized truth that humans can’t 
fundamentally harm nature. The belief must be deeply rooted; it 
seems more an axiom than a conclusion drawn from observation 
and experiment. If we position ourselves as a mere observer, we 
see for instance that a major deforestation has occurred across 
North America. We see that cod fishing has fallen off along the 
northeastern United States. Along the northwest, we see that 
salmon are going the way of cod.
If we look to lumberjacks and fishermen however, we find a 
curious response. At least until very recently, they’ve been less 
likely to complain that their fathers and grandfathers have cut 
down too many trees or caught too many fish than they have been 
to complain of government regulations that are meant to restrain 
them from acting as their fathers and grandfathers did.
In the midst of their complaints, they’ve been likely to call 
themselves “conservatives.” What they’ve wanted to conserve is 
a lifestyle, and as seems clear, the attitudes that would preserve 
this lifestyle have deep roots. It’s a lifestyle of freedom—  one in 
which one has generally felt free to engage nature without inhib-
iting restraints from government. If our lumberjacking activi-
ties were making a profit, we were doing God’s work. Let us be 
The Sense That Nature Can 
Take Whatever We Dish Out4
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honest here. This lifestyle has tasted good, and these complaining 
lumberjacks and fishermen are genuinely engaged in trying to 
continue it and pass it on. So their claim to be conservatives is 
not unintelligible.
This is so true, that those who wish, instead, to conserve the 
actual trees and cod and salmon have had to move over and call 
themselves by a different name. They call themselves “conserva-
tionists.” There are few things conservatives are more likely to 
find pesky and not worth saving than conservationists.
If we consider, say, the case of salmon, we can anticipate 
how the position of the conservative plays out. As the salmon 
become fewer, the demand for salmon either remains steady, or 
quite possibly rises. This means that as salmon become harder to 
find, and the supply dwindles, the price of each catch increases. 
As the supply dwindles, so presumably do the suppliers—  at 
least over time. But the incentive for true stalwarts to con-
tinue fishing for salmon— if left unharnessed by government 
regulation and fines—  can hold steady or even rise as a func-
tion of the increasing scarcity and rising price of salmon. I call 
them “stalwarts” because the expenditure of labor per salmon 
increases.
Those who catch the last salmon are likely to find those salmon 
command a higher price than any salmon ancestors in history. 
Because of this, the run towards extinction may in fact accel-
erate as extinction approaches. In the real world of course, the 
actual end of the industry probably won’t be reached with a “last 
salmon” but rather at a point when there are so few salmon left, 
and the trouble of finding them is so considerable, that only 
demented billionaires will be able to pay for what a continua-
tion of salmon fishing would cost, and they too will pass. (Also, 
there may be a critical mass necessary for salmon to continue 
to breed, and when the number of salmon fall below that, they 
may go extinct. Further, to be sure, the insult of our industrial 
wastes to the nurturing seas may render the seas no longer fit for 
salmon.)
What we observe among fishermen and lumberjacks still caught 
up in this economy—  and here we can, for good measure, throw 
in oil-personnel with regard to petroleum products— is that 
most aren’t much interested in contemplating some imaginable 
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extinction point down the road. Rather they focus on the very 
real trees, fish, and oil still out there waiting to be “harvested.”1
If, for all that, one insists on engaging in an argument with 
these enthusiasts for full utilization of forest, fish, and geology, 
and insists of pushing this process of depletion in a mental exper-
iment to its predictable conclusion, the conservative fishermen, 
lumberjacks, and oil producers aren’t bereft of all response. Those 
among them given to theoretical thinking may respond that once 
the resources run out, there awaits in nature a malleability and 
provision for substitution that’s limited only by the imagination 
and ingenuity of humans. If Africans hunt elephants to extinc-
tion for the sake of their ivory, well, that’s no big deal. We will 
find a substitute for ivory. We will engineer from nature an “ivory” 
far better than any “raw” ivory nature has provided on its own. If 
the polar ice caps melt, and take the polar bears and penguins 
with them, well, we will create in air-conditioned studios anima-
tions of bears and penguins more engaging for our children than 
any bear or penguin behaviors we or our parents ever observed. 
Likewise, if we deplete our fishing waters of salmon, we will cre-
ate “salmon meat,” pinked over by the magic of science, every bit 
as tasty as the antiquated salmon that delighted the palates of 
ancestors; and because we will control the process from start to 
finish, this new salmon will be easier to harvest. We can’t lose for 
winning. And of course, if petroleum products ever really run out, 
we can always go solar.
As I say, such optimism roots itself in a sense of the inde-
structibility and infinite plasticity of nature. Our easy taking for 
granted here betokens our confidence that this mistress we take 
for granted won’t run out on us. Our complacency about Mother 
Earth is firmed up in part by our observation of the miracles of 
1. People in petrol-industry in particular try to tamp down any alterna-
tive developments of energy while they engage in increasingly desperate 
captures of petroleum resources; they seem haunted by a fear that access 
to alternatives, coupled with public concern over climate change, may 
bring their enterprises to a premature and untimely end. They seem to be 
genuinely in the grip of a conviction it would be a crime against nature if 
their industry were tapered toward a shut down before the last accessible 
petroleum was converted to carbon dioxide.
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the industrial revolution. And anyway, aren’t people living longer 
than ever? Who says Progress is a myth?
Let’s concede this sense is not peculiar to Americans but is to 
be found today among entrepreneurs all around the world. It’s 
around the world however partly because we’ve exported it there.
I’m inclined to look back beyond steamships, and skyscrapers, 
and computers in search of a basis for our easy complacency. As 
Americans, we may tend to think we’re too practical to owe much 
to philosophy. I’ve argued however that ideological convictions 
are often more powerful when we don’t reflect on them. Some 
claim to find our attitude toward nature rooted in the Bible. In 
the Bible however (if only we can stop quoting it long enough to 
read it thoughtfully) we will find notions of human dominance of 
nature tempered significantly by notions that nature is precious 
and that we are meant to care for it and learn from it. Francis 
Bacon, with his ambition as it were to put nature on the rack 
and tear from her her secrets, seems a closer-to-hand and less 
ambiguous source for that attitude toward nature we find embed-
ded among us.
In the generation after Bacon came Descartes. If Descartes 
was not the sole source of “Cartesian dualism” (the dualism of 
Descartes), he was at least a highly persuasive promulgator of it. 
Descartes saw us humans as containing souls (genuine instances 
of an immaterial principle), and was inclined to think everything 
else on the face of the earth was soulless. We are spirit and there-
fore immortal, he insisted; but he seemed ready to posit the rest 
of the world was sheer matter (sheer stuff extended in space and 
time, lacking any dimension of subjectivity or consciousness). 
Compensating for such radical emptiness in matter (the en soi 
that Sartre portrays as nauseating) was its endless pliability. In 
the footsteps of the Greek originator of atomic theory, Democri-
tus, and in company with Galileo, Descartes affirmed that matter 
was without color, sound, scent, or taste. These traits, he taught, 
were mere creatures of our consciousness, products of our way of 
sensing and thinking.
The world-devaluing scope of Descartes’ conception may 
take a moment to sink in. Even in the case of animals— your 
pet dog or cat, the dolphins, the bonobos— Descartes seemed 
to doubt there was any actual interiority, any capacity for sen-
sation, much less any capacity for affection or decision-making. 
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In the fifth part of his Discourse on Method, he floats the notion 
that if God designed “automata” (we would say “robots”) having 
all the operations we observe in a monkey, we humans would 
not know these monkeys were mere machines. He finds it plau-
sible to think the whole animal world may be a clever array of 
interacting machines. He could thereby strategically eliminate 
a “middle case” that would otherwise have blurred his system’s 
neat dualism; for if a tiger had a “tiger soul,” it would seem it 
must have a tiger-immortality to match—  souls being, in Des-
cartes’ conception, incorruptible; and similar consequences would 
follow for snails and cockroaches. To populate heaven with the 
souls of dead tigers, snails, and cockroaches seemed unimagi-
nable. Cartesian tidiness invited the conclusion that tigers feel 
nothing at all. Why complicate things by positing an “inner tiger” 
beneath the fur? Why not settle for mere levers, pulleys, and 
connectors?
John Locke, while criticizing Descartes’ rationalism, accepted 
Descartes’ dualism with its denatured nature —  colorless, sound-
less, tasteless, and odorless. Locke declared material substance 
an “ignotum x”—  and passed on Descartes’ impoverishing dual-
ism to those who were colonizing America.
If we contrast this approach with the approach of American 
Indians, and with the approach of almost all our own non-Indian 
ancestors, we get some sense of how original and radical it is— 
indeed, how idiosyncratic and surgical. Yet Descartes’ soulless 
animal seems a comfortable premise for the factory farming 
whereby we supply our tables with meat today. And Cartesian 
Dualism may supply a clue when we try to understand the ease 
with which we slip into spectator mode as we watch so many spe-
cies approach the threshold of extinction and see others cross the 
threshold and glide irretrievably into extinction by reason of our 
habits of encroachment and consumption.
In humble mode people will say: “Humans are too puny to 
have any real impact on nature.” This is said though the loss and 
threat of loss of species is empirically evident everywhere. What 
perhaps enables our indifference to the endangered species list 
is an underlying sense that the loss of one or another contrived 
automaton is no big deal. In the magnitude of our humility we 
believe we can engineer other automata to replace whatever we 
do in.
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Cartesian impoverishment of nature opens the door to a kind 
of Baconian utilitarianism that situates all things in the service 
of our need and wants. Nature, it conceives, is neither more nor 
less than a storehouse of resources for us to dispose of. The value 
of things other than ourselves is their value to us as consumables. 
What’s the point, we come to ask ourselves, of elephants? Unless 
we can eat them, or ride and tame them to our service, or clothe 
ourselves with their skins, entertain ourselves by watching them, 
or make figurines from their tusks, they have no point at all.
Still, some may reply: “Why blame us Americans? The world 
at large thinks this way.” This is true; and it seems increasingly 
the case. Let’s concede that Cartesianism—  and the industrial 
revolution that hitched its wagon to it—  did not begin on Ameri-
can soil. It is however in our interest to discover why a uniquely 
thoroughgoing, spontaneous, and uncriticized form of optimism 
about the plasticity and pliability of nature has so captured our 
hearts and found among us its purest expression. The question 
opens a realm for speculation comparatively new; one ventures 
into such relatively unexplored territory at one’s risk.
Puritans and Nature
Fortified with awareness how speculative this is, let me offer 
three topics toward providing some kind of answer. I begin with 
the apparent vastness of our continent when our Puritan fore-
fathers first came to settle it. My second topic is the Christian 
tendency— particularly as Christianity was taken up by Puri-
tans— to observe nature through the lens of sacred scripture. 
And my third topic, which is something of an outcome of the 
first and second, is the Puritan tendency, which came to be incor-
porated into our national consciousness, to see the continent as 
an unredeemed wilderness.
We begin with the vastness of the American continent. The 
following speculations seem plausible.
The Puritan sense that the “new world” was, for all practi-
cal purposes, inexhaustible must have been compelling. Its 
message was that God intended through them— the purified 
Christians— to start the world anew. Cost was no consideration 
towards achieving God’s aim. Creating things is no trouble for 
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God. Providence had made provision in “a new world” for a new 
edition of humankind. In response to this unparalleled opportu-
nity, we see in the early days of New England, a continuing flow 
of immigration from England. Later, when this flow decreased 
some, there was the hardy natural increase of God’s people 
that made necessary a continuing movement into fresh territory. 
Within the lifetimes of some of the first settlers, New England 
Puritans had stopped looking eastward— back to cramped and 
contaminated England—  and had focused their eyes on the open 
west. The “errand in the wilderness” transformed into the mani-
fest destiny of a people.
Inevitably, every move westward involved encroachment on 
habitat. Tragically for native Americans, this encroachment 
was Puritan encroachment on their habitat. As noted earlier, it 
would be a mistake to think such encroachment took place with-
out deliberation. Book was kept; entries were made; in a sense 
then, the Indian counted. What it may have taken a while for the 
Indian to figure out is that he or she counted as a Canaanite — 
one whom the Lord God had created in order to destroy. The 
loss of an Indian would not be recorded in red ink, but in black. 
His or her death was a liability canceled. The Indian was being 
identified with nature as nature was conceived by Cartesians: 
nature was object, something to be conquered or disciplined or 
discarded. Indeed Indians’ inability to share this Puritan per-
spective on nature is what made them “savages.”
In what was regarded as a part of their benighted state, Indians 
thought of themselves and nature as alive, conscious, and rich 
in purpose. As for encroachments on other living species: such 
encroachments were, we can surmise, regarded as incremen-
tal and negligible. Theoretically, animals that were not eaten or 
skinned or domesticated could retreat westward. As for vegeta-
tion, it seemed extravagantly supplied. It would have to have been 
a very eccentric settler who factored in its cost. When, well into 
the nineteenth century, Thoreau began factoring in the loss of a 
grove of trees as a deduction from Progress, he was regarded as 
odd.
This last consideration is telling for the mindset we explore. 
Puritans weren’t notably prodigal or careless; if anything, they 
were the opposite. But it would truly have been a rare settler 
who’d feel compunction or trepidation about uprooting a tree or 
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plowing over of a field of flowers. Done for the sake of a New 
Eden, such things were a necessary and trifling cost. The redun-
dancy and generosity of nature impeded a sense of its preciousness.
Admittedly, these reflections are speculative. They embody rea-
sonable hunches as to how the vastness of the new world regis-
tered on Puritan sensibility.
Secondly, while Catholic theologian and ecologist Thomas 
Berry does not precisely cite the Bible as a source for devaluation 
of nature, he has said there’s been a strong tendency among our 
Christian ancestors to seek their bearings from their reading of 
the Bible, and then assign to nature the place and character their 
scriptural interpretations permit. It would be healthier, Berry 
suggests, to take our bearings from nature and then, guided by 
these empirical observations, take up the Bible and read it in the 
context our acquaintance with nature offers. For the Bible, Berry 
says, draws on what our observations of nature yield. The psalms, 
for instance, are rich in passages that presuppose we’re alive to 
the mystery and beauty of our habitat.
The Renaissance was an effort to achieve the break-out Berry 
describes and advocates. We can see this in the case of Galileo: 
telescope first, Bible second. Actually, if we look alertly, we can 
find this in the cases of Michelangelo, Leonardo, and Raphael— 
and running all through the Italian initiations of what we call 
the Renaissance. We find there the rebirth of pagan enthusiasm 
for the human body and the human scene; and this aesthetic 
shift re-configured the way people looked at the Old and New 
Testaments.
Beginning in Italy, the Renaissance spread westward and 
northward. It was sponsored more often than hindered by the 
popes of the time. When however the Renaissance effort to 
rebuild St. Peter’s led to the selling of indulgences and the revolt 
of Martin Luther, the Renaissance in the North took on in fun-
damental ways the character of a rejection of the Renaissance 
in the South. In fact a new label had to be minted for it: the 
Reformation.
The North strongly reaffirmed the primacy of scripture. Re-
affirming the primacy of scripture, the rebirth or Re-formation in 
the North found many un-scriptural elements to complain about 
both in the contemporary Catholic South and in the Catholic 
past. There was the strong monocratic doctrinal and political 
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power of the Roman pope. There were all those sacraments. There 
was the High Mass from the Middle Ages— with a metaphysical 
doctrine of “transubstantiation”—  along with incense, Gregorian 
Chant, mammoth cathedrals, and stained-glass windows. And 
the return of a pagan Greek celebration of the human body was 
one more troublesome encumbrance marring the shining face of 
scripture —  one more impurity. The North was sure one did not 
look to nature for the right way to read scripture; one righteously 
read scripture for a way to hold nature in check.
Even among so many protestors, Puritan Protestants dissenting 
from the Anglican Church distinguished themselves as a people 
who would have nothing to do with “Roman” accretions and 
dilutions of Christian faith. Because these Puritans have been a 
parental influence on every subsequent generation of Americans, 
one can ask whether, in rejecting so much that brings aesthetic 
sensibility into play, they didn’t successfully put their children’s 
and their children’s descendants’ capacity for appreciation of 
nature under constraints that tended to sap its vigor.
Our third topic regarding Puritan aesthetic sensibility contin-
ues the first and the second. We consider the Puritan reaction to 
wilderness. Wilderness was a place of wildness, a place of unpre-
dictability. As New Englander Robert Frost says in later times to 
his neighbor: “Something there is that doesn’t love a wall.” For 
the Puritan, this “something” had to be addressed, dealt with, 
brought to heel. The wild and the free was the devil’s playground.
Here however we must be especially tentative. Puritans were 
capable of spontaneous response to natural beauty. Rich in writ-
ten culture, and profoundly introspective, some demonstrated 
warn emotional engagement with this world. Anne Bradstreet, 
who lived from 1612 to 1672 (belonging therefore to the first gen-
eration of American Puritans) could write a letter to her husband 
in the form of a poem, and could begin by addressing him:
My head, my heart, mine eyes, my life — nay more,
My joy, my magazine of earthly store . . . 2
2. Anne Bradstreet, “A Letter to Her Husband, Absent upon Public 
Employment,” in The American Puritans: Their Prose and Poetry, ed. Perry 
Miller (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), 271.
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There’s conjugal compatibility celebrated here; but surely there’s 
tribute to conjugal sexuality as well. This is but a sample of much 
in her poetry showing a lively sense of the good things present 
here and now; and her poetry tells us something not just about 
herself but about her community, for it seems her poetry was well 
regarded by fellow Puritans.
In the next century, there’s Jonathan Edwards. In a notebook 
of personal jottings, Edwards reflects on natural beauty:
The works of God are but a kind of voice or language of 
God to instruct intelligent beings in things pertaining to 
Himself. . . .The immense magnificence of the visible world 
in inconceivable vastness, the incomprehensible height of 
the heavens, etc., is but a type of the infinite magnificence, 
height and glory of God’s work in the spiritual world.3
The first sentiment can be paralleled in the notes, life, and 
work of Michelangelo. The second is something one could say 
anticipates the message of Van Gogh’s Starry Night (the favorite 
one).
Here’s more from Edwards:
It is very probable that the wonderful suitableness of 
green for the grass and plants, the blue of the skie, the 
white of the clouds, the colours of flowers, consists in a 
complicated proportion that these colours make with one 
another. . . .The gentle motions of waves, of the lily, etc., 
[seemed designed to be agreeable] to other things that 
represent calmness, gentleness and benevolence, etc.; the 
fields and woods seem to rejoice, and how joyful the birds 
seem in it. . . .
Those beauties, how lovely is the green of the face of the 
earth in all manner of colours, in flowers, the colour of the 
skies, and lovely tinctures of the morning and evening.4
3. Ola Elizabeth Winslow, ed., Jonathan Edwards: Basic Writings (New 
York: New American Library, 1966), 250–51.
4. Winslow, Jonathan Edwards, 252–53.
  w h y the center ca n ’t hold 151
Here is a much richer sense of nature than the sterile sense of 
the world projected in Cartesian dualism. And this continues in 
Edwards. One might think one was reading John Muir. (Edwards 
belonged to the tradition out of which Muir came; Edwards was 
an American-born Scotch-Presbyterian-Puritan. His differences 
with other Puritans over church structure shouldn’t disqualify 
him as a representative of Puritanism. The breakout toward exu-
berant sense experience in Edwards becomes full blown in Muir.)
What remains noteworthy though is that these Puritan tributes 
to nature come from the same pen that wrote the sermon “Sin-
ners in the Hands of an Angry God.” In this sermon we’re not 
concerned with journal jottings. This was a sermon Edwards put 
out there for the world at large to ponder. Here we’re told that 
the very charms and god-revealing beauty of nature may lure the 
unsuspecting Christian into false complacency. When all things 
are going well, such a Christian may say to himself or herself that 
eternal damnation is an unlikely prospect, and this for Edwards 
places that soul in jeopardy.
In his sermon Edwards goes to great lengths to shatter one’s 
workaday trust, and make the case that the natural world in 
which we live and move is a thin crust over the flames of hell. 
How close are the excruciatingly painful fires of hell, and how 
eternally they will burn! Speaking of those who have succumbed 
to human emotion and begun to live trustingly in the world, 
Edwards preaches:
The wrath of God burns against them, their damnation 
does not slumber; the pit is prepared, the fire is made 
ready, the furnace is now hot, ready to receive them; the 
flames do now rage and glow. The glittering sword is whet, 
and held over them, and the pit hath opened its mouth 
under them.5
The sermon, powerfully written, has provided an example for 
evangelical preaching ever since. Its relevance to our inquiry is 
that it argues we’d be making a dangerous mistake were we sim-
ply to surrender ourselves to the harmony and beauty of things 
5. Winslow, Jonathan Edwards, 153.
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as they now present themselves. We must regard earthly beauty 
with what Puritans have elsewhere called “weaned affections.” 
Howsoever nature may still deck herself in innocent beauty left 
over from Eden before the Fall, she stands now—  due to the sin 
of humankind— in need of redemption. An acute Augustinian 
sense, further refined by Calvinism, had come to qualify, and all 
but erase, that passage we find in Genesis: “And God saw every-
thing that He had made, and behold, it was very good.”
Augustine, writing The City of God, depicted the present 
world— perhaps with deliberate rhetoric and hyperbole —  as “the 
city of Satan.” What Augustine may have intended for dramatic 
contrast was literal truth for Puritans: this world is Satan’s domain. 
Between Augustine and the Puritans had come Calvin. With his 
doctrines regarding the fewness of the elect and the predestined 
damnation of most humans, Calvin had limned in dark shadows 
a version of Christianity which became gospel truth for Puritans. 
Those shadows are brought to the foreground in the writings of 
Hawthorne, a deliberate anti-Puritan; they shade and color each 
page of The Scarlet Letter. Similar shadows linger in misgivings 
that haunt the meditations of Melville. One can find these shad-
ows still in the much later homey poems of Robert Frost.
The beauty of nature became provisional—  a hypothetical 
beauty. The only world that could be trusted was a redeemed 
world, and it would obviously be premature in the Puritan 
understanding of things to say the wilderness that confronted 
them was such a world. Rather the world as it presented itself 
to the Puritan was the domain of the trickster; it was Satan’s 
domain, and one put oneself in jeopardy who trusted in its 
beauty.
Only through completion of the God-given mission we have 
now mentioned at length could that wilderness be redeemed. 
Until then, if one was to regard nature’s beauty, it must be 
with “weaned affections.” Dedication to the mission armored one. 
An encounter with nature could be safe only for one held tight by 
the discipline of our godly mission.
Rejection by Puritans of the Renaissance in its Italian and 
Catholic forms of celebration of human nature was a good predic-
tor of how Puritans would regard American Indians. When Puri-
tans were pushing the notion that they had come into a vacuum 
domicilium, an unoccupied territory, they would often remember 
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(how could they forget?) that Indians did after all live here. That’s 
when it was convenient to call the Indian a “savage,” suggesting 
thereby he was a part of unredeemed nature; the implication of 
the term was that the Indian was altogether too much at home 
in his body and in nature, a condition certifying him as satanic.
The issue then of Puritan aesthetics is richly complicated— 
complicated by its rejection of “Catholic paganism,” and by 
resistance to the beauty and dignity of nature. Moreover the 
Italian Renaissance itself was a truncated project. In rejecting 
it— in rejecting the celebration of human beauty so evident in 
Renaissance painting and sculpture (and really in its literature 
and architecture as well) — the Puritans rejected what was an 
imperfect recovery by Italian Renaissance Catholics of that love 
of nature we find in classical Greece. From the perspective of 
ecologists today, the Catholics of the fifteenth and sixteenth cen-
turies didn’t go far enough. While reclaiming the Greek sense of 
human beauty, these Renaissance Catholics fell short of a general 
reopening of their eyes to nature. The Council of Trent and other 
features of the Catholic Counter-Reformation acted as agents to 
cool such paganizing tendencies toward nature among European 
Catholics.
If we look to the Greeks of pagan times, we see their celebra-
tion of the human form was just one part. They celebrated ocean 
and sky, sun, earth, and time itself. The forms they sculpted, and 
the stories—  often erotic— they told of gods and goddesses, pro-
vide intimations of sublime and awesome powers rippling every-
where. Even at the beginning, leaders of the Catholic Renais-
sance may have held back from a fear of idolatry were they too 
confidently to follow the Greeks in such a direction. (We know 
for instance that both Botticelli and Michelangelo, stirred by 
warnings from Savonarola, feared at times their preoccupation 
with beauty was putting their souls in jeopardy.) Also, perhaps 
even in Italy, it could be that with the emergence of the Scientific 
Revolution and Cartesian thinking, these freshly “re-born” Cath-
olics came to regard celebration of nature as a step backward. The 
bleak landscapes that backdrop some of Leonardo’s most graceful 
paintings of saintly humans are enigmatic; they provoke curiosity, 
and are perhaps instructive anticipations of Cartesian thinking. 
Perhaps Leonardo was registering a sense that humans are the 
one bright spot in an otherwise desolate world.
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Be that as it may, Puritans in general seem to have guarded 
themselves from even the threshold of any spontaneous ven-
eration for nature. When Arthur Miller writes The Crucible, he 
has the Salem witch trials originate from news that young girls 
were dancing scantily clad or naked in the forest. Whether this 
was really the beginning of that multilayered episode, is prob-
ably impossible to say. What makes it at least plausible is that 
two elements, both of which were regarded with Puritan sus-
picion, come together: the human body and the wilderness. To 
a Puritan imagination, conjunction of these two may have been 
proof enough that Satan was alive and well and about to take 
over Salem.
In general, American Indians, like the pagan Greeks, seem to 
have taken joy both in their bodies and in the natural surround-
ings that nurtured them in body and spirit. While nature had 
fearful aspects for them as well as for Puritans, Indian cunning 
and spiritual technology were usually deemed adequate to placate 
and supplicate malignant spirits. Nature seems for the majority of 
tribes to have been a “familiar”—  a dazzling ever-present coun-
terpart to life. But that’s too weak. Nature was the wellspring 
of life and resting place of ancestors, the source of being and a 
matter of constant interest—  a richness far more to be met with 
gratitude than suspicion. Had Frost been writing of Indians, he’d 
have done well to have them say: “Before the land was ours, we 
were the land’s.”
We can hypothesize that in rejecting and killing Indians, Puri-
tans did immense damage to their own souls. In the course of 
their long project of violence to wrest the land from Indians, one 
can imagine cases in which large numbers of them throttled what 
vestiges of aesthetic sensibility Calvin had left them. That some 
became murderous toward their own at Salem, as many had been 
murderous toward Indians, is not surprising. Freud might find 
in such violence something like a “return of the repressed”— 
the karma-like price one pays for despising what is natural. As 
Descartes had devalued nature, so Puritans despised those who 
recognized themselves as nature’s children.
If ever anyone thought “an idle mind is the Devil’s work-
shop,” Puritans did. It seems, “an idle mind” came to mean for 
them a mind that was at rest contemplating. One can specu-
late that this attitude became a widespread source of American 
  w h y the center ca n ’t hold 155
anti-intellectualism. Contemplation was especially dangerous, 
they thought, when this idle mind was reveling in natural beauty. 
To sanitize and purify one’s attention to nature, it was important 
that it be dealt out only under the constraints of duty. Pleasure in 
nature was legitimate only when it served the Mission.
Max Weber writes:
The idea of a man’s duty to his possessions, to which he 
subordinates himself as an obedient steward, or even as 
an acquisitive machine, bears with chilling weight on 
his life. The greater his possessions the heavier— if the 
ascetic attitude toward life stands the test— the feeling 
of responsibility for them, for holding them undimin-
ished for the glory of God and increasing them by restless 
effort. The origin of this type of life also extends in certain 
roots . . . back into the Middle Ages. But it was in the ethic 
of ascetic Protestantism that it first found a consistent 
ethical foundation.6
Weber goes on to say this ethic “acted powerfully against the 
spontaneous enjoyment of possessions,” but then immediately he 
adds:
On the other hand, it had the psychological effect of free-
ing the acquisition of goods from the inhibitions of tra-
ditionalist ethics. It broke the bonds of [restraint on] the 
impulse of acquisition in that it not only legalized it, but 
(in the sense discussed) looked upon it as directly willed 
by God.7
And so the Puritan Mission, begun as “an errand into the Wil-
derness” (phrase cited by Perry Miller from a Puritan pastor), 
transformed itself into — became in time the informing spirit 
of— the Monroe Doctrine, Manifest Destiny, the Open Door, 
and (to bring things into the twentieth and twenty-first cen-
turies) the War to Make the World Safe for Democracy— i.e., 
6. Weber, The Protestant Ethic, 170.
7. Weber, The Protestant Ethic, 171.
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make the globe safe for American-style economic activity every-
where. In the course of the transformation, “the wilderness” 
became the whole world, and the Mission became a permanent 
crusade — whose latest instantiation can be seen in our seeming 
war-without-end on terrorism.
This at least is Weber’s and my schematized version of how the 
pursuit of happiness came to be replaced among us by a compul-
sive effort to acquire goods and stabilize the process that makes 
their acquisition and secure retention possible. It’s a version that 
predicts what we actually experience: the commercialization of 
almost all aspects of our life —  so that it seems no sooner does 
a person climb a high mountain or win a golf tournament than 
that person turns himself or herself into a brand—  a marketable 
commodity. Our aesthetic sensibility pays a price.
We find it difficult to put our finger on the connections here. 
They are so familiar as to be invisible. To be sure, the Puritan 
doctrine of election is hardly held by anyone today. The terrible 
irrationality and denial of human equality in saying that God 
arbitrarily elects some to blessedness and others— the major-
ity— to damnation became at some point indigestible. Yet the 
doctrine of divine election didn’t actually disappear. It went 
through a transformation. It persists in a religious, social, politi-
cal, and economic doctrine of our exceptionalism. We Americans 
continue to think of ourselves as a great exception, endowed with 
unique prerogatives.
We regard some nations as more equal than others, and our-
selves at the summit; Calvinist arbitrariness and its assumption of 
an inequality that splits the human species apart at its depths still 
run the show. A willingness to trump the ordinary usages of law 
by providing special privileges and opportunities for the Ameri-
can way—  and by providing privileges for some Americans over 
other Americans— is in plain view. We who follow the American 
way act as an elect people still. We may say we do so from a sense 
of noblesse oblige, but often our actual program is neither noble 
nor governed by a sense of obligation to others.
Elect though we be, we’ve gradually been drawn, kicking and 
screaming—  and resisting even now— toward an awareness 
that we’re supposed to be equal within the confines of our own 
nation—  are supposed to treat fellow citizens as equals. When a 
Martin Luther King reminds us of this, we do give some attention 
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to what he says. Regardless though of whether we achieve that 
equality at home, we see ourselves as an elect people in relation to 
the world’s population at large. When, in the last year of his life, 
King presumed to deny we have this special status and demanded 
that we treat people in every corner of the world as equals, we 
ignored him; and we still ignore him. We’ve set aside a special 
day for ignoring him annually called Martin Luther King Day.
When we sing “God bless America” there’s reason to fear we’re 
not so much asking God’s blessing as asserting we’ve already got 
a special entitlement to it. When we sing Irving Berlin’s song at 
our national sport, it’s often a person in military uniform who 
performs it. The occasion moves us, I fear, by reminding us we 
are a holy nation. So much so, that when we invade a country 
to punish its leadership for keeping from us something we want, 
we praise ourselves as willing to die for the American way; we’re 
thinking of our soldiers and ourselves as protecting America by 
maintaining for it the special privileges God intended us to have.
Regarding the tenor of our daily lives, a moral reconfiguration 
has gradually taken place. What began as a quest for “the good 
that can fulfill the heart’s desire” has been diluted into a mere 
quest for goods. Black Friday heaped on Black Friday. We’re so 
busy increasing our acquisitions, we’ve little time to reflect upon 
the preciousness of what we already have. The Thanksgiving meal 
is encroached upon by the quest for yet more stuff. Consequences 
for the maintenance of habitat are considerable.
The key, as suggested by Weber, to understanding this lies in 
grasping that our desperate search for justification has required 
palpable signs of sanctification— has required Success in three-
dimensional form if we are to achieve the sought-for reassurance. 
And this reassurance is never sufficient. An ironic consequence 
is that we descendants of Puritans find ourselves indistinguish-
able from secularists and atheists. We can find in the atheist Ayn 
Rand a spokesperson for our agenda.
To review: The desire to know if one was “saved” was irre-
sistible. It seemed one could perhaps know one was among the 
elect if God confirmed one’s lifestyle with the blessings of suc-
cess. When Puritans gave up (once the non-Puritan Stuarts had 
regained the English throne) on reforming the Church of Eng-
land, the Puritan Mission came to be geographically redirected; 
the Mission turned from east to west. An errand to establish 
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Eden in New England as a temporary sanctuary re-emerged 
as a long term project to “win” the West. Manifest prosperity, 
achieved under Christian auspices, would be the token of victory; 
and the individual’s saving participation in that victory would be 
marked by acquisition of personal wealth.
This version of our development (embroidering on themes of 
Weber, Perry Miller, and William Appleman Williams) allows 
otherwise puzzling things to come into focus. The resolute oppo-
sition to taxes of people who label themselves Christian seems 
easier to understand in the light of such a version. Taxes are 
compulsory sharing. But such sharing tends to dim the radiance 
of triumph— the full physical prominence — that should distin-
guish those who’ve most successfully served the Mission. Gov-
ernmental intrusion has, in effect, the character of stealing luster 
from the specially blest. Such intrusion has a taint of sacrilege. If 
the poor are to be relieved—  and Jesus says they are — let them 
be relieved not by grey and godless acts of government, but by 
those generous personal gestures, those thousand points of light 
and acts of individual kindness, that will reflect back upon the 
giver, and beyond him or her, enhance God’s glory. This sense of 
how the righteous are to be known among us has relevance for 
our care of nature and good order; for a fairly predictable corol-
lary of the contraction of government’s role is that the preserva-
tion of habitat and civic infra structure should be more a matter 
of private dedication and donation than a matter administered by 
law. Conspicuous giving goes some way toward certifying pub-
licly the membership of the rich at the apex of the elect. Unfortu-
nately, and to the loss of all of us, this certification becomes more 
important than actually taking care of things.
The analysis being drawn here from Weber seems confirmed 
also by light it sheds on the Spanish-American War—  and 
the many wars, mostly undeclared, which have followed. That, 
with the exception of a disenchanted Mark Twain or a skepti-
cal Will James or a metamorphized Andrew Carnegie, practi-
cally no one with an important voice could find an alternative 
to the Spanish-American War and its aftermath is instructive. 
It accords neatly with the notion we’d become by then a peo-
ple in thrall to a machine-like ethos of acquisition— no longer 
appreciating or taking care of the things nature had plentifully 
provided. Misgivings Twain had expressed in The Gilded Age 
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in the 1870s— where he and co-author Charles Dudley War-
ner chronicle an accelerating decay of humans amid an increas-
ingly mindless worship of Progress— were strongly confirmed 
in Twain’s lifetime. It’s instructive that the inhumanity he had 
sensed at the center of things in the 1870s was so manifest in the 
slaughter of defenseless Philippine Moros thirty years later as to 
render this most articulate of Americans almost speechless with 
anger.
When the Spanish-American War was over, McKinley lived 
long enough before assassination to say it had been a mis-
take. Late in his own presidency, Theodore Roosevelt publicly 
acknowledged regret for the acquisition of the Philippines— the 
part of the war in which he’d had the most influence. Even John 
Hay, who’d called the war “a splendid little war,” didn’t seem to 
find much in its aftermath to lift his spirits. He worked harder 
than ever once the war was officially ended (among other things, 
penning those notes about China); but before the “pacification” 
of Filipinos was complete, he died abruptly, still in harness as 
secretary of state, in 1905—  done in apparently by his exhaustive 
service to the expanding Republic.
These earnest men seem the incarnation of Max Weber’s “obe-
dient servants” who bear “a chilling weight”— the greater their 
possessions, the heavier and more life-draining their sense of 
responsibility for securing and enlarging them. Roosevelt cor-
rectly predicted that the acquisition of the Philippines would 
eventually lead to a “catastrophic” war with Japan. It was beyond 
him however to apologize for the war he envisioned. Further, the 
contemporary deaths of thousands of Filipinos— while regarded 
as “necessary” to the exercise of the American Mission— 
left these earnest men, not bathed in some glow of victory but 
numbed with a sense of perplexity and futility. (This is much 
like what later leaders and the foot-soldiers under their command 
would find in Vietnam and in Iraq, and what we’ve now come to 
experience in Afghanistan, and are beginning to experience in 
Syria.)
Further, this version of our past supplies a context to under-
stand how it is that even as the Gulf of Mexico was serving up a 
murky brew of oil and dead waterfowl and contaminated fish, a 
preoccupation of many of us (even among those living along the 
oil-drenched shoreline of the Gulf), and of our media pundits, 
160 tom o’neill
and apparently of our president was that we not let ourselves get 
discouraged or carried away by the disaster, but that we resolutely 
and heroically continue our deep-ocean drilling for oil. American 
optimism demanded we do no less.
The revision of The American Story presented here makes it 
easier to understand our preoccupations. If our utilization of nat-
ural resources is not a means to some other end, but is itself an 
end to which we’re willing to subordinate just about everything 
else, then a lot of things fall into place. BP makes sense. Wal-
Mart makes sense. Monsanto makes sense. This unqualified and 
uncritical willingness to “move ahead” lends force to the hypoth-
esis that it’s rooted in an inherited sense of mission—  a convic-
tion this is what we were born to do. We seem to have lost all 
instinct for appreciating and nurturing the harmonies of nature, 
the beautiful synergies by which the natural order protects itself. 
Currently, as it were to corroborate this notion, we’re “fracking” 
oil shale deep in the bowels of the earth while seeming to turn 
a blind eye to evidence that we’re triggering earthquakes and 
leeching toxic substances into drinking water in ways not good 
for children or other forms of life. Here too our attitude seems 
counterintuitive enough to make one suspect that spontaneous 
responses are being overridden by an inherited program—  as if 
the very cells of our brain have been reconfigured to accept dic-
tates from a kind of ideological template.
This view of how aesthetic sensibility has been suppressed in 
us helps also toward explaining the almost inexplicable conduct 
of financiers who so game our economic system that they seem 
likely finally to destroy its credit and render it inoperable. If the 
accrual of monetary profit is the measure of Success, then each 
increment of money is an increase of points, promoting one to 
a higher score. And there’s no such thing as having too high a 
score; it’s a contradiction in terms. One therefore reaches toward 
as high a score as possible. One will do this even if “winning the 
game” by such means, results in ending the game one has won. 
The behavior is irrational only if the money game is, as Aristotle 
insists should be the case, a mere means to something else. The 
risk in the go-for-broke behavior is that Aristotle is right. If he 
is, then playing the game out to its point of failure does not seem 
a good idea after all. The connection with aesthetic sensibility is 
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that it is only if we have suppressed aesthetic sensibility that we 
can absolutize the pursuit of money in the way we have.8
That it seems so unnatural to us even to talk of the danger 
of  “too high a score” confirms we’re engaged in compulsive 
behavior. Aesthetically blind, our natural instincts smothered, 
we seem committed to a mission that imposes on us the kind 
of ultimate claim that only God could place on our ancestors. 
This is the evidence that we are a puritanized people. We seem, 
in fact, to be engaged in a modified version of no other than 
their mission—  secularized perhaps, but holding us in the iron 
and unyielding throes of obsession with precisely that blindness 
which is obsession’s touchstone.
Returning from there back to the bearing that blindness seems 
to have on national education, here too this “Weberian” version 
of our history may shed light. There is, I postulate, a longstand-
ing tradition of American anti-intellectualism, one about which 
Hofstadter wrote insightfully throughout his career (albeit with 
troubling inconsistency in his treatment of Puritanism), and 
about which Susan Jacoby and Naomi Klein have written more 
recently. This anti-intellectualism can be seen as a predictable 
requirement if we are to hold ourselves to, and be constrained 
by, the American Mission. As John Winthrop seemed to realize, 
criticism must be suspended if the mission is to proceed.
Education, of its nature, fosters critical thinking; it cannot 
occur without it. As Hegel pointed out, one can’t really think 
critically about things without engaging in dialectic. I mentioned 
already, if I say, “John’s a good man,” you can’t really weigh my 
statement— that is, process it critically— unless you’re willing to 
conduct a thought experiment in which you ask yourself: “How 
would things look on the supposition John is not a good man?” 
You must then ask how well that imagined world fits the world 
that actually confronts you. In other words, a thesis about a good 
John must be checked out by examining a hypothetical antithesis 
8. Some will respond that the complete collapse of the money game is 
unimaginable, and therefore not worth worrying about. The premise of 
their response seems to be: “What can’t be imagined, can’t happen.” The 
premise does not seem sound.
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about how the world would look with a non-good John. (John 
may of course come through this process just fine. When you 
think about a world with a non-good John you may conclude it is 
nothing like the world you actually know.)
But to do this sort of thing with the proposition “America is 
the greatest nation on earth” is to enter into temptation. To check 
out this proposition by entertaining its opposite is to flirt with 
heresy. Its to give aid and comfort to our enemies (currently an 
imprisonable offense). Keepers of the national conscience (George 
Will or Charles Krauthammer, Karl Rove or Barack Obama) will 
call “foul” if you do such a thing. Education however moves, as 
we can see in the example of Socrates (with Hegel concurring), 
towards just such testing of value judgments. While our politi-
cians praise education, few personally chance the burdens and 
jeopardy a critical thinker can expect in our American context. 
Not daring to venture into critical thinking themselves, is it any 
wonder our leaders prove less-than-reliable providers and guard-
ians of the education of others?
We find a critical thinker an embarrassment to the American 
project. When, say, a Noam Chomsky comes along, many among 
us are quick to dismiss him out of hand as a man who “hates his 
own country.” We do this lest we get drawn into an enterprise 
of reflection and criticism that’s both unfamiliar and danger-
ous—  an enterprise often viewed, in fact, as “un-American.” One 
who believes as I do that “an uncriticised past is prelude to repeti-
tion” can trace our rejective response to critical thinkers back to 
the paradigm provided by the Puritan exiling of Roger Williams 
and Anne Hutchinson, and to the Puritan execution of Quakers. 
It should be no surprise that one who suppresses his affinity for 
nature suppresses too his affinity for humans.
Particularly, then, the critical version of our history set forth 
here provides a context for understanding the Christian right.
The Christian right insists it’s Christian. Yet it is deeply com-
mitted to money-making; it’s opposed to taxes; it’s in favor of 
most wars our politicians propose; it prefers a well-established 
and aggressive foreign policy to one that’s accommodating; it 
seems to regard most efforts at critical thinking as trouble-
making; it opposes Darwinian views that would see man as a 
part of nature; and with regard to nature itself, it seems generally 
complacent and careless, dismissing most scientific concern for 
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the protection of species and habitat as elitist— that is, as ill-
founded, un-American, and motivated by hidden agendas.
Little of this, at face value, seems even remotely to echo Jesus 
as he’s presented in the gospels. Jesus looks to the lilies of the 
field and to the sparrows as emblems of God’s love. He sees 
God’s love mirrored in the care of a father for a wayward son and 
a shepherd for a lost sheep. He says it will be difficult for a rich 
man to enter heaven (and not because the rich man has stolen, 
but because the rich man is rich). He calls on those able to share 
to do so — to be protectors of the young, and to provide relief to 
the sick, and to the widow, the orphan, and the outcast. Jesus is 
presented as the Prince of Peace, and warns against living by the 
sword; he is shown demonstrating forgiveness. In his dealings 
with others, he aggressively transgresses boundaries of ethnicity, 
gender, and status, going out of his way to repudiate and violate 
well established games of segregation and subordination. He does 
not exemplify nor advocate an uncritical acceptance of authori-
ties (even those who quote scripture), but speaks of truth as that 
which can set his disciples free. His parables encourage consci-
entious care for God’s gifts, including a care for one’s personal 
talents. By his actions he manifests himself as one who thinks 
and acts independently. He was crucified for resolute political 
incorrectness.
If we ask where in history we find something that corresponds 
to the behavior of the American Christian right of today, there 
seem severe obstacles to finding a counterpart in Jesus as por-
trayed in the gospels. If however, rather than look to Jesus, we 
look to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a notable cor-
respondence to the Christian right can be located in the Puritans 
of that time. They too interpreted acquisition of money as a sig-
nal of God’s favor. They too resented taxes and regarded those 
who collected them as generally unauthorized. They believed in 
aggressive warfare against neighboring “savages,” and celebrated 
their victories over these neighbors (even such “victories” as were 
simple massacres) as acts manifesting God’s glory. Believing 
those who dissented from their doctrines should be exiled or exe-
cuted, they believed that much of what counted for secular learn-
ing in their day was godless and should be denied or neglected 
or excluded. As for nature, they regarded it as a wilderness—  a 
realm in which Satan had a free hand, a place to be regarded with 
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“weaned affections”—  above all, a place needing to be mastered, 
tamed, put into harness.
Pundits have written how political strategists, particularly 
in the Reagan/Bush era (1981–2016, and counting), “shrewdly 
brought the Christian right into politics.” What the pundits seem 
to overlook is the steady Puritan presence all along. Puritan ide-
ology has been the controlling ideology of our politics from the 
start. What the Christian right represent is the branch of the 
tradition that’s modified but not abandoned the explicit theologi-
cal moorings of the original Puritans. This is in contrast to those 
in the secularized off-shoot. Let Jefferson represent these. His 
defense of profit-making by way of breeding “slaves”— people 
he delusionally thought he owned— was largely unbeholden to 
theological reflection.
In summing up, it is hard to get a firm grasp on what’s going 
on today. Let me suggest there are three phases to consider. 
First there is the devaluation of nature that’s achieved within a 
Cartesian context and that’s carried forward with Puritan vigor. 
Nature has no interiority. Too indifferent and busy to study it, we 
eviscerate it. We deny to it internal form and dignity. We see it 
as altogether subject to our designs. We see it purely as plastic 
object.
Then there’s our identification of “enemies” (whatever human or 
non-human we find blocking our path) with that “plastic nature” 
which we’ve devalued. These enemies too become mere grist for 
our mill, no more than fresh opportunities for the exercise of our 
freedom. These enemies can be “savages,” or African-Americans, 
or Mexicans, or Filipino Moros, or “gooks,” or contemporary 
Muslims. They can be deer that threaten our suburban foliage.
Thirdly, a final phase of this devastating perspective is a move 
toward its more perfect realization within the boundaries of the 
United States. As we’ve seen lately, the logic of our foreign poli-
cies is being increasingly applied among ourselves. The dismis-
sive ways which we used to reserve for “foreigners” (alien parts 
of an alien world) are now coming home to roost. Those with 
economic and political power incline increasingly to treat the rest 
of us as mere empty matter also, awaiting more total integration 
into their designs. They are increasingly successful. Their control 
can be benign (Brave New World ) or menacing (1984) —  or a mix 
of both. The contrast developing so starkly today between them 
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and the rest of us is no embarrassment to them; it’s a contrast by 
which they achieve a desperately sought validation. Without it, 
these elect would not know who they are.
Stepping outside the perspective of the demented rich, a couple 
aspects of what’s going on are daunting. (1) The natural world is 
neither inert nor inviolable. As its free and conscious offspring, 
we can so violate the conditions by which it has managed to bring 
us forth that we turn it into a place that can no longer support 
us. We are moving with quickening pace toward achieving this. 
The rich and powerful, who — very much with our complicity— 
increasingly control our behavior, have insight neither into the 
compulsions that drive them nor the very real constraints of 
nature under which they operate. At a quickening pace, they 
treat “nature” as an externality—  something of no proper concern 
to them except as a business opportunity. (2) The second daunting 
aspect is that even when the rich and powerful would prefer to 
maintain their elect status through benign rather than menacing 
forms of control, they lack insight into what others need. With 
loss of aesthetic sensibility have gone wisdom and the ability to 
empathize. As the rich prove increasingly inept at benign control, 
they’re likely sooner or later (from the start, in the case of minori-
ties) to resort to efforts at control by intimidation—  employing 
tools well honed and tested beyond our borders. For decades the 
CIA has spied on people of other countries and subverted their 
attempts at self-determination; now, increasingly, the NSA is 
spying on Americans, and our government is persecuting and 
seeking to prosecute those who have revealed this. While this 
second daunting aspect may be the first to focus our full atten-
tion, it’s the first aspect— the inability to see ourselves as part 
of nature — that portends the more drastic and irreparable harm.

167
If I seem to be assembling what I’ve presented as grounds for dis-
missing the Christian right—  or, for that matter, America— my 
intentions are read in a way that falls short of them. To twist the 
phrasing of Mark Antony: my purpose is not to bury America, 
but to unbury it. If I seem to be constantly repeating myself, it’s 
because I am. It’s because it is only by circulating around our 
topics over and over that these things, which seem so familiar 
they’ve become almost invisible, can be brought to light. 
We’ve buried America too much. Let’s begin by further exami-
nation of connections between the ascendancy of the rich and our 
reliance on force.
When I’ve talked with students in history classes about the 
cruel treatment of Indians by our white predecessors, I’ve been 
dismayed at how quickly they’ve tried to bury the topic. “I didn’t 
do it!” they’ll say with predictable regularity. Those of a more 
social cast of mind will say: “We — the people of our generation— 
didn’t do it” or “We — the subgroup to which I belong—  didn’t 
do it.” They say the same of other past cruelties I bring up. What 
I don’t think they understand is they and I are not only identifi-
able beneficiaries of injustice in the cases of which I speak, but 
that most of us—  at a deeper level—  are wounded and bent as a 
result of them. We are among the victims of our injustices. We 
seem doomed to replicate the injustice that we’ve celebrated and 
not repented.
And we replicate our replications. We’ve done injustice to Indi-
ans. To kidnapped Africans. To the children of deprived Indians 
and the children of kidnapped Africans. To Mexicans. To Filipi-
nos and Vietnamese. To Iranians. To Chileans. To Panamanians 
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and other Central Americans. To Iraqis. To Afghans. And this 
is the short list.
We say Vietnam is the first war we ever lost. The statement 
seems less than accurate. Repeatedly, we’ve emerged from war 
battered, desensitized, and bitter. This was true of many veterans 
of the Mexican War. It was vividly true in the case of the Civil 
War. It was true again of our bloody effort to subdue the Fili-
pinos. Later, the pain wasn’t novel but simply more obvious in 
many who returned from Vietnam. We’re seeing it again today in 
those who come back from the Middle East. We see it daily in 
the suicides of our soldiers.
Our character is coarsened by things we’ve done. Our con-
science is bothered, and we cannot return to the persons we 
were. Were our society in general to recognize the extent to 
which we’ve inherited a pathology, we might reduce its hold on 
us. What impedes recognition is our improbable conviction that 
our way of doing things has always “worked.” In these matters, 
we speak of those who shrug and “bite the bullet” as the coura-
geous ones; but we seem not brave enough to tell ourselves the 
truth. We seem not to recognize that “the good ole days” are a 
convenient legend. We shunt our veterans to the side lest they tell 
us what they’ve learned. Too many of the good ole days are bad 
ole days of unrecognized and unrepented recklessness—  days of 
doing unto others that which in our wildest dreams we would not 
have them do unto us.
Our days have hollowed us out. The thousands of suicides give 
testimony. By episodes we’ve been drained of vision and aesthetic 
feeling— rendered sterile in spirit if not in body. After 9/11, there 
were young men who volunteered and went to Iraq to avenge that 
day. Some of them killed men and women and children. Some of 
them suffered a loss of limbs. When they returned, we thanked 
them for their service; but neither they nor we could articulate 
in what that service consisted. There is no logical path from the 
desecration of the Towers to the invasion of Iraq.
I’ve recounted a story in which an Anglican priest was directed 
to apologize for his unauthorized attempt to make Jesus more 
central to Christmas than Santa Claus. Though Santa Claus is 
nice, it’s been more demoralizing than we care to notice to sub-
stitute Santa Claus for Jesus. We’ve come to believe in exten-
sions of commerce at any cost. I’ve mentioned our Black Fridays 
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in which adults wrestle with each other over Christmas presents. 
One reason we’re insensitive to curtailments on our liberty is 
because the companies with which we forge relations— relations 
seemingly intended by the companies to be more permanent than 
marriages—  dazzle us with such variety and convenience. While 
we have here a new corporate mercantilism, addictive and manip-
ulative and more extensive than anything Adam Smith sought to 
liberate us from, we seem disinclined to recognize it as such.
In the administration of John Quincy Adams, there had seemed 
a chance that the federal government could become a careful 
steward of westward real estate; and that it would sell land, not to 
speculators, but directly to the very people intending farms and 
homes. This was a part of the “American System” of Adams’ sec-
retary of state, Henry Clay. According to the plan, a rich revenue 
would accrue to the federal government. Each land-sale would 
be moderately priced, but the total accrued by the government 
would be considerable. There would be no middlemen. Adams, 
the last Federalist, seems to have intended that the money from 
such sales would then be spent on infrastructure — roads, water 
ways, bridges, schools, hospitals, concert halls, museums—  so 
that an orderly infra-structure and a vertical cultural develop-
ment would be sponsored among the American people with 
monies garnered from its horizontal expansion westward. It was 
a thoughtful vision.
To the people of his time, though, Adams seemed elitist. His 
program may have had the scent of socialism though that term 
was not used at the time to discredit it. That it was paternalistic 
was clear. It would have been a kind of New Deal for the 1820s, a 
century and more before FDR’s. At the end of one term, unable 
to rally the people, Adams was replaced by Jackson. Jackson initi-
ated what some have hailed as a grand democratic revolution, but 
what others see as a mere scramble to participate in ill-regulated 
land grabs in western real estate — with speculators collecting the 
high prices that actual settlers needed bank loans to afford.
Henry Clay, the pre-eminent Whig (“Whig” meant “anti-
Jacksonian”), tried to keep his and Adams’ vision alive; but it 
never caught on. The idea of government as an active promoter 
of the common good seemed to many then, as to almost all 
Republicans today, un-American. Government’s function was to 
ward off foreign enemies and protect white people; beyond that, 
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it should leave people alone to do what they wanted. What the 
white majority wanted was to compete among themselves for the 
very overt and palpable signs of success: land, wealth, servants 
and slaves, conspicuous consumption—  and to be able on public 
holidays to say we’re the greatest people on earth. Rugged Amer-
icans required no vertical development.
Perhaps Adams had earned this defeat. After all, it was he 
who had authored the Monroe Doctrine. It can be argued it was 
the crass spirit of expansion— for which his Doctrine was per-
verted to act as cheer leader and enabler— that doomed his pur-
suit of quality. Quality was for effete young men of northeastern 
schools. Horizontal development triumphed. (If the phrase has 
connotations of “rape,” that’s OK as a metaphor for what hap-
pened.) Regarding specifically the westward lands, the popular 
will seems to have been: “Let the free market decide who will sell 
what to whom—  and at what price.” This was a get-rich-quick 
scheme for speculators, and it was the loan-burdened farmers 
who got the short end of the deal.
At the end of the same century, we had in the 1890s another 
opportunity to structure our society differently. The depression of 
1893 sounded a clear warning of something amiss in the American 
design. We’d plunged head-first into exponential development of 
an increasing production of goods at the lowest production-cost 
achievable. Like the Sorcerer’s Apprentice, we were in danger 
of being swamped in what we’d conjured forth. Economic and 
political leaders feared we were about to drown in surplus prod-
uct. In fact the fear was general. The relentless economic model 
to which we’d hitched our future required that the laborer and 
farmer be paid as little as possible. It seemed that soon there’d 
be no one around who could afford to buy the cornucopia we 
were ginning forth, and the whole economic system might come 
crashing down.
At this point we could have re-evaluated what Adams and Clay 
had proposed. We could have taken seriously what the pream-
ble to the Constitution meant in stipulating we had a national 
goal “to promote the general welfare.” We could have redirected 
our energies to: (1)  making equality-of-humans tangible in our 
society through a more equitable sharing of the rewards of pros-
perity; and (2) taking quality-of-life as the gage of American suc-
cess. Had we been willing to share across the board the profits of 
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our productivity, we could presumably have maintained a robust 
market here at home for products then glutting our market. Giv-
ing flesh to our bushels of words about political equality (some-
thing Adams, after his presidency, worked tirelessly in Congress 
to extend to black Americans), we could in the midst of shared 
prosperity have attempted a quality-of-life unparalleled in previ-
ous history. A vision along these lines fueled the eloquent but 
insufficiently radical critique of William Jennings Bryan.
A vision of change is not as far-fetched as it may seem. We had 
eventually, through a civil war and three amendments, addressed 
emancipation of African-Americans. As a follow-up, a general 
white-and-black economic emancipation does not seem to have 
been beyond the realm of the possible. In the populist stirrings 
of the 1890s, there was popular momentum to achieve this more 
equitable distribution of rewards, and thereby raise the nation’s 
quality of life. We’ve all learned from the film Inherit the Wind 
that Bryan lost the respect of the public in his struggle against 
Darwinism. Far more important, but few seemed to notice, is 
that in the course of his career Bryan lost the struggle to save 
America from “Social Darwinism”—  an ideology which Dar-
win himself rejected but for which Puritanism ran interference 
by sanctifying as divinely decreed the privileges of the powerful. 
We regarded as an eleventh commandment and sacrosanct: “And 
thou shalt pay the laborer as little as possible for his or her labor.” 
Our decision to go along with this was not done by divine 
decree but by us. We had at the time a choice. In the age of 
robber barons, we could resolutely have worked to put a more 
generous share of America’s unparalleled wealth in the hands of 
farmers and our multitudes of laborers, whether white or people 
of color. But a majority of the white voters (and white male voters 
were the electorate) envied the robber barons and wanted to be 
like them.
The alternative — the decision we made — was to work toward 
“enlarging the pie.” Let us, we said, expand our markets. Let the 
Chinese soak up the surplus product of our fields and factories. 
Expansion abroad was viewed as the less painful approach. It was 
a step that moved to the cadences of our traditional westward 
march. 
No matter that we sought expansion on a scale that would 
require war with Spain, and would, down the road, bring us into 
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collision with Japan. This expansion was presented as “win/win.” 
The robber barons could keep hold on their top-heavy share of 
the nation’s wealth, but there would be enough new wealth to 
effect incremental improvements in the lives of everyone. Expan-
sion would leave the rich rich— no doubt richer in fact—but it 
would pacify the unrest of the farmer and the laborer by keeping 
them gainfully employed; it would allow our great commitment 
to America’s mission to continue its westward course.
That such expansion would require at least two world wars was 
not entered on the accounting sheet, although policy-makers of 
the 1890s had some sense of what they were getting into. War 
was an externality. War was, as Theodore Roosevelt explained, 
a natural part of the human condition; and a good war now and 
again was a necessity for maintaining the muscle tone of a nation 
emerging into manhood. The American people seemed to agree.
Had we attempted a reassignment of shares in wealth instead, 
while it would no doubt have required consumer boycotts, labor 
unions, and strikes to achieve the rearrangement, it would not 
have required some radical abandonment of private property. 
What it really required was a willingness to pay farmers some-
thing more commensurate with the value of their service to the 
rest of us, and a readiness to do the same for the miner and the 
industrial laborer. 
We’re actually quite familiar with the line of thinking involved. 
In a barter arrangement with a neighbor, one attempts to give 
the neighbor the value of what one receives; one attempts to 
match value to value. This is done in the interest of honoring and 
nurturing a sense of community. One wants the neighbor to be 
a friend as well as a short-term opportunity. Beyond neighbor-
hoods, in our larger society, fairness could have been presented as 
a sound investment in maintaining a wholesome domestic mar-
ket for the indefinite future. As noted, that way, the farmer and 
laborer would have had purchasing power, would have been able 
to exercise “effective demand”— not merely aspiring to a com-
fortable share of the goods they were producing, but holding in 
hand the money to achieve it.
The logic for such an innovation was as valid for black work-
ers as it was for white. (Booker T. Washington understood this 
well. So do advertisers today, who conscientiously feature repre-
sentative images of black affluence in their commercials.) Worth 
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noting too is that such an innovation was compatible with “hard 
currency,” whereas the “soft currency” proposed by Bryan seemed 
ready to dodge the issue of inequity while inflating the currency.
The principle of “a fair wage” isn’t as elusive as some would 
claim. When, as a young inventor-entrepreneur— before success 
and greed had gotten to him— his accountants came to Henry 
Ford and told him he could hire labor at a lower rate than he was 
paying, Ford rebuffed them saying: “I want the people who make 
Fords to be able to buy Fords.” His logic was as wise as it was 
obvious. (Unfortunately, as time went on this the vision faded 
for Ford, as did the warmth of his relations with his workers, and 
even with his family.) 
Contrary to almost all business schools in America today, 
there’s no need that private business run on Scrooge-like princi-
ples. Instead of the entrepreneur asking: “How little can I pay my 
workers and still maintain a labor force?” there’s no reason he or 
she can’t ask: “How much can I afford to pay my workers and still 
maintain, with them, an ongoing enterprise?” W. Edwards Dem-
ing frequently insisted this second question is more likely than 
the first to foster the kind of consistent excellence in goods and 
services which provides competitive advantage in any market-
place genuinely responsive to consumers. Adam Smith had made 
the same argument. Even today in “family businesses”— business 
owned and staffed by family members— this ethos of equity 
seems the prevailing standard. In rejecting Deming and Smith 
in favor of bottom-line profit maximization, we’ve persisted on 
a path leading to a market subjected to pervasive manipulation, 
fraud, and exploitation. It’s a market where misrepresentation, 
cutting of corners, and outright lying are regarded as acts of vir-
tue. It’s difficult to imagine anything more counterproductive to 
the human happiness of all concerned.
As mentioned here frequently, what was too little taken into 
account in the “larger-pie” scenario which we opted for in 1898 
were the costs of war and other “externalities.” In addition to 
some routine and easily rationalized exploitation of workers and 
hoodwinking of consumers in the interest of larger profits, there 
had to be a shoving, pushing, and cool trampling-under of peoples 
and nations throughout the world if we were to have our larger 
pie. And there had to be a willingness to sacrifice the blood of 
the best and brightest among our young if our enterprise was to 
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prevail. These costs have been altogether real; in the accounting 
process however, they’ve been pushed to the margins— written 
off as collateral damage. This continues.
(If our soldiers are so unlucky and “improvident” as to get 
wounded, our actual inclination is to say let this be a matter 
of concern for their families and for private charities. Let our 
maimed veterans bootstrap their way out of whatever emotional 
and physical mess they find themselves in. We treat our wounded 
veterans not unlike the way we’ve tried to treat subdued Indians 
who have survived our agendas; we try to put them off some-
place where we don’t have to think about them. We —  our presi-
dent and Congress and society— have more serious things to do 
than tend to their wounds till the day of our veterans’ deaths. 
True, every few years this matter of neglect intrudes onto our 
radar screen, and we make promises of reform. The promises are 
important. They salve our consciences.) 
Further, recall that the example America gave at the end of 
the 1890s, in pushing unreflectingly forward with a project of 
expansion, was fresh stimulus for those in other countries to do 
the same. They too wanted special advantages in the guise of 
an  “Open Door”— but Japanese style, or Russian style, or Ger-
man style —  copying us as we were copying the British. Mahan’s 
book, a handbook for the arms race, was a worldwide best seller.
These “externalities” are, as I say, part of the real cost of such 
commodities as we can obtain only with their help. Let me repeat 
that. These “externalities” are a part of the real cost of such com-
modities as we can obtain only with their help. We seem to have 
trouble taking that in. They’re the enabling circumstances with-
out which we can’t achieve the kind of lifestyle of the elect we do. 
They’re a part of the real cost of our not-too-mysterious economic 
miracle. Not only do we pay the cost of gasoline at the gas pump; 
we pay for it too in funding our incalculably expensive wars and 
awkward political arrangements in the Middle East. And while 
the cost of our car and its fuel and its insurance and registra-
tion fees and its maintenance are a part of the cost of our driv-
ing, it’s true another significant cost of our driving is an increase 
in forest fires occasioned by climate change. Yet this last is so 
totally an externality that if you introduce it into an inventory 
of the costs of driving, the other parties to the accounting pro-
cess are likely to be entirely at a loss and say they have no idea 
  w h y the center ca n ’t hold 175
what you’re talking about. (The mindset of a student I had a few 
years ago was expressed more or less as follows: “When I came 
to this course I knew the difference between driving a car and 
starting a forest fire. If you’re trying to teach me the two are the 
same, I’m really not interested in taking this course.” He spoke 
sincerely, and would have dropped the course had he not needed 
the credits.)
With externalities, by definition the tendency is to say: “Those 
aren’t our problem.” American economists, as we saw in the case 
of Milton Friedman, are fond of listing all the things that “aren’t 
our problem.” But of course when problems aren’t owned by any-
one, they grow. When they do, it’s our habit of mind to regard 
them as something dropping from the sky or coming from the 
hand of God. Consider some of the many evils that currently 
tend to demoralize us. Consider, for instance, the jostling about, 
shoving, and destruction of other peoples that’s going on around 
us, and the international turf wars, and the promotion of nuclear 
proliferation, and the thefts and the fraudulent evictions carried 
out by banks, and the inequities we see in law enforcement, and 
the increase in street crime, and the increasing violence in our 
schools, and the decay of our infrastructure, and the extinctions 
of species along with the pollution and degradation of habitat 
that that accompany the quickening tempo of climate change — 
with regard to this whole list, we wish fervently not to acknowl-
edge these are evils that enter the world on two feet. In many 
cases on our two feet.1
In those cases where we do acknowledge that evils come on 
two feet, we want them to be somebody else’s feet. We look for 
the splinters in the other guy’s eye and ignore the chunk of lum-
ber lodged in our own. We blame the troubles of our lives on the 
savagery of Indians, the ineptitude of slaves, the communism of 
Russians, or the terrorism of Muslims. When a president proudly 
1. Some have said Reinhold Niebuhr taught at the time of the Second 
World War that aggregates of people —  societies— behave “of necessity” 
on principles “uncomplicated by morality.” If he did teach that, that may 
be why he was such a popular theologian at the time. Over and over, we 
reap the bitter harvest of such convenient thinking; and the pattern shows 
few signs of ending.
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announces, “I will never apologize for the American people,” he 
speaks resolutely in our tradition, and we applaud him. (Later, we 
elect his son.)
Let us proceed carefully. One can’t deny that Indians, 
slaves, Russians, and Muslims have all, on occasion, caused us 
suffering—  sometimes terrible suffering. What might help would 
be to attend more to how what’s happened seems often to have a 
retaliatory character. It would help were we ready to search closer 
to home for origins of things that trouble us. But this need to 
look to ourselves continues to be something one mentions at one’s 
hazard. An immediate and almost inevitable response is: “Oh— 
so you’re saying we’re the bad guy? You want to see America 
suffer!”
What’s lost in the anger of such a response is the chance to take 
charge of a disturbed situation. To the extent we own (own up 
to) whatever initiative has been ours in generating troubles that 
beset us, we can take in hand a process to reduce trouble. We 
can work toward some resolution of grievances. We can appro-
priate what seems Hegel’s distinction between an undialectical 
counter-thesis (i.e., “So’s your old man!”) and a creative response 
that seeks to incorporate the other’s grievance (“I recognize some 
of my behavior has insulted and angered you.”).
What makes it so hard for us to come to this is our Puritan 
heritage. We are the City on a Hill, the Great American Excep-
tion; in the language of our forebears, we’re the Elect. It’s nearly 
unimaginable to us that significant contributions to the world’s 
evil should have entered on our two feet.
Here then, in this review, we try to take stock of some of the 
interlocking aspects of the position we’ve adopted. We believe 
in acquisition. In our devotion to it, we’ve been willing to treat 
outsiders with brutality and— while we did so — we’ve been will-
ing to suppress sources of grace and health at home. Things that 
promote a sense of value in our lives and a sense of the precious-
ness of others’ lives—  and of lives outside our species—  get lost 
in the shuffle. We economize on education; we question the need 
for national and state parklands; the preservation of “wastelands” 
we regard as waste indeed; “nature” we think of as “on its own.” 
We wonder whether we haven’t gone overboard in our willing-
ness to fund remedies for the lives of the desperate — including 
our wounded veterans. We question the National Endowment for 
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the Arts and similar enterprises, saying: “Let those who care for 
such things finance them from their own pockets.” With happy 
blindness we say: “Let there be a thousand points of light!”
We feel we don’t have much money. For the power we so cher-
ish as a nation requires, as Admiral Mahan made clear, that we 
seek out foreign markets and have foreign bases from which to 
supply and monitor those markets. Our efforts to achieve these, 
when pushed without concern for the aspirations of others, call 
forth both imitation of our behavior by others and resistance to 
such behavior by others— in short, bring us into ever-increasing 
tension with non-Americans and into bloody and lethal conflict 
with them. A culture of violence ensues, and the wars that mark 
that culture appear to us as a sort of unavoidable destiny. Granted 
the premises on which we act, they are.
These wars must be funded. Restrictions of funds for maintain-
ing infrastructure and improving the quality of life at home must 
pay for crusades abroad. Moreover, the less educated the voting 
public is, the less likely it is to resist this sorry trade-off. The 
consequent lack of an educated workforce need not disturb us. 
As Americans become less educated, they’re less likely to demand 
high wages; and we can take up any slack in our workforce by 
employing hardworking, well educated people in other countries 
to work on our behalf in their homelands—  or when desirable, to 
come work here in the United States, taking on tasks Americans 
seem either unwilling or unqualified to perform.
As Americans become less productive, and as the wars needed 
to maintain America as a superpower become more expensive, 
further “austerities” can be demanded. The people most closely 
associated with wars and with defense and with the control of 
precious planetary resources will become richer still—  and they 
will flourish as convincing signs that America is still the land of 
opportunity. The rest of us will need to work longer hours for less 
pay. The young among us will be more easily recruitable for mili-
tary service. Further, we who lead the free world in the imprison-
ment of our citizens, can progress further on that front too.
When it comes to exercising care for our habitat, if the trends 
sketched broadly above continue along present lines, environ-
mentalism will come to have generally that character of a passing 
fad—  a do-gooder hobby— that’s been a charge against it from 
the start. It will be nothing any serious-minded person can give 
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thought to amid mounting crises and increasing economic aus-
terity. It won’t matter that the signs of environmental distress 
grow clearer; that very clarity will help solidify the case that pro-
tection of the environment is outside our reach.
If you are still with me, let me make belated acknowledgement 
this dreary scenario is in reality of course subject to an infinite 
variety of possible modifications and interruptions. We say: “The 
past is prelude.” But the past need not be prelude for those who 
understand and appropriate it. What I attempt to suggest here is 
how closely conjoined the factors of incoherence are. The desire 
for unmeasured accumulation occurs, for instance, where there’s 
lack of insight and education. This desire to quicken the pace 
of accumulation diverts funds from what education there is and 
dilutes the wisdom in our schools that might check the pace of 
greed. Unchecked, the pace leads to war; and war both further 
depresses investment in education and— let me say it again— 
flourishes best where education is lacking. Accumulation— 
acquisition of goods— is addictive; and war quickens that 
addictive and competitive impulse. Accumulation is the opiate 
of our people. The cost to habitat and to kindness and civility 
in our relations is pervasive. The coarsening of character can be 
expected to increase. Street crime can be expected to increase. 
Violence in schools can be expected to increase. Forest fires can 
be expected to increase. Only when dysfunction has become so 
dramatically manifest that there’s a general loss of confidence in 
traditional economics and politics is there likely to be a ground 
swell for radical change —  and it’s difficult to say what form that 
will take and what possibilities at that future moment will still be 
on hand for us to organize around. 
Had we opted for a more equitable sharing of wealth in the 
1890s, our position in the world today would no doubt have less 
the character of a superpower than it has. Instead of that, we 
might be the nation with the most accomplished middle class in 
human history. By reason of extending purchasing power more 
generally throughout our society, we could be the best-housed 
people on the planet (with no foreclosures or homelessness); we 
might have the finest, most accessible health care found any-
where; we might be the best-educated people the world has seen. 
A realized fairness that affirms all of us in our diversity might 
mean we had become the most harmonious people God has yet 
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to see. We might be renowned as a people who had found the 
leisure to talk at length with our kids and celebrate in their com-
pany the most spectacular skill-sets of sports, and the heights of 
the fine-arts, producing among ourselves performances and mas-
terpieces to rival ancient Greece and Renaissance Italy. (While 
parents are wonderfully engaged these days in efforts to provide 
activities for their children, it’s sad to reflect that the “family din-
ner table” seems to exist mostly in old sitcoms, and that the “older 
teenager”—  someone seventeen, eighteen, nineteen— who lives 
under one roof with both parents is now a vanishing breed. The 
ability to create and maintain enduring lifestyles of cooperation 
in one’s home seems to be slipping away from us. Regarding our 
spouse as one more commodity, a great many of us seem inter-
ested in trading up. In place of commitments, many of us plan 
our marriages with careful designs for what should happen when 
the marriage ends.)
Living peacefully with other nations and enjoying at home the 
benefits conferred by education and natural abundance, had we 
chosen differently in 1898, our urgency about personal acquisi-
tion might be much tamped down. We might be at once a center 
for scientific research and a haven where a multitude of ideolo-
gies and religions could establish places of inquiry and worship. 
Tom Paine’s deism notwithstanding, we might be that refuge for 
truth tellers and searchers after righteousness which he’d hoped 
we would become. (The dreary secularism of our present day is, 
I suspect, less interested in freedom of religion than in freedom 
from its disturbing urge toward transcending secularism.)
Instead of choosing a rich and diverse society, we chose in 1898, 
consistent with our past, to continue the project begun by the 
Puritans of the 1600’s. A corrosive underside of this project is that 
it requires our respect for outsiders to be a provisional matter. We 
don’t enter relations with foreigners on a plane of mutual respect. 
We don’t regard them at the start as worthy of our respect. How 
can we? We know they are not Puritans. Rather we’ll respect 
them when they “learn to behave.” They must learn to behave 
as we do and must learn how to facilitate our purposes. As a 
startling line from Oscar Hammerstein says sarcastically in the 
middle of South Pacific, they’ve “got to be carefully taught.” 
We who revolted against mercantilism turn out to believe in 
mercantilism after all. We believe it is our destiny to manipulate 
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and exploit. In this, we receive no endorsement from Adam 
Smith. Some cite us here for racial prejudice; for it seems we need 
to become racists in order to move forward our program with a 
good conscience. More fundamentally though, our malignancy 
toward others may seem to be derivative; our behavior seems 
it may be rooted simply in uncritically seeing our way of doing 
things as the norm. We are the norm. While we claim to separate 
church and state, our religious past has everything to do with our 
complacency in this matter.
An additional point that historian William Appleman Wil-
liams was at some pains to make (in discussing Cuba, for exam-
ple) is that this program of ours hasn’t quite the consistency we 
might think it has. More recent commentary along the same 
lines has been offered by Howard Zinn, Noam Chomsky, Naomi 
Klein, Chalmers Johnson, Chris Hedges, and John Perkins. 
What Williams and these others point out is that even when 
outsiders have gone the extra mile to accommodate American 
expectations and demands, there’s no guarantee they’ll then be 
treated with respect. There seems among us a deep need to assert 
superiority such that, even when others conform to our sense of 
how things should be, we still feel impelled to undermine and 
exploit them. We have a curious habit of turning on those for-
eign leaders whom we befriend. And so the depths of malignancy 
remain hard to fathom, and my inclination is to refer them back 
to that space where strange things begin to happen when religion 
sunders its bonds with rationality.
And while I’d say our exploitations originated in a spirit of reli-
gious nationalism, this no longer guarantees they’re done today 
on behalf of the nation. As noted, the logic and internal func-
tions of The Game have become so enthralling that its master 
players, the CEOs of multinational corporations, no longer feel 
constrained by national loyalties. As Joseph Sottile has pointed 
out, it would be wrong to call corporate rule in America today a 
form of fascism; it’s not that patriotic. Many American heads of 
corporations today no longer promote achievement of an Ameri-
can mission, but seem to have left even that degree of social alle-
giance behind, relocating their companies’ headquarters abroad 
and hiding their companies’ profits offshore to avoid American 
taxes, and relocating factories abroad so as to avoid what there 
still is here of environmental law and labor law. They entomb 
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themselves in pursuit of a kind of winning that has little refer-
ence to anything—  even one might say much reference to yachts 
and vacation homes and family life: “Who has time for such 
things?”—  outside the Game itself. They are our walking dead.
As I write, there’s much ranting against the Koch brothers. This 
is not mainly against Bill— who is sometimes in the forefront of 
those doing the criticizing. The anger is directed more especially 
against Charles and David. The hostility must surprise the two 
brothers. For in spite of what I’ve just said about executives for-
saking patriotism, few people believe so strongly in the American 
Dream as these two do. They believe in strengthening the strong 
rather than the weak. They believe in busting the unions. For 
what do unions do except shore up the weak at the expense of 
the strong? They believe the land belongs to those who use it— a 
principle on which we fought and won the Mexican War and 
then went on to win the West. They want to diminish or abolish 
taxes. For what do most taxes do but take wealth from its origina-
tors and rightful possessors, the wealthy, and distribute it among 
losers? They believe a man should be able to do what he wants on 
his own property and in his own corporation, and no government 
bureaucrat should be able to tell him differently. Otherwise, do 
we not make fools of ourselves when we call this the land of the 
free and the home of the brave? As for pollution, what’s the fuss 
about? All pollution does is sicken and disable those too poor 
to live in decent neighborhoods; in fact it serves to alleviate the 
downward pull that undesirables exercise on the competent and 
successful. And to what purpose do we fund schools crowded 
with the offspring of our undesirables? Do we not often say we 
want to return to the good old days? Don’t we often say as a 
kind of mantra that we want to restore the American Dream? 
Who then is more engaged in preserving American tradition and 
advancing that dream than David and Charles? Think back to 
the golden days when Jefferson was at Monticello. Those were 
days when the rich ruled, minorities knew their place, and the 
only good Indian was a dead one.2
2. To maintain, though, some degree of responsibility in my rhetoric 
here, I have to admit that Charles and David would much rather see a live 
Indian with oil rights than one of Sheridan’s dead ones.
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Two great Enlightenment thinkers struggled specifically with 
how to avoid the emergence of economic power such as the Koch 
brothers hold. One was British, the other American. Adam 
Smith judged the mercantilist hold of the British government 
over the details of trade to be a source of abuse; and he advo-
cated a replacement of such micromanaging by the free inter-
action of a vast number of individuals seeking a profit. He did 
not fully ponder nor foresee how the entry of corporations into 
this give-and-take could lead to a corporate mercantilism that re-
configured government as a powerful ally in a corporate quest for 
ever-increasing economic and political control. Smith intended 
to lead humans away from oligarchy, and didn’t anticipate how 
his words would be twisted to make it far stronger than ever.
The foremost American economic thinker struggling with 
how to discipline economic power was Alexander Hamilton, a 
younger contemporary of Smith, sharing in Scotch ancestry. His 
plan was to bind the business community and its companies to 
a strong central government with such enticements that busi-
ness in America would readily enlist to serve our government as 
its agent to promote the common good. His goal— the general 
happiness— was not significantly different from Smith’s. The dif-
ference between the two was in the choice of means. Hamilton 
saw a strong central government as the solution rather than the 
problem. He has often been called a pessimist. To me it seems he 
might more rightly be faulted as an optimist; he saw government 
as a countervailing power that could protect the public from the 
greed and recklessness of American tendencies toward profit and 
acquisition. (He did not foresee the extent to which Black Friday 
could encroach on Thanksgiving.)
Both Smith’s and Hamilton’s programs have foundered on 
the shoals of corporate power. Corporate power was still a mere 
faintly visible star on the horizon in the time Smith was col-
lecting data. That corporate power could prove to be a problem 
was not all that surprising to his American contemporary, born 
a quarter of a century later. What neither managed to provide 
against is the now-proven skill of corporations— like agile 
wrestlers— to shift the center-of-gravity and take control of the 
government that was supposedly controlling them. In Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court sim-
ply gives voice to what’s become a transparent fact in America: 
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the purpose of elections today is to give corporate power the 
opportunity to install politicians who will see to it that govern-
ment works for corporations while it engages in only nominal 
efforts to regulate corporate interests and activity.3 In this matter, 
regard for instance the recent careers of Timothy Geithner, Eric 
Holder, and Ken Salazar, all appointed by Obama. In this new 
order, people are awarded with federal offices essentially on the 
basis of an unspoken understanding they will come to Washing-
ton and—  at their worst—  do nothing to impede corporate inter-
ests, and—  at their best—  do much to promote those interests. 
Democrats, as names above suggest, can often be more useful in 
this regard than Republicans, with Obama arguably proving to 
be one of the most useful ever. (If some regard him as a failure, 
they may be judging from the mistaken premise that he came to 
Washington to curb war and the excessive power of corporations.)
In view of this, today there’s a growing question whether any 
form of capitalism can long put up with traditions of democracy, 
even if democracy was originally a premise for the emergence of 
capitalism. It seems the two, which fit so well together in our slo-
gans, have proven incompatible outside them. (To state the mat-
ter with greater refinement, capitalism has shown dazzling suc-
cess at manipulating the judgment and aspirations of the people 
in our democracy, so that traditions and institutions which the 
people reliably support are often deeply subversive of their well-
being. Whether this is to be seen as a triumph over democracy 
or simply as the predictable exercise of democracy in a Puritan 
nation is perhaps no more than a choice about nomenclature.)
As the determination to accumulate wealth, and to secure 
wealth which has been accumulated, continues, a need for ever 
more sophisticated and effective weaponry grows. As reliance on 
force and as our actual resort to violence become more routine 
and unobjectionable, there’s an increasing need for extraordi-
nary resources and a need to recruit more people into the design, 
manufacture, and use of weaponry—  and to recruit diplomats, 
informed by superior intelligence, who are ever more adroit 
3. For a critique of the way Citizens United accords to corporations the 
status of human beings, see Justice Steven’s dissent (in which Justices 
Ginsberg, Breyer, and Sotomayor concur).
184 tom o’neill
at deterring others from doing the same. We hope thereby to 
increase our power to intimidate potential rivals. As we succeed, 
however, the number and dedication of hostile rivals increases 
too. While Machiavelli shrewdly advised that it’s good if your 
enemy fears you, Hobbes was perhaps shrewder yet in suggest-
ing what is nearly the opposite — that an enemy who genuinely 
and sincerely fears you is arguably the most dangerous thing on 
earth.
No doubt the point above has become déjà vu all over again by 
now, but what I’m engaging in here is one more effort to make 
real to our imagination the vicious, intertwining cycles of our 
times. I’ve belabored already the consequences for education. To 
foster critical thinking in such an environment as ours today 
would clearly be a subversive act. If one wishes to get ahead in our 
current mainstream media, one must demonstrate that one has 
accommodated to this. (Gary Webb clearly did not accommodate 
soon enough, and had to go. Robert Scheer acted like we still 
had a free press, and was fired from the L.A. Times as the price 
of his mistake. Dan Rather proved insufficiently subordinate and 
respectful to the powers that be [too much Edward R. Murrow 
circulating in his brainwaves], and CBS felt the need to cut him 
loose. Etc.)
Of course, the media need not kill or fire every noncompli-
ant messenger who might spread news of what’s going on; it’s 
less messy to neutralize such messengers by other means. The 
benumbing function of the mainstream media is facilitated when 
the educational establishment has so dumbed down the body 
politic that it no longer exercises critical attention to realities-at-
play. A public subdued by a pervading academic relativism, but 
plied with a ready supply of here-and-now distractions and grati-
fications, can find in our two-party system’s circus a comforting 
sense that there remains a wide scope for free choice in America, 
and that the people are still in charge.
What is striking is the increase in momentum downward in 
all of this. The synergy of it all! The war-making tendencies feed 
off the accumulative tendencies; the accumulative tendencies feed 
off the war-making tendencies. Both depress education. Amid 
the negative synergy, injury to habitat is consistently written 
off as unintended— therefore unimportant—  collateral damage. 
Only an under-educated public would tolerate such recklessness. 
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(While wounds we inflict on habitat often still aren’t acknowl-
edged, surely they’re felt. Perhaps it’s the rumblings in our 
house of life that quicken our unease and send us scurrying 
forth from home before the plum pudding is served. Is it not a 
uniquely American optimism that hopes Black Friday can save us 
all?)
Regarding war, as Hobbes warned (and Einstein seconded): 
if we max out our tendencies on this front, most all will die. 
Regarding our accumulative tendencies, there’s clearly a readi-
ness, witting or unwitting, on the part of key players in the global 
economy to push our system to its point-of-failure. It’s as if NAS-
CAR drivers were intent to achieve a climax in their flirtation 
with mayhem and wouldn’t feel they’d tested the limits of their 
sport till the whole track and stadium were consumed in fire. 
As we pleasure ourselves with our toys of nuclear-delivery sys-
tems and credit-default swaps, we neglect the natural order that 
spawned and supports us. That order, in turn, is simmering with 
maternal exasperation and shows a growing inclination to evict 
the lot of us as obnoxious children. 
Perhaps something of Freud’s late-in-life perspective on the 
human predicament is proving true. Perhaps our special aesthetic 
enthrallment with ever-greater acquisition and consumption is 
becoming too much for us. Perhaps as we push forward our eros, 
an eros configured and stoked by our Puritan heritage, we have 
at some subterranean level decided to call a halt to all proceed-
ings. Churchill once remarked on the sweet lure of the commuter 
train as it rushes towards one who stands waiting on the platform. 
A simple step forward and all problems are solved. Perhaps the 
death wish is becoming a shared principle of community life, and 
we — like lemmings— now worship Thanatos. 
With all the factors mentioned—  education, financial affairs, 
foreign policy, ecological relations— falling in a quickening spi-
ral toward incoherence, our summary can perhaps more properly 
end, not with a final dismal speculation, but with two questions. 
Can we Americans recognize the anti-climatic and banal finale 
into which a Puritan heritage —  often no longer tied explicitly to 
God or nation— is leading? And can we, who are children also of 
the Enlightenment, finally choose against our failed Puritanism 
and submit instead to the principles of equality and justice we 
have so often professed?
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Perhaps this book should have ended with the last questions on 
the previous page. Much of the material up to now may seem to 
some to be trite and self-evident. Such in fact much of it seems 
to me. I wonder then how it is that this material escapes the con-
sciousness of so many Americans today. Here, in this section, I 
try to examine the epistemology (or lack thereof) that makes this 
possible.
In the opening chapter I compared education to mother’s milk. 
A mother doesn’t wait till her child has earned a right to be fed; 
she draws her child close and nurses her or him. Education is 
something like that. To treat it as a privilege or a reward is to 
suspend our wholesome instinct in the matter. We override intui-
tive wisdom with a convenient rationalization. Convenient that 
is to the powers that be. Among other functions, education— 
resembling mother’s milk—  stimulates the immune system of 
the mind. As a part of my unease about contemporary culture, 
I fear one reason education has become as problematic as it has 
is because the powers that be don’t want a general public well 
immunized against nonsense. When prophetic voices among us 
disclose the mythic character of our economics and our foreign 
policy, efforts are made to marginalize and silence them. Gov-
ernment treatment of Julian Assange, Chelsea Manning, and 
Edward Snowdon is instructive here. Think of the outrage of 
the Nixon Administration when Ellsberg, Zinn, and Chomsky 
brought The Pentagon Papers into the media mainstream. In many 
cases, our government prefers that we work within a foggy blur.
“What you don’t know can’t hurt you.” We’ve all heard this; 
no one can really think it’s true. The bus hurtling toward you 
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as you jaywalk across a busy street engrossed in your cell phone 
can certainly hurt you. Flip the stupid phrase, and you arrive 
at something close to the most basic premise of common sense: 
What you do know may be of help to you. Confirmations are 
more numerous than there are grains of sand.
What’s insidious about skepticism is that it smothers the quest 
for knowledge before it can get fairly started. Skepticism is our 
soup du jour. It’s become the artfully contrived mother’s milk of 
our times. It expresses itself as irony and cynicism. It raises an 
eyebrow. It keeps reality at bay.
Skepticism shouldn’t be confused with critical thinking. Skep-
ticism and critical thinking are like identical twins in a comi-
cal farce — two characters whom others continually mistake for 
each other, but who have altogether opposing agendas. Critical 
thinking leads to science and wisdom; skepticism leads to word 
games and sophistry, ending in disengagement. Both skepticism 
and critical thinking may express themselves with the ques-
tion: “How do you know?” Yet the intentions in asking are quite 
different. Skepticism intends to shut down the quest for under-
standing; critical thinking embarks upon it.
The reason I speak of the skepticisms that follow as “convenient” 
is because they provide an easy way out. They’re not convenient in 
the sense that they allow us to arrive at what we want; their con-
venience is limited to permitting us to stop asking what we want.
Why is skepticism attractive? Well, the actual task of our time 
is uniquely daunting. People my age are glad they’re old. The 
kind of challenge facing us—  once the ecological dimension is 
factored in— is without parallel. For a whole society to reconfig-
ure its internal sense of who it is and where it’s going is a monu-
mentally greater task than for a cruiser to swerve from an iceberg 
toward which it’s headed. It’s a much more demanding task than 
to send a man to the moon. To relinquish the specific sense of 
mission that began with the Puritans and that manifests itself 
lately as still alive and well— in our wrathful behavior toward 
Iraq after 9/11, for instance, and in our supine response to finan-
cial extortion in 2009 — would impose a burden of reconstruc-
tion on the American people that almost everyone in America 
would rather avoid— politicians, media pundits, clergy, teachers, 
and, to tell the truth flat out, typical Americans everywhere. To 
examine our life and recognize the extent to which our coping 
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strategies have only made matters worse — really, there’s nothing 
more painful. It’s “a long day’s journey into night.” Instead of 
doing that, we choose to be gamblers doubling down. If we’d just 
be more forceful in our foreign policy, we tell ourselves— if we 
can just arm enough drones and kill enough terrorists to convince 
our enemies that violence never works, we tell ourselves— then 
all will be well. As for our finances, in the wake of the bankster 
meltdown, we say let’s unfetter the apostles of greed once and 
for all, and then surely they will serve us devotedly. That’s only 
logical, isn’t it? I mean, who knows more about the ills of our 
financial system than our financiers? 
Ominous thinking. How, though, does all this connect to 
skepticism? If the indictment I’ve made has truth, it seems our 
problem is one of rampaging, uncritical complacency and trust. 
Skepticism would seem in order. Is it not the remedy?
The opportunity for skepticism and its lure today among the 
eyebrow raising intelligent is the manifest credulity of the herd 
of true believers we’ve mentioned at such length by now— the 
great numbers who never question their familiar opinions but 
simply forge ahead. Such true believers are in the grip of obses-
sion, and the intelligent, including the thoughtful young, can 
see this. Worse yet, the obsessed people in charge of our society 
are clearly in the ranks of the credulous true believers. A very 
common response of intellectuals then to the manifest absurdity 
of current foreign policy and current financial policy is a shrug 
in the physical order and a shift into skepticism in the mental 
order.  “Look where convictions lead people! The last thing this 
world needs is another true believer!”
Have I described the situation accurately? The response of the 
sophisticated is to look at the triumph of folly, and rather than 
be motivated by it to look for answers to say instead: “Do you see 
what a mess people make of things when they think they have 
answers?” (This question was in fact a favorite maneuver of David 
Hume.)
That response —  a retreat into civilized and urbane despair— is 
too easy. 
To elaborate: among many it’s fashionable today to greet almost 
any statement of conviction with an ironic smile. To do so has 
become a mark of political correctness among many of our young 
at universities today, and the behavior is modeled and reinforced 
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by many of their professors. The consequence of this tendency is 
paradoxically conservative. If we’ve found that all ideology leads 
to egotism and bloodshed, then it becomes fashionable to have 
none. Students these days study ideologies as taxonomists study 
butterflies. The butterflies are all dead. Such detachment in turn 
leaves those who blindly possess (are “possessed” by) an uncriti-
cized ideology firmly in control of all things outside the class-
room. The thoughtful people have surrendered to those among us 
who are least sane. The Milton Friedmans and the Pol Pots rule.
The compensation for such an inglorious surrender is that it 
absolves one from Herculean/Augean labor of sorting well-
grounded convictions from ill-grounded ones (or, as the Greeks’ 
metaphor would bluntly suggest, from getting the bullshit out 
of the stable). Meanwhile, it allows a docile society to soldier 
on without let or acknowledged misgiving in our mission. Ours 
not to reason why, into the valley of death ride the three or four 
hundred million Americans; and the world at large twists in the 
after-draft.
In this section we will investigate skepticism about history, 
skepticism about beauty, skepticism about morality, and skepti-
cism about anything being known absolutely. All are common 
today; and all contribute toward conservation and perpetuation 
of the interlocking cycles of disintegration described in earlier 
chapters. One of the problems the reader is likely to face is a nag-
ging misgiving that none of this is really relevant. That misgiving, 
I claim, makes it more relevant than ever. We Americans have 
not much inclination to ponder how epistemological stagnation 
and paralysis block our path to meaningful action. Bear with me 
then.
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Once I was tutoring a young African-American who was about 
fifteen years old. He announced to me that he and his buddy had 
figured out that history was a worthless study. I asked how they’d 
come to that. He said they’d realized history was about the past 
but that they were interested in the future. I sat there, staring at 
him. After a while he became uneasy and said: “Well, what do 
you think?” “About what?” I asked. “About what I just said,” he 
replied. “Oh, that,” I said; “You did say that. But I’ve decided to 
focus on the future rather than the past.”
The incoherence of his program was what I’d hoped to demon-
strate. In a way, though, he was ahead of many of his peers— for 
no doubt much that he’d been taught as history was worse than 
worthless, and he at least was conscious of his act as he struck 
history from his list of concerns. For many of his generation, his-
tory was never on their list. For some perhaps there was no list.
One worries about the digitalization of experience. Is the 
grand four-dimensional gestalt of things disintegrating into twit-
terings? As my students emerge from the classroom, I can watch 
as fifty percent or more reach robotically for cell phones— if they 
haven’t held fast to them through the session— in a conditioned 
reflex to return to comfort. Some stand stationary in the pathway 
as they tweet away their breaking news (“on way 2 library, c u 
there”). They seem oblivious to the four-dimensionally-present 
others trying to shuffle past them. Journals and diaries are impor-
tant ways to memorialize events of one’s life; but something more 
radical seems in progress here: a kind of em-bubbling of oneself 
in a world of one’s own making. (Have we here an attempt to 
make Hume’s “Egocentric Predicament” a reality? Does each of 
Skepticism about History6
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us want to become star of his or her universe in cyberspace —  and 
demote what’s outside that space to the status of a hypothesis? 
Does the guy who goes and shoots up a crowd of anonymous oth-
ers believe more or less he’s simply the main character in a video 
game of his invention?)
In the em-bubbled world where the student moves freely, 
allusions to the past tend to fall flat. The ability to grip large 
sequences of the past and hold in memory the figures and facts 
of them seems (with the exception of baseball commentators) to 
be in decline. Perhaps, to phrase the matter differently, there’s 
a plasticity and multiplicity in the processing of the past which 
amounts to the same thing. Some years ago I was discussing the 
birth of free-market economics and I mentioned Adam Smith. 
One of the more alert students remarked, “I think he’s gone 
off the air.” (There had in fact been a media personality oper-
ating with that name.) Suppose I mention MacArthur leading 
an invasion to regain the Philippines. A puzzled student may 
object: “But I thought it was the Japanese who invaded the Phil-
ippines.” (It was, of course, but . . . )
A story has a plot that connects the incidents. In a slightly 
different sense, history too has a plot, or at least a pattern. To 
uncover it is at once the formal task of historians and the infor-
mal task of everybody. We ask what were the undergirding trends, 
conditions, transformations, motivations that provided context 
and opportunity for such and such to happen. Both to follow 
a story and to follow history requires a certain difficult exercise 
of keeping in focus a succession of incidents. One must be able 
to sustain “long” thoughts. This capacity seems in trouble today. 
The bleeps and splurges of our digitalized culture seem to work 
against it.
So half the problem with the past may be that competence to 
engage it is fading. Let me suggest a second half may be skepti-
cism about the past being recoverable in the best of conditions. 
This latter I call “skepticism about history.”
Why does it matter?
In the struggle to create psychotherapy, Freud acts on a convic-
tion that recovery of the past is a worthwhile goal— in the case 
of many of his patients a necessity. Perhaps his premise is that the 
only people who can function effectively in the present are ones 
equipped with a reasonably accurate sense of their personal past. 
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At the least, playing the matter from the other end, Freud seems 
to believe that when one can’t function effectively in the pres-
ent, the remedy often begins with an active effort to re-engage 
the past. What we don’t know can hurt us, and does so all the 
time. It can, in fact, tie us in knots. The return of the repressed 
can occur in confused and disorienting ways. The alternative is 
to summon the repressed forth in a deliberate and painstaking 
effort at self-understanding.
We have, I’ve been arguing, a dynamic past—  a shared past— 
regarding our experience as a society. It operates on us and in 
us but is not necessarily reflected in conscious memory. In fact, 
pseudo memory may conveniently mask a deeper, more dynamic 
and darker memory for a society as a whole just as it can for an 
individual. When that’s the case, we’re talking about a past: 
(1)  that’s operating in us, (2)  that’s guiding decisions, (3)  that’s 
deeply installed in the shared affectivity of us all in our public 
celebrations, in our expectations, and throughout our interac-
tions with one another (including what we will allow as “com-
mon sense” when we carry on discussions), but that (4)  is never 
made a focus of attention in itself. It’s the kind of thing that can 
influence us to choose item A without hesitation, while we recoil 
from item B. It can explain why we walk through a particular 
door without hesitation while we do not even consider walk-
ing through some other door. To deliberately turn from delving 
into the actual past if one is a member of a deprived minority 
seems obviously counterproductive (which is why I made an issue 
of it with my African-American student); but if one turns from 
delving into injustices of which one’s group was the perpetrator, 
this too is profoundly counterproductive (which is why I have 
so belabored the injustices perpetrated by the white majority of 
America’s past).
While then we are capable of being aware of our past, often 
we’re not aware. It’s when we’re not aware, that its control over us 
is likely to be strongest.
When my teenage student said he’d written off the past, I 
thought it likely his freedom would be diminished if he man-
aged to persevere in his disregard. Prompted by Heidegger, I’d 
say in fact my student was quite wrong about history. Deliber-
ately paradoxical, Heidegger claims history is really always about 
the future. If you think of history not as something Napoleon 
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did, but as something historians do, you can take in Heidegger’s 
point. “History,” as he uses the term, does not occur simply when 
deeds are done; history occurs when someone creates a record 
purporting to be a record of such deeds.
The record can be accurate or distorted. It can even be quite 
fictitious. If it’s presented as fiction, the historian isn’t precisely 
a historian, but a maker of legends—  one whom the ancient 
Greeks would have called a poet. When however it’s a genuine 
effort to give a factual account, it can still be distorted and ficti-
tious. Further, a counterfeit of an effort at historical accuracy may 
be offered in a deliberate effort to deceive. Here a “poet” is at 
work, but a malicious one.
Whatever of these is the case, what’s noteworthy is that the 
writer is attempting to present to the listener or reader a future to 
be pursued. We are reminded often enough: “All history is told 
from a point of view.” That however doesn’t go the distance. His-
tory is always told for a point of view— is told to install a point 
of view in the recipient of the account. We do know this. When 
we listen to a long account that begins to seem tedious, we inter-
rupt:  “What’s the point?” There always is one. The teller of the 
tale may be saying: “Look out! Don’t do what this poor fellow 
did.” Or again, may be saying: “See! In this woman’s actions we 
find how things of this sort should be handled.” Accounts com-
monly admonish in both ways.
The criterion of selection for the historian is the kind of world 
the historian would like his listeners or readers to ambition. The 
historian doesn’t recount some action simply because it happened, 
but because the material seems relevant to future action—  either 
clarifying a goal or giving a warning. This doesn’t make the his-
torian a poet in the Greek sense. An honest historian doesn’t 
make things up; but he or she does select in accord with a pur-
pose —“raises” the data by directing it toward a moral. 
While it would be wrong then to say history is mere propa-
ganda, it’s true that all history not perverted by a desire to deceive 
is guided by an intention to edify. The historian is a moralist.
Patrick Henry spoke of experience as the one lamp by which 
his feet were guided. George Santayana said those who do not 
study history doom themselves to repeat it. Paradoxically, it’s pre-
cisely this power of history to act the aggressive school marm— 
this tendency to take hold of us, to instruct us, to summon us to 
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do this and avoid that— that can make us want to run from it. 
When we don’t learn from our mistakes, it’s largely because we 
figure the process would prove painful. When we dismiss with-
out reflection moments of insight and clarity, it’s because insight 
and clarity can spoil a whole day.1
One way then to deal with history is just to dismiss it out of 
hand— much as a slothful person may discard evidence of his 
or her life’s triviality, much as an alcoholic or other drug addict 
may discard evidence of his or her illness. This seems in line with 
what may have been my student’s strategy; perhaps he didn’t 
want the painful nudge that memory of the past can give. In such 
cases, if the evasion is more or less outright, made in the clear 
light of decision, it may be less harmful. What’s outright can be 
questioned.2 
Another approach, more subtle and therefore often preferred, 
is to say: “In looking to history, there’s no way to know if you’re 
getting it right. One historian sees things one way, and the next 
historian sees things quite differently.” Such a charge brings us 
quite explicitly to what I’m talking about when I talk of “skepti-
cism about history.” I call it “convenient” because it provides a 
way to skip out on history and look principled in doing so. One 
can exempt oneself from the burden of trying to learn and under-
stand the past on the principled ground that one knows better 
than to think such a thing possible.
This is the radical skepticism we must examine. Let’s look into 
the case for it.
At a radical level, one can question the efficacy of memory. It’s 
an easy target because, as a function of consciousness, memory 
1. It doesn’t seem too strong to say that in such situations, we often 
choose for ourselves what may be the tragic plight of some schizophrenics: 
we choose a state of consciousness in which the past is neutralized and 
provides no lessons as to what we should do next; we choose to be in a 
state where the status quo seems inevitable.
2. A professional colleague of mine once said: “You pay attention to his-
tory and current events? I’ve got better things to do.” I responded: “Does 
it not occur to you that you thereby retard your progress toward becoming 
an adult?” She was stunned— which is what I’d intended. The forthright-
ness of my colleague opened the door to my stark criticism and to a pos-
sibility of change.
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entails the mysterious elusiveness of consciousness. One can state 
one’s mistrust saying: “Memory plays tricks on us.”
A more grounded approach, I’d say, challenges this challenge 
and replies: “Is it not rather that we play tricks on memory?” To 
take a common example: consider an event in one’s early child-
hood that has constantly been retold at family gatherings. Psy-
chologists claim it’s frequently the case that the child protago-
nist in such events does not remember the events themselves, but 
remembers only the retelling of them in the family circle. Good 
enough! The child remembers something. What she perhaps 
doesn’t remember is that her first well-focused attention to these 
events was as material in stories told by relatives. This is natural 
enough, for her attention is on the content of the story and not 
upon how she first became aware of it. It does not seem accurate 
to say memory tricks her here; closer to the mark is to say there is 
an omission of memory or an omission of attention.
If I may give a trivial case of such an instance, I once caught 
myself remembering “that time I was fishing for marlin in the 
Caribbean.” Problem is, I’ve never been in the Caribbean, much 
less fished for marlin there. The memory was so clear, I was star-
tled by this realization. Then it came to me: “That’s Hemingway 
putting me in the Caribbean by his uncanny capture of detail and 
mood.” My memory is not at fault. The content I’m holding in 
memory is something I truly experienced. What I’m not initially 
reflecting on is that this is a memory of literary experience.
For this reason I say we play tricks on memory. Memory works, 
but we don’t always scrutinize it as it works. I’d even say “memory 
never makes a mistake.” While we make mistakes about mem-
ory, these mistakes can more accurately be assigned to what we 
omit to remember—  can be referred back to contextual matters 
we did not bother to note. Lacking a remembered context for 
an incident held securely in memory, we then improvise later. In 
fact: all the time and almost inevitably, we improvise context in 
order to imbed facts. This is why two eyewitnesses can, without 
lying, give incompatible accounts. What’s of key importance here 
is that it’s possible to sort these matters out. (One can observe 
this scrutinizing process in action on TV by watching Judge Judy 
at work; she’s a tireless master at stripping away and discarding 
conveniently improvised context from remembered fact.)
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Bertrand Russell once presented the most absolute attack on 
memory he could think of. He said your memory of the past pro-
vides no purchase whatever on the past you remember; this is 
because for all you know, you and your memory of the past were 
all created just a moment ago. (This is a more radical version of 
the more familiar argument that, for all we know, the Grand 
Canyon was created more or less in its present configuration less 
than five thousand years ago.) We will touch briefly on absolute 
skepticism in a chapter later on, but not so comprehensively as to 
destroy this argument for those who find it compelling.
A less radical way of undermining history concedes to each of 
us a reliable memory (if we will be careful to scrutinize the claims 
we make), but then goes on to put in question all accounts received 
from others. People lie. David Hume was so impressed by this 
that his tendency was toward telling his reader never to believe 
things on the testimony of others; at most, take what another 
says as an invitation to go see for yourself. If you are told “there’s 
a three-legged chicken in that field over there,” that should not, 
Hume is inclined to say, function legitimately as anything more 
than an invitation to cross the field and see for yourself.
Rigidly adhered to, such a policy would overwhelm with uncer-
tainties the context in which one conducts the affairs of daily life. 
Its effect on the study of history would be very nearly to end 
it. Did Napoleon exist? Hume’s advice to go take a look doesn’t 
take you the distance. Very soon you begin invoking testimony. 
(That Hume was a practicing historian, and judged to be a good 
one, shows how quickly he could put aside what he argued philo-
sophically when he wanted to do something else.)
There is, to be sure, lots of data that people do lie. Particularly 
they lie these days. I’ve suggested our government and media 
routinely lie to the American people (especially to motivate 
continuing participation in the violent world mission this essay 
claims we’ve come to think is ours). 
This lying comes with a backup strategy. When one objects to 
the lying, or wishes to investigate something beyond limits our 
government regards legitimate, one is likely to be labeled a “con-
spiracy theorist.” This, it seems, is a very bad thing. Threat of the 
label doesn’t, I think, exactly convince the typical American that 
the smooth and sanitized stories presented by the government 
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and media regarding official motives and acts are true; rather it 
simply discourages one person and then another from further 
inquiry, so that eventually most people give up the chase. Their 
discussions with others turn elsewhere. With regard at least to 
some particular thing (say the death of Kennedy or the circum-
stances leading to 9/11), they despair in effect of learning from the 
past; they cease paying attention to it.
This is a more genuinely unfortunate thing than being a con-
spiracy theorist. Of the death of Kennedy for instance, we know 
something: we know our government has not told us what hap-
pened. Those who studied it know that the assignment given the 
Warren Commission was to so massage the account of Kennedy’s 
death as to do minimal damage to The American Story. They 
know the report of the commission was riddled with implau-
sibilities and contradictions. They know, for instance, that the 
many testimonies and indications that there was firing from in 
front of Kennedy have not been refuted but have simply been dis-
carded. But think positively. To know that the account we have 
been given is not true, is to know a great deal. The cover-up is in 
plain sight even if the details it covers up are not.
In what is a far more complicated case, something similar can 
be said regarding conditions surrounding 9/11. Those who study it 
know for instance they’ve been given four mutually incompatible 
versions of what NORAD was up to that day— not just regard-
ing incidentals, but regarding mission, orders, and actual deploy-
ment. To know we haven’t been told the truth is to know a great 
deal. While we are far from knowing exactly what happened, we 
do know that what we’ve been told happened is not— in matters 
of some importance — what did happen. 
If we shrug complacently, and go about our business, not only 
does this shrug allow us to continue our support for America’s 
crusade against an expanding list of people without examining 
our premises and motivations, it also means that many related 
issues, rich in consequence, urgent for our future, also go unex-
amined. Reluctant to recognize the complex and continuing 
mental maneuvers and social constructions that have landed us 
in a box, we slacken in our efforts to think outside it.
Let me, by way of illustration, take up briefly two issues, closely 
related, where history could shed much light were it not that we 
have become demoralized about turning to history. Let’s take 
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the issue of population growth first. Since we don’t readily see 
a solution for it, our tendency is to act as if there is no problem. 
Yet our human population size (with our deep commitment, for 
instance, to eating meat in greater quantities than formerly) is 
clearly implicated in the whole crisis of habitat. All kinds of sys-
tems are overtaxed and in danger of toppling by reason of recip-
rocal interaction of our numbers and our ungoverned appetites: 
arable land, fishing, transportation, housing, and water, to name 
some obvious examples, are all jeopardized. The regurgitations of 
our waste clog our habitat and jeopardize these systems further. 
Some biologists and sociologists hypothesize that the lethal 
skirmishes of human against human breaking out in so many 
parts of the world currently may not be due simply to racial, class, 
and religious antipathies, but may be due to those antipathies 
as they are heightened by anticipations of scarcity. Our common 
apprehensions seem, E. O. Wilson hypothesizes (in reflections on 
what happened in Rwanda), to be ginned up of late by the mis-
giving that there isn’t—  or soon won’t be —  enough for everyone. 
Our data-intake processing quietly suggests to us, “There may not 
be enough X [water; food; living space] for my grandchildren and 
the grandchildren of those others. Let us then strike before their 
numbers increase.” Hobbes would understand perfectly.
In this matter of pressure from population, we are given less 
leadership than we need. Pastors, rabbis, priests, and politi-
cians have generally been worse than unhelpful. Often enough, 
they’ve encouraged their own group to outbreed the competition. 
Regarding American politicians, surely you’ve never heard even 
one candidate promise, “And if elected, I will do all I can to 
encourage smaller families.” Their campaign managers wouldn’t 
allow it. Sooner, would say the managers, attack baseball or apple 
pie than go after motherhood.
History has something to say about this problem. It provides 
instances where societies have collapsed when their numbers out-
ran their resources. Our own American experience provides the 
example of how the increase of each new generation of aspiring 
white settlers led to such competition over habitat as to motivate 
the whites to entertain projects of genocide against native Ameri-
cans. On a planetary scale, history marks time with a kind of 
steadily quickening drumbeat for those with ears to hear. Often 
we ignore that beat because the unwelcome message is that the 
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rich need to curb their consumption while the poor need to limit 
the number of their children. 
History also suggests a way of escape. If one is disposed to 
consult history, what emerges as a salient feature of population 
growth is that it’s often greatest where one might least expect— 
namely in regions characterized by desperation. This may seem 
counterintuitive. Without benefit of historical study, one might 
conjecture that when people are well-to-do, they’d have lots of 
offspring; and that when they’re poor, they wouldn’t. The oppo-
site is the more general case. It requires attention to history to 
take in this trend, and its lesson.
One learns it’s useless to denounce the phenomenon and regard 
the people of poor countries as irresponsible. Neither should we 
regard the poor in our own country as irresponsible. The poor are 
in fact responsible in the sense that they’re responding. They’re 
responding with a natural reflex to the experience of misery; 
they’re responding by reproducing. When situations are calami-
tous, people breed. This has been nature’s way of maintaining our 
species. Our evolutionary history has built it into us. A man close 
to despair may say: “The one thing I can still hope may give my 
life significance is to have offspring who survive me.” Another, 
less despairing, may say: “I must have children who will care for 
me when I’m old.” A still less distressed person, hopeful but still 
anxious, may say, “My enterprises will thrive if I have many chil-
dren. And without them, who will take care of my enterprises 
when I’m gone?”
Perhaps though this is to be too ready to imply such things are 
dealt with at a conscious level. The blunt truth is: when things go 
bad, we breed. (If the pill disappointed some planners because 
it did not reduce the growth of population to the extent they’d 
hoped, it’s because the planners hadn’t factored in the extent to 
which conception itself, not just sex, can become more intensely 
desired in times of stress.) The solution is as simple as it is dif-
ficult for us affluent people to accept: if we would stop rigging 
the world markets to our advantage, and stop consuming more 
than is good for us, the poor of the world would have greater 
opportunities to achieve local prosperity and would curb the rate 
at which they reproduce.
My point in discussing this here is that, so far from seeking 
to master the not-too-difficult dynamics of overpopulation, we 
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prefer to act as if there is no problem. Though history could tell 
us much about the problem, we prefer not to acknowledge the 
problem. One might think, for all the attention paid it, it doesn’t 
exist. We seem to have trouble reaching any kind of consensus 
even on immigration—  a problem deeply influenced by underly-
ing problems of population growth and habitat degradation. We 
avoid the subject in part because we sense —  correctly— that a 
solution will require a radical change in perspective and behav-
ior. Demoralized, we ignore historical trend lines and what they 
predict. When challenged on this, we disingenuously coun-
ter:  “What has history to tell us about the unique problems of 
the present?” If though we will put the problem of population 
in the context of an historical overview, the solution is, I claim, 
implicit in the problem. Over-consumption, unfettered develop-
ment, and the desperation of the poor are the causes of the prob-
lem. Addressing these, we can move toward a solution.
History, as we anticipate though, is a tough task-master here. 
It offers an unwelcome answer. Desperate people breed; to reduce 
breeding, alleviate desperation. To do this, the affluent must 
place restraints on their lifestyles and their expectations of ever-
greater prosperity in an effort to render the lives of the desti-
tute less desperate. That is, the affluent must do this if they wish 
to continue to live some kind of shared life on this planet with 
those who are less fortunate. (The alternative for the affluent is to 
change, consciously or unconsciously, toward finding “final solu-
tions.” As attempted refugeeism becomes more common, the two 
alternatives—  one humane and the other inhumane —  are going 
to test us Americans profoundly.)
As I speak of “shared life,” I don’t mean free food— which 
can, as Garrett Hardin argued, put local farmers out of business. 
What seems indicated rather is a sharing of opportunities—  a 
willingness on the part of us, the substantially more affluent, 
to restrain ourselves in foreclosing the opportunities of oth-
ers. We must reverse our expansion in the interest of allowing 
room and availability of resources for a multitude of diverse and 
independent initiatives on the part of others. But this means let-
ting go our notion that the world is a wilderness which we have 
been assigned to tame and exploit. (It means—  dare I say it?— 
wiggling free of the death grip in which capitalism holds us.) On 
the other hand, if we adhere yet tighter to traditional ways, there 
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will be exhaustion of resources and such changes of climate that 
desperate people in many parts of the world will become envi-
ronmental refugees, squabbling in hardly imaginable ways over 
scarcity. 
What history suggests further is that if we can’t bring our-
selves to a concern for others, we will continue pursuing hege-
mony and waging wars of attrition against potential rivals. We’ll 
continue to call these rivals “terrorists,” and in time many who 
are not already such will become terrorists in their response to us. 
We’ll intensify confrontations with these others in the interest of 
moving things toward “final solutions” in a pursuit of air-tight 
national security. Consequences of sharing and consequences of 
not sharing seem the options history illuminates for us if we’re 
willing to look to it for guidance. The beleaguered and desperate 
state in which the Israeli people live may be an example that pre-
dicts what may become the beleaguered and desperate situation 
of the United States.
Perhaps that’s enough for now on history and overpopulation. 
A closely related instance where historical insight can help is, as 
suggested earlier, regarding the issue of climate change. We see 
the weather every day. Climate change is another matter. Yet in 
the melting of the ice caps and the plight of polar bears and pen-
guins and Eskimos, and in the increasing tempo one can moni-
tor in lives of firemen and firewomen, and in the droughts that 
increasingly plague California, and in the increasing storms that 
disrupt life further east, a thing as theoretical as climate change 
can become palpable. In fact it has become quite palpable. Hur-
ricanes, rising seas, fire storms, and the loss of familiar patterns 
of rainfall are palpable. Increasingly therefore climate-change 
deniers are pushed toward a more nuanced defense: “OK, climate 
change is occurring, but there’s no reason to think it’s from any-
thing we’re doing.” 
Some deniers go further; they say, “You want history; we’ll 
give you history. Climates change all the time! They’ve been 
changing all through time.” Yet as we scrutinize history, a plot-
ting of climate change against the increase in the atmosphere of 
carbon dioxide discovers a robust correlation. The Greenhouse 
Effect was a hypothesis proposed in the 1820s— when the Indus-
trial Revolution was still in its first half-century. The hypothesis 
predicted that if we continued pouring CO2, and like gases, into 
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the atmosphere, there would be a gradual rise in earth’s average 
temperature with the kind of climate-change phenomena we’re 
now observing. We’ve continued our experiment with CO2 at 
exponentially increasing rates— rates which accelerate as I write. 
The confirmations of predicted correlation between CO2 and cli-
mate change that are coming in are very strong. Robust correla-
tion is the lifeblood of science. There is, then, human causality 
in the present case; but to grasp the robust correlation of trends 
that tells us so requires that one not only talk of history but be 
attentive to it.
Our peculiar American resistance to science surely has rela-
tions back to our Puritan past, a time when the only truths worth 
attending were thought to be those relating rather immediately 
to the salvation of one’s soul. The planet was reduced to little 
more than a scoreboard from which one could hope to coax signs 
of election. Further, anything historical which seemed to con-
flict with our superficial, uncritical, and highly westernized and 
anglicized reading of the Bible was rejected.
This tendency became further rigidified in America’s religious 
struggle against Darwinian biology. The modern-day Puritans 
among us—  supported by the inner Puritan in many more of 
us— have never abandoned their rear-guard defenses against bio-
logical history. Because it’s common among us to deny that we are 
parts of nature, it’s inconceivable to many Americans that we’re 
now agents altering the habitat out of which we have sprung. A 
denial of the scientifically emerging timeline of human origins 
paves the way for a denial of current scientific reports about our 
human predicament at this moment. Without an attention to his-
tory, we neither know where we’ve come from nor where we’re 
going. History then is vital to our future.
To return then to the issue of history and validity, is there a 
way to do history effectively? Yes. But not if we insist that his-
tory’s lessons all be comforting, and not if we insist on holding 
history at arm’s length, enthralled by an arbitrary and uncritical 
reading of the Bible that assures us we are God’s elect. Memory 
can inform us, and can correct the errors we ascribe to it, if we 
want it to. Regarding the testimony of others—  and much of his-
tory is a less-than-neatly-coherent tapestry woven from the tes-
timony of others— there are means for sorting honest testimony 
from dishonest testimony, and reliable testimony from unreliable 
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testimony. (One hopes all who accept jury duty are convinced of 
this.)
From the medieval Schoolmen— who probably owe it to Aris-
totle — we get: Nemo gratis mendax, no one is gratuitously a liar. 
This seems both reasonable, and confirmed by experience. The 
impulse of humans is to communicate their sense of things. Hid-
den agendas notwithstanding, in general we want others to know 
what we think. We are social, and want to share our view of real-
ity. For this we have coffee breaks, dinner parties, libraries, and 
theaters. Parents wish, by and large, to empower their children by 
telling them the truth. It would be a monster indeed who would 
choose to inundate his child with misinformation.
But this last sets up, paradoxically, an opportunity for exploita-
tion by others. Parents who have raised their children well, con-
scientiously empowering them with information and thoughtful 
guidance, may have a hard time putting these same children on 
alert against the hidden agendas and deceptions of other more 
opportunistic adults. It’s especially difficult to fortify chil-
dren against the common nonsense of the times. For the well 
raised child’s experience has been that adults provide wholesome 
testimony.
How do we guard our children and ourselves against those 
who would take advantage of our inclination to trust? Well, vio-
lation of trust by acts of fraud and manipulation requires special 
motives. In seeking to protect ourselves and those in our care, 
we look then for those hidden agendas and vested interests that 
stand to be served by deceit. And we try to engage our children 
in this exercise of detection from their early years. (Not only is it 
OK to attempt to raise one’s child as a discerning critic of out-in-
the-open conspiracies, it’s a derelict parent who does not do so.)
This is because, for all I’ve said about honesty as the default 
mode of human behavior, hidden agendas are now everywhere 
in play. Milton Friedman’s doctrine (once its empty gesture of 
respect for ethics is peeled away) that a corporation boss’s obliga-
tion is to do everything possible to increase stock dividends and 
values, is a likely culprit here. Standard practice has dictated, at 
least till very recently, that if a food company’s advertising person-
nel can increase sales by misrepresenting the quality of its food, 
it’s not only their right but their duty to do so. If a car manufac-
turer finds it’s cheaper to pay civil damages for deaths caused by 
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a defect in its cars than it is to fix the defect, then that’s the way 
to go —  so long as it can hide the game it’s playing. If the Koch 
brothers can let their oil pipes rot, and bribe regulators not to call 
them on it, and if they can pay such fines when accidents occur 
as are negligible when calculated against profits, then clearly it’s 
God’s will they do just that. If the Veterans Administration can 
win bonuses for its personnel by misrepresenting the efficiency of 
its services, surely sound business practice requires no less. An 
extreme example —  so extreme one finds it hard to credit— is the 
much-litigated accusation that some drug companies, including 
Bayer/Cutter, though they had reason to believe some blood they 
had on hand for transfusions (developed through an outdated 
technique) could easily be tainted with HIV, decided nonetheless 
to continue marketing it to Asia. As a commodity, it had a mar-
ket value. The governing logic, the plaintiffs alleged on behalf 
of the victims, seemed to be one could not just pour it down the 
drain. Talk of caveat emptor. The ethos in such examples as these 
seems to say to the public at large: “It’s your job not to trust us; if 
you ignore your duty, you deserve what you get.”
In the business of war-making, we’ve seen it’s entirely in con-
formity with our sense of national mission for our government 
to sponsor wars. Yet for our government to do so openly runs 
contrary to an image of ourselves that we hold dear. Honesty 
here would violate a cherished fiction. Knowing this is the case, 
knowing our officials must give accounts configured to fit The 
American Story, it’s reasonable and prudent for every Ameri-
can citizen to regard official statements relating to any and all 
motives for war with anticipatory suspicion. The track record of 
our government, brought to light by historical reflection, is of 
great service if we will attend to it.
Polk informs us that our acquisition of California was some-
how a natural consequence of aggressive action by Mexicans. 
McKinley would have us believe our bloody annexation of the 
Philippines was somehow necessitated by the misconduct of 
Spain. Wilson tells us our desire to make the world safe for 
democracy required our entry into the First World War. Johnson 
tells us the popularity of Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam threatened 
American security. (We were warned in quasi-official advisories 
it was better to fight with the Vietnamese in Hanoi than on the 
streets of San Francisco.) Suspicions emerging from this record 
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should prompt us to heroic scrutiny of governmental purposes 
when it comes to new proposals for war. (Norman Solomon and 
John Perkins can be helpful here —  as of course can the publish-
ers of the Pentagon Papers: Daniel Ellsberg, Howard Zinn, and 
Noam Chomsky.)
Regarding destruction of habitat, the moral that history 
teaches is similarly cautionary. We know that our corporations 
are, by and large, headed by people in the grip of an ethos of ever-
expanding utilization. The ethos that infatuates them requires 
that with each passing day they find more resources and use 
them at a quicker pace than they did the day before. Therefore, 
when they tell us the environment is doing fine, or that only fools 
are concerned about long-term consequences, we should look to 
their agenda and their track-record of habitat protection. (Mark 
Hertsgaard has written eloquently about this; so too has Naomi 
Klein.)
What we learn is that attention to testimony can itself pro-
tect one against the traps that testimony can set. In the climate-
change debate, for instance, when one hears geologists in the 
employ of oil companies say that global warming was invented by 
an elite band of climatologists on the lookout for research grants, 
one should not ignore the piece of fossil fuel in the eyes of these 
well paid spokespersons for big oil. Were money really the con-
trolling goal of climate scientists warning of climate change, we 
know they could quickly become more wealthy than they are by 
switching sides. In some cases, it’s plausible to think entrepre-
neurs would pay them just to stop talking. (James Hansen, for-
merly NASA’s chief meteorologist, could probably be living in 
comfortable retirement in a New York penthouse, if he would just 
start saying kind words about the oil industry.) Historical aware-
ness of how the money game is played should enable us to know 
whose testimony is the more trustworthy.
“History” then is self-correcting. If someone’s testimony is 
internally incoherent, that’s reason for discarding it. In a more 
complicated case, there can be remarkable internal coherence in 
statements of one testifying falsely. When, however, such a per-
son says things incompatible with other things the listener knows 
well, that too arms the listener against being taken in. Good 
detectives everywhere know that incoherences of either type in 
testimony provide criteria for suspicion and rejection (and that 
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incoherence points toward what is being concealed). So do hon-
est judges. (Judge Judy is quicker on an incoherence than a cat is 
on a mouse.)
Lest I seem to mangle and fray the thread of my argument, let 
me single it out clearly. Skeptics regarding history will point to 
the disagreements one finds among historians. “Where there is 
so much controversy,” they will say, “who can know the truth?” 
Yet the problem they cite is, in fact, the solution. The field of dis-
agreements, entered honestly and with good will, is the field of 
answers. History will not save us by itself, but the desire to save 
ourselves without history is basically a desire to save ourselves 
without processing the painful lessons of our past. It’s a desire 
similar to the cocaine addict’s desire to find security and a full 
life in the sheltering clouds of cocaine.
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If I have a student who loves to write music and perform it, that 
student is not a logical positivist. If I have a student who loves 
to walk trails into the mountains, one who lies under the stars 
with his or her significant other while they gaze in amazement at 
the splendor of the night sky till sleep comes on, such a student 
is not a logical positivist. But, without knowing the term itself, 
most of my other students are logical positivists. Growing up in 
our technological society, they have somehow imbibed the notion 
that what we “really know” is restricted to what can be tested in 
a lab or certified by a collection of physical data.
Among other unfortunate consequences of this gratuitous 
belief is that they do not believe there’s anything objective about 
beauty. And though I say I do not believe their theoretical con-
viction is the product of critical thinking, they do have some 
experience to make it plausible. For instance, they have favorite 
musical groups and favorite songs, and have found by experience 
that these preferences are often hard to communicate to others. 
Regarding tastes in general, they’ve found it impossible some-
times to recruit others, and have felt it painful at times when 
others have tried to recruit them.
They’ve concluded beauty is simply in the eye of the beholder; 
and from this, in turn, comes a process in which, notwithstand-
ing their awareness they have preferences, there develops a kind 
of trivializing— a de-substantializing and dismissive attitude 
toward aesthetic experience. This demotion of aesthetic experi-
ence is worth worrying about because the demotion tends to filter 
from our culture what could be important clues to the unwhole-
someness of our present course; we lose what could be intimations 
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of privation and of unmet needs for connections, connections 
that is with nature, other people, and the Origin of the order 
we behold. The experience of nature that was commonplace for 
Thoreau and Whitman and John Muir has somehow not regis-
tered with them. To the extent they experience beauty, it is some-
what in the mode of the man who replaces one trophy wife with 
another, or like the experience of the dentist who recently went to 
Africa to kill a rare and beautiful lion so he could display its head 
upon a wall. We fail to appreciate, that in their eloquent protests 
and affirmations, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, Keats, and 
Byron by no means thought they were indulging in airy nothings; 
they saw themselves engaged in rear-guard action to save civi-
lization from the numbing effects of the world’s industrial and 
technological revolution. There was a similar agenda among the 
French Impressionists— even among those who painted steam-
ships and railroads. There was Paul Cezanne with his simple 
mystical houses, Gauguin with his languid and sultry Tahitians, 
Van Gogh with his sunflowers. They wanted to place us back in 
the moment, and to feel the things we were being tutored by the 
times to neglect. 
I’ve suggested a recent a brand of philosophy offers endorse-
ment for the conclusion about beauty which so many of my stu-
dents take for granted (or, as James Joyce might pun: take for 
granite). Logical positivism—while out of fashion currently 
among philosophers—is alive and well in everyday thinking, and 
in American schools of education. According to logical positiv-
ists, you’ve only got a genuine statement in hand when you’ve got 
something that can be judged true or false by a physical criterion. 
Suppose I say: “It’s raining outside.” I’ve made a statement, the 
positivist will say. Why? Because if you or someone steps outside, 
they’ll find either that things are getting wet from water falling 
from the sky, or they’re not. Since there’s a way to determine 
whether it’s raining or not, the sequence of words: “It’s raining 
outside” has meaning and is a statement.
While we’ve been accustomed to divide things said into “true” 
or “false,” the logical positivist begins by dividing things said 
into “statements” and “pseudo-statements.”
We can get into the reasoning here by looking again at how 
we talk about music. Suppose I say: “Beethoven was born 
before Mozart.” This, the logical positivist says, is a statement. 
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The reason it qualifies as a statement is because there are cer-
tificates, diaries, dates of works published or performed, letters, 
etc., that can function as criteria for the truth or falsehood of 
what I’ve said. It happens that Mozart turns up as born first; 
but this doesn’t disqualify what I said from being a state-
ment; the evidence establishes simply that my statement was 
false.
Again, suppose I say: “Beethoven lived longer than Mozart.” 
This too is a statement. It happens to be a true statement; but 
what constitutes it as a statement is not its truth but that there are 
physical criteria (diaries, etc.) for judging it.
Having made two statements about Beethoven and Mozart, 
one false and the other true, suppose, then, I go on to 
say,  “Mozart was a greater musician than Beethoven.” Is this a 
statement? “Of course not,” answers a good positivist, for there’s 
no physical criterion by which to judge it. How, the positivist 
will demand, do I measure “greater musician”? I may want to 
save it; so I rephrase, “Mozart’s music contains more beauty than 
Beethoven’s.” Have I saved it? Again, the positivist will say: “Of 
course not; there’s no physical criterion by which to measure 
beauty.” Counting of notes won’t do the trick; neither will num-
ber of compositions. Neither will arrangement of notes; at most 
one can say one composer arranged notes one way, the other 
arranged notes a different way. The lack of a satisfactory criterion 
may lead a truly aggressive positivist to say may in fact: “The very 
term ‘beauty’ is nonsense and gibberish!”
While you might think this matter of leaving such things at 
the level of “to each their own” is very liberating, it comes at a 
high price. You might notice, for instance, how well this is con-
formed to Descartes in his reflections on physical nature. There’s 
no color, sound, scent, or taste in things. How could there be? 
Does sugar in the sugar bowl find itself sweet? Rather all these 
qualities are projected by us. (Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, 
takes this further, saying we never know things-in-themselves 
at all; we know only what we have generated in our response to 
them.)
Beauty seems, in the wake of such considerations, to retreat 
into pure subjectivity. What I find beautiful, is beautiful for 
me. There’s no occasion for argument with others, and no occa-
sion for instruction. If others share my tastes, fine; if they don’t, 
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equally fine. “Concerning tastes, there’s no occasion for dispute” 
an ancient adage tells us.
Perhaps you can anticipate why I say a trivialization of aes-
thetic experience sets in. This approach leaves the joy I take in 
one of Van Gogh’s paintings on the same footing as the plea-
sure I take in a strawberry sundae. You may never eat strawberry 
sundaes, always preferring those with hot fudge. Here there’s no 
right or wrong; to each their own. For me, says the positivist, to 
try to draw you into my appreciation of Van Gogh is as arbi-
trary and silly as for me to try to recruit you to my preference for 
strawberries.
This is where we are. It’s not a good place. It forfeits claim-
ing a role for art in the intellectual and moral development of 
us humans. When Aristotle takes up the plays of Sophocles, he 
doesn’t regard them as a pastime. He sees Sophocles’ works as 
powerful engines for the cleansing and enlightenment of the 
soul—works that can lift us from the self-preoccupations of our 
normal world into a liberating awareness of the common human 
predicament. Our sense of shared mortality with all humans 
comes to the fore. A capacity for empathy with those who suffer 
is quickened. A sense of our personal moral frailty and past sins 
can summon us to feel our guilt and seek forgiveness— as was 
the case with Oedipus when he realized he was a patricide.
Along with friendships with good people, Aristotle —that 
most practical of men— sees engagement with great art as a 
shortcut to virtue.
It’s true we can seek development of our character by a diligent 
cultivation of this or that virtue; we can calculate, and attempt to 
practice a mean between two opposing vices. Aristotle devotes 
a book of his ethics to expounding this approach. Ben Franklin 
writes, too, about this approach. But this is heavy lifting—not 
comparable to the electrifying influence of a friendship with a 
good person or exposure to great art.
I speak of skepticism about beauty as “convenient” just because 
it avoids the transformation an encounter with beauty can 
demand of us. We shun it. We shun it as we sometimes shun 
the company of people better than ourselves. There’s a summons 
in beauty. There are works of art which we hesitate to revisit 
because they shake us to our depths. Watching King Lear is an 
ordeal. Some might say: “Yeah! It’s boring.” No doubt they speak 
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from experience. For an attentive playgoer, however, Lear can be 
excruciating and revelatory. In the storm scene, the sense of one’s 
own folly can induce a terrible vertigo. Likewise, there are films 
(Sophie’s Choice comes to mind) one hesitates to see a second time. 
One doesn’t forget how wrenching they were the first time. Film 
buffs can produce a list of such works. We’re ambivalent toward 
such works, approaching them warily, just as one does well to be 
wary approaching the third rail of an electric railroad. For while 
films can cast a spell that allows escape from the weight of things, 
they can also waken us from a spell, and bring us to a state where 
fundamental realities hit us with blinding clarity.
Music, too, can have such effects. And a painting or sculpture 
can ambush one and induce a change of life.
The reluctance we may feel to be tutored by great art testifies 
to its power. On the other hand, if we weigh art on the scale 
on which we weigh a strawberry sundae, we insulate ourselves 
against such power. We shelter ourselves from it in a way that 
leaves us lodged in comfortable habits and tedious complaints.1
On the day Pavarotti died, my car radio began playing his per-
formances of arias by Puccini. My eyes blurred; I felt unstrung 
by beauty. What responsible man drives in such a state? While it 
no doubt contributed to my sense of preciousness, I don’t think 
it was especially Pavarotti’s death that blurred my vision; I was 
blindsided by perfection.
Much of a liberal arts education is an effort to lead students, 
males no less than females, to the masterpieces of great poets, 
playwrights, novelists, painters, sculptors, musicians, and per-
forming artists. This last category, performing artists, opens out 
horizons of excellence of unlimited variety. One can be sustained 
in spirit for a week, buoyed by the grace of a perfectly executed 
double play in the World Series— an instance among thousands 
for anyone paying attention.
1. My self-congratulatory— delusional?—hunch when students so rap-
idly reach for their cell phones after a class of mine is that it’s because the 
class experience has opened such vistas for critical thinking and reform 
of life that they need to hasten back to familiar ground— ground about 
whose dullness they routinely complain.
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The differences-in-taste argument should not lead to the skep-
ticism about beauty it often does. Differences in taste are due to 
differences in cultivation. One sees the beauty one has prepared 
oneself to see; and each kind of beauty has its own apprenticeship. 
An experience of baseball can be as bewildering to the newcomer 
as it is exhilarating to all the other people in the stands. (A suc-
cessful sacrifice fly can look like a failure to a newcomer.) One 
can’t expect to get jazz on a first encounter. Some do. Perhaps 
Mozart, at the age of five, would. Most of us have to put our-
selves under discipline (as Mozart at the age of five serenely was). 
And as suggested, even when art begins to speak to us, most of us 
have to hold ourselves in discipline so as not to run from it.
Important things are at stake. When we trivialize art, and say 
there’s nothing “objective” about it, we trivialize our own aes-
thetic sensibility and leave our souls untended. We close down an 
encounter with being that only our affectivity can provide. Keats 
said, “Beauty is truth.” He said well. Art is objective in the way 
that some art is more revelatory than other. Great art can dis-
close the sublimity of the familiar; it helps us hear the whisper-
ings— catch the glimmer— of the mystery of existence. If it can’t 
reveal God’s nature, it can at least bring us to a state where a 
denial of sacredness is no longer possible.
In the earlier chapter on nature, I noted how hostile the ethic 
of Puritanism is to the experience of natural beauty. We have 
fortified our state of deprivation by telling ourselves beauty isn’t 
really out there. So long as we believe and feel this, we will have 
little incentive to restrain ourselves regarding those redundant 
and mindless intrusions into nature that now threaten us all. Just 
as the dentist who beheaded Cecil the lion tried to defend him-
self by claiming it was all perfectly legal, so we attempt to defend 
ourselves on similar grounds regarding our unrepented rape of 
mother nature. What can be more fatal to our sense of beauty 
than an ethos that invites us to see it only as something to own?
Here, let’s conclude this reflection on beauty. Our reflection 
lays groundwork for the next chapter. Those who know and 
respect beauty are on their way to knowing that morality too 
is somehow objective. Not to know this about morality is to be 
reduced to a life that offers no genuine opportunity for insight or 
heroism. In a depleted world where “ justice” is an empty word, 
what room is there for commitment or loyalty? What meaning 
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can such a world deliver? If we demote beauty and ignore moral-
ity, is it any wonder that marriages are fragile and that relation-
ships in general are difficult to sustain? To echo Thoreau, in such 
a world, one resigns oneself to a life of quiet desperation. Worse 
yet, one turns to war. This is the devalued world, the familiar 
wasteland, in which currently so many of us— good descendants 
of good Puritans—move restlessly about.
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Here, too, in challenging times, skepticism is “convenient.” Think 
of all the things you don’t have to worry about if there’s no right 
or wrong. But convenience comes at a price: drama and mean-
ing pretty much evaporate. In a moral vacuum, things lose all 
density. Chronic depression can be a matter of hormones; but it 
can also be a matter of ethics—that is, of a lack of ethics. Even 
if someone attempts to restore a sense of actuality by becoming 
a “law unto oneself ”— a serial killer, say, engaging in horrendous 
deeds— such a one achieves only, as Hannah Arendt suggests, 
variations of banality. Each absurd deed clamors to be topped by 
a new one. A moral desert is a boring place.
The argument for a total subjectivity of morality (which amounts 
to a denial there is morality) begins pretty much in the same 
place the argument for the non-objectivity of beauty does. Not 
only do we see people disagreeing on questions of moral behavior, 
we see people of notable intelligence and integrity disagreeing on 
such questions. And bringing a third party in to referee doesn’t 
seem to help, but just adds another participant to the fray.
Law can’t really solve the problem either. Not if the problem 
is one of how to escape sheer relativity. Laws of one place are 
contrary to those of another. Different times in the same place 
deliver different laws. The laws of Germany under Nazism pro-
vide an instructive example. When these laws were first promul-
gated, they were very clear, and most people in Germany obeyed 
them. Yet nobody, including elderly Germans who once obeyed 
them, thinks today such laws were just or moral. The skeptic will 
use this to deny there’s any objectivity to morals.
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The classic argument against objective morality belongs to 
Hume. He imagines a murder scene, and asks what conclusions 
an observer might be able to draw from it. Such an observer 
might be able, he concedes, to conclude from physical evidence 
to objective facts about the murder. An astute detective might 
be able to determine the time of the murder, the weapon used, 
and even reach likely surmises as to the motive of the murderer 
(whether robbery, say, or revenge, or personal amusement). Hume 
then asks, could that same detective also conclude as to whether 
or not the murder should have happened. He answers with a 
follow-up question: “On what basis is such a conclusion possible?” 
Where is the data that takes one beyond what the facts are to 
what the facts “should or should not have been”? How, he asks, 
does one travel from “what is” to what “ought to be”? Our senses, 
operating at their best, he says, give us facts; they report on the 
physical world. But facts are always about actuality. We have no 
senses for what should not have happened.
It’s true that in his Enquiry Concerning Moral Principles Hume 
provides an account of human affectivity and emotion that 
roughly parallels that of his friend, Adam Smith. Hume’s account 
is however non-prescriptive. He doesn’t say people should have 
certain feelings of empathy, or that they are wrong if they don’t, 
or that they are wrong when they don’t obey such feelings as they 
have. To say as much would be to return to a conventional moral-
ity, which Hume refuses to do. He doesn’t retract here what he’d 
proffered as a serious reflection in A Treatise of Human Nature ear-
lier—namely that the word “should” is devoid of content. (When 
people prove lacking in empathy, the best Hume can do is say 
that fortunately they seem in the minority.) 
In A Treatise of Human Nature Hume provided a foundation 
for the logical positivism we discussed when we were treating of 
beauty. In this system, every valid use of language requires “sen-
sible correlates” for the terms used. Let’s return to review the 
detective at the murder scene. The term blood has a sensible 
correlate; we’ve all seen it—red, sticky stuff. Blood can dis-
cover to us the cause of a death. From the way it has poured 
forth or splattered, we can know in some cases that the cause 
of death was murder. Blood can register the approximate time 
of death, and help determine therefore the time at which the 
murderer acted. It can, in the way it was shed, discover to us 
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in some cases the weapon(s) used— and may even tell us some-
thing about motive. Murder committed in anger may have a 
bloody look different from the bloody look of murder commit-
ted with premeditation. How though can blood— or anything 
else at the murder scene — discover to us the moral character of 
the act? What is the evidence on which a moral judgment can 
rest? What is the objective “correlate” for the term “evil deed”? 
What does an evil deed look like? What state of blood reveals 
it? 
Logical positivism systematizes what Hume offers. We can 
make genuine statements only when the claim they contain can 
be put to the test of what can be seen, heard, touched, tasted, or 
smelled. When we speak of things that can neither be confirmed 
nor denied by sensible experience, we talk nonsense. All claims 
for a rational aesthetics, for morality, for metaphysics, or for reli-
gious teaching fall into this category— all are sheer nonsense. 
(Hume suggests at the end of An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding that we should burn the books which engage in 
such claims. In other words, he seems to claim it is morally better 
not to make claims for morality than to make them.)
The inconsistency of logical positivism notwithstanding, this 
is strong stuff, and many a young person finds it liberating. It 
seems to say: “You can do no wrong.” Like Dostoyevsky’s Rash-
kolnikov, one can feel excused from the burden of moral reflec-
tion. Exempted from deliberations about right and wrong, one 
can simply do what feels convenient at the moment. One is 
absolved from sin by the revelation there’s no such thing. One is 
a law unto oneself.
Some perhaps come to recognize the cost of such convenience 
only when they, or someone they care about, becomes a victim. 
Then one feels wronged or feels another has been wronged. One 
feels injustice has been done. 
Aye, but there’s the rub. There can be injustice only if there’s 
such a thing as justice. Unless there’s justice, what can be done to 
make that feeling of victimhood more than a mere ungrounded 
sentiment? A toothache certainly can feel bad. We want it to go 
away; but we don’t generally assign to it a moral character. Except 
in a joking mood, we don’t call our toothache evil. To give the 
feeling of victimhood substance, and to be able to call upon the 
community to do something about it, requires that one import 
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something like “ justice” into the discussion. Only then does “evil” 
acquire a definition: it is a violation of justice.
Unwelcome acts can then be renamed as acts that violate jus-
tice. Otherwise, one’s grievance remains weightless. “Get over it!” 
might be the advice. “What is, is,” the stoic may remind. As vic-
tims know, such advice is thin comfort and new outrage. Some-
thing important is being overlooked.
If, though, abandoning a victim to victimhood is intolerable, 
what is the objective correlate of “ justice”? What is there “out 
there” in the realm of reality to which the term points? (It’s 
exactly here Hume conducts his search for a sensible correlate; 
but since justice is nothing like a pine tree or a turtle or a Cadil-
lac, Hume draws a blank.)
Plato wrote his masterwork the Republic in an attempt to give 
an answer. His answer: the idea that justice is when everything 
is in its proper place seems too abstract and bloodless to do the 
job. And to define “the just” by introducing the category “proper” 
seems a begging of the question.
Kant presented the “Categorical Imperative,” not so much as a 
speculative answer, but as a practical way to test whether justice 
is, in fact, being exercised. You’re acting justly if you can will that 
your example be a principle on which all can act: “If you can will 
that people in general act as you do, your action is just.” In effect, 
Kant does then offer Hume and other skeptics a criterion of sorts. 
Rooted in experience, it’s a criterion that shares some ground not 
only with Hume but also with Hemingway’s partly facetious but 
much-cited proposal “An act is moral if, long after you’ve done it, 
it still feels good.” Kant makes no effort to prove you should act 
morally; he states rather that you already know that. 
A promising place to start thinking about this matter of 
whether there’s anything objective in morality is to begin think-
ing about whether “human rights” exist. Kant guides attention in 
that direction when he says one way to formulate the Categorical 
Imperative is: “So treat humanity, whether in yourself or another, 
as always to treat it as an end and never as a mere means.” In 
other words, we exercise morality when we act with regard for 
human rights.
Louis Pojman, a philosophy teacher formerly at West Point, 
recounts his way of directing his young cadets toward the issue 
of rights. After “losing,” in class discussion, to his students on 
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his position that “morality is objective,” Pojman assigns a paper 
on the issue in which most of his students put in writing what 
they’ve already said in class—namely that morality is purely 
subjective (or is perhaps just a meaningless word). Pojman then 
grades the papers, not on their content, but in accord with some 
arbitrary system (say, giving A’s to those students sitting closest 
to the front of the room in the previous class, and lower grades 
to those sitting further back). After assigning these grades, in 
the next class, he returns the papers, explaining—while keeping 
a straight face —the system by which he graded them. Uproar! 
Pandemonium! “You can’t do this!” “This isn’t fair!” At that point, 
Pojman springs his trap: “How can you say what I do is unfair 
when most of you have just argued both in class and on your 
papers there’s no such thing as justice or injustice? Are you telling 
me now you don’t believe a word of what I find in most of your 
papers?”
Locke and Jefferson could think of no way to prove human 
rights from sense experience. Locke, with his doctrine of the 
mind as a blank slate, is at a loss here because if the mind begins 
as a blank slate, there are no truths that are “self-evident.” “Self-
evident truths” is a phrase that seems to imply the mind comes 
equipped with some truths without regard to any empirical test. 
Locke was so sure though that human rights do exist, that he 
took the bit in his mouth and declared that human rights are self-
evident. In drafting the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson-
and-company famously followed Locke, declaring “We hold 
these truths to be self-evident; that all men . . . are endowed by 
their Creator with certain unalienable rights. . . . ”
Here I may seem ready to allow the affirmers of rights a too easy 
victory. But the objection of the logical positivists that all state-
ments must be subject to a test by sensible data is itself arbitrary. 
The positivists have simply decided that all genuine experience 
is of sense objects only. This is an act of faith. This proposition 
which they posit cannot itself be established by some experience 
of sense objects. This is what makes them positivists. They simply 
posit materialism. What they posit is far from self-evident. All 
the passions, desires, ambitions, and motivations of humankind 
(belonging to some realm other than sense objects) seem to stand 
in contradiction to what they posit. For the positivists do not 
say merely that it’s unreliable to depend on things that can’t be 
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tested by their method. Their doctrine requires that we’re “not 
talking about anything” when we speak of anything their method 
can’t validate. Such things don’t exist. Or if they do, we have no 
experience of them— and have therefore no right to talk of them. 
(Notice the notion of “a right” is implicit in the positivist case 
and gets slipped unobtrusively back into the discussion, but used 
negatively and entering as it were by the back door. Hume does 
the same thing. This explains the low standing of logical positiv-
ists among philosophers— even as schools of education and of 
business continue to worship at their feet.)
Think how the negations and curtailments of the logical posi-
tivists work for love. Suppose a logical positivist says: “I will not 
believe that love exists until you provide some hard, cold evidence 
for it.” Think of the burden the positivist is trying to impose on 
the person who believes love is an actuality. Unless love registers 
some dimensions in the space/time continuum or registers some 
weight in the gravitational matrix, must one who believes in love 
cease doing so? If one wishes to be thought a sober-minded adult, 
must one deny the reality of love? 
One can of course try to meet positivists on their own ground 
by turning to, discovering, manifestations of love. But is one 
ready to say love is simply a box of chocolates handed to another 
on Valentine’s Day? Is love just a red flush on the face or a high 
temperature that registers on a thermometer? Do a red flush and 
a high temperature characterize a mother as she rises from bed 
at night to tend a sick child? (Perhaps one can cite cases when 
they do; but surely the more significant sign is that she gets out 
of bed. And even that, surely, does not suffice to take the measure 
of love.)
It’s in the realm of interiority, not easily accessible to instru-
ments of the laboratory (though brain scans are adding new data), 
that the experience of value occurs. And one’s experience of 
value — of one’s own value and the value of others and the value 
of things—provides a ground for the “objectivity” we’re seeking. 
(What the brain scans provide are precise and intriguing biologi-
cal changes that correlate neatly with such experience —just as 
we have always known that blushing and paleness do.) It does not 
matter that the experience itself remains a matter of interiority. 
If by “objective” we mean “empirically present,” then the experi-
ence of value is as “objectively given” for a person of wholesome 
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sensibility as, say, the experience of seeing a mountain is for a 
person of undimmed eyesight. Confirmability by another is a sec-
ondary issue. (Only by adding all kinds of qualifications—bells 
and whistles, if you will—to this notion of “confirmability by 
another” can such confirmability even begin to have the status 
some logical positivists— some biological behaviorists— demand 
for it as a test of what is real.) 
Yet in a kind of accommodation to objections, it must be 
granted in the case of morality that this sensibility—this sen-
sitivity to value —is not simply “there,” but develops in a person 
through a process. Moral sensibility is in this respect very much 
like aesthetic sensibility. Where Hume falls short of Kant is in 
overlooking our common human experience of being “called.” 
What accounts for significant human differences in the matter of 
moral sensitivity is that development of it is a process conducted 
in freedom; how we respond to the mysterious “call” makes the 
difference. Further, because a freely-entered process depends on 
perseverance by the agent, our response can be aborted at any 
time, including when it’s just getting started. Just as a person 
being introduced to the study of jazz may declare in the midst 
of their first lesson: “Say! You know: there’s nothing here!” so, 
in a similar manner, one is free at any time to abort one’s moral 
education.
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle elaborates at length on the 
learning process involved here. At the center of his exposition 
is an analysis that goes something like this. Suppose I think of 
some helpful act I could perform on behalf of another. I realize 
the act is within my competence and I realize this act could pro-
vide a significant benefit in the other person’s life. So it’s an act 
I’m free to do and know would do some good. If I follow through 
and carry out the act—if I conform my action to the judgment 
inspiring me (and, say, like the bishop in Les Miserables, give the 
candlesticks to Jean Valjean) —I get new insight into reality. For 
there’s an opportunity for me to go from the particular to the 
general, from the individual to society as a whole, and to go from 
a single act of generosity and kindness to a whole career—recog-
nizing fresh paths to enhancing the happiness of humankind. As 
I do this, I come to know myself better. Not because some teacher 
has told me so, but because I experience it within myself, I come 
to recognize myself as a being who achieves happiness in living 
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according to my judgment (or “my reason” or “my conscience”). 
In beginning by helping another, I get deeper understanding not 
only of how this particular person behaves and thrives, but of how 
people in general do. And as I continue in this path, this growth 
in understanding continues. Beyond that—if you will allow—I 
grow in confidence regarding the dialectic by which wisdom is 
achieved, and get fresh insight into being. The numinous halo of 
being— something Aristotle surprises students by addressing at 
the end of his Ethics— discloses itself more emphatically to me; 
and joy is the consequence. Such joy is the karmic consequence 
of acting morally. (It may require some time in pondering the 
Nicomachean Ethics to see this, but this really is a fair take on 
Aristotle’s description of moral process.)
To be sure, I may find my act didn’t have the specific con-
sequences I’d hoped for—may not have had the results I’d 
intended. This can be painful; it may even be disastrous. Here too 
though insight is stimulated. The gritty facticity and less-than-
predictable oddity and stubbornness of things is brought home to 
me in such moments; I recognize myself, in Heidegger’s words, 
in “a world not of my own making.” 
Fortunately though—to go back and view this dialectic of 
action and judgment in its larger perspective — often enough 
it turns out my act does have consequences along the lines I’d 
hoped. To repeat what I’ve said above, this happier instance, like 
the negative instance, provides grounds for enhanced judgment. 
Enhanced judgment, as noted, discloses to me in turn new ways 
to apply what I’ve learned. So fidelity to the promptings of judg-
ment leads to judgment sharpened and enlivened. I become more 
discerning and alert. (Think for instance of what happens in a 
successful marriage when mutual respect prevails over all the 
inevitable frictions and frustrations intimacy entails.) With new 
understandings of reality come fresh opportunities for creative 
and satisfying activity. As Aristotle declares in book 10, in the life 
of such a one, the world reveals itself increasingly as meaningful 
and radiant with value. One contemplates. One begins to see the 
world from a divine perspective. (He cautions that, although the 
capacity to do so may seem small and fragile, we should nurture 
it, for it is absolutely the most important potentiality in us.)
If all this sounds too much like a tale from Mary Poppins, it’s 
because words cannot capture what must be lived. Heidegger 
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speaks of a virtuous circle: what we find precious, we care for; 
and what we care for, we find precious.
Take a directly opposite case. Granted when the thought of a 
virtuous activity first occurs, if I decide not to do it, it may be 
a case of “no foul, no penalty.” I prefer to expend my energies 
in a different activity which I regard as equally worthy or more 
worthy. Often enough though, when I’ve said “no” to something 
which my judgment has proposed as good, I’ll experience a kind 
of internal dissonance and a need to rearrange myself. When I 
don’t do something I regard as reasonable, I typically feel a need 
to re-establish lost integrity. I will attempt this through denial.
The maneuver goes like this. Since no positive action of mine 
followed upon my judgment (that is, since I didn’t go where my 
reason invited), I’ll try to reconfigure my judgment to fit my inac-
tion. I’ll rationalize. I will for instance decide that this person I 
was considering helping is not in fact worthy of help. Or, further 
upstream, I may decide that if there is any “helping” to be done 
by me, it should be restricted to helping myself. “Charity begins 
at home.” “God helps him who helps himself.” “Strengthen the 
strong.” “God loves me, so I should too.” In other words I’ll 
invent sophisticated reasons to close myself off and foreshorten 
opportunities for moral growth. (I’ll read Atlas Shrugged.)
It’s because of this I worry about those who say “There’s noth-
ing objective to morality.” Not only have they adopted a theory 
likely to become a hurdle for any project of moral growth, but it’s 
quite possible —in an existential way—they’ve already said “no” 
to such growth in many particular instances. Action contrary to 
conscience, or inobedient to it, tends toward lethal consequences 
for conscience. They may be habituating themselves to strategies 
that cannot make them happy. They may be starting to go rancid. 
(The murder of the Indians was most inconvenient both for the 
Puritans who did it, and for their unrepenting offspring. It is not 
too surprising that so many of us today find ourselves echoing 
Macbeth after he murders Duncan: “Tomorrow and tomorrow 
and tomorrow creeps in this petty pace from day to day. . . . ”)
To habituate oneself in this direction is to supplant reason with 
rationalization; it’s to install an enervating selfishness in the place 
of a far more wholesome prizing of self that finds confirmation in 
opening out in love to others. We sometimes feel pity for mede-
cins sans frontières— doctors and nurses who starkly exemplify an 
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indiscriminate love for others—but we shouldn’t. If we would be 
happy, we should end our admiration and envy for the likes of the 
Koch brothers, and replace that envy with a wholesome envy of 
medecins sans frontières.
This brief review of morality may seem a parenthesis in our 
effort to diagnose America, but isn’t. If we wish America to have 
a future, we need to cast off our convenient skepticism about 
morality and address the issue of selfishness. We need to take 
our affirmation of human rights out of the clouds and bring it 
down to earth. A mere change of our office-holders (as I’ll argue 
at length later) can’t save us. Even were we somehow able to deny 
power to all the corporate leaders now dismantling our habitat, 
we would not be saved—for we would seek their replacement 
with other persons as misguided as they. For the sake of harmony 
with nature, for the sake of health and prosperity among our-
selves, for the sake of peace with other peoples and countries, we 
must address and question our personal habits of selfishness as 
part of combating the shared culture of selfishness we’ve inher-
ited. The alternative to calling ourselves to account as we sur-
render our illusion that we’re somehow the Elect is to continue in 
our aberrant and absurd narcissism and to continue our immense 
agency toward producing an increasingly desolate world.1
1. This is no easy matter to deal with. I’d suggest a long pause —taking a 
break from the dental chair—before proceeding to the next chapter.
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If nothing is known with certitude, a logical corollary is that 
everything is uncertain. The person who says it the first way may 
sound like a moderate. “I don’t deny that we know things; I’m 
just saying we’re never sure.” That’s the person you want on the 
jury when you’re being tried in a capital case. He or she finds 
nothing true beyond a reasonable doubt. Without quite realizing 
it, he or she is in a flirtation with absolute skepticism.
If nothing is certain, all the other skepticisms can come 
wrapped in this one. History is just someone’s opinion—  or per-
haps a tissue of fairy tales like stories about Santa Claus. The 
same can be said of science. The fact a lot of people proclaim 
themselves experts and say something in concert doesn’t make 
it true; think of all the times scientists have admitted they’ve 
been wrong. As for beauty, it’s something people pretend to dis-
cover. People praise Shakespeare and Mozart because they’ve 
been taught to. Or maybe it’s just a matter of neurological firings; 
some things “turn one on.” (And if that’s all “beauty” is, why not 
take a shortcut, and get the same from drugs?) As for morality, 
surely it’s a con. It’s a way by which some try to manipulate oth-
ers; those who preach it most, observe it least. The same can be 
said for religion.
These attitudes often pass for wholesome cynicism— for neces-
sary defenses against being taken in.
There may be cases in which that’s all they are. But absolute 
skepticism (in contrast to mere gestures of hesitation and doubt) 
endorses all that’s negative in such propositions, and works to 
cut off retreat back toward any unqualified affirmation. Where 
Skepticism about Anything 




a moderate agnostic may say: “I don’t know,” an absolute skeptic 
says: “Nobody knows.”
Once one arrives at such, one has no more lessons to learn or 
duties to fulfill. That’s as convenient as things get. A state of rest 
is achieved. The purchase price of such sublime disengagement is 
the despair of achieving any coherence. One takes this nettle in 
hand. One bites the bullet. There’s no northern star by which to 
steer one’s troubled bark through choppy waters.
For coherence in one’s thinking requires that there be some-
where or somehow an absolute in the system, and one other than 
absolute denial. Without such, there’s no fulcrum for Archime-
des’ lever; everything’s left up in the air. For all that some decon-
structionists may say to the contrary, if all things are regarded as 
subject to interpretation, there’s no “given” material for interpre-
tation to address. Nor is there any standing principle for interpre-
tation to utilize. Interpretation needs starting points. Anchored 
in those, or at least governed by them (or at least by one of them), 
it can move along. The alternative is a mental block of infinite 
proportions. If we cannot be sure of what the number “3” is, and 
of what its difference is from “4,” all counting has been compro-
mised. Equations cannot be trusted. The attractions and utility 
of mathematics have been greatly diminished. (And school’s out 
early.)
Consider how, if everything is changing, there’s no fixed back-
drop against which even change can be measured. Much less can 
there be a purpose in accord with which it might make sense to 
help along one change at the expense of another. To seek a “bal-
ance of nature” or speak of maintaining a “sustainable lifestyle” is 
sheer nonsense amid such randomness. One must reconcile one-
self to Macbeth’s “tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, 
signifying nothing.” (Interestingly, for all his acknowledgement 
of flux, Heraclitus was not so destitute — he had his “Logos” as a 
source of meaning; and Hegel for all his celebration of contradic-
tion, had his “emergence of Absolute Spirit.”)
In his discussion of speculative reason, Kant asks what a “fact” 
is. To take Kant’s discussion off the page and bring it home, let 
me direct it toward an act of snapping my fingers. Suppose as 
I’m working at the keyboard, I stop and snap my fingers twice. (I 
just did.) Will that action (O’Neill just now has snapped fingers 
twice) constitute a “fact”? According to Kant such an act will. 
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He then asks what an assertion of that sort means. Suppose we 
posit an eventual loss of all memory of this deed (in the face of 
all my efforts to memorialize it) and suppose we posit the very 
collapse of the universe in which this act occurred. “Will that 
event remain a fact?” is Kant’s question. He answers that most 
of us intuitively feel it will. The universe may come and go, but a 
fact is not thereby undone.
This leads Kant to say he sees in our intuitive response that we 
humans spontaneously regard the world of our experience, and 
all the details of all the acts that occur in it, as taking place in 
full view of an absolute spectator, a divine witness. Here Kant 
seems to anticipate Hegel. In speaking— in The Critique of Pure 
Reason —  of God as a “regulatory principle of speculative rea-
son” Kant claims that in asserting the eternal endurance of facts, 
one regards a mere snapping of fingers (my example, not his) as 
taking place against a backdrop of Absolute Consciousness; we 
regard it as caught up and eternally conserved in a divine mind. 
Kant makes no effort to use this to prove the existence of God. 
He thinks all attempts to prove God’s existence involve an ille-
gitimate maneuver— involve a begging of the question. He says 
however that it seems evident we cannot think at all without 
thinking God.
Kant is very modern in a way. He finds there are all kinds 
of things we humans must think, but finds too there’s no way 
to know these things are true. We cannot get outside the phe-
nomenal order—  something like Plato’s cave — in which we 
discover ourselves to dwell, and escape into what Kant calls 
the  “noumenal”— the world of things-in-themselves. This is 
a world about which we can think (and that’s why Kant labels 
it “noumenal” or thinkable), but it remains inaccessible to us, at 
least in our present state. Kant thereby ends up closer to Hume 
than he may have intended. Along with Hume, Kant anticipates 
logical positivism by confining our experience to the phenomenal 
world— which for Kant means: the world as we constitute it (reli-
ant on a priori categories with which consciousness comes fitted) 
in response to our sensations.
Should one accept these fashionable modern restrictions on 
knowledge? Can we only think things, but never know them? Is 
a conscientious organizing of our thinking, as we respond to a 
phenomenal world we generate in consciousness, the most we can 
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achieve in our intellectual life? Or is this an extravagant contrac-
tion? Is there a subset in the circle of things we think? Among 
the things we think, is there a subset containing things we know?
Surely this latter is the case. There are things of which we are 
certain. We know things. (And among the things we know is 
that memory is something more than shuffling through a bunch 
of images that may or may not put us in touch with the past. By 
memory we inhabit the past. This may seem miraculous, but— 
contrary to what Bertrand Russell says— we know it is the case.)
The suspicion we don’t know things does not, I suspect, come 
to us directly from Hume, or Kant, or any other philosopher. (In 
his Treatise on Human Nature Hume diligently employs reason 
to persuade us reason doesn’t work. Somehow most of us find 
this unpersuasive.) Rather our suspicions about knowing come 
generally from two common, and ongoing, experiences. One is 
the familiar experience, mentioned already, of finding that very 
intelligent people disagree. The other is finding that we ourselves 
are often mistaken— mistaken even regarding issues about which 
we care deeply and to which we’ve given full attention.
There’s no getting around these kinds of things; one can how-
ever put them into a perspective where they function as invita-
tions to a richer intellectual life rather than as excuses from hav-
ing one.
With regard to the first— the disagreements among brilliant 
and people — let me offer, as a case for study (among the literally 
millions of case studies one could conduct), the fractious rela-
tions that developed between Freud and his two most famous 
disciples.1 Both Carl Jung and Alfred Adler eventually had trou-
ble with Freud’s pan-sexualism. Where Freud saw libido or sex 
drive as the fundamental motive force of the human being, Adler 
said rather that it was the will to power. Jung too seemed to find 
that rooting everything in libido was too confining, and he pro-
posed that the realm that roots our affectivity and motivation 
might more usefully be labeled the “collective unconsciousness.”
1. My account here can no doubt be improved; specialists in the history 
of psychoanalysis may shiver, but my hunch is that even as they refine my 
very simple presentation, the point of my argument will stand.
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Three brilliant men disagree. But is there in this kind of thing 
any serious excuse for doubting that truth can be known? All 
three men collaborate in trying to unveil the mysteries of con-
sciousness and motivation. Jung, with his profound awareness 
of a “shadow side” of the human psyche, can easily be read as 
an elaboration of Freud rather than a rejection. There is within 
us, Jung says, a largely unexplored ground of human concerns— 
things, contents we do not choose, but which “choose us”—  out 
of which we act but about which, by preference perhaps, we 
remain largely ignorant. Particularly when we sense a negative or 
shameful character in these contents, instead of “owning” them, 
we may in cases project these vaguely felt but unacknowledged 
contents— the very stuff of sin no less than of life —  onto others. 
Then we are apt to fight these others, righteously and compla-
cently, and commit time and again sins of violence whose source 
in us we deny; for we do not acknowledge that the true target of 
our hatred is inside ourselves. (This isn’t all Jung says, of course; 
but I’m impressed that this is there.) This, says Jung, can become 
our program; we can deny what consciousness we have in com-
mon with our ancestors; we own to no share in their guilt; and 
so we are free, in perfect “innocence,” to recapitulate their crimes.
Doesn’t this sound a lot like Freud? (See Freud’s Moses and 
Monotheism.) Only it is less “one note” than Freud was. It elabo-
rates on Freud, much as Freud himself (no rigid Freudian) felt 
free eventually to elaborate by introducing the “death wish” to 
supplement the “pleasure principle.” Even in Freud, libido doesn’t 
get the last word.
As for Adler, he does not exclude Freud’s pleasure principle. It 
seems though he “complicates” Freud’s doctrine of sublimation. 
Whereas Freud would say of a man who spends his life climbing 
mountains or becoming boss of a huge enterprise that such a man 
is no doubt “sublimating” his sex drive, Adler is free to suggest 
that having sex might be a poor second best for a man who really 
wants to climb mountains or be a corporation executive.2 Echo-
ing in a way Plato in the Symposium, Adler sees Eros as having 
2. This reconfiguration of Freud is fairly caught by the message on a shirt 
I saw on a pedal-pushing, hill-climbing San Franciscan cyclist: “This is 
what I fantasize about when I’m having sex.”
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from the start a self-affirming horizon-expanding agenda that 
can, if one will, instantiate itself in sex, but which has never been 
confined to it.
Shared questions, and shared conviction as to the importance 
of those shared questions, continue to unite Freud and his dis-
ciples long after they part company. Their very rivalry is a bond. 
One should take no scandal here. These men are jointly caught 
up in a broadening encounter with reality. One hears in their 
disagreements their emphatic testimony to the reality and impor-
tance of their common subject matter in those very moments 
when one hears them conscientiously at odds with each other 
regarding which hypotheses and interpretations and metaphors 
do most to clarify it. What greater invitation to an intellectual 
life could one request?
As for the second cause for scandal, namely errors in which 
one finds oneself engaged, we know that each discovery of error 
is, genuinely, a discovery, an uncovering—  a learning experience 
which opens the door to further learning. We can recognize mis-
takes in our thinking because we have a known context in which 
to identify truth. Successful golfers and pitchers, for instance, can 
make great use of their errors because they have a context— the 
rules and goal of the game, and knowledge of the discrete physi-
cal arena in which they play— in which to recognize them. In 
general, good athletes (the most successful of them) tend to be 
distinguished by calmness.3 They regard their performance with 
the Zen-like attentive detachment of the scientific observer. As 
the ball veers disappointingly from the hole, the kind of golfer 
I’m talking about doesn’t curse and ask, “How could I have been 
so stupid as to swing like that?” She or he’s too busy adding new 
knowledge to old: “So the turf just here has a near-invisible rise. 
Tomorrow, I’ll allow for it.” So too the reflective pitcher says, as 
he hears the batter connect sweetly for a base hit: “So that’s the 
pitch he can’t resist. I’ll use that against him his next time up.”
3. Tiger Woods in his salad days, Buster Posey anytime, Joe Montana 
and Jerry Rice in the legendary closing minutes of a game, Michael Jordan 
in the legendary closing minutes of a game, Madison Bumgarner most 
anytime, Steph Curry anytime, Russell Wilson most anytime, Serena 
Williams year in and year out, are examples that come to mind.
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Rather than support skepticism, acts of ours which go wide of 
the mark, if analyzed, point to new tactics and abandonment of 
false assumptions. That we can recognize acts that are wide of 
the mark suggests that beyond the things we think (and can be 
wrong about) are things we know (and are not wrong about). Our 
moments of frustration resolve into moments of insight. Hori-
zons of knowledge open. Amid temporary setback, the attentive 
human finds an invitation.
If this sounds a bit too like the breezy “by-your-bootstraps psy-
chology” that floods our media, let me hasten to concede that 
when it comes to understanding contemporary affairs, there are so 
many interlocking unknowns and hidden agendas that the effort 
to understand them is indeed daunting, and tends to overpower 
one. If we’ve wondered whether official governmental reports 
involve cover-ups and lies, surely the Pentagon Papers, the Nixon 
tapes, the refusal of Obama to disclose videos of CIA torture, 
the information and documents made available by WikiLeaks 
and Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden, etc., should put 
the matter to rest. 
Complicating things further, as one’s eyes open to the duplic-
ity and manipulations of our government and begin looking into 
the myriad things that remain unknowns in our government’s 
public reports, one is likely, as noted, to be labeled “a conspiracy 
theorist”— which carries the implication one is not quite sane 
or at least not quite adult. This has been effective in dampen-
ing down the curiosity of us Americans. (Even when govern-
mental cover-ups have been uncovered, we seem at times less 
displeased with the agents of the cover-ups— the government 
conspirators— than we are with those who have disillusioned 
us by uncovering their conspiracies. We are uncomfortable, and 
turn away, when James Douglass uncovers our government’s 
involvement in the Kennedy assassination, when Robert Parry 
delves into the sordid details of the Iran-Contra scandal, when 
Gary Webb discovers the collusion of the CIA in the affairs of 
gangsters who were poisoning our ghettoes by importing drugs 
into them, when Edward Snowden discloses the officially-denied 
spying of the National Security Agency on the American people, 
etc. In turn, our tendency to reject the messenger is endorsed by 
presidents and mainstream media when they label the messenger 
a traitor.) 
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The retreat of so many of us from the world about us (the only 
planet those currently alive are likely ever to inhabit), while 
we take up residence in a personally designed neighborhood 
in cyberspace, tends to leave under-exercised our capacity for 
truth-finding regarding this more primary and immediate four-
dimensional world— the one where trucks can run over us as we 
tweet. While there is much to hope for from social media, our 
escape from immediate physical habitat into psychic habitat can 
have as its flip side the abandonment of our physical habitat to 
the care of those who can least be trusted with it. By reason of 
the many lingering tokens of American prosperity, and the pal-
pable comfort and longevity many of us continue to enjoy, such 
an escape strikes many as affordable. For this reason, withdrawal 
into a personalized alternative reality has probably played out 
more freely among us here in the United States than, say, in India 
or China. As our electronic embubblement continues, our feel-
ing of responsibility to make sense of the world which feeds and 
sustains us often tends to shrink. Our desire to understand gets 
undermined. From a daunting world, we can seek refuge in elec-
tronics; but if we retreat there and take up residence, the world 
surrounding us will—  count on it— become more daunting still.
What I’ve argued in this section on skepticism is that the 
things many of the most sensitive among us are relegating to the 
margins are the things that offer coherence. In putting away his-
tory, we reduce our sense of identity and forego our opportunity 
to discern and elude the traps and flaws that others set for us. 
In trivializing beauty, we consign our affectivity to a process of 
numbing. When we do the same with morality, we all but lose the 
ability to live purposefully. When we hitch up our pants, stand 
straight and stoical, and loudly proclaim: “There are no absolutes!” 
we despair in general of our understanding and effectively close 
down effective response to current challenges. 
I agree with Kant that we cannot think without thinking God. 
But I depart from Kant when he says this is the best we can do, 
the closest we can get to anything absolute. We don’t just think 
an absolute but are in touch with one. Somewhere, somehow, in 
our exertions within the common reality we all share, we interact 
with the structure and laws of being; we have ontological insights 
and certitudes. We know that what is, is actual. We know that 
events which have taken place will without extinction remain 
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“what has been”—  so that the past is eternal. And we know, as 
Descartes says, that even if we are making a mistake, we must 
be —  else we could not be making it. So we know that we exist, 
that memory is a source of contact with reality, and that the com-
plex and confusing world in which we live, move, and learn— 
this world into which Heidegger says we have been “thrown”— is 
not a world we’ve cooked up on a personal whim, nor is it a world 
simply devoid of pattern, intelligibility, value, opportunity, and 
purpose. We know further, that when we retreat from interaction 
with this world, we culpably chip away at our confidence about 
everything. We know that if we indulge ourselves in games of 
skepticism, we leave what’s precious and fragile in our world to 




I didn’t say this would be easy. No sooner do I call us out for 
decadent games of skepticism, than I turn and warn against 
ungrounded hopes. Of necessity, this section is tentative. It’s not 
its purpose to condemn all hope as naive or delusional. Lacking 
hope, we who live are as the walking dead. Yet the denunciation of 
skepticism I’ve attempted in the last four chapters, and the rejec-
tion of skepticism I’ve called for do not at all mean one should 
extend a welcome to just any hope that comes along. Hopes can 
easily be mere wishful thinking, and when they are, they distract 
us from the task at hand. (It was of course this insight that moved 
Marx toward his uncompromising rejection of religion.)
In these next four chapters, I deal with the hopes of people 
who are, on some level, aware of the jeopardy in which we 
Americans—  and the rest of our species— find ourselves. The 
hopeful among us attempt, each in their own way, a mindset for 
coming to terms with the jeopardy we’re in. It is toward what’s 
wistful in their mindsets that I invite criticism; the people who 
hold these mindsets can be admirable. As noted earlier, humans 





Today, perhaps no one actually says this. The term “fundamen-
talism” has attracted too many bad connotations for that. But 
without using the actual terms, many still posit mentally the sub-
stance of the statement above. So bear with me here as we initiate 
a long, inwardly spiraling effort to reach the core of fundamen-
talism. The efforts that follow are attempts in casting about for a 
thoughtful sense of what that term represents.
By reason of economics and communication and travel, the 
world has shrunk and become palpably One World. Thereby a 
goal of some idealists of the past has been fulfilled. But this ful-
fillment is proving less comfortable than its promoters had hoped. 
A disease in one part of the world more easily threatens now 
to go global. An economic failure in one country sends ripples 
everywhere. Political troubles have a way of not staying localized. 
America’s Open Door statements at the end of the nineteenth 
century meant that in our quest for economic hegemony we’d 
joust with whatever political arrangements were out there. The 
colonizing initiatives of European nations, and indications that 
the Japanese were becoming very restless, added to our readi-
ness to take on the world. In turn, our forward leaning example 
stoked the incentives of our rivals. 
At the brink of the twentieth century, while it may have grati-
fied Alfred Thayer Mahan to see his eloquent tribute to the influ-
ence of sea power translated into so many languages, his book 
became in effect a manual for more intense international compe-
tition. The benign revival in 1906 of non-violent athletic rivalry in 
the world of the Olympics was paralleled by malignant prepara-
tions for violent worldwide rivalry a few years later. 
“Fundamentalism Will  
Save Us!”10
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While John Hay’s notes capped the Spanish-American War 
and guaranteed we’d be a participant in the First World War, 
their influence didn’t end there. After the Second World War, 
our persistence in seeking an Open Door everywhere for Ameri-
can commerce led to an effort to contain the Soviet Union as 
it struggled to incorporate Eastern Europe politically and eco-
nomically, and thereby close it to us. During these times— the 
founding days of the United Nations—  shared interests, compe-
tition, friction, conflicts, and alliances drew the peoples of the 
world into tighter interactions, positive and negative, than they 
were in before the war. By reason of the Cold War, one might 
think we Americans turned our backs on the Russians, but really 
we became more acutely interested in them than we’d ever been 
before. It was, of course, mostly negative. Any initiative of the 
Soviet Union was likely to be felt as threatening our national 
security; a success of the Soviets, such as the launching of the 
space satellite Sputnik, was processed as a challenge and taunt 
to America.
Fortunately, in the years since the Second World War, the 
frustrations, rivalries, aggressive agendas, and distrust gener-
ated have not incinerated the planet. On the other hand, what 
they have done is intensify, in places all over the world, the 
human inclination toward xenophobia. Fear breeds fear. In our 
fearful responses to others, we have added to whatever grounds 
those others have for fearing us. Machiavelli advised his prince 
that it was good to be feared. People everywhere seem to 
have appropriated his lesson. Surely though, as suggested ear-
lier, Thomas Hobbes, said the wiser thing when he counseled 
his readers that a fearful neighbor is a dangerous and volatile 
thing.
An upshot of all this is that, even while much activity on the 
planet is becoming more integrated, there are strong counter-
movements everywhere from people assuming hostile stances. In 
more ways than we’d anticipated, the New World Order mani-
fests itself as a new-world disorder. People hunker down. They dig 
in. They prepare themselves to come out fighting. It’s predictable, 
howsoever counterproductive and reprehensible, that some will 
attempt ethnic cleansing and genocide, and many will engage in 
deadly skirmishes. With each effort to settle scores once and for 
all, fresh seeds for retaliation are sown.
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An aspect of this pushback against globalization is the inten-
sification of fundamentalisms. Fundamentalism is a reaction of 
people who feel religiously and culturally—  and often, territori-
ally, politically, and economically— threatened. Such fear inten-
sifies when a people feel an alien culture and religion actually 
closing in. Further, this spiritual response to encroachment by 
hostile outsiders can be further heightened by the leveling secular 
culture of globalization itself. Many traditional people have a fear 
this secular culture will swamp the planet and become its only 
culture.1
As secularists so often seem not to understand, their emergent 
secular ethos can be as dogmatic as any religion. It routinely dis-
allows any claims that can’t be established from its own premises. 
Its contemporary un-Marxist version absolutizes economic prin-
ciple as much as Marx ever did. It’s a less humane but an equally 
as materialistic version of things, compared to what Marx advo-
cated. (I speak here of Marx himself; not of Stalin, Mao, etc.) 
One hears at times that this globalizing secular ethos is tolerant 
of religion. One has to wonder. What may look like tolerance is 
arguably more a form of strategic patience. Religions all over the 
world have felt the presence of this secular ethos as a threat. They 
sense its basic opposition to religious commitment. Their sense 
is that when this secular ethos gains ground, religious commit-
ments weaken.
One might naively expect then that the religions of the world 
would unite in opposition to their common enemy. The opposite 
of this is what has happened. The world’s religions seem more 
commonly to have suffered such spirals of desperation that each 
has tended to seize on just those things most peculiar to itself 
and, shibboleth-like, have promoted precisely these unique fea-
tures as the test case and index of genuine religion and godliness. 
1. As we see from its current adoption in China, capitalism is less 
entwined with its Protestant origins than it once was; the culture of capi-
talism seems currently—  as it melds in the Far East with an immemorial 
Asian work ethic— to be completing its evolution into an altogether secu-
lar, spirit-free and non-religious worldwide ethos. Perhaps it is time to see 
resistance to Beijing by the Dali Lama and Tibetan Buddhists— and by 
the Falun Gong— as less a matter of resisting communism than a matter 
of resisting the global triumph of capitalist ethos.
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The religions of the world seem often to be strengthening the 
case for secularism by engaging with new vigor in their history 
of bad behavior toward each other. (In the case of Catholicism, 
Pope Francis seems heroically struggling to pull his church back 
from the abyss, but the inertial resistance is considerable.) One 
way to label the waves of bad behavior is to speak of an increase 
in fundamentalism.
We may improve our sense of the term by noting recent 
instances that have called it into play. One might expect Hin-
duism at least, by reason of its great tolerance for diversity and 
celebration of variety, would prove immune to fundamentalist 
tendencies. Of late, however, we find among Hindu politicians 
some leaders who are resolutely rejective of all things Muslim 
(and rejective of the example set by Gandhi). Perhaps more sur-
prising yet, we’ve lately seen in Sri Lanka clashes between Hin-
dus and Buddhists. Does this imply that even among Buddhists 
there can be fundamentalists? It seems to.
That there are Christian fundamentalists seems hardly to need 
argument. Fundamentalism operates as a force within American 
exceptionalism even as the secularization of America threatens 
fundamentalism. The threat of secularism summons our vital 
subterranean currents of fundamentalism into the full light of 
day. “You’re either with us or against us” is not just a slogan for 
Americans in general, but has special authority for fundamental-
ists. The “Tea Parties” that dot our landscape can be places of 
retreat and consolidation— places for returning to fundamentals. 
Frequently, they are places for those who, in defense of what they 
take to be American Christian tradition, are surprised and scan-
dalized to find themselves in opposition to contemporary forms 
of American secular society and government. When they find 
themselves in opposition to America, it’s not themselves they 
want to reform, but America.
They’re surprised because our country has long been a familiar 
and fertile field for Christian fundamentalism. The term “funda-
mentalist” was coined as a means of self-identification by certain 
American Christians. Threatened in the early years of the twen-
tieth century by such foreign influences as Darwinism, Marxism, 
and Freudianism, and more intimately by the “higher criticism” 
of German biblical scholars, certain Christians in the twentieth 
century seem to have wrapped themselves in the “fundamentals” 
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of their faith as a shield against contamination. It is easy to rec-
ognize how the term “fundamentalism” (the affirmation of what’s 
left when you wipe away the dross and frivolous trimmings) arises 
as an echo to the term “Puritanism.” As critics of Rome, that’s 
just what the Puritans were trying to do.
As for fundamentalism among Jews, I do not think it is anti-
Semitic to note that the two-thousand-year tradition of rabbinic 
humanitarianism seems currently challenged and undermined 
by the extremes to which Israeli leaders extend themselves in 
asserting special prerogatives over real estate. When the Puritans 
claimed such prerogatives, they thought they were simply copy-
ing ancient Jews. Today the politicians of Israel return the com-
pliment. Traumatized by the Holocaust, and haunted by fear of 
its recurrence, Israeli politicians have accustomed themselves to 
speak of “the existential crisis” in which Israel finds itself. By this 
phrase they seem to imply that historical precedent and inter-
national law are overridden by the non-negotiable need of the 
Israeli people to be precisely where they are, and that Israelis have 
a bible-based right to expand from there. It’s the assertion here 
of a non-negotiable and fundamental right that lends plausibility 
to use of the term “fundamentalism” as a description of what’s 
going on.
Thirdly, to say that the groups of jihadists among the Muslims 
are fundamentalists seems a legitimately grounded use of that 
term. These jihadists often assert fundamental, non-negotiable 
obligations as binding Muslims everywhere to some quite par-
ticular version of Islam—  obligations so firm and unquestionable 
that they override obligations to family, neighbor, huge popula-
tions of fellow Muslims, religious tradition, and the customs and 
observances of international law.2
By now the reader may wonder what I’m really up to here. 
(Voltaire once wrote sarcastically to Rousseau, “Thank you for 
forwarding to me your charming little book against the human 
2. To repeat myself, it strikes me as ironical that while we Americans 
decry this fundamentalism with a suggestion we can’t imagine such a 
thing, the truth is it has stark parallels in our own practice; we seem mag-
nificently to have modeled something close to this fundamentalism in our 
jihad against American Indians. Ask the ghost of Custer.
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race.”) By bouncing about here and there, pointing fingers in 
all directions, what I’ve been up to is reaching for a legitimate 
and useful— rather than purely opportunistic—  sense of the 
term  “fundamentalism.” As for a blanket condemnation of the 
human race, I leave that to Rousseau— who, when he wasn’t elo-
quently praising the human race, spent a lot of time denouncing 
it.
In the section preceding this one, I argued that humans can 
hardly function lacking awareness of an absolute. Further, I 
argued that the sense of this absolute seems to be dimming. I 
have lamented this. In this chapter, we note that the fundamen-
talist is typically someone keenly aware, as I am keenly aware, 
of threats to confidence in the absolute. The fundamentalist is 
a passionate opponent to relativism. While the fundamentalist 
often feels he or she is defending an actual turf, a deeper root of 
fundamentalism seems to be something approaching panic in the 
face of ideological challenge. Fundamentalism seems a response 
in defense of the ideological roots that make live worth living.3
Further, as argued, there’s a complicating duality here. One 
may in the same breath fear the multiplicity of cultures and fear 
the emerging uniformity of culture. A sense of vertigo may take 
hold. Amid the variety and confusion of the modern world, fea-
turing both relativism and conformity, Nietzsche asks: “Can you 
not feel things are getting colder? Do you not feel the ground 
crumbling beneath your feet?” and the fundamentalist, if honest 
and self-knowing, answers: “Yes!”
So while territory may be at stake, it need not be the sole motive, 
nor the most important, for a sense of foreboding. At the end of 
the First World War for instance, when there seemed no immi-
nent threat to American territory, Attorney General A.  Mitch-
ell Palmer organized massive roundups of people suspected to 
3. Things can become so bad, that rather than defend against encroach-
ment by hostile forces, it can seem the only thing to do is to migrate. But if 
one is trying to migrate to countries that have been causing the encroach-
ment, there’s a high possibility of resistance to immigration, and even if 
one succeeds in immigrating, there’s a likelihood the hostility will persist 
in the new location. If the spiritual climate in the new place is as unsym-
pathetic as it has become in the old, migration may have simply relocated 
the problem.
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be America-based Bolsheviks. It seems any socialist or radical 
critic of The American Story could qualify as a Bolshevik and 
be marked for jail or deportation. During this time, socialist and 
presidential candidate Eugene Debs was imprisoned for having 
spoken during the war against the draft. Though the spirit of 
American fundamentalism reaches back to the beginnings of set-
tlement in the 1600s, we’ve noted it was at this time around the 
First World War that some American Protestants first used the 
label “fundamentalist” to identify themselves. 
Their intent, we noted, in coining the label echoed that of their 
forefathers in coining the term “Puritan.” Both regarding Palmer 
and regarding his fundamentalist soul-mates, a way to interpret 
the firming up of fundamentalist impulse is to recognize it as 
response to the First World War. The horrors of the war seemed 
to have made a statement about Progress. (Hemingway captures 
the mood of this huge, looming, amorphous statement in The Sun 
Also Rises.) The First World War taught its survivors that Prog-
ress did not after all ensure improvement. At most, what Prog-
ress seemed to entail was increase of technological power in the 
hands of humans. The war had proved this power could be used 
as effectively to destroy as to build.
In response, in America, there were on the one hand the Jazz 
Age, the Charleston, speak-easies and bath-tub gin, flag-pole sit-
ting, acrobatic stunts on the wings of airplanes, and the ever-
ascending stock-market. On the other hand, there were Sacco 
and Vanzetti’s trial and execution, A. Mitchell Palmer’s crusade 
against Marxists and socialists, the Scopes trial, and the emer-
gence of self-identified fundamentalists.
So the war’s demonstration that Progress wasn’t the guarantee 
we’d thought was not just a deep scandal to American expatriates 
in Europe; it rocked Americans here at home as well. The war’s 
lesson was incompatible with our dearly held notion of Manifest 
Destiny— the notion to which Wilson had keyed his speeches in 
guiding us into the war, the notion our mission extended to our 
rendering the whole world conformed to our notions and safe for 
our lifestyle. The loss of any guarantee this would happen was 
altogether too demoralizing to be faced head on. The Charles-
ton and bathtub gin were an effort to step into an alternate real-
ity (not unlike what cyberspace can be). Palmer’s suspicions, the 
fundamentalists, and persecutions of “foreigners” were at once 
246 tom o’neill
opposite to the spirit of the Jazz Age and similar to it. For these 
sour and nativist reactions too were a form of bravado, of whis-
tling in the dark. They too were efforts to say the evils of the 
time had nothing to do with America— to say such evils had 
incubated on foreign soil, and good Americans would act to keep 
them from taking root here. (Was this not a very Jeffersonian 
and Quixotic way to view the world? It had all the earmarks of 
Puritanism and American exceptionalism.)
We remind ourselves that the key insight for understanding 
fundamentalism is that it is conceived in fear. Prominence of fear 
doesn’t mean of course there are no grounds for fear; nor does it 
mean that fearful fundamentalists are timid and harmless. Fear 
can make fundamentalists dangerous in the extreme. One over-
whelmed by fear can figure he or she has nothing to lose; one can 
go for broke. If you’ve ever trapped a squirrel in the corner of a 
basement or attic, you may have insight how this works. Big as 
you are compared to the squirrel, something tells you to be care-
ful. In a fear-crazed moment, the squirrel may tear your thumb 
to shreds.
Fear, then, is matter for study. It may seem to some in fact that 
I should wholeheartedly endorse the fears felt by fundamentalists. 
For I’ve said we cannot function without an absolute, and I’m 
saying here that fundamentalists know this. I seem to be agree-
ing with them. Why then say fundamentalism can’t save us?
Think of a person in the throes of a dreadful disease, and of 
how quick the person may be to grab onto whatever’s offered as 
a remedy. The fundamentalist is like such a person. The patient’s 
desire for a cure is not what’s wrong. Even his or her convic-
tion that there must be “out there” somewhere a remedy for their 
threatening condition is not notably at fault; for at least in many 
cases, what has gone wrong can be put right, what’s needed 
for a return to health can be supplied. What leads to counter-
productive behavior isn’t then a patient’s wholesome hope and 
desire for health; rather it’s a patient’s impatience. The patient can 
prove too ready for the first thing—  or the most obvious thing— 
that comes along. 
A fundamentalist can be compared to a person adrift in a river 
who, white-knuckled, holds fast to a handy log. Such a person 
won’t let go easily. Imagine yourself as someone standing on 
the shore who knows the log is headed toward steep falls and a 
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dizzying plunge. For all your shouting, you might have a hard 
time persuading the one holding the log to let go.
I offer these analogies not in order to demean fundamentalists. 
We’re trying to get a handle on our topic. Alfred North White-
head speaks of a “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.” I like the 
phrase though I may not understand it in the way Whitehead 
intended. I use it to indicate taking a part for the whole, or a 
symbol for the symbolized, or a name for what is named. One 
way to view a fundamentalist is to regard him or her as someone 
involved in such a fallacy. The fundamentalist seems one who 
holds onto the finite as though it were the infinite, seems to hold 
onto the passing and insecure as though it were the eternal and 
fixed, seems to regard the imperfect as though it were perfect, the 
provisional as though it were the final and absolute.
For all its abstractness, I think that’s a good preliminary 
description of religious fundamentalism. The matter, though, 
remains murky. This is because it may seem to cast too wide a 
net; it may seem to set up too wide an indictment. All genuine 
religion involves a response of the soul to what is infinite and 
beyond reach. It might seem then that all religion is fundamen-
talist in character. The effort of religion to grasp, in passing time 
and finite circumstance, what is eternal and infinite and good 
beyond all vocalization may seem to condemn religion in gen-
eral to falsification. We may seem to be saying religion is always 
an instance of misplaced concreteness, and that every religious 
person is either a fundamentalist or on the way to becoming one.
Eastern religion has fortified itself against the pull of this 
temptation better than have the religions that come out of Pal-
estine and the Arabian Peninsula. The Buddha tells us “nirvana” 
is the goal of spiritual struggle, and when asked to define “nir-
vana,” refuses. Taoism tells us: “Those who know the Tao don’t 
talk about it and those who talk about it don’t know it.” (This 
helps one understand why Zen Buddhists spend so much time in 
silence.) As for Hinduism, it allows us to speak of the ultimate 
reality principle in so many forms and conceptualizations that it 
comes to the same thing: namely, there’s no conclusive and com-
prehensive notion and vocabulary available to us— no “one-size-
fits-all,” no non-negotiable way— to characterize ultimate reality. 
For a Hindu sage, the ultimate is many—  or more plausibly, it is 
one; it is male or female —  or more plausibly, it is both or neither; 
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it is personal—  or, more plausibly, it is beyond everything we can 
think about persons.
This tentative character of eastern religion is echoed by the 
great mystics of all the religions. Relentlessly, they insist we are 
in over our heads. They insist on the inadequacy of everything 
we say or do in matters of religion. This is true for Jewish, Chris-
tian, and Muslim mystics no less than for Hindu, Buddhist, and 
Taoist mystics. But, as just noted, warnings against taking our 
formulations about the absolute for the Absolute itself seem to 
have been better heeded among religious people of the East than 
among religious people of the West.
The temptation to think we and we alone know the absolute by 
its First Name is distinctly stronger in the Abrahamic western 
religions (originating in the Middle East). The sense of intimate, 
personal dialogue with the Ultimate is sharper here; and while 
this may be a source of great vitality in Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam, it’s clearly their great peril. Claiming to know the absolute 
on a first-name basis, we westerners have a major difficulty with 
any similar claims by people of traditions outside our own—  even, 
perhaps especially, by people of traditions very close to our own. 
Western Europeans crossed the Atlantic and became the new 
Americans. We, their descendants, expanded westward across the 
continent, and then yet further westward across the Pacific for an 
opening of doors in Asia. In every case when we encountered 
indigenous people with their own religious beliefs, we disparaged 
those beliefs and tried to replace them with our own. We’ve rea-
soned that since we know the right name for God and the right 
way of relating to “Him,” others who make claims for different 
names and different ways must be in error. A fundamentalism 
seems to have blinded us to the possibilities of heterogeneity. In 
making claims for God we’ve shrunk God to fit our conceptions. 
We’ve made God mean, made of God a talisman we hold in our 
pocket.
What then precisely is it that makes a fundamentalist? Some 
have said it’s “idolatry,” and I think that can be helpful. The 
charge will seem outrageously paradoxical to any actual funda-
mentalist; but then it seems essential to the character of idolatry 
that its devotees not regard it as such.
Here too, one must be careful. In the wake of the likes of Henry 
David Thoreau, John Muir, Thomas Berry, Bill McKibben, and 
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the Sufi poet Rumi, one can argue, for instance, that we’ve a need 
to venerate nature far more than we do venerate it. When this 
veneration is genuine and heartfelt and is accompanied by ritual 
behavior (e.g., blessing valleys, dancing at harvest time, getting 
up early to hail the sun’s rising, reveling in the purity and beauty 
of rivers and streams), such veneration can be mistaken for idola-
try. As I suggested in the chapter on beauty, we stand in need of 
a passionate love for the physical world, a love some Christians— 
John Muir’s Presbyterian father comes to mind— would regard 
as a return to pagan idolatry.
A loving and ardent response to the world’s preciousness would 
be neither idolatry nor fundamentalism. Likewise, when Mexi-
cans and others regard Our Lady of Guadeloupe with fervent 
devotion, they’re not, I think, idolaters or fundamentalists. An 
achieved Bhakti Hindu (one whose love has gone from love of a 
person to love of all things and to love of their Source) would say 
of Our Lady of Guadeloupe that she is— for those who pay her 
homage —  an “ishta.” The Bhakti adept would mean Our Lady of 
Guadeloupe provides a favored or specially suited opportunity, an 
instantiation, whereby her devotees can enter the presence of the 
Ultimate. (For those who do not find her such, the Bhakti would 
say “no foul, no penalty.”) Bhakti Hinduism not only doesn’t con-
demn worshipers for finding an ishta in this fashion, but encour-
ages those who haven’t found one to do so.
The fundamentalist, on the other hand, does not simply say: “I 
have found a means by which I relate to the Ultimate.” Granted, 
a person would almost need to grow up “talking Eastern” to say a 
thing like that. But then, to rephrase for the West, a fundamen-
talist does not simply say: “I have found a truth,” or “I have found 
something of great importance,” or “I have found something 
that lifts me out of humdrum and mean-minded concerns.” In 
his or her desperation, that doesn’t suffice for the fundamentalist. 
He or she must say: “I now possess the whole truth.” And this 
fundamentalist is inclined to add: “To the extent anyone speaks 
contrary to what I say, or even says something more than what I 
say, to that extent that person is in error.” A fundamentalist isn’t 
content to have a word; he or she must have the last word.
In this respect, a fundamentalist always acts in contradiction 
to the original inspiration of the religion to which he or she 
is attached. This is a difficult point to take in. Up to now our 
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discussion has been rather abstract and general. Let’s try now to 
make it more concrete. Let’s do so in the face of all the hazards 
that specific analysis of religious commitments can entail. The 
case I argue is that while religious inspiration is affirmative, and 
value-finding, and positive in its origination, the fundamentalist 
who would protect that gift does, by reason of being a fundamen-
talist, twist the inspiration into something that has a negative 
bearing on other people. In order to test this out, we have to 
wade into the treacherous waters of citing particular examples.4
In Roman Catholicism, the fundamentalist tendency bears 
upon dogmatic affirmations. Leaders in the Catholic Church 
regard as sacred and irreformable some statements of theirs 
which they call “dogmas.” These statements have been formu-
lated by humans in language inevitably bearing the limitations of 
human speech. The language used is often Greek or Latin, and 
some formulations are close to two thousand years old. The for-
mulations are shaped by and respond to the preoccupations of the 
formulators. The language employed is often abstract and can be 
metaphorical. The language is laden with the denotations and the 
connotations current at the time of formulation, and it has devel-
oped in a culture that is itself continually undergoing change. 
There is no scandal here. Almost any scholar working with ear-
lier writings is more or less in the same predicament as a scholar 
who is working with these formulations. It isn’t even a problem 
that the Catholic scholar regards these particular formulations as 
true. Many a scholar and many a scientist brings a kind of vote of 
confidence to the propositions under study in his or her discipline. 
The problem is that the leaders of the Catholic Church have 
wanted to absolutize statements which are inherently imperfect 
and provisional. And they have wanted to absolutize their histor-
ical interpretations of those statements as well. They have taken 
themselves so seriously in this matter that they burned Giordano 
4. The reason religion is hardly mentioned in k-through-twelve public 
education is to avoid just these dangers. The reason there is so little ecu-
menical (i.e., inter-religious) discussion these days is to avoid just these 
dangers. The cost of avoiding them is horrendous. We get Kissinger say-
ing, “If I had known about the rivalry of Shiites and Sunnis, I never would 
have endorsed the invasion of Iraq.”
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Bruno at the stake when he wouldn’t go along. They used the 
fire from that burning as a means to intimidate Galileo into 
silence. 
While we can be absolutely sure of some things, we cannot 
impart that same absoluteness to the propositions in which we 
express ourselves. When we regard them as true without quali-
fication, and claim they are perfect and irreformable, we are 
ascribing to these creations of ours characteristics which more 
cautious believers reserve for God. In other words, we stumble 
into fundamentalism.
This has real consequences. When, back in the sixties, Pope 
Paul VI appointed a commission to study Catholic restrictions 
on birth control, the commission came back saying unanimously 
that Catholic teaching on birth control needed to be revised. 
Nonetheless, Paul reaffirmed the traditional prohibitions. Paul’s 
reasoning, even if not explicitly stated, seems to have run along 
these lines: 
The Church is infallible in matters of faith and morals. But 
the Church has long taught, in a public and deliberate way, 
that artificial birth control (i.e., contraception which can 
be accomplished by interrupted ejaculation, or the use of 
condoms, or diaphragms, or anti-fertility pills) is immoral. 
If then one were to revise this teaching on contraception, 
one would be saying “the Church is fallible after all.” Since 
however the Church is infallible, it follows that contracep-
tion is immoral. 
(This isn’t, to be sure, anything near a direct quote, nor am I try-
ing to lampoon the pope’s position; I’m doing what I can to set 
forth the only conditions I think can explain it.)
This reaffirmation of traditional doctrine seems to have con-
tinued a hardship for some Catholics, seems to have driven other 
Catholics from the Catholic Church, and seems to have decreased 
the confidence in church teaching of most of the rest— those 
who neither left the Catholic Church nor accepted its teach-
ing on contraception. (I don’t know what European Catholics 
make of these matters. In America, this third group seems large. 
Sociological research, always a tricky enterprise where sexual-
ity is involved, seems to indicate American Catholics these days 
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practice contraception to about the same degree as the rest of the 
American population.)
I see this effort to take past historical teaching and give it uni-
versal status as a fundamentalist act.
Similarly, in the Catholic Church’s sex-abuse scandal, funda-
mentalism seems to have played a role in the way bishops and 
the Vatican reacted. Regarding the Church as the rock against 
which  “the gates of hell shall not prevail,” church officials in 
America, under guidance by the Vatican, closed their eyes to 
reports that told them of predatory sexual behavior in churches 
under their supervision. When news of such behavior forced itself 
on their attention, there was a church-wide pattern of irrational 
denial and inappropriate response. Strong efforts were made to 
discredit and intimidate abused children; silence was purchased 
with bribes; known predators were transferred to distant loca-
tions where it was hoped their reputation would not catch up 
with them. There was widespread concealment and lying.
Church officials seem to have focused their efforts almost 
exclusively on maintaining the reputation of that “Church” which 
their theology and seminary training had taught them exists. In 
place of serving the children of God, they rendered uncritical 
service to a figment of their theological imagination. To label 
their behavior as an example of “dogma idolatry” doesn’t seem 
exaggerated. Had churchmen been less enthralled by fictitious 
claims and faltering dogmas on their own incorruptibility, they 
might have seen what was going on and have responded in accord 
with admonitions of Jesus as reported in the gospels.
Take one more example from Catholicism— this one too has a 
bearing upon sexuality. The long history of dismissive and hurt-
ful treatment of homosexuals by the popes and bishops and local 
pastors of the Catholic Church seems to be motivated primarily 
by a desire to maintain consistency, as in the case of contracep-
tion, with past church teaching. Contemporary psychological 
theory offers little or no support for this teaching, and much 
opposition. In the days of Galileo, the Catholic Church felt itself 
obliged to maintain, for the sake of its authority as an interpreter 
of scripture, that the sun daily orbits the earth. In similar fashion, 
the Catholic hierarchy seems today—  gripped by the same fun-
damentalist regard for its own teaching authority— to feel itself 
obliged to teach that homosexuals are “objectively disordered.” 
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Why belabor these points? It’s not to drum up anti-Catholic 
feeling. It’s because only by citing specific instances is one likely 
to make the character of fundamentalism clear. Also, I’m at some 
concern to see we don’t limit our recognition of fundamentalism 
in an opportunistic and arbitrary way, bringing the term into play 
only when discussing those whom we take to be “foreigners.”
Let’s proceed. If next we look to Judaism, here the cur-
rent temptation to fundamentalism, as noted, seems directly 
concerned with land. Judaism by and large is less centered on 
orthodoxy (that is, on insisting every Jew holds the same well 
defined doctrines) than on “orthopraxis” (observance of identity-
providing behaviors); it’s “down to earth” and is concerned with 
the practical matters of what’s to be done habitually by “us as a 
people”—  and of what’s to be done soonest. Doctrines about con-
traception and homosexuality, though related directly to behav-
ior, are less likely to have the hard dogmatic edge at a synagogue 
that they have at a council of the Catholic Church. Much is left 
to rabbinic disputation and rabbinic/lay dialog.5
As remarked elsewhere, among Jews there’s a notable 
degree of liberty of spirit— not well understood by Christian 
fundamentalists— regarding interpretation of scripture. How far 
this can go is striking. With breath-taking freedom, rabbis led 
their congregations into new paths after the destruction of the 
Temple in 70 C. E. For all that the book of Leviticus seems to 
require to the contrary, the priestly caste seems to have disap-
peared from active Judaism around that time; and the rabbis who 
led Judaism in the Diaspora (the dispersing of Jews into many 
places, which intensified after 70 C. E.) seem to have left animal 
sacrifice altogether to the past.6
No, with possible exceptions among Orthodox Jews, funda-
mentalism about matters of dogma and scriptural interpretation 
5. It was, I think, the Jewish violinist Itzhak Perlman who commented 
playfully, “A Jew chooses his synagogue by its cantor, and puts up with its 
rabbi.”
6. A Jewish student of mine responded to my assertion of this lack of 
interest in continuing the sacrifice of animals by saying that animal sacri-
fice has never been repudiated, and could be revived at any time. Be that 
as it may, I’d be amazed to learn on TV or from a newspaper that animal 
sacrifice was about to be re-instituted at a Jewish place of worship.
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doesn’t seem at the forefront of Jewish concern. Yet fundamen-
talism is an abiding temptation for religion, and particularly, as 
noted, a temptation for the three radically personal monotheistic 
religions that arose in the Middle East. As has always been a 
possibility among fundamentalisms, current Jewish fundamen-
talism is directly connected to an issue of land. (So it was for 
Puritans; so it may have been for Anglicans and Orangemen 
in Ireland; so probably it is for Muslims in Sudan and Dar-
fur, and between Muslim and Muslim in Iraq and Syria.) But 
there is a special predisposition toward such in the case of a 
people whose exodus and coming together entailed a prom-
ised land. Exodus-and-arrival-at-the-Promised-Land is seen 
as the constitutional moment of the Jewish people. This sug-
gests that if there’s going to be a characteristic fundamen-
talism among Jews, it’s likely to be a fundamentalism about 
land.
For the sake of the “Promised Land,” the “Holy Land,” some 
Israelis and some who sympathize with them (including some 
American Christians) have been willing to discover in Genesis 15 
and in Exodus 23 a quite literal land grant or deed of real estate 
which they regard as “inextinguishable”— without date of expi-
ration. While many Jews would not put it this way, to a remark-
able degree — both for some Israelis and for some supporters of 
the Israeli state who live elsewhere — the very test for endurance 
of the Jewish covenant with God has come to be that Jews occupy, 
at whatever cost, this land. It seems some would not hesitate to 
say: “For Judaism to survive, it is necessary that ‘The Promised 
Land’ be occupied by Jews.”
To a non-Jew, this can look like a very unfortunate case of 
a fallacy of misplaced concreteness. And many a devout Jew 
regards it as just that. While commitments can be admirable, the 
fundamentalist character of this commitment is brought to light 
in all the things one must deny in order to maintain it. If one 
regards the Jewish prophets of biblical times and the rabbis of 
the last two thousand years as major architects of and witnesses 
to the doctrine of universal human rights (the historical contri-
bution of the prophets and the Talmudic tradition in promot-
ing human rights seems to me clear and undeniable), it seems 
rash and extravagant—  even with the unspeakable horror of the 
Holocaust as context— that Jewish biblical teaching on human 
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rights over thousands of years should be overridden by the claim 
of “an existential crisis.”7
A fundamentalist character seems manifest here in the will-
ingness to present a “part” for the “whole.” I’d say it’s not that 
Israelis must deny what Jews and all decent people affirm, namely 
that Jews have a right to live securely. Rather it’s that Israelis 
must continue to maintain what some Israeli politicians and their 
followers lately deny. Much that they affirm today, they need to 
affirm; but some seem to have discarded too much on its behalf. 
For it would seem that for a believing Jew, all the children of the 
world must be blessed in the blessings conferred on Abraham 
and his progeny. And in light of that, it would seem a reckless 
contraction of Judaism to let the sheer “comic book” or thrill-
ing “action movie” character of the book of Joshua, and the like, 
supplant the faith of Abraham as the touchstone of Jewish faith.
Our purpose here, however, isn’t to “straighten out Israelis.” 
It’s rather to clarify the nature of fundamentalism. By now, I’d 
hope the character I would assign to fundamentalism is starting 
to come clear. It’s by no means restricted to any one faith among 
the three great faiths of the West. All three of the Abrahamic 
religions have strong tendencies to fundamentalism within their 
traditions.8
7. Without denying the special and dramatic predicament of the Israeli 
state, can one not claim in company of existentialists that we are all— 
Muslim, Jew, Christian, and Hindu— irretrievably and habitually in a 
state of existential crisis?
8. It’s my conviction that each of these rich traditions is strengthened 
when these temptations are recognized and resisted by those holding the 
tradition. No else can do it for them. At the same time though, secularists 
who sneer at religion in general would do great benefit to themselves were 
they able to exercise similar discretion in their reactions to religion. When 
Christopher Hitchens or Richard Dawkins or Bill Maher or Matt Taibbi 
takes on religion to dismiss it, they’d sound less like pubescent high-
schoolers sneaking smokes under the football stands if they could avail 
themselves of what religion is about. Whatever else it is, it’s the human 
response to the miracle of existence. It’s as likely to go away as sex is. The 
task is not to get rid of religion but to distinguish between the response of 
wonder which is at its core and the accretions of fundamentalism which 
tend to obscure it.
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It may help to speak of fetishes. If we take the term fetish 
in the negative sense often intended in its use in psychology, it 
refers to something that absorbs, preoccupies, blocks off atten-
tion from the larger scheme of things. The fetish of the Catholic 
Church might be said then to be its dogmas—  or, more generally, 
its sense of itself as infallible. A fetish of Judaism cherished by 
some contemporary Jews might be said to be the Holy Land, and 
the sense that Jews must, by any means necessary, have exclusive 
occupancy there. 
In both cases it’s important not to disregard context. In the 
case of the Catholic Church, a resolutely materialistic and rela-
tivistic world, deeply hostile to Catholic values, is no doubt the 
context out of which the Catholic hierarchy acts on assumptions 
that are cited here as fundamentalist. After John XXIII and up 
to the election of Pope Francis, the Catholic Church has been 
reacting in fear. And its fears are not without grounds. In the 
case of Israel, it’s important to look to the Holocaust. In the long 
history of inhumanity, the Holocaust continues to shock us by 
reason of occurring in the circumstances it did, and with such 
ungodly deliberateness. If this event continues to perplex and 
startle us “gentiles,” think what it must be for Jews. Adding to 
the trauma of this, there’s the present geographical context of 
Arab states— with one or more of them vociferously hostile to 
Israel at any given moment. The circumstances for insecurity are 
about as perfect as they can get. In such a context, is it surpris-
ing to hear apologists for Israeli policy resort to fundamentalist 
premises? Fear is a bad counselor, but a persuasive one. 
Perhaps by now we’re ready to attempt a deeper assessment of 
what fundamentalism there is among Muslims. If I’ve seemed 
strongly critical of Catholic and Jewish fundamentalisms, it’s 
partly because I’ve been anxious to balance the scales a bit from 
the rant which our mainstream media routinely offer in support 
of our government’s destructive interventions in Muslim affairs. 
Just as we know that not all Catholics embrace the fundamental-
ism that seduces many among the Catholic hierarchy, and just 
as we know not all Jews embrace the fundamentalism espoused 
by some leading right-wing Israeli politicians, so we should now 
be ready to localize (rather than universalize) the elements of 
Islamic fundamentalism when we speak of Muslims. 
  w h y the center ca n ’t hold 257
As it’s been criticism from Catholics, in whose ranks I spent 
my youth, which has done most to disclose to me what I take to 
be fundamentalist characteristics in contemporary Catholicism, 
and as it’s been criticism from wonderfully humane Jews which 
has done most to disclose to me what I take to be fundamental-
ist characteristics in contemporary Judaism, so, likewise, a series 
of encounters I regard as fortuitous and privileged with devout 
Muslim students has been what has most helped me discern, in 
their criticism of Muslim practice, what I take to be fundamen-
talist characteristics in contemporary Islam.
Just as “Catholic teaching” is by no means necessarily bad— but 
to make a fetish of Catholic teaching is bad; and just as the “Holy 
Land” is surely not bad in itself— but to make a fetish of the 
Holy Land is bad; so while the Koran should be viewed positively 
by Muslim and non-Muslim alike, this view which all can share 
should not blind us to the possibility that the Koran, if handled 
as a fetish, can be read and interpreted to excuse the inexcusable.
Context here, as everywhere, is important. When the Koran 
was given on the Arabian Peninsula early in the seventh century, 
it was proclaimed as the “Secure Guide” and the “Straight Path” 
at a time when everything on the peninsula seemed up in the air. 
Proclaimed as remedy, the Koran, as it confronted human wild-
ness and reckless rationalizations, was not ambivalent. It did not 
encumber the listener or reader with a multitude of qualifications 
or extenuating circumstances or alternative choices. Allah spoke 
through it with all the simplicity and authority of the one and 
only God telling what was to be done and what was to be avoided. 
Gray areas went largely unacknowledged. (To be sure, in a sepa-
rate and perhaps later sura [chapter], what had seemed ambiguous 
may have been clarified. One may suppose that circumstances of 
an emergent Muslim lifestyle demanded clarifications. The fact 
that the Koran is not chronologically organized to make later 
suras come later in the book tends to make attempts to specify 
which verses were clarifying which verses a matter of hypoth-
esis. Even in the clarifications, however, the tone is authorita-
tive. Not only must anyone who reads the Koran with full atten-
tion recognize this is the case, but one may even argue that this 
book could not have been effective had it lacked precisely this 
tone.
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The voice of the same Allah continues to resonate today for 
millions of Muslims throughout the world. The perspective from 
which the Koran is addressed by devout readers is that all of this 
is from God; none of this is from Mohammed or from human 
ingenuity.
In the meantime, some thirteen centuries have passed. There 
had been, especially in the hundred years following the death 
of Mohammed, an astounding expansion of Islam to the west 
and the east. There had been a golden age of Muslim culture 
that had, among other things, helped lift Christendom from the 
Dark Ages by reconnecting Europe to the ancient Greeks. But 
there had also been European crusades against Islam—  crusades 
which manifested Christian much more than Muslim fundamen-
talism. In later centuries, especially around the time of the First 
World War when the Ottoman Empire expired, there came in 
the Middle East a time of political and economic decline coin-
ciding with a quickening tempo of exploitation by Europe, and 
as the twentieth century progressed, by the United States as well.
During these long centuries, the Koran provided guidance 
to Muslim life and culture. One can argue whether in the time 
of near miraculous extension, the Koran was read as a “ jihadist” 
manual. For all that’s been said here by way of indictment of 
Puritan expansion westward, my inclination in the case of Islam 
is to suggest that Muslim expansion was less “ jihadist” than 
one might think. I say this because the peoples to whom Islam 
came have, by and large, both endured as peoples and have kept 
Islam. Islam did not expand without force; but it seems that the 
force it expended was directed mostly at ruling classes, and that 
what Islam had to offer, the masses accepted. In obedience to the 
explicit command of the Koran, it seems religious conversion was 
not routinely imposed as lands came under Muslim rule. Signifi-
cant numbers of indigenous peoples must have seen in Muslim 
rule and the customs that attended it an opportunity for a better 
life —  a step upward; else they would not have so readily adopted 
and retained Islam. 
To some, it may seem with these words I become an apolo-
gist for Islam; but to me rather, it seems I’m guilty of damning 
with faint praise. I tell my cynical students that the aspirations of 
the human heart are toward some form of permanence in loving 
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relationships and toward a transcendence of human limitation. 
Islam is a faith. For hundreds of years and for millions of Mus-
lims, Islam has connected with these aspirations and nourished 
them. 
Where force is involved, submission is always a tricky and com-
plex business. That’s why the judgment made above necessarily 
remains subject to challenge. Perhaps further research can help. 
A calculus of “how many were killed,” “who was killed,” “at what 
depth did acceptance take hold,” “how enduring has the accep-
tance proved” must be worked through as part of the evaluation 
of freedom’s role in the submission. Did the conqueror bring 
liberation or a new form of slavery? Alexander conquered vast 
territory to the east and south of the Mediterranean almost a 
millennium before the advent of Islam and is often regarded as 
a benefactor of humanity. Napoleon in his venture into Russia 
has a far more dubious reputation. In the case of Hitler and his 
conquests, there’s no ambiguity at all: the man has come to per-
sonify evil.
Violence did clearly play a part at the very inception of Islam as 
the people of Medina warred to protect Islam from destruction 
by the people of Mecca. Shortly thereafter—  and in the long run 
far more damaging to the harmony of Islam— there were mur-
derous squabbles over who was a rightful successor to Moham-
med. These rivalries and the recklessness of these squabbles have 
put a poison in the veins— I will not say of Islam, but—  of Mus-
lims ever since. In addition, I do concede that violence was an 
ingredient in the rapid expansion of Islam. And later, as men-
tioned, there were the Christian crusades to “re-conquer the Holy 
Land.” These raised the passions of war in Muslim warriors, and 
provided just those circumstances for which the Koran authorizes 
war. Yet I’d say making all these concessions still doesn’t justify 
the stereotype that Islam is a violent religion. If, as our media do, 
one insists on saying this, it seems to me sheer fairness requires 
that we then assign the description “violent religion” to all three 
Abrahamic religions.
My hunch, though, is that for most of its history, the activity 
sometimes called the “Lesser Jihad” (the practice of war in defense 
of Islam) really was the less important jihad. The “Greater Jihad” 
of the Koran was central—  and this concerned the conquest of 
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self. It ambitioned what’s symbolized by the posture, head to the 
ground, of the devout Muslim at prayer. It demanded surrender 
of self to Allah. That, according to the Koran is the holy conquest 
that leads to peace.
One cannot however deny that for some Muslims today the 
violent Lesser Jihad figures centrally. This “lesser” is, as noted, 
the practice of holy war for the preservation of Islam. For some 
Muslims this practice has come to seem a matter of the utmost 
urgency. Yet to promote this to the point where one abandons the 
Greater Jihad is undeniably a perversion of Islam. This is done by 
numerous groups in the Middle East today— with broad effects 
elsewhere. The Koran explicitly condemns this. 
I know as I write this that it’s almost impossible to establish 
a recognized objectivity for any comments I make. An anti-
Muslim may say, “Why does he tiptoe? Surely he must know 
from the evening news, night after night, there are monsters of 
Islam afoot— terrorists threatening his very existence as he sits 
spinning his fantasy.” On the other hand, a devout Muslim may 
say, “How presumptuous he is! He presumes to discourse about 
shortcomings within a religion with which he has only the faint-
est acquaintance!” 
Likewise a devout Jew is liable to say, “Who is this, a non-Jew, 
to say what Judaism is, or to say what its greatest values are —  and 
to designate when they are being betrayed?” And a Catholic can 
object, “How is one to criticize Catholicism who is looking in on 
Catholicism from the hostile world outside —  a world the Church 
was instituted to correct?” 
In the face of all political correctness, there is a response to 
these objections. It seems fairly common for a member of a reli-
gion to be able to find negative fundamentalism in the practice 
of one who follows a different religion, but yet resist recognizing 
fundamentalism as a negative influence in his or her own practice. 
So when it comes to recognizing fundamentalisms, one look-
ing in from the outside — not sharing the blinding but invisible 
biases of those within—  does have a kind of advantage. Further, 
it seems to pertain to the character of a fundamentalist to deny 
that anyone outside the group is qualified to judge him or her in 
any way. Fundamentalism finds, by its very definition, “external” 
standards to be irrelevant; but this is the very condition for its 
excesses. 
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Finally, one should consider whether it’s not the case that in 
every instance of fundamentalism, the disease masquerades as 
the cure. (There’s a legendary Chinese king who was persuaded 
to take mercury as a remedy for weakness; not surprisingly, the 
more mercury he took, the weaker he felt; and so his demand 
for mercury constantly increased. On his deathbed, he’s crying 
out “Mercury! more mercury!” as he dies.) 
While it’s wrong to demand one’s own religion be practiced by 
others, this doesn’t mean one is required to approve everything 
done by others in the name of religion. Not every religious rem-
edy works. (To reverse this: while the secularist has the right to 
say that no religious remedy works, nonetheless if the secularist 
attempts to demand that out-of-hand dismissal from others— 
bypassing argumentation and resorting to ridicule — the secular-
ist becomes by that behavior the narrow kind of person whom he 
or she denounces.) 
Acknowledging the all-but-insuperable difficulties about 
objectivity, let’s get on with our assessment of fundamentalism 
in Islam.
Under the great pressures that western religion and culture, 
and technological development, and new forms of colonialism 
have brought to Muslim lands in the Middle East, it’s to be 
expected that issues over how to understand Islam are now in a 
state of crisis. There is of course the crisis of those outside Islam 
looking in. But I speak here of a crisis within the Muslim world. 
It’s not surprising that for some Muslims, the legitimation of war 
presented in the Koran should have come to the fore —  should 
in fact have come to be the central focus of their life. Yet I say 
to lift the Lesser Jihad (the military jihad) from its context and 
limitations in the Koran and make it the central activity of Islam 
is—  as I define the phrase —  a fundamentalist act. It’s to take the 
part for the whole. It’s to make a fetish of certain verses. Such an 
act doesn’t draw one to an authentic understanding of Islam or to 
a life compatible with the Koran.
While then we say it’s a great mistake for non-Muslims to think 
Islam is all about violent Jihad, we must acknowledge it’s a mis-
take that non-Muslims might be less inclined to make if Muslims 
themselves weren’t making it. Jihadism has created, as is evident, 
immense trouble and division and death among Muslims them-
selves. And, yes: complicating and enlarging the harm is that this 
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lethal jihadism, especially when exercised against non-Muslims, 
tends to become the only lens through which many outsiders can 
now see Islam.
It won’t be easy for Muslims to institute unity and community 
among themselves. Derivatively, it won’t be easy for Muslims to 
present a more generous and accurate version of Islam to the non-
Muslim world. (Here though I wish to insist much of the prob-
lem we Americans have is from our obdurate willful readiness 
as westerners to misunderstand or overlook what we have done, 
particularly since World War Two, to Muslims.) For the sake of 
Muslim unity, an act of reflection and critical self-analysis that 
may not have been urgent in Islam’s earlier history has become 
urgent. But to perform such reflection will demand a great deal 
from Muslims. 
For both Muslims and non-Muslims, an act of analysis is 
needed that will distinguish the core of Islam from its fundamen-
talist accretions. Tentatively, and realizing I speak as an outsider, 
let me presume to make some observations—  observations I offer 
in order to suggest fundamentalism is not an essential feature 
of Islam. I do so, not as one attempting to impose Christianity, 
or Judaism, or any other religion, but simply as one considering 
what exigencies must be met if the Middle East is ever again 
to become a place where people can live together in peace. (If 
the U. S., Britain, France, Israel, etc., will not restrain themselves 
politically, I realize of course the hope for harmony among Mus-
lims, and for harmony between Muslims and others, shrinks to 
a vanishing point— regardless of any thoughtful observations I 
or others may make. Sadly, the habit of our meddling is now so 
ingrained it seems predictable that continued meddling by the 
West will delay peace in the Middle East for decades to come. In 
fact, the eventual accommodation, if accommodation occurs, may 
come not in the Middle East but in the West—  once Muslims 
have found the Middle East so totally dismembered that large 
numbers of them have become, if the West will allow, political 
refugees in the nations that have intruded on them.) Here are my 
observations on fundamentalist accretions to Islam:
1) The “Uncreated Koran,” while arguably defensible as a theo-
logical notion, tends to be the source of a problem. It’s a 
notion analogous to the notion of Jesus existing before his 
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birth as the pre-existing Word of God from all eternity. 
Just as a notion of Jesus as an all-knowing being existing 
from all eternity can drain the historical Jesus of all his-
torical conditioning, so the notion of an uncreated Koran 
can leach over and seem to drain a tangible Koran one 
can actually hold of its ties to human history and cul-
tural context. Consider how a human Jesus who knows 
at each moment of life what’s going to happen next is not 
a human after all. The Christian protest against Scors-
ese’s The Last Temptation of Christ was at root a refusal to 
consider Jesus as a man— to consider specifically that he 
was a man who could fall in love. What the protestors, 
with their bias against the human body, didn’t seem to 
understand is that their refusal was a rejection of Christi-
anity; their Jesus wasn’t a man after all. Likewise, it seems 
a mistake to deny that a physical book, the Koran, is a 
creature of time and place —  a document with a history. 
For in that case the book becomes mythical and eternal. 
All expressions in it are eternally wrought by God. There 
is little room for interpretation, much less for revision. I’d 
say the trouble here is that so long as Muslims allow to 
this three-dimensional, physical Koran qualities that can’t 
rightly be attributed to any created thing, they shouldn’t 
be surprised at outbreaks of extremist behavior from their 
eccentrics. They shouldn’t be surprised at the horrible 
sectarian squabbles that have rent the harmony of Islam 
from almost the earliest days up to the present. For if this 
is a magical book, wrought by God from all eternity, it 
would seem to provide for no accommodation to differ-
ing human experiences and differing cultures. A plural-
ism of interpretations seems excluded on principle. This 
can lead a devout Muslim to regard all Muslims who dis-
agree with him as mere pretenders and “infidels.” It is no 
problem that devout Muslims hear in the Koran the very 
voice of Allah. What’s become unaffordable is that some 
so absolutize their personal experiences of the Koran that 
their readings and sense of it go uncriticised. To regard 
the Koran with unqualified worship moves one away from 
Islam; for one is likely to end up worshipping, not Allah, 
but the particular way one processes the Koran. 
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2) Demonstrably the Koran cannot support such weight. As 
a created entity, the Koran— howsoever more perfect 
than all other creatures— is not ultimate perfection, is 
not absolute. It speaks differently to different hearers and 
readers. It has ambiguities. It does not contain all knowl-
edge in the sense that all other books could be burned 
without any loss. One cannot on its authority shut up 
all other voices on the face of the earth. The language in 
which it is written is a human language, emerging out of 
a human culture; and it is marked by the pre-occupations 
and limitations of the time in which it came to be. The 
warning: “There is no God but Allah” actually summons 
one to awareness of this. Only Allah is Allah; the voice of 
Allah may be heard in the Koran; but the Koran in one’s 
hand remains Allah’s creature. 
3) The most radical change needed is this one — to make a 
clear distinction between the Koran as the Secure Path and 
Allah as the goal of that path. Following on this, a change 
in perspective associated with this seems less fundamental, 
but still very important. A confining and extravagant way 
to read the Koran is to say that whatever it does not directly 
mandate is forbidden. (This is comparable to Thomas Jef-
ferson’s impossible “strict-constructionist” reading of the 
Constitution; even he could not follow it.) Contrary to 
such a letter-of-the-law approach, there are schools of 
Muslim theology which advocate a way of reading the 
Koran that protects it from being reduced to a mere code 
book of particular injunctions and particular restrictions. 
Tracing their roots, I dare say, back to Mohammed’s suc-
cessful administration of the city of Medina, these schools 
say instead that whatever the Koran does not expressly 
forbid is matter for consideration in accord with known 
Koranic principles. This second approach can accommo-
date changing circumstances in which a living Koran can 
continue to be a guide for how to be a Muslim today. It 
was consideration along these lines that made possible the 
marvelous Islamic civilizations of the past in which Mus-
lims and non-Muslims dwelt together in peace — fostering 
architecture, science, and magnificent scholarship.
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4) Another matter for consideration is the doctrine of predes-
tination. The doctrine of predestination is neither unam-
biguously rejected nor directly taught in the Koran. I’ve 
already argued at length that this doctrine has had ruin-
ous effects on the Puritans who gave to America what’s 
been its special character. It seems permissible here to 
argue, in recognition of the Koran’s ubiquitous verses in 
which human responsibility is affirmed, that the passages 
in which some find a doctrine of predestination should not 
be interpreted as denials of human freedom, but rather as 
affirmations that nothing happens outside Allah’s provi-
dence. To claim this is to claim a great deal while, at the 
same time, it refrains from canceling human responsibil-
ity. When evil human deeds occur, they occur, according 
to a providential theology, because Allah has willed the 
freedom of humans and is capable of providing victims of 
evil with divinely sponsored ultimate compensation. An 
interpretation that goes beyond this and affirms that God 
predestines all that happens is an interpretation at odds 
with Koranic teaching— prominent virtually in every 
surah—  on the capacity of humans to sin. To let a doc-
trine of predestination override this teaching can suggest 
the following dreadful line of thought: “Since whatever I 
manage to do has been eternally decreed by Allah, I can 
do whatever I want, knowing that what I do is exactly 
what Allah has willed.” I cannot think of a prescription 
more likely to corrode all dignity in human affairs and all 
sense of meaning and responsibility.
5) It’s a kind of get-out-of-responsibility-free card. Not only 
is there a theoretical possibility of chaos here; the card has 
actually, observably, been played at times. Further (as we 
saw in the case of Puritanism), if I believe I am among 
Allah’s Elect, I may thereby discover in myself license to 
despise and destroy those whom I regard as cast off by 
Allah. (Atrocities perpetrated by Christians have been 
rationalized on the ground one is only destroying those 
whom God has from all eternity marked for destruction. 
The same seems true of similar atrocities by Muslims.) 
Predestination is an inhumane doctrine, reducing human 
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existence to an empty charade. It dishonors the strong and 
steady Koranic teaching that my sins are mine and that 
Allah is just when Allah condemns them.)
6) Finally, in this effort to use Islam as an example of how 
to distinguish between the core of a religion and its fun-
damentalist accretions, let me briefly address the status 
of women. Some Muslims seem insufficiently respon-
sive to the example of Mohammed regarding women. A 
Muslim male may claim it’s the preciousness of women 
which requires the far-reaching constraints he and other 
males place on them. Of a particular woman, a Muslim 
male may say: “I protect her so because she is the jewel 
of my life — my most precious possession.” One sus-
pects Mohammed never regarded Khadija or Fatima or 
any other woman as a possession. To regard women that 
way was one of the great evils of “the wild times” that 
the Koran denounced. Beyond that, if a male Muslim 
intends outright exploitation of a woman, he has only to 
read the Koran to find his practice condemned. A Muslim 
need not go outside Islam for the grounds for reform. He 
should behave as Mohammed behaved. (Westerners who 
satirize Mohammed on this score should be ashamed of 
their ignorance. The entrenched ignorance of these West-
erners is a sign of their ill will. In the Koran the harsh 
warnings and punishments laid on women for their moral 
improvement should be read within the hyperbolic context 
of harsh warnings and punishments laid on men. We find 
much of the same in what as Christians we name the Old 
Testament. Read in the context of the place and time in 
which it came forth, the Koran clearly worked toward an 
improvement in the status of women rather than toward 
condoning disparagement; and there are ample reports 
indicating this was confirmed in the behavior toward 
women of Mohammed.) 
As I’ve suggested though, reducing the role of fundamentalism 
in Islam will not come easily. The fetishizing way some Muslims 
treat the Koran has opened a way for taking parts of it out of 
context and, in the name of Sharia [Muslim law], twisting such 
  w h y the center ca n ’t hold 267
excerpts to support what is un-Koranic and irresponsible. A win-
nowing task is the task of the hour. Until the day when Muslims 
in general, as they read and hear the Koran, make a clear distinc-
tion between the Koran and Allah—  as Jews and Christians must 
distinguish between the Bible and God— tension and trouble 
are likely to continue. Islam is not in its very nature fundamen-
talist, but the belief of some Muslims that they have a right to 
unrestricted violence in Allah’s name is. They become as misled 
as violence-addicted commentators on Fox News, the New York 
Times, or the Washington Post. What they say runs against explicit 
verses in the Koran, and is contrary to the spirit of Islam, which 
is surrender to Allah, “the All-Merciful, the Compassionate.” 
(Yes, you can find apocalyptic celebrations of divine violence in 
the Koran as you can in the biblical Jewish book of Joshua and 
the biblical Christian book of Revelation. It is a function of sane 
people to know how to process these.)
By now, perhaps we’ve discussed fundamentalism among Cath-
olics, Jews, and Muslims at sufficient length to arrive at some fair 
sense of the term’s meaning. The strategy has been to travel a 
broad circle by which to return to Puritanism and America.
All the strictures charged against the fundamentalisms of 
Catholics, Jews, and Muslims seem to suggest counter-parts for 
stricture against Puritan fundamentalism. The mythic self-image 
of the Catholic Church as a perfect institution functioning in 
an imperfect world is clearly paralleled by the Puritans’ sense of 
themselves as an Elect people. The land fetish of some contem-
porary Jews is wonderfully prepared by the way Puritans took 
the mythic propaganda of the book of Joshua as a model for a 
centuries-long campaign of ethnic cleansing against American 
indians in the Winning of the West. The un-Koranic tendency 
of some Muslims to worship the Koran is fully matched by an 
un-Biblical tendency of Puritans to bibliolatry. 
As large groups of Americans back away from what we feel is 
the abyss of secular relativism, it’s toward Puritan fundamental-
ism that many of us non-secularists retreat. One can appreciate 
the motivation here. It’s to achieve coherence and equilibrium by 
a return to basics. 
This maneuver however seems insufficiently alert to the inse-
curities of Puritanism itself and to the longstanding cleavage 
in American Puritanism between “on-Sunday” lofty gospel 
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professions of love for God and “weekday” down-to-earth Amer-
ican Puritan hard dealing. It’s especially a fundamentalist sense 
of themselves as the Elect that makes a transition from lofty 
intent to vicious everyday practice possible. A task of this book, 
especially in the section regarding our reliance on force, has been 
to etch the character of this back-and-forth transition; an attempt 
has been to uncover the monumental incoherence it entails.
Complicating our retreat from secularism is the manner in 
which American practice of a Puritan version of Christianity has 
itself done much to nurture the secular ethos from which we hope 
to escape. The bed we disdain to lie in is the bed in which we were 
conceived. By this I mean we are conflicted about our history. 
Current members of “Tea Parties” for instance often have a reli-
giously grounded and justified sense that things have gone quite 
wrong. What seems, however, often to escape notice is how even 
as they clamor against corruption in government and through-
out American life, they have as voters done much to invite cor-
ruption by resolutely championing a marketplace ungoverned by 
reasonable restriction. An unregulated marketplace —  one which 
ends up paying no heed to ethical or religious principle — is at 
once that which they support in their voting and shopping and 
that which they denounce in their Sunday rhetoric. There’s some 
insight on one day of the week, for in their Sunday rhetoric and 
meditations, they have glimpses that the buyers and sellers have 
desecrated the temple. That we have a tough time holding onto 
Thanksgiving Day is a symptom of our times.
Setting to one side the sometimes difficult business of deci-
phering “Tea Party” agendas, it can be argued generally that the 
literalist reading of the Bible to which Puritan fundamentalists 
often adhere is not effective in promoting the Bible as a moral 
guide. It prematurely disqualifies the Bible as a credible and rel-
evant force. If one is concerned to prove that a serpent once lit-
erally talked in a literal Garden of Eden, one is going to be so 
buried in a tangled scrutiny of arguments as to miss the genuine 
lessons in the Genesis stories, and to miss as well the great voices 
of Jeremiah and Isaiah and Jesus summoning us to the care of 
the widow and the orphan. Further, by replacing the Heavenly 
Father of Jesus with the inscrutable God of Calvin, devout Puri-
tans have driven people into atheism and hastened the arrival of 
secularism. Confusions abound.
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The larger error, then, is to assume that Christianity as prac-
ticed by our Puritan forebears (“that ole time religion”) can res-
cue us from the predicaments we experience at present. This is all 
too much like that Chinese king trying to recover from mercury 
poisoning by ever larger drafts of mercury. A return to the faith 
of our fathers cannot save us if, by our fathers, we mean those 
who —  gripped by an arbitrary and inhumane interpretation of 
the Bible — have fathered our Puritanism and our sense of Amer-
ican exceptionalism.
What I’ve meant to argue toward— through this lengthy and 
meandering consideration of fundamentalism— is that it was 
the Puritans’ tragically compromised reading and consequent 
compromised practice of Christianity that has been central in 
bringing on the problems we find ourselves in today. While a 
deeply Christian compassion among Americans would indeed go 
a long way toward achieving a reconfiguration for the better of 
the world’s prospects, Christian fundamentalism as a descendant 
of Puritanism simply insists on doubling down on trends already 
leading to a worldwide free-for-all over money, resources, and 
power. It’s a prescription for universal riot. It fires up all the other 
fundamentalisms we’ve noted here —  and makes prospects for 
preserving human civilization throughout the length of the pres-
ent century worrisome. At the very least, it forecasts increasing 
disorder in American life. This is true whether we look to family, 
to international relations, or to provision for our individual health 
and education, or to provision for our man-made infrastructure, 
or to preservation of the habitat that’s made us possible.
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(What! More God? In the previous chapter we considered how 
notions of God can provide sources of hope that lead to violent 
and aggressive action. Here we consider how notions of God can 
provide sources of hope that lead to lethal complacency.) 
Some of us do try to think long-term. We who do so tend to 
think by way of processes of extrapolation. We note how we labor 
compulsively to widen the scope of the dominant trends and hab-
its, mindsets and ambitions of our society, both as these are real-
ized in our individual lives and as they’re realized among us as 
achievements of the group. For instance, we think of the way we 
fund our government by borrowing, and we wonder how long we 
can get away with increasing deficits. Reagan famously achieved 
a kind of “morning in America”—  still remembered fondly— by 
borrowing us into prosperity, and Bill Clinton found ways of 
continuing the good times by withdrawing restraints on the 
activities of banks and the stock market— restraints put in place 
during the Great Depression. Currently the Federal Reserve sus-
tains our banking system by daily infusions of nearly interest-
free cash. Again, we think of our unilateralism in foreign policy; 
we reflect on how we decide which political system to subvert, 
which foreign leader—  duly elected or not— we see fit to replace, 
which country to invade (when, and for what reason), and on how 
we will attempt to reconcile the rest of what we call  “the free 
world” to the choice we have made. We note how bitterly we 
complain when France, or Russia, or Europe in general seems 
recalcitrant. We note how we recently refrained from “French 
fries” and ate “freedom fries” instead. We wonder if there are any 
adults left in America. We note that in some parts of America 
“God Will Save Us from  
Ourselves!”11
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we are exhausting our groundwater and our aquifers and no one 
seems to have a plan for what to do about it; rather, some want 
to use the water left to us to carry out fracking. It occurs to us 
the extravagance with which we throw our weight around seems 
to have a connection with our mounting debts and depletion of 
resources. We seem never to have met a war we didn’t like; and 
where there is no war, we invent one, as we did in Iraq. One bad 
habit seems to feed the other. We live like a spoiled and brawl-
ing playboy, and those among us given to reflection wonder how 
long the synergy of this brawling and this borrowing against the 
future can hold up.
We think of our hoarding yet throwaway lifestyle. We wake 
up in the morning to invitations to guard our house with a state-
of-the-art security system, to invitations to try a diet famous for 
miracles performed on imperfectly shaped celebrities, to invita-
tions to reconfigure our drab backyard by installing a sparkling 
fresh-cut redwood deck, along with invitations to reconfigure our 
faces with a series of cosmetological interventions, including— 
but not limited to —  surgeries. We live in perpetual unrest, 
besieged from dawn to dusk with admonitions as to what is 
newer, better, bigger, faster, and cheaper—  and believe what we 
hear. Some of us are too restless to sit through a Thanksgiving 
meal. We replace our car, our cell phone, and our drab back-
yard. Our landfills bulge with our discards. Rather frequently, we 
replace our spouses. We use our rivers as toilets down which we 
flush the waste materials of our extravagant lives. On those occa-
sions when we gaze at idyllic scenes of sailboats off which people 
fish in San Francisco Bay, we have to hope the happy sailors are 
too prudent to eat freely of their catch. An uneasy misgiving tells 
us nature has a way of striking back. In fact, the first half of the 
evening news is now regularly devoted to showing us how nature 
is currently doing so.
Politicians play to us on the hunch that many of us feel impov-
erished. But for millions of us, this is not precisely our plight. 
Rather we are too locked into a round-the-clock commercialism, 
and we feel stretched to our limit in our effort to keep up.
We see species on the brink of extinction. There are other spe-
cies we do not see — they turn up missing. And we wonder what 
life on earth will be like without these fellow members of the 
biological web that spawned us.
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As the climate warms, and old provisions of nature can no 
longer be counted on, we wonder too what accommodations 
will be necessary in some future sharing of declining, no lon-
ger reliably provided resources. Will we, backed by our nuclear 
arsenal and our permanent state of military readiness and activ-
ity, simply continue to utilize the share of things to which 
we’ve become accustomed? If so, what will this tenacious exer-
cise of privilege cost in our relations with others? How ready 
will we be to exercise hospitality toward those whose home-
lands have become inhospitable as a result of the lifestyle we’ve 
exemplified?
In uses of water and land, in some places we already experience 
domestic tension within our borders between those who would 
retain traditional agricultural uses and maybe protect habitat for 
wildlife as well, and those who would trade such uses for fur-
ther development of homes, malls, and factories. The homes may 
be needed for foreseeable numbers seeking refuge from more 
blighted areas; and the people who will live in these homes must 
have places where they can purchase the necessities of life, and 
they must have places where they can work to earn the purchase 
price of these necessities. Amid all this, we can easily forget that 
among these necessities are food and water, and as Malthus fore-
saw, our demands keep forging ahead as our agricultural and 
other food resources are thinning. (How come the price of crab 
is rising, and will oysters still be available as the chemistry of the 
oceans changes?)
What is the formula for adjudicating the conflicting claims? 
And what will the world look like if we do not calculate wisely? 
Can we really leave the calculation to an interplay of greed and 
the fine-tuning of an invisible hand? Will we Americans con-
tinue to have abundant sources of food? Will potable water con-
tinue to be generally accessible? Or will increasing demands and 
disruptions in our food and water systems reduce the quality of 
life for us as well as for those who live elsewhere? Has our evo-
lutionary history installed in us such a tendency to consume that 
we are programmed to succeed into failure?
Time to take a deep breath. 
I do not say all of us are spending our days on such consider-
ations. Most of us are not. Quite a few of us are too busy tweeting 
our friends, responding to the latest commercials, worrying about 
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our eyelashes and face wrinkles, and wondering why this or that 
celebrity has slept with someone other than their spouse.
To a resolute secularist, I have not much to say about all this. 
Find within your resolute secularism what means you can to cope 
with it. For the remainder of this chapter, I address believers— 
people who believe there is some noble and transcendent purpose 
at stake in our human endeavor.
One should not despise this huge mass of us. As a people of 
great energy and creativity, it’s unlikely that we’re genuinely 
oblivious to the issues just mentioned. If we were, why demand 
so much from drugs, alcohol, and our storehouses of painkillers? 
Why elect to dwell in cyberspace?
More likely we simply can’t see what to do about these issues. 
In our workaday lives, we leave such problems to “experts” (spe-
cial people to be hired and guided by our elected officials) — 
dreading, even as we do so, that members of that special and rare 
set from whom we choose our officials are more apt to draw profit 
from our problems than solve them.
And so the aforementioned pause for refreshment— that deep 
breath— renders up, does it not, a daunting scene?
Enter God.
What sometimes occurs to us as an alternative to all this dreary 
casting about is to turn all these matters over to God. This last 
isn’t simply a space-filler for careless people who don’t think often 
about these things; it’s a default position as well for some who do. 
Haven’t we been taught to accept the things we cannot change?
“God” as an answer has some plausibility.
I often think the most convincing evidence for God is the hab-
itability of our planet. I know what I speak of isn’t really a proof 
at all, but more in the order of a notion, or perhaps an intuition. 
Here we are: emerging from nowhere — who knows how?— into 
a place that has characteristics of having been prepared for us. To 
be sure, the resolute secularist will protest: “That’s a mere truism. 
It’s a tautology. For earth would have to be accommodated to us 
for us to be here!” But I’m not precisely making an argument. The 
purpose here isn’t to make a case so much as to assess a situation. 
It’s as if one walked ashore on an unknown island and found the 
place hospitable. There was foliage with delightful hues, offering 
shade; there was birdsong and fresh water. Moreover, there was 
a library full of volumes well suited to entertain and inform one. 
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Throw in a candle, lit and shining, on a table spread with food. 
Coming upon such apparent provision, one would surmise the 
presence of a host. (I can hear my good friend Spinoza saying 
softly: surely you don’t want to go down this road; surely you’ll 
soon find yourself saying with Bacon, Descartes, and the Puri-
tans that the whole value of nature is its mere utility for us!)
What I present here though is neither precisely an argument 
nor an agenda. I attempt an analogy for how human beings every-
where and from time immemorial have come to sense a sacred 
dimension to things, a divinity hovering over us that “shapes our 
ends, rough-hew them how we will.”
Granted the real-world correspondences there are to such pro-
visions as those on our imaginary island, it seems unlikely to us 
humans that our host would have paid such attention to mat-
ters of detail simply so our habitation here would end in dismal 
failure. It’s on these grounds we hear devout people say: “God 
wouldn’t allow us to bring into the world more children than the 
world can handle” or “God wouldn’t let us destroy our environ-
ment!” or “God would never put so much power into our hands 
as to enable us to defeat His plan by nuclear catastrophe.” These 
are powerful messages.
They are “liberating” as well. As argued earlier, we often choose 
our thoughts for their convenience. The thoughts just cited tell 
us there’s no problem of overpopulation. There’s no real problem 
with the environment. It’s only those who look a gift horse in the 
mouth who worry about climate change or diminishing resources, 
or some danger of self-annihilation of the human species through 
our own weaponry. God would never let such things occur.
To our temptations to despair, these messages offer an inviting 
alternative. Why not adopt them as our answer? Why carry the 
world on our shoulder? Why not live, instead, in the comforting 
and reassuring glow they offer? Such messages invite us to sleep 
comfortably on this Greyhound bus called earth and leave the 
driving to God. Why say no to morning in America?
In truth, it’s very human to take this kind of thing to heart. 
And not just in America. When devout Hindus say “everything 
is maya,” they are, in a sense, going here. They’re saying, “God 
has not, in reality, let things reach anything like a cul-de-sac. We 
only think He has. The world we perceive is not the world that 
is.” When Muslims or Puritan Christians opt for predestination, 
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they are doing something similar. A thoroughgoing doctrine of 
predestination can take the worst horrors human history has con-
trived and see them as neither more nor less than what God in 
His eternal wisdom and goodness has decided to make happen. 
Such horrors are thereby sanctified as products of God’s will. The 
sting of such horrors has been removed.
A dispositive objection (one that gets the job done) to both these 
approaches— maya and predestination— is that they are in con-
flict with our deepest intuition of the actuality of the world and 
of our freedom of action within it. The Hindu sage who speaks 
of maya denies this world explicitly, telling us that all we experi-
ence is mere appearance; he is Plato on steroids. The proclaimer 
of predestination is less direct. Yet to deny a thing its proper 
agency (as those who believe in predestination do both regard-
ing things in general, and particularly regarding human beings) 
seems finally to consign to oblivion the reality of everything but 
God. Common sense and our experience in general inform us 
that existence and agency are inextricably bound together. When 
the proponent of predestination says: “God has all the agency,” 
for such an advocate it follows: “Creatures have no agency at all.” 
In such a conception, we and the world about us are reduced to 
no more than mere characters and props in a divinely written 
script; the world collapses into a plaything of Divine imagina-
tion. (Contemporary Puritans have trouble with Darwin because 
of the immense agency he assigns to the physical universe. Good 
Calvinists want to reserve all that agency for God. Not only has 
God got the whole world in His hands, but— by the way— there 
actually is no world.)
The extreme test-case for such a perspective was the Holocaust. 
In Letters and Papers from Prison, the Lutheran theologian Diet-
rich Bonhoeffer, during the unspeakable anguish of the Third 
Reich, writes that we must live and act in the world “etsi Deus 
non daretur”—  as if, that is, God did not exist. What had come 
home to Bonhoeffer was not atheism, but realism about the actu-
ality of our world being a place where evil can take hold. He’d 
arrived at an irresistible insight into the actuality of evil. He 
found himself immersed in consciousness of its density and claim 
to being. While Aquinas and other medieval schoolman spoke 
of evil as a form of privation, they also anticipated Bonhoeffer by 
their insistence on what they called “secondary causality.” This 
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was the causality inherent in all creatures— the causality we 
humans exercise. While God causes the world and everything in 
it, Aquinas insisted that humans have by reason of their partici-
pation in being, a causality that is equally real, though altogether 
rooted in God’s sustaining gift of being. That this human causal-
ity can go unimaginably awry is the insight that came crashing 
down on Bonhoeffer.
In the aftermath of the Holocaust, there was a brief surging 
and prominence of death-of-God theologies. The mood lingers 
on, though the slogan has retreated. Rather what the Holocaust 
should have led to was the death of predestination as a credible 
doctrine and to the demise of God-will-save-us-from-ourselves 
theologies.
As I suggest, in addition to monstrous events, what should 
further fortify us against an easy religious complacency is the 
spontaneous awareness, possessed by each of us, that we exist 
and each has demonstrable agency as a being who is not infinite. 
In our human case, although it’s a dependent agency dependent 
on the source of our being, it’s a very rich agency, richer it would 
seem than the everyday agency of rocks, or vegetables, or— it 
would seem—  of the whole order of non-human animals.
If nothing else has sufficed, our daily experience of this rich 
human agency should lay to rest the notion “God will save us 
from ourselves.” God is not in the business of saving us from 
ourselves. God who created us with agency is not in the business 
of cancelling that agency.
Surely, there’d have been no point in creating each of us a “self ” 
had it been our creator’s plan to save us from the inconveniences 
of being a self. In a very radical way—  as the existentialists tire-
lessly insist— we are genuinely “on our own.” Yet this isn’t quite 
as atheist existentialists would have it. Contrary to Sartre, it 
seems it isn’t because of God’s absence we are on our own, but 
because God has the unimaginable power to give existence to 
what God conceives.1
1. To say this is not to claim we creatures endure in existence without 
God’s sustaining action, but to say that by reason of God’s sustaining 
action, we really do exist and have an agency that is truly not God’s but 
ours. If this strikes one as a great mystery, well, welcome to the club.
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For if God really is a creator, creation must, in a sense, be “on its 
own.” A notion therefore that one enhances one’s sense of God’s 
reality by declaring God the micro-manager of the universe is 
bad theology. It diminishes God— for it will not allow that God 
can create that which can stand against God and oppose God’s 
purposes; it denies nuclear physicist Ian Thompson’s assertion 
that God can create a rock he cannot move. As Thompson says, 
God did. That rock is us.
Calvin’s God doesn’t do this. The God of the Bible does. Cal-
vin, one must conclude, is not a reliable reader of the Bible for 
Calvin cannot take in the opening lesson of the Bible’s teaching 
that God can create what really is not God.
If we’re real, if we’re intelligent being with the self-
determination which intelligence entails, we can’t be such that 
our agency is magically suspended or swept away when it would 
get us into trouble. Though Leibniz and that kindest of men, Spi-
noza, would blissfully like to think otherwise, they are clearly 
wrong. They would reduce us to what we’ve noted we clearly are 
not: divinely designed toys for the play of divine imagination. 
(Whatever is wholesome in the writing of Nietzsche can, I think, 
be traced to this: his relentless insistence on the actuality and 
freedom of his own being.)
Because we are real, God cannot save us from ourselves. If 
God could, it would be in the ironic mode of the American pilot 
in Vietnam who remarked: “We had to destroy the village to save 
it.” A deliverance of that sort isn’t quite the deliverance we desire. 
Neither, it would seem, is it a deliverance God has ever intended.
While it’s a false hope to think “God will save us from our-
selves,” nonetheless it does not seem in any way false to hope that 
God will somehow make available to us (indeed has made avail-
able to us) sources of direction and guidance amid the predica-
ment and perplexities of human freedom.
Until quite recently, all peoples everywhere have had this hope 
always— that there is wisdom available to us; that within the 
miraculous, inexplicable gift of existence, some direction for our 
response and use of it is included; that there are indicated paths 
for success in the human project. When we speak of “conscience,” 
and “inspiration,” and “intimations,” we are addressing this. 
That different peoples have come up with different formulations 
doesn’t tell against such formulations having a common source 
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in that which holds the whole in being. A good physician suits 
the prescription to the patient. We wonderfully diverse humans 
do not lack prescriptions. (More particularly, consider how a 
recently silenced Catholic theologian Roger Haight has written 
that you cannot take seriously the vision Jesus provides of God 
as loving father—  and mother—  and then go on to believe that 
God would have rationed the revelation of human dignity and 
purpose to a mere subset of God’s human creatures.) Christians 
have often thought they, as missionaries to non-Christians, were 
the first agents of such revelation. But surely, as the Jesuit Roger 
Haight surmises, God has been there before them.
As suggested in the chapter on fundamentalism, what we 
must learn is to stop saying: “I’ve found the only guidepost!” We 
believers must learn not to be so enamored of our guidepost that 
we’re ready to use it as a stake through the heart of anyone who 
holds a different one. While God doesn’t save us from ourselves, 
God has provided abundantly, so that no one is without some 
means whereby to live meaningfully. An urgent part of our task 
is to learn how to avoid converting the means provided us into 
a weapon— to avoid making a sword of our guidepost. Better 
by far if our guidepost comes in the form of a plowshare, or a 
shovel for planting trees, or a pointer toward development of solar 
energy, or a formula for worldwide compassion.
To believe as some religious persons among us do that “no work 
of ours is conducive unto salvation” and to cry “Sola Gratia!”— 
only by God’s grace are we saved!—  can be a path to thoughts 
of predestination and desperation. We echo then our Puritan 
ancestors. To say however “God is gracious” is to speak a saving 
truth—  so long as one realizes God’s gracious initiative dies in us 
if we do not respond. While Luther is right about grace —namely, 
that we have need of grace (for we lack the means to place our-
selves in God’s friendship) —Bonhoeffer’s truth supplies the nec-
essary corollary: a grace that does not invite and summon us to 
an act of personal choice is cheap and spurious— no grace God 
would bother with.
God doesn’t save us from ourselves. It is the terror of the God-
given human predicament that— with God’s help — to save us 
from ourselves is up to us. (See Kierkegaard. See Pogo. See the 
Greater Jihad— in which we struggle against ourselves, to sur-
render ourselves to Allah.)

281
When people speak of “the next election,” what they seem most 
often to be looking to is the approaching election of a president. 
In our system, the president is no mere humble executive officer 
who sees to it that decrees of Congress are carried out. Impor-
tantly, our president is also our head of state; he or she is, at any 
particular moment, expected to perform as a personification of 
the American nation.
However modest their achievements may have been, our 
individual presidents have each become a cottage industry for 
historians—  each has been the focus of a continually growing 
number of assessments and counter-assessments. The “History 
of the American Presidency” is, by contrast, a leaner source of 
books— perhaps because the generalizations in such a history 
must accommodate vastly different personalities functioning 
under vastly different conditions over a period of more than two 
hundred years. Generalizations in social studies are notoriously 
difficult and subject to challenge; generalizations about what’s 
been happening to something as abstract as “the American Presi-
dency” are especially so.
Nonetheless, let’s venture an opening generalization about 
American presidents. By and large they’ve been people who have 
celebrated The American Story. As suggested in the opening 
chapter on education, that story says we are a people who have 
cultivated freedom, and who have constituted a shelter for it— a 
sanctuary where there is liberty and justice for all. Ours is the 
land of the free and the home of the brave. While slow to anger 
and war, we have been heroic in response when summoned by 
attacks on the freedom and prosperity of our way of life. Further, 
“The Next Election  




we’re a humanitarian people — willing to spend blood and trea-
sure overseas, putting ourselves in harm’s way from humanitarian 
motivation in arduous missions, necessary but often thankless, to 
extend abroad the benefits and blessings of democracy we enjoy 
at home.
In the section on force, I’ve argued at length that this story 
is less supported by evidence than we might imagine, and that 
indeed a great deal of data contradicts it. It’s not my purpose to 
argue that case again. Here let’s note only that the recitation of 
The American Story has been an expected function of our presi-
dents in their capacity as head-of-state. They have tended to be 
good Fourth-of-July orators.
(Contrast them with Charles Beard who has argued that our 
forefathers in the era of our revolutionary days were largely well-
to-do landowners and businessmen, caught up in a tug-o’-war 
between themselves and the governmental elite of England over 
who should prosper most from the success of the American colo-
nies. Howard Zinn, while valuing the values asserted in the high 
rhetoric of those revolutionary days, says those who spoke that 
rhetoric were often less than serious. Zinn is sympathetic to the 
story as told by Beard, and in A People’s History of the United States 
Zinn has fleshed out the approach of Beard. But this was Beard’s 
and Zinn’s story; it emphatically has not been The American 
Story.)
Not only have our presidents told The American Story, they’ve 
often been presented as exemplifying its promise of freedom and 
opportunity. Jackson rose from struggle and mistreatment by the 
British to become “a great champion of the common man.” In 
order to improve his brand, William Henry Harrison was pre-
sented as one who emerged from a log cabin in response to a call 
to public service that prepared him for the White House. (Actu-
ally, Harrison was a member of the southern aristocracy.) Later, 
in the case of Lincoln, the story about a journey from a log cabin 
to the White House was actually true. In 2008, Barack Obama 
used his own story of Kenyan ancestry to present himself as one 
exemplifying the upward mobility possible in America.
America is “a city on a hill,” and the White House is sacred 
space at the center of that city. From there, presidents are 
expected to project the radiance of America to the world at large.
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How this plays out is instructive. That Jefferson owned slaves 
was not a problem. That Jefferson called in our merchant fleet 
off the Atlantic Ocean was a problem. Presidents don’t do such 
things. Temporarily he became very unpopular. When John 
Quincy Adams, as Monroe’s secretary of state, drafted the Mon-
roe Doctrine, there was “an era of good feeling,” and both he and 
Monroe basked in the public’s approval. When, as Chief Execu-
tive, Adams tried to impose greater order on the way America 
was developing, his popularity declined, and he was rejected as 
an elitist. And later, when as a congressman, he declaimed end-
lessly against slavery in America, many regarded him a crank 
and an embarrassment; his behavior was un-presidential and out 
of touch with The American Story. Lincoln, however, as a law-
yer for the railroads, was a sound man who could be trusted to 
know how the West should be developed. As a man who spoke 
eloquently and acted forcefully to maintain the Union as the 
indispensable premise of American Destiny, Lincoln was doubly 
sound. He died in time to escape the ordeal of addressing the 
consequences of his success; his place of greatness in our memory 
of presidents is secure. He fit our story.
By contrast, a century and some years later, when Jimmy Carter 
delivered a speech that seemed, according to our media, to reg-
ister a sense of national “malaise,” he was replaced by a man who 
spoke of “morning in America.”
So, telling The American story and embodying the spirit of 
that story is an important part of what presidents do. When they 
do it well, they are popular. When they falter in doing it, they 
may be rejected as being job-holders who don’t understand their 
job.
Fulfillment of this presidential function has had consequences 
tending toward a concentration of power in the executive branch. 
A shift of power away from the Congress and from the courts to 
the presidency has been enabled by a predilection in our char-
acter. We like the spokesperson for our nation to be outspoken 
and strong. (The popularity, as I write, of Trump’s candidacy 
reflects this, I think. Even those who dislike what he says may 
like his style.) If our president acts in a way that seems bold and 
uncurtailed, we tend to celebrate that as representing the spirit 
of America. Jackson was “a man on horseback.” Lincoln could 
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endure against intense opposition and could suspend habeas 
corpus and could, without constitutional authorization, issue an 
Emancipation Proclamation because he was seen by many (and in 
the border states as well as in the North), as a dependable guard-
ian of America’s destiny. Teddy and Woodrow and Franklin all 
knew the uses of the bully pulpit, and this was a source of their 
popularity.
First Major Current in the History of the  
American Presidency
Let me suggest, then, that our tendency to turn to presidents 
for a reassuring sense of who we are provides the context for a 
major current in the history of the American presidency: namely, 
a gradual ascendancy of the executive branch over the legisla-
tive and judicial. Such growth has been regarded negatively by 
some who see it as a march towards what Arthur Schlesinger Jr. 
labeled “the Imperial Presidency.” While there may have been a 
hiatus in the time of Jimmy Carter, and a fierce effort by Repub-
licans to inhibit exercise of presidential power in the adminis-
trations of Clinton and Obama, it’s evident that the tendency 
toward concentrating power in the presidency continues in the 
twenty-first century. The tendency has been artfully re-christened 
in recent administrations as support for “the unitary executive.” 
Our presidency shows, even in the face of manifest abuses, an 
apparently irreversible tendency toward ongoing accumulations 
of power.
Because the American president is the head of state, the Amer-
ican presidency provides our most heightened form of celebrity 
politics. “America’s Got Talent,” “American Idol,” “the Voice,” 
and “Dancing with the Stars” are distant rivals for public atten-
tion compared to our quadrennial contests for the presidency. 
Nothing else brings in such revenue for the media as this contest 
does. The media do not pay for this “reality TV”; rather, the con-
testants pay the media for the opportunity to perform political 
commercials.
A notable source of celebrity to qualify one as a candidate for 
this contest is from participation in war. Washington, Jackson, 
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W. H. Harrison, Franklin Pierce, Zachary Taylor, Grant, Hayes, 
Garfield, Benjamin Harrison, T. Roosevelt, and Eisenhower had 
each achieved celebrity as war heroes prior be being considered 
viable candidates. With the exception of Colonel Benjamin Har-
rison and “Colonel” Roosevelt, all had been successful generals. 
Among other candidates whose war records seem to have helped 
qualify them have been McKinley, Truman, Kennedy, Nixon, 
Carter, and G. H. W. Bush, as well as unsuccessful candidates 
John Kerry and John McCain.
War during an administration tends of course to expand the 
scope of authority for one who’s already been elected president. At 
the outbreak of war, the president taps into unmeasured reserves 
of power available to our commander-in-chief in time of national 
peril. The nation as a whole could probably not have survived 
without this virtually unrestricted allowance of power to Lincoln. 
Eighty years later, when the frustrating slowness of New Deal 
recovery was dimming his popularity, Franklin Roosevelt’s hold 
on power was renewed by the darkly threatening clouds from war 
in Europe, and then by the very real smoke over Pearl Harbor. 
Roosevelt’s “bold executive action” was granted a new lease at the 
center of affairs. Nixon, during whose presidency the Vietnam 
War continued, seems to have made attentive use of precedents 
provided by his predecessors (including to be sure the Republi-
can Lincoln and the Democrat Roosevelt), and it was particularly 
Nixon’s administration that was the object of Schlesinger’s com-
plaint in The Imperial Presidency. 
A part of the congressional response to perceived excess in the 
executive branch was the War Powers Act, intended to curb the 
increasingly elastic war-making power of presidents. Noteworthy 
is how little impact the law has had. Ronald Reagan, immensely 
popular, was able to flout it with near impunity. Yes, there were 
complaints, but there were minimal consequences for the careers 
of those who violated the law. Since then the Cold War has been 
replaced by the War on Terror, and all the earlier arguments for 
unfettered presidential power have returned. The advocates have 
not, of course, argued for an “imperial presidency”; the case they 
present, and the theory on which they would have presidents 
act, calls for, as I mentioned, a less ominous-sounding “unitary 
executive.”
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The notion of the “unitary executive” has a number of impor-
tant features. Taken at a fairly technical level, it means that the 
president is immediately in charge of all executive agencies within 
the executive branch. This is not the dry civics lesson it may seem. 
While it may seem a mere truism of Civics 101, in the hands of 
those promoting it the theory takes a long step toward reduc-
ing the executive agencies to the level of advisory committees— 
groups whose chief function is to suggest to the president what 
he or she may want to consider in the way things are run. The 
Justice Department and the attorney general are less the autono-
mous crime fighters we might expect, and are more an agency 
for suggesting to the president which crimes the president might 
decide are worth pursuing. The Food and Drug Administration 
is decreasingly in charge of regulating food and drugs; it acts at 
the good pleasure of the president. Its findings can be nullified 
by the president; its rulings can be revised or suspended by the 
president. The same can be said of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. The same can be said of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency. And so forth. 
This of course is far from being altogether new. Strong presi-
dents have always tended to see the executive branch working 
this way. It would probably be close to the mark, for instance, to 
imagine that Lyndon Johnson thought of the executive branch as 
his “ranch,” and thought of all who held office in it as his “ranch 
hands.” In fact even very weak presidents (Grant, Harding) have, 
to their sorrow and our loss, loaded the executive agencies with 
cronies in the expectation the president would thereby put the 
stamp of his inclinations and preferences on all the operations of 
the executive. 
But with the concordance of a working majority of current 
Supreme Court Justices, the logic of the “unitary executive” lately 
means the reach of the president extends beyond maintain-
ing tight cohesiveness in the executive branch and touches in 
fact all the activities of Congress. Since the president swears to 
uphold the Constitution, it’s among the president’s constitutional 
responsibilities—  so the argument of the second Bush goes— to 
see that congressional law does not usurp or breach constitutional 
law. In place of vetoing a bill, the president can in the course of 
signing it into law explain in a “signing statement” what he or 
  w h y the center ca n ’t hold 287
she takes to be its constitutional scope. An irony that has not 
been missed is that the president, acting as a defender of consti-
tutional law, thus achieves a neat end-run around the Constitu-
tion. As legal scholars have been quick to point out, the effect of 
this practice is to reduce radically the power of Congress and also 
to encroach dramatically on what has traditionally been regarded 
as the defining function of the Supreme Court. 
When however Congress consents to this innovative version of 
veto power and the Supreme Court itself goes along with it, the 
tendency of the public in general is to ask: “Where’s the prob-
lem?” Among those who inveigh most against “big government,” 
many seem to take in stride the concentration of power that has 
taken place. Perhaps this is because a clear effect of strengthening 
the presidency is to facilitate the use of military force. A strong 
presidency “uncomplicates” the business of engaging the nation 
in war. Once our commander-in-chief has positioned troops in 
harm’s way, it’s a foregone conclusion our nation will rally to 
their support. Without benefit of Constitutional amendment, the 
war-deciding role of Congress has laped into desuetude. To use 
a metaphor from bridge, the Constitution has not been violated 
(harsh word!), it’s been finessed.
There’s more. John Yoo, at the University of California at 
Berkeley, finds in the doctrine of the unitary executive an implied 
power by which the president, in time of war (such as the cur-
rent seemingly open-ended war on terrorism), can act as the final 
arbiter of morality. As with Lincoln during the Civil War, habeas 
corpus and other due processes of law can be bypassed. In fact, 
were the president to deem that the security of the nation would 
thereby be enhanced, there are no limits to what the president 
might order. It seems the president could order anything. The 
president could, for example, authorize that fingers of an unwill-
ing witness, on the suspicion that he or she harbored lethal 
secrets, be incrementally chopped through the bone — like a car-
rot on a cutting board— till the witness gave satisfaction to his or 
her interrogators. Yoo, so far as I know, hasn’t cited this example; 
but his doctrine authorizes it. In the nuclear age, where quick 
response may, Yoo argues, be the crucial factor for survival, the 
powers of the commander-in-chief are self-legitimating. There 
is no outside agency that can exercise oversight in their regard; 
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they have a quasi-divine character. In time of emergency (such as 
the permanent emergency in which we now live, the American 
president is the god of planet earth. (The goal of absolute national 
security can allow no less.)
John Yoo continues to be a tenured lecturer in American law 
at the University of California at Berkeley. John Roberts, Samuel 
Alito, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas—  Catholics and 
comfortable with strong authority—  continue to be justices of the 
Supreme Court; Anthony Kennedy—  also Catholic— frequently 
votes with them. And Barack Obama has not repudiated the 
extraordinary powers claimed for the presidency during the era 
of his immediate predecessor.
Such seems a sober account of the growth of presidential power.
Second Major Current in the History of the  
American Presidency
One might say, well, so far we’ve proved that presidential elec-
tions are more important than ever. With such tremendous pow-
ers in the hands of the president of the United States, all we have 
to do is elect the right person, and our problems will be solved. 
This is, in fact, what many hoped when they voted for Barack 
Obama in 2008.
Why it didn’t happen requires further consideration— much of 
it seeming to run contrary to things just set forth. Paradoxical as 
it’s sure to sound, while the powers of the office have expanded to 
a kind of virtual infinity, the discretionary freedom of action of 
the person occupying the office seems under growing constraints. 
To understand this, one should take the matter further upstream. 
For the constraints regarding who will be considered as a candi-
date seem to have increased, and it’s likely the one who wins the 
contest and arrives at the presidency will maintain a keen aware-
ness of how he or she got there. This person will not easily forget 
the assurances given— perhaps not explicitly, yet quite clearly— 
during the vetting process. He or she is likely to remember not to 
bite the hand that provided— will you allow?— the pet food, the 
collar, and the leash. 
The matter of who will be in the pool of those from whom 
the president will be selected is settled in advance, and far from 
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the polling booths where individual citizens cast actual votes. So 
if anyone thinks this is something the citizen decides through 
the primaries, they might want to think again. Note the general 
dismay of the public lately as they listen to the sorry mix of can-
didates who come forward in the primaries; hear the collective 
moan as they reflect that one of these is likely soon to be presi-
dent for the next four years. The people have little control over 
who is offered to them. By the November election that picks the 
winner, the voter often sadly feels the only thing left to decide is 
who among the candidates is likely to do the least harm. 
Out of all this comes a second general observation. Just as the 
process of selecting a president has been found too important to 
be left to the people, so the politics of how the president will 
behave in office has been found too important to be left to the 
president.
We can watch this trend of constraint growing in the years 
after World War Two. While Franklin Roosevelt provided a ser-
vice to America’s capitalist system (saving it temporarily from its 
more blatantly counterproductive addictions), he dealt with it in 
a highly personal and freewheeling manner—  one resonant with 
exuberant disdain. Not only was this noticed, both then and now, 
but it’s been deeply resented, both then and now. Two presiden-
cies later, Eisenhower ended a popular two-term administration 
with a warning to the American people about a growing military-
industrial complex. Among other things, it seems Eisenhower 
was expressing a sense that constraints on presidential initiative 
and presidential decision-making were increasing, and that suc-
cessors would probably have to struggle with increasing pressures 
from the military and from corporations to control America.
One interpretation of the short and drama-filled administra-
tion of John Kennedy is that Kennedy became increasingly aware 
of efforts within the executive branch to control, undermine, and 
resist presidential initiatives, and that when he balked at these 
efforts, he was brought to heel. 
Regarding Johnson, let’s assume that the Great Society was 
the apple of his eye. A possible explanation why he escalated in 
Vietnam a war he seems to have said privately he thought we 
couldn’t win is that continuation of the war was the price he had 
to pay if he wanted to be architect of the Great Society. In the 
Far East, our power brokers felt an example needed to be set. 
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Japan had been duly disciplined; but we had “lost” China. When 
we’d “won” South Vietnam by setting up the Geneva Accords 
and then violating them (done under Eisenhower), it seemed to 
us the unscrupulous Vietnamese were trying to steal Vietnam 
right back from under our feet; such at least Johnson may have 
been made to understand. At the time it may have seemed a good 
idea to remind Asia how high the price could be for thwarting 
U. S. plans and for proceeding autonomously. When Johnson lost 
all effectiveness in selling the war, he was exhausted, and felt the 
need to step down.
Nixon was a reliable steward of the Vietnam War, but he had 
a brooding and persistent sense that hostile forces were out to 
get him. This fact is usually set forth as a tale of how Nixon’s 
paranoia led to his downfall. Thinking he had enemies every-
where, he managed eventually to make enemies everywhere. 
A nuanced variation is reported by Russ Baker in his book on 
the Bush family. In Family of Secrets, Baker depends upon Len 
Colodny’s Silent Coup as a source for an alternative explanation. 
One can draw from these books a picture along the lines that 
stray from the canonical story. Nixon, taking a select few into his 
band of brothers, acted with notable independence as president, 
working at his grand architecture of world peace. He was by no 
means inclined to keep the intelligence community posted as to 
what he was doing; nor was he at all inclined to be their puppet. 
He was disinclined to listen to pedigreed advisors among his fel-
low Americans, regardless of their party or presumed place in the 
hierarchy of power. A master manipulator, he did not at all like 
being manipulated. Important parties in the government and the 
military found him inconvenient. Using his well-known paranoia, 
they baited him into a cover-up, and brought him down. 
Someone to whom I expounded this passed it on to his teacher, 
who dismissed it as a “conspiracy theory.” I in turn thought this 
a naïve response. At the very least according to the Deep Throat 
motif that Woodward provides in his account, there were insiders 
in the intelligence community (FBI, CIA, etc.) working behind 
the scenes with Woodward to bring Nixon down. If that doesn’t 
qualify as a conspiracy, I don’t know what would. We never ask 
what the motivation was of these busy people within the executive 
branch. Is it really all that obvious that it was sheer patriotism?
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It can be argued this is wrong. My constructions here are 
controversial. But the pattern of three “failed” presidencies in a 
row— Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon— is interesting. Kennedy was 
shot; Johnson was broken by what was expected of him; Nixon 
was forced to resign. No doubt later presidents have found the 
sequence instructive.
Carter clearly was “beyond the pale”—  a man who had slipped 
through the vetting process by mistake. When he wanted to 
make Ted Sorensen (JFK’s eloquent speechwriter) the Director 
of the CIA, he was firmly shown he could not do so. Later, in the 
immensely awkward situation of the hostage crisis, there’s credit-
able evidence he was undermined by opponents acting behind 
the scenes— that is, by people within our own political system 
exercising leverage in foreign policy over which he, the president, 
had no control.
Even in the case of Ronald Reagan (usually regarded a strong 
president), it’s interesting at the meeting with Gorbachev at Reyk-
javik to see Paul Nitze making sure that American staff work was 
as pedestrian and ungenerous in its estimate of Soviet intentions 
as possible; and it’s interesting to see Richard Perle (who could 
have made a living playing Richard III) there at Reagan’s elbow, 
staying Reagan’s hand when he was ready to sign an agreement 
that credited Gorbachev with being decent and trustworthy. (To 
paraphrase Robert Frost: something there is that does not want 
a peace.) Interesting too is Nancy Reagan’s statement after Ron-
ald’s death that he seemed less and less his own man during his 
second term.
For many years now, three full-time students of current affairs, 
Nader, Zinn, and Chomsky, have —  among others— been saying 
our two-party system is largely a charade. Reading them, one can 
arrive at a fresh perspective. The power of government does not 
reside in the person elected president. Granted, our party system 
is organized into distinct groups, similar to the way some neigh-
borhoods are divided by rival gangs in an inner city. The celebrity 
politics of the Beltway does genuinely separate Republicans from 
Democrats. The aversions are real, and the personal ambitions no 
doubt are divisive and mutually incompatible; what one wins the 
other loses. For all that, the activity is hardly more than “celeb-
rity politics.” It has little to do with real politics, i.e., governance. 
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Actual governance is concerned with the structuring of priorities, 
the formation and implementation of policies, the allotment of 
goods and services and taxes. Our quadrennial contest over the 
presidency is so much kabuki theater. Or rather it is a matter of 
determining who will be the designated spokesperson for policies 
too imbedded to be at issue in any election.
For those of us who accept this view, it’s not surprising that 
celebrities drift into politics. Since politics as we play it has 
become largely a matter of celebrity, why shouldn’t they? This 
helps explains why the things that interest us about politicians 
are often the same as things that interest us about other celebri-
ties. When, for instance Arnold Schwarzenegger was solving the 
problems of California by borrowing on its credit to the brink of 
bankruptcy, few among us seemed to notice. When, however, we 
got news of marital infidelity, there was a surge of interest and 
many said negative things of him for the first time. It’s as if we 
had little stake in his governorship, but had a vital interest in his 
marriage. Along those lines, we find it comforting to think the 
worst thing Clinton did as president regarded his personal life. 
That isn’t true, but many of us would like to think it was. Then we 
can chide him—  and turn and forgive him— like a charming but 
resolute misbehaver one might view on Big Brother.
As I say, Nader, Zinn, and Chomsky have tried for years to 
help us apprehend these matters more clearly; they’ve been saying 
what we think of as politics is entertainment— meant to distract 
and engage us while the consolidation of America into a plutoc-
racy moves forward—  or, if you prefer— while the well trained 
hand of the banker slips into your back pocket and steals your 
future.
Few things can make Nader and company’s case more persua-
sively than the campaign and administration of Obama. While 
people had thought they were voting for change, it turns out they 
elected a gifted performer and a reliable defender of the status 
quo, a conservative maintainer of the order they had elected him 
to reform. This was such bad news that even when he was most 
transparently discarding the promises by which he had won votes, 
people were writing this off to awkwardness or insufficient skill 
in dealing with a wily opposition; they did not see it as demon-
strating a keen sensitivity to the interests of those whose money 
and influence had put him in office.
  w h y the center ca n ’t hold 293
The moral from this review of recent presidencies is that while 
the powers of the presidency have expanded immensely, the 
actual discretionary freedom of the person who is president has 
contracted. Presidential initiatives are exercised on a short leash.
A Concluding Observation
One might think we’ve reached the end of a train of thought. 
Some voices on the far left say: “Elections do not matter because 
we are the captives of the corporatocracy.” But that’s not quite 
where I’m heading.
Underlying the best of radical dissent and critique is, I think, 
a hunch at once more disquieting than that, but also more hope-
ful. The hunch is that the reason the next election cannot save us 
is because the sensibility we have developed through four cen-
turies of American tradition disposes us to be the accomplices 
and enablers of the corporations that exploit people abroad and 
subvert the quality of life here at home. Let’s consult the record 
here, and see how well the charge of citizen complicity holds up.
In the beginning (and until recently), when the victims were 
Indians, a majority of “us” were approving. (Michael Huckabee, it 
seems, still is. He prides himself that he knows which side to root 
for in 1950s westerns.) Also, when the victims were blacks, for 
centuries—  and with increasing violence after the Civil War— 
many of us whites stood by while aggressive numbers among us 
actively engaged in exploitation, segregation, and vigilante hang-
ings of our fellow Americans. For the hundred and fifty years 
since the Civil War, blacks have been successfully charged with 
what I call PCWB — Presuming Citizenship While Black— 
something that continues to be recognized in many quarters to 
this day as an unpardonable crime. Also, earlier, when the vic-
tims were Mexicans of Mexico, a majority of us supported the 
notion of our manifest destiny, taking comfort in such muggers’ 
slogans as “The land belongs to those who use it!” Later we did 
not balk when American hegemony was extended over Cubans, 
and Hawaiians, and Filipinos. After the Second World War, we 
became informed supporters of a Pax Americana, to be imposed 
wherever and however we see fit; and we have been able of late, 
time and again, to shrug off any sense of the painful costs our 
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vision has imposed upon non-Americans—  consider for instance 
how undisturbed we have been over the recent massacre of civil-
ians in Gaza of July 2014—  covering over the mayhem we have 
endorsed with the mind-numbing phrase “collateral damage.”
Through all this history, we’ve developed almost no critique 
of “big government” as the enabler of this history—  so that even 
today, when we complain of “big government,” it’s not about this 
that we’re complaining. In the meantime, we continue to be ever 
more enamored of the products and conveniences and luxury that 
big government, by supporting our corporations, makes avail-
able to us. We want our lives well decked out with the signs of 
our election to grace. When push comes to shove, we want big 
government. Our sense of entitlement seems to have become 
almost  “iron.” We’re now so habituated and conformed to the 
rhythms and processes of American affluence (whether we’re rich 
or poor) that any truly genuine complaint of ours against big gov-
ernment tends to be that it hasn’t made us affluent enough. 
So it’s not just corporations that require political candidates 
to be enthusiastic champions of The American Story; one reason 
they require it is because we require it.
Listen to us as we demand from our candidates a promise that 
each generation will live richer than the one before, “because this 
is what America is all about!” We say this even as mechanisms 
which have formerly ground down others during the four cen-
turies of our development are now palpably grinding us down 
as well. Why can’t we be saved by the next election? The reason: 
because it’s not simply politicians who are at the root of our prob-
lems; it’s not the military; it’s not finally even the corporations. 
Pogo got it right: “We have met the enemy and he is us.”
There is no soft deliverance here. We have to deserve deliver-
ance if we are to achieve it. When we snuff out lives of others in 
covert operations of greed, and when we screw our heads into 
knots to convince ourselves that what looks here at home like a 
racist act really isn’t, we drown all wisdom.
As God cannot save us from ourselves, neither can Barack 
Obama. Neither can Hillary Clinton nor Sarah Palin nor 
Michele Bachmann nor Mitt Romney nor Jeb Bush nor Ron 
Paul nor Rand Paul nor Donald Trump. Bernie Sanders— who, 
in July of 2014, along with Elizabeth Warren and all members of 
our Congress, green-lighted a punitive action in Gaza in which 
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four hundred Gazan kids were massacred— is not a plausible 
candidate for our deliverance either. As the ruinous costs of our 
way of life become harder to ignore, the issues reduce to two: 
whether we’re willing to change a mindset and lifestyle we’ve 
been addicted to for centuries—  so we can act on the great truths 
we claim to believe; and—  secondly, whether we’re willing to do 
so while there’s still time.
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Well, good for you!
But one shouldn’t respond too sarcastically. There are only so 
many moves on the board.
We’ve seen that a fundamentalist insistence on one’s particular 
choice of religion as “the last word” is not likely to solve the prob-
lems of America or the world. Along similar lines, we’ve seen the 
hope God will save us in spite of ourselves has no foundation 
either in experience or thoughtful theology. But then when we 
turn to the political process as a place where we can take up our 
duties as adults and we discover the process itself seems irreme-
diably broken, for some there seems only one option left. It’s the 
option to give up on society and live for oneself, or for oneself 
and a few others. It expresses itself sometimes in the declara-
tion: “I’ve decided to be a survivor!”
If one is going to critique this, it’s good to proceed discreetly. 
For starters, there’s a significant difference between “retreat” 
and “radical separation.” It may be “retreat” that is really the goal 
of the speaker. As one who’s taught night classes, I’ve encountered 
more than once a woman who broke off her formal education 
to take up a life as wife and mother, and who —  once her chil-
dren were past their teens— had returned to school. I’ve heard 
this woman rhapsodize about those rare days when, somehow, 
everyone was going to be out of the house for a full twenty-four 
hours or so, leaving her on her own. This was not some woman 
engaged in an extramarital affair, nor one who wanted a divorce 
or who hated her children. But the joy— the sheer unspeakable 
relief—  of having a whole twenty-four hours in which no one 
would call out to her “Mom!” or “Honey!” was bliss. She just 
“I’ve Decided to Be a Survivor!”13
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wanted to reconnect with herself, wanted gently to think her own 
thoughts and live for a few hours in her own rhythm. The bliss 
of it all!
Such a woman knew the value of making a “retreat.” (Typically, 
she was a wonderful student.)
In the East, the tradition of the Holy Man has a long his-
tory. While most Asians are not official Holy Men, even today 
it would be impossible in many parts of Asia to grow up with-
out having a passing acquaintance with the phenomenon. These 
Holy Men are people disconnected somehow from the day-to-day 
affairs of society.
The “disconnection” can have very different textures. In the 
Asian traditions I value most, emphasis is placed on a social ori-
entation for the disconnection itself. One leaves society, but does 
so for the sake of society. It’s true that Siddhartha fled from wife 
and child, but he fled toward Buddha-hood. As the Buddha, he 
founded monasteries for monks and nuns and lived forty years in 
the service of all who came to him for guidance.
In the branch of Buddhism called Zen, much effort is expended 
by the novice in achieving “satori.” The koans (sound of one hand 
clapping, etc.) and the rock gardens play a part in this. The Zen-
master is emphatic however in insisting the blissful awakening— 
the breakthrough to bliss called “satori”— is no end in itself. Its 
value is as a threshold to a life of example and service to others.
So “retreats” can be of great utility— for the housewife; for 
Gandhi; for Buddhists; for any one of us.
I’d hazard one of the most consequential retreats in Ameri-
can history was that of Thoreau to Walden Pond— for about two 
years and two months. The withdrawal was by no means com-
plete; he wasn’t walled off from the rest of society. To some per-
haps his solitude may have seemed a stunt or an episode of self-
indulgence. His purpose was to figure out what really mattered. 
A good pragmatic American can ask: “What could be more con-
ceited and self-centered than such a project?”
Yet to take the measure of its aftermath would be difficult. The 
essay we call “On Civil Disobedience” no doubt draws much of 
its vitality from those near eight hundred days in which he was 
mostly his own companion. What his essay has done in India and 
America and elsewhere to inspire humane non-violent struggles 
for freedom during the century and a half since it was published 
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is startling. It could be a much better guide to the human future 
than Admiral Mahan’s Influence of Sea Power. That it may yet help 
head off what some thoughtful people regard a destined nuclear 
rendezvous with armageddon remains, I think, a hope worth 
sharing. 
Thoreau has fans in many places. Some find in his observation 
of nature the beginnings of American environmentalism. Some 
are impressed by his care for words and the construction of sen-
tences. He was searching for a rhetoric that lets things speak for 
themselves— with minimal imposition from the writer’s ideol-
ogy and assumptions. Like the English Romantic poets and the 
French Impressionist painters, he wanted to be an open-minded 
listener and watcher for what nature was presenting. Having lis-
tened and seen, he struggled for the most down-to-earth speech 
he could muster to express what he’d discovered. While a search 
for this kind of innocence was a very American thing, it belonged 
to a countercurrent of American culture — for it owed nothing 
to Puritan distrust of the natural world. The effect of Thoreau’s 
effort on later American diction is hard to gauge. My hunch is 
that it’s been considerable, and that Whitman, Mark Twain, and 
Hemingway are among those in his debt.
One praises Thoreau in the awareness he’s often been dismissed 
as quaint by fellow Americans, both in his lifetime and up to the 
present day. (So help me, there are presently intellectuals in our 
institutions of higher learning who will tell us “Thoreau is passé.” 
What they seem to overlook is that the environment about which 
he wrote with such care is also on the verge of becoming passé.) 
For some of us, this only adds to his distinction. He attempted to 
share with us his savvy anticipations of the harm rampant con-
sumerism could do to us. Long before most of us realized we 
were enthralled, he expressed misgivings about the way we were 
identifying the industrial revolution with moral progress. He had 
reservations too about the way we were identifying a budding 
American nationalism with moral progress. He took the heretical 
position one need not be a soldier to be a patriot. You could love 
America even without going out and killing an Indian, or Mexi-
can, or black person to prove it.
My point in discussing him is that Thoreau’s retreat was one 
with instructive consequences for society. It should keep us from 
simply condemning all retreats as anti-social.
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On the other hand, there are the likes of Ted Kaczynski and 
Jim Jones, where one has to feel things could not have gone more 
wrong. Kaczynski’s withdrawal seems to have been rooted not 
only in criticism and near-despair, but to have been corroded by 
misanthropy. His published manifesto is not lacking in logic and 
sensibility (some of it echoing Thoreau; some of it anticipating 
pages in this book), but it’s a logic and sensibility insufficiently 
tethered by humane feeling— not too distant from the mindset of 
professional advisors to our executive branch who defend torture 
and death by drone as our path to national security.
The case of charismatic leaders like Jones, who persuade whole 
groups to withdraw into cadres of “survivors,” is more difficult to 
assess and judge. In Jones we sense something of the fundamen-
talism criticized in earlier chapters of this book. He and his disci-
ples claimed to possess a wisdom that was unassailable. The claim 
was attended by a tendency to reject everyone not a member of 
the group. Still, it would be a mistake to meet this rejection with 
an equally blanket rejection of Jones and company. I would be 
very distressed if a child or friend of mine were involved with 
him; but we won’t understand this form of withdrawal unless we 
factor in its intent that at least something will be rescued from 
the current dismal scene —  a biblical remnant, an undestroyed 
sample of humanity from which to start afresh.
In fact, here too, lest we slip into an easy demonization of 
programs such as Jones’ program, let us note that, even when 
they lapse over into killing outsiders, they’re not as strange to us 
as we might pretend. When we undertake adventures in other 
countries that entail thousands of civilian deaths (our invasion of 
Iraq for instance) and when we write off these deaths (along with 
predictable deaths of many of our own soldiers) as collateral dam-
age, our pursuit of national security seems to have landed us in 
a mindset that rivals the anti-social behavior of survivalists like 
Jones. That we shield our acts with the umbrella phrase “acts of 
state” and as requisite for national security, shouldn’t blind us to 
their deep affinities with bizarre behavior and the mental aberra-
tions that separation from the larger community of humankind 
can give scope to.
In the space between retreats that have positive social conse-
quences on the one hand, and radical separations from society 
that are misanthropically tainted on the other, there’s a vast grey 
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area. Sulks (refusals to resolve grievances) figure into this area 
as do some forms of despairing altogether non-violent personal 
optings out. Regarding the latter, I had a brilliant student, an 
expert at writing scientific reports who worked at one of our 
national nuclear labs, who —  so far as I could tell—  eventually 
came to regard the human future as so daunting that he turned 
from the contemporary scene to immerse himself in study of his 
family tree and in pursuit of an understanding of Celtic poetry. I 
understood him quite well. Another student, whom I regard as 
the most gifted I’ve encountered, has frequently threatened to 
forsake all attention to current affairs and go live at peace with 
his soul in Amsterdam. (I tell him it won’t work; but the impulse 
to try is understandable.)
Various programs of survivor-hood present themselves for 
attention. One hears of people who are busily collecting canned 
goods and bottled beverages. Among them some also are stock-
ing firearms. Others, like the student of Celtic poetry, are bury-
ing themselves in hobbies that shelter consciousness from the 
undeniable manner in which, in Chesterton’s phrase, “the sky 
grows darker yet and the sea rises higher.” Some, as noted earlier, 
seek refuge in drugs and alcohol. Some retreat to gated commu-
nities, seeking at least a delaying action there from the encroach-
ing ugliness, unpredictability, and danger of the contemporary 
world. Others place their hope in financial advisors, and hope 
the right stock portfolio will enable them to weather whatever 
storms may come.
These people surely should not be despised. Darwin has taught 
us that the survival instinct is evolution’s great spring.
The dividing line I’d say for judging these tactics for survival 
is whether they function within the context of a social strategy 
or are taken up in rejection of such. It may seem a truism to say 
that if it’s the latter—  a radical rejection of social context— they 
won’t do much for society. The point we ought not to overlook is 
that neither will they do much for the survivalist.
Once in an informal seminar (there was neither tuition paid 
nor attendance kept) I listened as the delightful literary critic 
and social anthropologist René Girard posed a riddle. He asked 
us: “What books would you read were you truly stranded alone 
on a desert island with no expectation of escape?” People around 
the table made various proposals. Eventually Girard called a halt: 
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“You’re all wrong. You wouldn’t read any books at all— for read-
ing’s a function of our sociality; once there’s no longer a prospect 
for social interaction, reading stops.” Girard, with Gallic exuber-
ance and a smile, was playing with us, and I can’t say how sin-
cerely he was invested in his answer; but he was making a point.
The world of “meaningfulness” begins to collapse when there’s 
no sociality. This is why “I’ve decided to be a survivor!”—if it’s 
intended as a get-out-of-society-free card—fails even before it 
can get started. There are, of course, subsidiary arguments too. 
If human folly incinerates the globe, a mere decision to sur-
vive is not going to prove efficacious. Likewise, if global warm-
ing undoes the food chain, that may be inconvenient even for 
those living alone on mountain tops. Epidemics could also prove 
a problem. And any project of emigration to another planet— 
something I hear my more technologically inclined friends take 
seriously— would seem problematic too if there’s no coherently 
functioning society here from which to launch. But these are sub-
sidiary considerations. The trump card to most of this thinking is 
where Girard played it. Our world is pretty much held together 
by our human relationships. What does it profit a man if he gains 
the whole world at the cost of these relationships to others? He 
loses in fact the only world he cares to inhabit.
Assigning to a special parenthesis the case of the Buddha, 
there’s a sadly common case: the young father who, wishing to 
survive, runs in panic from the family he has started. In his mid-
dle years, he may return, hoping to reclaim what he abandoned. 
Typically, the opportunity isn’t there. It’s not even from lack of 
forgiveness. People have simply moved on. In those fortunate 
cases where he does reintegrate, he still can’t recover what he 
lost. One must allow for special cases, but typically, the man he 
once was, and the man he might have become, is not what has 
survived.
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This conclusion is going to be work. For it’s no mere cheerful 
summary of points already made. It’s intended as an opportu-
nity to reach conclusions— to conclude the diagnosis envisioned 
in the title. There are three major distinctions that need to be 
worked through to do this. 
The first distinction is a distinction between Enlightenment 
thinking and the Puritan project. These two are interwoven and 
conflated in rhetoric and policy throughout the whole of Ameri-
can history, yet they are clearly in opposition to each other. It’s 
not just a matter of two things co-existing in tension, but of two 
things that are polar opposites. If we’ve been moving toward one, 
we’ve been moving away from the other.
The second distinction is between society and the state. 
Around the time of the First World War, Randolph Bourne 
wrote that “war is the health of the state.” He did not say it is the 
health of society. Throughout our history, there has always been a 
residual wholesomeness in our society; yet, for all Bourne’s effort 
to make a strong distinction here, our society cannot be regarded 
as simply innocent in the manner it’s been recruited by the state 
for purposes of war. We’ve been complicit in the process of our 
seduction. So Bourne’s distinction needs further attention.
The third distinction concerns our present condition. On the 
one hand, there’s statistical probability; on the other there’s 
opportunity. It’s incumbent on us to consider the difference 
between these. Statistically, it’s likely we’ll continue along the 
destructive path we’ve been on, endorsing and engaging in activ-
ities we refuse to acknowledge as detrimental to our character 




do irreparable damage to habitat. If our sense of statistical prob-
ability is so strong that we believe, as many of us seem to, in a 
kind of destiny and fate, then it would seem the handwriting’s 
on the wall. One should despair of the common good and seek 
what enclave of personal happiness or pleasure seems still avail-
able. (An opium den comes to mind.) 
The statistically improbable but urgently needed alternative 
is to find in the past an opportunity for self-instruction. Rather 
than regard that past as the template for our future and let iner-
tial momentum carry us into the future, there’s a discomforting 
(no typo here!) opportunity to believe we are free —  and then go 
on to validate that belief by acting on it. It’s of freedom’s essence 
not to let the past weigh on one as a doom. Our freedom is not 
held in thrall the way rocks in an avalanche are held in thrall by 
the laws of physics. We know this, not by a speculative analysis, 
but by acting freely.
To elaborate on these distinctions, and find guidance in them, 
is the work of this conclusion. 
1) The Enlightenment is not the source of the Puritan project; 
the Puritan project rejects the Enlightenment.
To separate these two is a fundamental task for any historian of 
America. It’s not an easy task. This is due to some simultaneity 
of the two and to a sometimes conscious, sometimes unconscious 
conflation of the two from the very start of our history by leading 
Americans.
When we say “all men are created equal” and when we dedicate 
ourselves to promoting “the general welfare” and securing “the 
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity,” we are endors-
ing the Enlightenment. When we honor our nation in song by 
calling it “the land of the free and the home of the brave,” the 
Enlightenment resonates in these moving lines. Again, when we 
pledge our allegiance to “one nation, under God, with liberty 
and justice for all,” we are pledging to live in the halo of the 
Enlightenment. 
If it’s difficult to pinpoint the essence of this movement of the 
human spirit, it’s partly because the Enlightenment was differ-
ent things to those who were its champions. To Hume it was, 
surprisingly, a matter of liberating mankind from the tyranny of 
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reason. To Hume’s lifelong friend, Adam Smith, it was a matter 
of bringing rationality and clarity to the conduct of economic 
affairs. To Thomas Paine, it was the very Age of Reason made 
flesh. Further, while Voltaire, in company with Hume, saw the 
Enlightenment as freeing humans from the dictates of religion, 
Kant saw it as a matter of setting limits to reason so as to make 
room for faith. 
Even though the Enlightenment was in general a kind of 
morning-after resolution in favor of sobriety following a night-
long binge of religious intoxication and mayhem, it’s not by acci-
dent that so many of its leading lights stopped short of atheism. 
When in his last years Thomas Paine was rejected by the same 
American people whose banner-carrier he’d been, it was on a 
charge of atheism. But this was a misreading. Paine’s unrelent-
ing theme from Common Sense to The Age of Reason was human 
rights. In pleading his case for them, Paine drew on the long 
tradition—  at least as old as Aristotle — that rooted human rights 
in natural law. To Paine, as to the majority in that tradition, it 
seemed an implausibility to have natural law without a lawgiver. 
Therefore, Paine, the son of a Quaker father, stopped short of 
atheism and was a deist.
But Paine’s explicit deism (God stands back and leaves it to us 
to run the world properly) was enough to do the trick— that is, 
it provided Puritan America sufficient cause to turn its back on 
him. Puritanism insists we are on a mission of purgation under 
the generalship of Divine Providence. Puritans seemingly are 
sure God wants us His instruments to take the world by the neck 
and shake it till its teeth rattle. Enlightenment deism shudders at 
the thought of such a mission.
In his advocacy of rights, Paine was of necessity a critic of 
privilege. Central to Puritanism however is a claim to privi-
lege. The problem Voltaire, Hume, and so many other leaders 
of the Enlightenment, including Paine, had with religion is that 
it seemed of its nature, by a kind of inbuilt reflex, to turn from 
worshipping God to instituting claims of privilege on behalf of 
the worshippers. Belonging to God’s party, one was superior to 
everyone else. Worse yet, in the case of the Puritans, the act of 
worship tended to be identified with a mission to subjugate the 
ungodly— if necessary, purge them from the earth. (One can see 
why puritanical Christians have so much trouble with jihadist 
306 tom o’neill
Muslims; the programs of the two are near mirror images, and 
like a man’s two hands, neither can reshape itself to occupy 
smoothly the space of the other. “Success” in either camp stirs 
outrage in the other.) The elitist mission of the Puritans was then 
incompatible with the Enlightenment’s affirmation of the equal-
ity and dignity of all humans.
To be honest, it’s hard to dwell in the Enlightenment. We’ve 
seen already how the illuminating reflections of Adam Smith 
were perverted into mere defenses of greed by those preparing a 
space for Ayn Rand and the Friedmanesque business schools and 
lawyerly operations of America today. To catch something earlier 
on of this same mechanism by which Enlightenment principles 
are let slide into dilution and contradiction, we can note in the 
life of Thomas Paine that before he was rejected by American 
society, he was rejected by the French whose revolution he had 
come to France to celebrate. As in human history everywhere, 
the issue was privilege. While Paine went to France to partici-
pate in a triumph of human rights, the leaders there who came 
actually came to power there preferred to celebrate their extraor-
dinary ascendancy over others; and their revolution degenerated 
into chaos and terror, with Paine imprisoned and spared only by 
happenstance from execution. 
We find a dialectic at work by which things become their 
opposites. This leads to disappointment and confusion. If amid 
this murky flow of human affairs, one wishes to locate the core 
principle of the Enlightenment, I’d hazard one can hardly do 
better than Kant’s aforementioned second formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative: “So treat humanity, whether in yourself 
or another, as never to regard it as a mere means.” Simple as the 
wording is, one has only to attempt to abide by this imperative 
to find how totally it sets one in opposition to the current flow 
of American affairs. To echo what Chesterton says of Christi-
anity, one can say of the Enlightenment: “We have not tried it 
and found it wanting; rather we’ve found it difficult and left it 
untried.”
Taking Kant’s Categorical Imperative as the litmus test of 
Enlightenment thinking, one defines the Enlightenment as an 
unyielding champion of human dignity. On the other hand, to 
understand the Puritan project one must realize Puritans had 
no allegiance whatever to this imperative. In the Puritan view, 
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the majority of humankind are damned, ours not to reason why. 
What we must do to certify ourselves as among the non-damned 
is put ourselves in opposition to the great unwashed majority 
with every fiber of our being. The more thoroughgoing our effort 
to cleanse the earth of them, the more secure in God’s blessing 
can we feel.
In place of the tolerant garden of the Enlightenment, what we 
encounter here is the inhumane root of American exceptional-
ism. It’s interesting that today, when we congratulate ourselves 
on racial progress in America, we’re usually speaking of a kind 
of accommodation of white society to the descendants of people 
we brought here from Africa. This accommodation—  and it’s of 
course both more than that, and still remains tragically incom-
plete — is really not so surprising. Blacks were always valued. 
Why else the labor of kidnapping them and transporting them 
across the Atlantic? (Eventually, even Thomas Jefferson came 
to realize that the most valuable harvest of Monticello was each 
fresh harvest of black children.) The blacks planted the cotton 
and picked it. They built the houses of the whites. They cooked 
their meals and raised their children. They taught them music. 
What was there not to like?
To recapitulate lessons from an earlier chapter, we are almost 
never speaking of an accommodation to Indians when we speak 
of racial progress. This is because we whites never had any inten-
tion to accommodate. Ralph Ellison’s truly “invisible man” was 
the Indian. The Indian was beyond the pale. The Indians were 
an anomaly of nature (signs indeed of nature’s “fall”). Once the 
Indians showed they would not be tamed by us, they became cer-
tifiable agents of Satan— to be cast into outer darkness. 
(If you can’t take this in, read the documents— the diaries, 
accounts, letters, and speeches of the whites, and read too those 
reports which have been handed down to us of the astonished, 
outraged reactions of indigenous Americans. This whole bundle 
of material is given limited space in our curricula. If one asks a 
college class whether Frederick Douglass was a great American, 
the more alert and articulate among the students will say there’s 
no doubt he was. If then one follows by asking if Chief Joseph 
was a great American, the same students will go mute. Some may 
try after a pause to recover, and say “Well, he really isn’t a part 
of the story of America.” And of course, in a sense, that answer 
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is perfect. Genuine documents and preserved data about Indian/
white relations do nothing to sweeten The American Story. They’re 
demoralizing, and, like the torture activities of the CIA, they’re 
best kept from the young and impressionable.) 
Amid the many squabbles and rivalries present in Massachusetts 
Bay Colony from the start, one point there was that was universally 
agreed: Indians had no rights. Those who couldn’t subscribe to this 
self-evident truth were exiled from the colony. Practice followed 
readily on the heels of preachment, and the bonds of fellowship 
within Massachusetts Bay Colony were soon quickened and sealed 
with Indian blood. As recounted earlier, this occurred within the 
first six years when at Mystic Fort the whites carried out a just-
at-dawn massacre of Indian men, women, and children. We seem 
to have conducted no reassessment in the aftermath of this event; 
rather the event was allowed to become a paradigm, a community-
affirming ritual act, which we repeated again and again through 
two and a half centuries, till there was no more Indian opposition 
we need worry about.
There are people alive today whose grandparents lived through 
the culmination of this enterprise. Further, as I mentioned, when 
I was a kid, the Westerns I imbibed at the corner theater ended 
typically when the federal cavalry would arrive at the last possible 
moment and shoot every Indian in sight— while we, the juvenile 
audience, cheered furiously. It happened in a way similar to the 
way Americans, still juvenile, assembled recently in Times Square 
to chant “U. S. A.!” at news that Osama bin Laden had just been 
assassinated in his bedroom in front of his wife.1
Perry Miller, our foremost scholar of the mentality of Puritans, 
says tentatively in his Errand in the Wilderness that the Puritans 
seem to have provided a thread which persists throughout the 
rest of American history; but Miller—  ever provocative —  avoids 
specificity here, leaving it to the reader to take things further. 
One of Miller’s students, Bernard Bailyn, says in his study of the 
1. I guess one has to grant— for it seems almost a requisite for being con-
sidered a genuine American— that this recent evening was a great moment 
in American life. Perhaps it would have been even better if bin Laden had 
been subjected to Abu Ghraib type torture before death instead of being 
rendered a bloody dishrag by streams of machine gun bullets from all direc-
tions. As it was, the people in Times Square got a lot out of it. And Presi-
dent Obama did too.
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ideological origins of our American Revolution that even before 
the crystallization of our thinking in the second half of the 1770s, 
there was a consensus throughout the colonies, passed down to the 
present, regarding the nature of American life, and that Puritan-
ism was a part of this. 
They need not have been so tentative and cautious. There was, by 
reason of the Puritan settlement process— with its decision not to 
seek any lasting accommodation to Indians—  a strong bond forged 
from the start between “civilians” and “military.” In the early days, 
in fact, the two groups were often one. René Girard hypothesizes 
it’s frequently part of the pathology of human societies that they 
have been formed “against”—  and that actual bloodletting is fre-
quently what seals the bond that holds them together. This has 
been the case with the United States. While we think of the United 
States as conceived in a bloody revolution against England, this 
bloodletting is prominent from the first Puritan settlements. At 
all subsequent moments in “the Winning of the West” the settlers, 
hand in glove with the military, have reconfirmed their sense of 
themselves in Indian blood. When the West was won and we ran 
out of domestic candidates for our rituals of solidarity, we sought 
new candidates abroad. We’ve never been at a loss for how to com-
memorate our shared citizenship and re-consecrate our original 
bonds.
It was only in the nineteenth century, with writers like Thoreau, 
Frederick Douglass, Helen Hunt Jackson, and Mark Twain, and 
in time since, with writers and orators like Will James, Randolph 
Bourne, Eugene Debs, William Appleman Williams, Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Howard Zinn, Noam Chomsky, Chris Hedges, 
Naomi Klein (of Canada), John Perkins, and Norman Solomon, 
does it seem a concerted effort has been made to study the con-
stantly refreshed bond in American life between our civilians and 
our military.2
2. Barton Bernstein of Stanford has attempted to extend Eisenhower’s 
notion of threat from a military-industrial complex by directing attention 
to ever tighter bonds between the military and our allegedly civilian insti-
tutions of higher learning. The alumni magazine of the allegedly civilian 
institution of higher learning called Stanford has not let this critique pass 
without printing a commentary on Bernstein that charges him with being 
an agent of violence.
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These authors sometimes try to soften their depictions of us 
Americans on the home front by indicating the manipulations to 
which we’ve been subjected by industrialists and military leaders 
and bad media and bad schooling. The point I suggest here is that 
such manipulations would not have been working so predictably 
all these years without some predisposition of the public to go 
along.
Puritanism in America begins with a mission to tame the wil-
derness and plant a New Eden. Taming the wilderness meant 
eliminating or immobilizing its savagery— its savages. Stretch 
though it may seem, that same zeal, with father-to-son biologi-
cal continuity, is alive and active in the Monroe Doctrine, in our 
acceptance of a Manifest Destiny, in the Winning of the West, 
in the annexation of the Philippines, in the announcement of 
an Open Door (a door open to us) in China, in Wilson’s grand 
crusade to make the world safe for democracy (and American 
commerce), in our effort through manipulation of the United 
Nations to establish a Pax Americana throughout the world since 
the end of the Second World War, in our efforts to contain the 
Soviet Union in the Cold War, and in our present open-ended 
and apparently un-endable War on Terrorism.
There will be more on this when we try to reflect on the dis-
tinction and relations between American society and the Ameri-
can state.
What we’ve been elaborating here is the non-identity, and in 
fact deep opposition, between Enlightenment ideals and this 
Puritan project that has such a hold on our dedication. It was John 
Winthrop who first attempted a conflation of the two. Speaking 
of the Massachusetts Bay Colony as “a city on a hill,” Winthrop 
suggests that Puritans will light up the world by their example. 
We echo this ambition when we speak of America as  “the last 
best hope of humankind,” or when we refer to the president of 
the United States—  as media newscasters still casually some-
times do —  as “the leader of the free world.”
For all the sweetness of our rhetoric, we noted the Puritans 
soon swooped down from the sacred hill to wreak mayhem on 
everything that moved on two legs. The example thereby given 
was something less than the tolerant and beautiful thing one 
might have hoped. It proved more a matter of “making an exam-
ple of ” than a matter of “setting an example for.” Convenience 
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and dishonesty were facilitated by Winthrop’s use of Enlighten-
ment rhetoric. 
Let’s review, and incorporate in our conclusion some of the 
data from earlier in the book. 
The pattern for action we proclaim is routinely humanitar-
ian, but the practice is routinely Puritan. As noted, Polk (some-
times listed a Presbyterian, sometimes a Methodist— but a good 
Puritan either way) provides a clear instance. As Polk enters the 
White House, Texas is already ours; but Polk wants to add Cali-
fornia (and why not all the land that lies between California and 
Texas as well?). He sends John Slidell to Mexico City to negoti-
ate a purchase of California for $25,000,000. No one will talk to 
Slidell for, in the turmoil of Mexican politics, after the U. S. had 
annexed Texas, it would be political suicide for a Mexican politi-
cian to be found negotiating some further loss of land. In the 
ordinary uses of diplomacy, that would end the matter—  at least 
for the time being. That doesn’t happen. Frustrated, Polk decides 
to present Mexico’s refusal to negotiate as itself a casus belli — 
such a breach of international law that he’s entitled to go to Con-
gress and request a declaration of war on the ground that a right 
of the United States has been grievously violated. It’s no longer 
a mere piece of land he’s seeking; he seeks rather to uphold the 
very fabric of international law. An effort at a landgrab has been 
elevated to an act to maintain the sanctity of international law.
Eventually, Polk was rescued from needing to stoop to quite 
such silliness, but the incident is worthy of our attention because 
its structure reveals a sad pattern in our way of doing foreign 
policy. No sane person (and Americans are mostly sane) really 
believes a nation has an obligation under international law to 
enter into negotiations for a sale of its land whenever a neighbor-
ing nation wishes to buy it. Yet the benefits of expanding west-
ward were so manifest to Polk that he figured he could get by 
with such an argument if it was the best he could invent. He may 
have been right since the ploy he did use to get his declaration of 
war wasn’t much better. The essence of the matter was to pres-
ent America as the victim— the innocent but brave defender of 
justice. The Enlightenment was on our side. Our rival was the 
violator of rights and law— the God-rejected savage, if you will.
Sometimes we think the Puritan project was an offspring of 
the Enlightenment because we regard the Puritans as well read 
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and remarkably articulate in the exposition of their views. They 
were. Perry Miller demonstrates this with a dazzling exploration 
of Puritan intellectual life in his Errand into the Wilderness. But 
we should avoid making a muddle of things. In an effort at dis-
entanglement, let’s consider twentieth-century President Wood-
row Wilson. Here, certainly, one might think, is a child of the 
Enlightenment— wide in his grasp of history, a university profes-
sor, eloquent, proficient in scholarly works, and eventually a pres-
ident of Princeton University. Yet if we look to his performance 
as president of the United States, we find the Enlightenment is 
employed to fulfill its traditional role in our foreign policy: it’s 
there to legitimize the Puritan project. 
In The American Political Tradition, Richard Hofstadter intro-
duces his chapter on Wilson: 
Woodrow Wilson’s father was a Presbyterian minister, his 
mother a Presbyterian minister’s daughter, and the Cal-
vinist spirit burned in them with a bright and imperishable 
flame. Their son learned to look upon life as the progres-
sive fulfillment of God’s will and to see man as “a distinct 
moral agent” in a universe of moral imperatives. . . . Deadly 
in earnest, rigid, self-exacting, Wilson suffered acutely 
from his Presbyterian training. . . . Capable himself of 
intense feelings of guilt, he projected his demand for 
unmitigated righteousness into public affairs, draining 
his intellectual capacity for tolerance. In an early essay on 
Burke he commented feelingly that “we should not expect 
a man to be easy and affable when he finds himself in a 
death-grapple with the enemies of his country.”3
“Draining his intellectual capacity for tolerance” is a telling 
phrase. For Wilson had intellectual capacity second perhaps 
among American presidents only to Lincoln. By that I mean he 
could view a situation from five or ten angles when others in the 
room could see it only from one or maybe two. That he wished to 
act within the sphere of the Enlightenment seems evident from 
3. Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men who 
Made It (New York: Vintage, 1974), 309–10.
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the recurring originality with which his speeches echoed it. At 
the outbreak of the First World War, he spoke of being “impar-
tial in spirit as well as in action.” He spoke of a “peace without 
victory,” expressing his hope the war could end with neither side 
feeling vanquished and aggrieved. Later, when he felt the need to 
promote the war, he spoke of “a war to end all war,” and “a war 
to make the world safe for democracy.” After the war, he went to 
Versailles and lectured the victorious Allies at length on the need 
to allow all countries the right of “self-determination.”
It fell apart. It was a tragedy in the Aristotelian sense where 
the downfall is the consequence of a flaw in the heroic protago-
nist. For Wilson could never free himself from the grip of the 
Puritan project. While he envisioned a postwar world in which 
natural law prevailed, one where justice and the rights and free-
dom of all were respected, he could never rid himself of the 
notion that the natural order was one in which white Anglo-
Saxon Protestants—  especially such as were bred in the United 
States—  guided, tamed, and controlled everybody else.
His neutrality during the war was never genuine. With justi-
fied cynicism, we may say he believed in neutrality right up to 
the point where it might endanger the prosperity America could 
reap during the war from sales to Britain and France; beyond 
that point, he did not observe it. Or, taking a larger measure 
of the man, let us say he believed in neutrality right up to the 
point where it might endanger a British/French victory; at that 
point, he no longer believed in it—  and never had. Believing an 
Allied victory would be conducive to leadership of the world by 
the United States after the war, he could not, in the days before 
our entry, genuinely commit to any neutrality that would leave an 
Allied victory in jeopardy. 
Eventually he sounded as ridiculous as Polk. In 1915, he claimed, 
as Hofstadter tells us, a kind of unalienable right of Americans to 
travel on belligerent British merchant ships in a war zone. Such 
travel of course rendered probable a loss of American lives amid 
the hostilities. When that happened, Wilson would thereby be in 
a position to reproach the Germans with illegally killing “neutral” 
American citizens. He seemed to imply to the Germans that so 
long as a “neutral” American was on a ship, the Germans had to 
regard it as free from attack even though it might carry a cargo 
of food and munitions in support of the Allied cause. To suggest 
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such a claim in the name of international law was to make a 
mockery of international law, and the Germans of course under-
stood this. When the battle in Europe reached such a crisis that 
Germany felt it could no longer afford any deference to Wilson’s 
hoax, it began sinking all ships supporting the Allied cause, and 
America discarded the pretense of neutrality and became a direct 
and honest participant. The honesty was new, for as Hofstadter 
makes clear, the United States was a participant from the start.
In the matter of Wilson’s advocacy of self-determination for 
nations everywhere, there was again an undermining duplic-
ity. On the eve of the First World War, Wilson had said, “I am 
going to teach the South American republics to elect good men.” 
When a certifiably bad man muscled his way to the presidency of 
Mexico, and when this man added to his other disqualifications 
a lack of respect for the United States, Wilson saw him as setting 
a bad example, and sent troops to invade Mexico at Veracruz. 
Our troops remained until, in the ferment of the Mexican revolu-
tion, a new Mexican president came to the fore. While Wilson 
may have felt he had done the Mexican people a favor, it should 
surprise no one that there was widespread Mexican resentment 
of the American intrusion. Again, some four years later, in the 
aftermath of the First World War, Wilson sent a military force 
to Russia to protect the Russians from making mistakes simi-
lar to those to which Mexicans were prone. It’s difficult to get a 
coherent account of just what Wilson thought he was doing. It’s 
been charged against him that the main effect of our interven-
tion in Russia was to prolong a chaotic state of affairs there at 
the cost of many Russian lives. George Kennan (a champion of 
a proactive policy toward Russia at the end of the Second World 
War) attempts a sympathetic account of how Wilson arrived at 
his policy, but ends by saying Wilson acted in complete ignorance 
of facts on the ground.
What these bookend events at the start and the end of the First 
World War suggest is that Wilson was prone to quixotic bun-
gling in the exercise of diplomacy. While he believed in the right 
of people everywhere to self-determination, he was tolerant of 
the results only so long as what the foreigners strove for met his 
approval. Where their aspirations fell short, it was the office of 
the U. S. president to correct them. The president should do so 
with lethal military force if necessary. 
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During the war itself, Wilson (who’d often denounced the war 
as inhumane and as a war being fought for unworthy purposes) 
was routinely inhumane in persecuting and prosecuting dissent-
ers who continued to say things Wilson no longer thought conve-
nient. Pursuit and persecution of dissenters continued until Wil-
son’s administration ended in 1921— more than two years after 
the war itself ended.
William Appleman Williams cites a onetime admirer of Wil-
son, Raymond Robins, as follows:
Wilson was a great man but he had one basic fault. He was 
willing to do anything for people except get off their backs 
and let them live their own lives. He would never let go 
until they forced him to and then it was too late. He never 
seemed to understand there’s a big difference between try-
ing to save people and trying to help them. With luck you 
can help ’em— but they always save themselves.4
That Wilson envisioned himself and the United States as savior 
of others calls to mind how Massachusetts Bay Colony dealt 
with Quakers. Winthrop’s successor as Governor, John Endecott, 
was willing to accommodate to Quakers if they’d give up their 
heretical notion of an Inner Light and would convert to Chris-
tianity— by which Endecott meant Calvinism as interpreted by 
Puritans. Short of that, he was willing to allow them to depart 
from the Puritan community. When both these generous alterna-
tives were rejected, Endecott did what any godly person would do 
in such circumstances: he had them hanged. 
Similar to the manner in which much that Wilson did in for-
eign policy violated the spirit of the Enlightenment, so, more 
explicitly, much that he did on the home front violated our Bill 
of Rights (our great effort to install Enlightenment principles at 
the core of our Constitution). This needs saying, not to heap coals 
on his head. Life itself did that. In the course of a couple years, 
Wilson lost the respect first of the leadership of the Senate, then 
that of the surrendering Germans, then that of the victorious 
4. William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New 
York: Dell, 1962), 82–83.
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Allies, and finally the respect of the generation of Americans 
who had twice elected him president. We need to note that the 
Wilson administration was not an outstanding moment of ideal-
ism but a stark example of how the Puritan project, alive and at 
the center of things in the twentieth century, trumped the spirit 
of the Enlightenment at just the moment it was most emphati-
cally invoking it. 
The maneuver has become such a staple of our foreign policy 
it seems almost trite to speak of it. In a generation some forty 
years after Wilson, our deep objection to the Castro revolution 
in Cuba was that it was not carried forward under American 
auspices and was not directed by American leaders. It violated 
our Monroe Doctrine and the hegemony we thought we had 
achieved over Cuba. We packaged our opposition however as an 
enlightened effort to resist a godless communism of Soviets who 
were intervening illegally in the western hemisphere and were 
out to destroy freedom everywhere. We insisted our opposition 
was simply a necessary response by the nation charged with lead-
ing the free world. 
To bring this matter up to the time of writing: recently, having 
warned the Palestinians of Gaza not to elect the Hamas Party 
as its leadership, we now leave them with two options: having 
defied us, they can vacate Gaza and go God knows where; or 
they can stay in Gaza and die. The deaths are under way, and they 
proceed with our funding and with our approval and guidance. 
John Winthrop and John Endecott were never more clear than 
we. While baptized in the waters of the Enlightenment, the riv-
ers in which we do our daily swimming are those of the Puritan 
project.
2) American society then is not the state; yet while our state 
often pursues projects very harmful to our society (thereby 
manifesting the two are not identical), the state wouldn’t 
be able to do this with such regular and predictable ease 
were there not some predisposition in our society to go 
along. 
The second-to-last paragraph of Randolph Bourne’s remarkable 
indictment “War Is the Health of the State” is as follows (slightly 
shortened, and with the addition of a bracketed word):
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Nothing is more obvious . . . than that every one of us 
comes into society as into something in whose creation 
we had not the slightest hand. . . . By the time we find 
ourselves here we are caught in a network of customs and 
attitudes, the major directions of our desires and interests 
have been stamped on our minds, and by the time we have 
emerged from tutelage and reached the years of discretion 
when we might conceivably throw [direct] our influence to 
the reshaping of social institutions, most of us have been 
so molded into the society and class we live in that we 
are scarcely aware of any distinction between ourselves as 
judging, desiring individuals and our social environment. 
We have been kneaded so successfully that we approve of 
what our society approves, desire what our society desires, 
and add to the group our own passionate inertia against 
change, against the effort of reason, and the adventure of 
beauty.5
It would be difficult to over praise this paragraph. Each word-
choice registers. Bourne combines insight with careful articula-
tion. Trouble is, the gist of his paragraph here complicates the 
direction in which he’s been arguing. He’s labored eloquently to 
make a distinction between a generally wholesome and inno-
cent populace (one believing presumably in the platitudes of the 
Enlightenment) and a duplicitous and manipulative state. Good 
society, bad state. Now he finds he must acknowledge a kind of 
original-sin arrangement built into the very structure of human 
existence. We are what our social forebears have chosen us to be. 
In a sense, it doesn’t matter whether we are “society” or whether 
we are “state.” What W. A. Williams calls “the dead inertia of the 
past” weighs equally on all. We are all equally innocent and all 
equally guilty. 
Bourne’s essay stops about here —  ended either by the “Spanish 
flu” which ends his life, or perhaps stopped simply by the quan-
dary into which his thought had carried him.
5. Randolph Bourne, The State (1918, available at http://fair-use.org/
randolph-bourne/the-state/). 
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While Bourne formats the problem in universal terms, it’s really 
in its exceptional and highly dramatic form in American history 
that Bourne is struggling with it. What he has come up against 
is the Puritan project. The long hand of Winthrop and company 
has been discovered in our heart of hearts, setting the values and 
paradigms by which we judge and live —  and by which we decide 
whom to let live. And Bourne’s acknowledgement carries with it 
the ring of truth. Surely the past is irreformable. There is abso-
lutely nothing we can do to turn it into a different past.
Yet defending the innocence of us Americans becomes problem-
atic as one reflects on the ease with which we have lent ourselves 
to cruel and violent enterprise. Bourne’s poignant phrase  “our 
own passionate inertia” points to the complicated reality here. 
We are victims of a cruel tradition—  and this is a point Bourne 
very much wants to make. But we are willing victims— we have 
ingested the things that wound our souls. What does emerge 
clear in this sociological reflection is that it undermines one of 
the favorite tropes of would-be reformers; it cuts the ground out 
from under those who say: “let’s return to the good ole days.”
At the center of Barry Goldwater’s conservatism was his con-
viction we must return to some Eden-like and forthright inno-
cence of ours. The same conviction inspires the Tea Party move-
ment today. My hunch is that this conviction is currently held 
with deliberate and conscious dedication by the much-denounced 
Koch brothers. We must strengthen the strong. That is what we 
did in the past and should do now. Handicapped parking spaces 
are a mistake. Human progress depends on enhancing the strong 
without regard to the price paid by the weak. Nietzsche has said 
exploitation is the law of life; he invites the strong to engage in 
it without remorse. He does this in Beyond Good and Evil. Ayn 
Rand echoes Nietzsche. What makes us Americans peculiarly 
open to this teaching is that we believe “strength” is the sign that 
God has befriended us and predestined us to grace. We white 
Americans come into the world not into the hands of an angry 
God, but into the hands of some very aggressive Puritans who 
immediately begin molding us into replicas of themselves.
For this reason, a genuine opposition to the class which 
includes the Koch brothers is almost impossible to mount among 
us; beyond our outbursts of rhetorical denunciation, there’s a 
longstanding emotional flirtation with what they hold dear. Even 
  w h y the center ca n ’t hold 319
that is too weak. There’s a longstanding dedication. A people 
whose elected representatives recently voted one hundred per-
cent for violence against the ill-fed, ill-washed, near defense-
less people of Gaza can have no real argument with the Koch 
brothers.
What about the “good ole days”? When were they? Were they 
at the beginning when we were slaughtering Indians and hanging 
Quakers? Were they in the long years thereafter when, North-
erner together with Southerner, we were accepting Africans kid-
napped from their farming communities in Africa, and insisting 
we were the rightful owners of their labor? Think of the use of 
black women as “bed wenches” and of the disregard for their fam-
ily relations by Christian whites who commodified them, treating 
them and theirs as disposable income. Think what such commer-
cialization meant as members of black families were sold severally 
to the highest bidder or were separated to be handed over to the 
most insistent debt collector. (Do some black women have “atti-
tude” today? How could they not?) Perhaps the golden days were 
when Thomas Jefferson would leave off overseeing the whipping 
of a slave boy at his nail factory so he could retire to his study and 
write eloquently on the equality of man. Perhaps the golden days 
were those of Andrew Jackson, slave-master and heroic hater of 
Indians. Here was a man, admired greatly in his own day, and 
admired still—  a man on horseback who, in the midst of setting 
up pet banks or managing the spoils system, could turn at the 
blink of an eye and promote sending thousands of Cherokee on a 
trail of tears from their ancestral lands. Then there were the days 
of his protégé, James Polk. He too was respected and prosperous 
by reason of the slaves he acquired; he didn’t exhaust himself 
with the undoing of Indians but rather with the taking of land 
from Mexicans. To this day there are historians who complain 
he’s never gotten the full measure of credit he deserves. 
Not to make too long a list, there was Teddy Roosevelt, as 
genuine a believer that might makes right as one could ask for. As 
noted, he cites among the chief benefactors of humankind those 
who purged the West of savages to make way for civilization. He 
was a legitimate offspring of the ancestors he praised. He helped 
purge Cuba of savage Spaniards in order to replace these arro-
gant Spaniards with ourselves. Later as president, he cheered on 
his good friend Leonard Wood as Wood purged the Philippines 
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of savage Filipinos. He was and remains what most Americans 
regard as an exemplary president.
Putting sarcasm to one side, the truth of the matter is there 
were no good old days. When one hears the claim there were, one 
should ready oneself for fresh calls to violence. 
From the age of nine, I’ve been fascinated by seeing in news-
reels the faces and gestures of young men in landing barges, 
many of whom were less than thirty minutes from death on a 
foreign shore. While I’ve been moved beyond speech at the cour-
age and grace of these Americans who fought the Second World 
War, nonetheless I fear the feelings of those who celebrate and 
remember with me. I fear lest in their nostalgia, they will keep 
those days going on forever. In many ways we remain in the 
midst of such days, guaranteeing our children and grandchildren 
will know them too, and know them first hand.
But as Bourne acknowledges, taking up a critical stance toward 
our past is very inconvenient. Where, if not to the past, is one to 
look for inspiration and direction?
Bourne speaks at the end of the paragraph cited above of “the 
effort of reason, and the adventure of beauty.” It is, I think, not 
in celebration of our wars, but by rational reflection on the par-
amount accommodation in America’s history that we can find 
something of the beauty and sense of direction we need— if we 
have the deeper courage to go there. 
Our history does have something to say about accommodations. 
The fundamental accommodation of American history is the one 
between blacks and whites. I don’t say it is achieved. Rather it’s 
a work in progress. We whites often think of it I fear as a grad-
ual process wherein whites have brought blacks to accommodate 
to the exigencies of living in white society. In actual fact, the 
accommodation is much more interesting than that, for—  as is 
the general nature of accommodations— the process has been 
mutual and reciprocal. If whites have been the teacher, they have 
also been the student; if blacks have been the student, they have 
also been the teacher.
This accommodation is so imperfect, by reason of many kinds 
of fear and countless eruptions of hatred and bloodshed, that we 
may hesitate. Indeed, the reader may be incredulous. If however 
we want a future better than our past, it’s especially here we can 
hope to learn something. When I speak of this accommodation 
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of whites and blacks, more precisely what I have in mind is the 
still halting, deeply conflicted and imperfect accommodation of 
whites to blacks. In the face of all that’s still lacking to whites 
in their capacity for this accommodation, it impresses me as the 
foremost success in American history. (More important even 
than the electric light bulb of Edison; more important than the 
Model T of Ford.)
After the Civil War, American blacks had no real choice but 
to stay pretty much where they were, and to achieve there what 
they could in the uncharted waters of emancipation. It turned out 
that the accommodation the mainstream was willing to make to 
them— in the North as well as in the South— was very limited. 
With the stoicism by which they’d survived more than two cen-
turies of bondage, black Americans tested their new opportuni-
ties as best they could.
Amid Jefferson’s stupefying list of black limitations set forth in 
his Notes on Virginia (read the list; the man was no sage), Jeffer-
son conceded that blacks seemed good at music. They were. And 
they combined this gift with a Christian hope and with patience 
towards others’ shortcomings that was altogether beyond Jeffer-
son’s reach. (This patience could of course bother Marx, and did 
bother Richard Wright and Malcolm X, and many others.)
When blacks were first introduced to the Bible, they knew 
where Egypt was. It was the plantation on which they lived. They 
recognized who the Egyptians were. The Egyptians were these 
light-skinned people of stunted affectivity who held them in 
bondage. As for Jesus, they understood—  as their white handlers 
did not— that the sympathies of Jesus were with the orphan and 
the widow, the hungry, the unjustly treated, the despised. While 
for the whites, a sign of their election to grace was their success as 
oppressors, the blacks understood intuitively what a failed read-
ing of the Bible that was. (The whites’ special reading of the Bible 
was the bedrock of The American Story, and I suspect no black 
has ever been taken in by it.)
Blacks exercised their talent for music particularly along two 
lines. One was music that registered with equal force their sense 
of distress and their hope for deliverance. These “spirituals” ini-
tiated the gospel tradition which became the foundation for so 
much of the world’s music from then till now. The other was 
music dealing with their deep dependence on personal relations, 
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particularly the dependence of black men on the caring love 
and respect received from black women in a time of near utter 
humiliation.6
We call such music “soul.” (It’s well named, for this music 
emerges in response to an attempt to annihilate the souls of 
blacks.)
The themes of the gospel music and the soul music have never 
been in opposition to each other. The longing for salvation is 
common to both, and the passion voiced in each blends into the 
other. Whites have long been surprised by the easy conjunction 
here of religious sensibility and human sensuality—  and find the 
result exotic and arresting. One can surmise that the African 
communities from which American blacks were taken were inno-
cent of Calvin’s withering touch on human sensibility.
Nowhere is the tutelage exercised by blacks more evident than 
in this matter of music. (This is matter greatly encumbered today 
by ill-directed efforts at political correctness; many in our univer-
sities get it wrong; musicians on the other hand understand the 
matter intuitively.) As just suggested, even in the days of slavery, 
the inhabitants of the Big House would hear the musical laments 
and musical celebrations (often in the same song) of those whose 
freedom they had done what they could to cancel. The inhabit-
ants of the Big House were “captivated”—  as well they should 
have been—  and would invite the blacks “up” for the edification 
of themselves and their guests.
Antebellum accounts clearly attest that whites were impressed 
by this music. What can get lost in the mists of political correct-
ness is how this white interest came to effect change in white 
6. James Baldwin sets the mood for such music tellingly in Go Tell It on 
the Mountain (New York: Dell, 1980):
They had been very happy together, in the beginning, and until the 
end he had been very good to her, had not ceased to love her, and tried 
always to make her know it. No more than she had been able to accuse 
her father had she been able to accuse him. His weakness she under-
stood, and his terror, and even his bloody end. What life had made 
him bear, her lover, this wild, unhappy boy, many another stronger and 
more virtuous man might not have borne so well. (193)
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aesthetic capacity. The beginnings of American minstrelsy can be 
given a too-complicated treatment as a result. 
Minstrelsy probably began with blacks publically satirizing 
themselves in music for the amusement of themselves and of 
whites. If one wishes to pour out outrage at such a terrible self-
violation of human dignity, well, be my guest. It seems to me a 
failure of human imagination to do so. From birth, American 
blacks enjoy privileged insight into human hypocrisy; conditions 
of their birth gift them with this. In the centuries of slavery, 
though, they could hardly make public sport of whites. Whites 
were, they knew, mysteriously challenged when it came to humor. 
So the original “Jim Crow” (perhaps the first minstrel) and oth-
ers did what they could to clown and make mirth, but with cir-
cumspection. Satire on blacks could be performed publicly before 
both races; satire on whites had better be reserved for discreet 
performance in the slave quarters. 
What’s really quite wonderful about this— less sinister I’d say 
than subsequent critics, black and white, realize — is that, sooner 
than one might expect, whites who were looking on at black min-
strelsy were saying: “Hey, let me try that!” Not much reflection 
has been expended on what that meant. The easy, politically cor-
rect, judgment is that whites were piling on. “If blacks are getting 
positive approval, and being rewarded by whites for demeaning 
blacks, I want a piece of the action. I can mock blacks better 
than they can.” What this neat judgment leaves out is attention to 
the underlying humane context and intent of the music and the 
humor. For that, we do well to look back to the motivations for 
plantation music mentioned above.
When whites put on blackface, what they were often working 
toward was a more intimate entry into black music. If you want 
to say, “Well, then, they were attempting to kidnap black music 
just as they had kidnapped blacks,” again, be my guest. But music 
doesn’t work that way. The original white “covers” of black music 
had a singular honesty; whites put on blackface to do these cov-
ers, saying in effect, “If you want to know the sources of this 
music, I’m showing them to you.”
What was being conducted, more perhaps than consciously 
realized, was an experiment in empathy. The white performer 
wanted to get into the shoes and skin of the black. Or, if you 
find that metaphor cloying and repugnant, you can reverse it: 
324 tom o’neill
the black Americans’ music had gotten “under the skin” of the 
whites.7
Even in antebellum days, a process of tutelage and nurturing 
had been under way. The parched souls of aesthetically chal-
lenged Puritans were being washed in the redeeming waters of 
black sensibility. (Do you think that’s over the top? To take a 
prominent instance from a later moment in the process, think of 
the millions of white Americans who responded to the ominous 
message of the First World War by entering the Jazz Age. The 
Jazz Age had roots other than the discredited worship of Prog-
ress that had been the white man’s faith. This black music became 
balm and comfort food for the wounded hopes of whites.)
As I speak of a gradual accommodation of whites and blacks in 
America’s history up to now, notice I’m not repeating a bromide 
about white Americans teaching blacks how to fit into white soci-
ety. It should be clear by now I’m saying something quite different. 
True, there’s always a reciprocal dimension to accommodations 
(and I do think along with Booker T. Washington—  as updated 
by the Warren Court— that it’s important for the skills necessary 
for economic success in America to be shared across the races). 
But a fundamental countermovement was in play: slowly, in the 
face of great resistance, and with many awkward starts and cruel 
rejections, blacks have been educating white Americans toward a 
more sensitive and humane understanding of others and— more 
basically and haltingly— to a more realistic sense of the short-
comings of the whites’ own religiously impoverished souls. (To 
the extent that Martin Luther King Day serves any authentic 
purpose currently, it is to celebrate this.)
Blacks began bringing whites around through their music—  a 
music now very nearly the idiom for music everywhere. (They’ve 
also done it through athletic skills— performances of grace under 
7. In its later phases, in the first half of the twentieth century, the role 
of young Jewish musicians can’t be exaggerated as a catalyst in accelerat-
ing the crossover of this music. Out of their own legacy of hardship and 
persecution, these brash young men, whose families were fresh from the 
ghettoes of Eastern Europe, “got” black music in advance of mainstream 
white America. Jolson said he’d never felt at home on stage till he put on 
blackface.
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pressure. Think Jackie Robinson. Think Muhammad Ali. Think 
Bill Russell and Magic Johnson, Michael Jordan, Kobe Bryant, 
LeBron James, and Steph Curry.) And, as just suggested, they’ve 
done it too through a far more accurate and down-to-earth 
understanding of Christianity than their old-time plantation 
handlers (the Jefferson crowd) intended. 
The sermons at typical black churches evidently owe less 
to Calvin and more to Jesus than has been the norm at white 
churches in America. So when Martin Luther King tried to 
bring the religious experience of blacks in America to bear upon 
American foreign policy, white America wouldn’t let him. He 
was ridiculed in our mainstream press and by our president as 
being “intrusive” and  “out of his league”—  dismissed in Presi-
dent Johnson’s revealing phrase as  “ just a nigger preacher after 
all.” Then he was assassinated. Today, unfortunately, his eloquent 
teaching that injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere 
is largely ignored on the day dedicated to his memory; in the eyes 
of King, in contrast to the good Puritan, the obligation to respect 
the rights and freedom of foreign peoples was quite real—  and 
violence toward others in order to impose our will was violation 
and sin. (Were King alive today, one can be confident he would 
greet our veterans, returned from Iraq, with compassion and love; 
no doubt he would credit them with sincerity. But one familiar 
with the speeches of his final twelve months cannot imagine him 
congratulating them by saying: “Thank you for your service to 
our country.” For this reason, those speeches are now seldom fea-
tured on the day dedicated to his memory.)
Our strong resistance to a black understanding of Christian-
ity shows there’s still a way to go; our Puritan heritage stands 
in the way. Black literature provides a kind of bridge. Through 
the works of David Walker and Frederick Douglass, Langston 
Hughes and Richard Wright, Ralph Ellison and James Baldwin, 
Maya Angelou and Alice Walker and Toni Morrison, to name 
a few, there has been an opportunity for whites to take in the 
texture of black lives and black aspirations more accurately than 
in earlier days. Not irrelevantly, in the two hundred and more 
years since the beginnings of black minstrelsy, black stand-up 
comics have in the last four or five decades been able to take on 
white audiences and get them laughing to the point of tears at 
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the contradictions and hypocrisy of our white-dominated society. 
Dick Gregory, Richard Pryor, Eddie Murphy, and Chris Rock 
are prominent examples. More recently, reviving a style from 
the earliest days, there’s the raunchy, minstrel-like honesty and 
down-to earth humor of Steve Harvey— judging from the laugh-
ter of audiences, as liberating to whites as to blacks.
This is mentioned, not to congratulate blacks but to locate 
where there remains hope for some change of direction in our 
American mainstream. True, some blacks, particularly in poli-
tics and law, have sold out— just like so many others— to the 
worst aspects of American ambition and American opportunism; 
and the system has rewarded them. But there’s reason to believe 
the majority of blacks know too much and feel too strongly for 
that. If whites are becoming aware of the inconsistencies of our 
traditional story, and are looking around for a new and more 
realistic commentary on who we are, blacks have been and are 
now becoming increasingly a source and catalyst for white self-
understanding. As I say, it’s unlikely any black has ever taken 
seriously The American Story.
It’s not then to some golden moment of our past we should 
look for remedies. The most positive thing in our history has 
been the gradual, halting—  sometimes furiously resisted—  steps 
of accommodation that sons and daughters of Puritan forefa-
thers have made toward comprehending the struggles and riches 
of black culture in the face of white oppression and white resis-
tance. An understanding of these struggles sweetens our temper, 
shames our arrogance, and redirects our shared society to more 
wholesome goals. It’s from this, if anywhere, we can hope still 
to become responsible citizens of global society and conservers 
of the planet. (There’s even hope we whites may someday forgive 
ancestral Native Americans for all the bad things we’ve done to 
them, and that we may begin to be tutored by their unslaughtered 
descendants who continue to breathe among us. The wisdom we 
tried to bury under the corpses of our Indian predecessors can, if 
we have the humility to accept it, yet help us toward redemption. 
In the meantime, we can look to Indians as a warning. In the 
nineteenth century, as time was then running out for them by 
reason of our actions, so time today, by reason of closely related 
current actions, is running out for the rest of us.)
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3) So, while it’s true we’re all products of our past, that 
doesn’t mean our past is our destiny—  doesn’t mean we’re 
doomed by it. 
Some of the most refreshing voices among American historians 
and commentators, past and current are those of Perry Miller, 
Richard Hofstadter, William Appleman Williams, Howard 
Zinn, Noam Chomsky, Barton Bernstein, and Chris Hedges. It’s 
not that these scholars all agree; but they all tend to take ideology 
seriously. They think the ideas in our minds are of great impor-
tance, and that we cannot have much understanding of our past 
unless we attend to them. This makes these authors interesting to 
read— the more so because their approach is not familiar.
It’s not that the rest of Americans have no ideology; it’s just that 
most of us tend not to pay attention to the ideology out of which 
we act. Hofstadter wrote an entire book on anti-intellectualism 
in America. 
It may be that Hume is the culprit here. (Or it’s more prob-
able he just articulated well what was to become the American 
mindset.) Reason, says Hume, does not call the shots in our ethi-
cal behavior; rather our emotions do. We act in accord with our 
inclinations and affectivity.
There is, to be sure, at least a half-truth in what Hume says. 
When I am wondering whether or not I should go to the beach 
today, it’s probably not by a logical deduction but by an inclina-
tion, an appetitive disposition, that I’ll resolve the matter. What 
Hume and we Americans seem insufficiently attentive to is that 
the general scheme of my affections— the organic whole of 
my affectivity— is no doubt deeply saturated with my ideology 
(something that does involve a network of—  at least informal— 
reasonings and convictions). While Hume would have it that rea-
son typically enters after the decision is made, and that then— 
when it does arrive —  comes in the form of a rationalization, this 
can seem on reflection a bit glib. A more attentive phenomenol-
ogy might reveal reasoning has been there from the start, pre-
determining what parts of my affectivity I will bring to bear upon 
the options under consideration. To state the matter in more gen-
eral terms, Hume seems to disregard that one of the things to 
which one’s affectivity is most inclined is one’s ideology. That for 
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Americans, it’s typically an unexamined ideology does not make it 
any the less dynamic. Here Freud is more useful than Hume.
In fact, a great deal of harm seems to have been occasioned by 
our American inattention to ideology. First of all, we don’t notice 
our own; instead we will say that our preferences are simply for the 
natural order of things. (Some of us are able to say, for instance, it’s 
quite natural to go to Africa and behead a lion named Cecil there.) 
Secondly, we’re not alert to ideology in others. It doesn’t occur to 
us, for instance, that Native Americans had (have!) ideologies of 
their own. We seem to have been so simple as to think their minds 
were simply examples of Locke’s blank and chalk less slate —  an 
empty tablet awaiting the slash of our writing instruments. Ditto 
for the minds of laborers drawn from Africa. Ditto for Mexicans, 
for Filipinos, for Vietnamese, Central Americans, and all classes 
of Muslims.
It’s for this reason we’ve been so ready to go along with Wilson’s 
“I will teach the people of South America to elect good presidents.” 
It fits a pattern. In Chile, when the people elected Allende, Kiss-
inger and our CIA knew better, and worked effectively to empower 
those opponents of Allende who drove him to commit suicide. In 
Iran, when Iranians elected Mossadegh, TR’s grandson Kermit 
Roosevelt, Jr., of our CIA, pitched in to correct the outcome of 
their vote. When Ronald Reagan saw that the Nicaraguans had 
made a mistake in electing Daniel Ortega, he sponsored the 
Contras. The Contras, working closely with our CIA (and with 
people funding our clandestine operation by smuggling drugs into 
America’s ghettoes), were — most of us felt— merely attempting to 
restore things to normal. Earlier, when Cubans made the mistake 
of choosing Castro, JFK worked hard for Castro’s assassination. 
Earlier yet, Eisenhower knew that if the Vietnamese were left free 
to conduct the elections we had promised in the Geneva Accords, 
the Vietnamese would mistakenly have chosen Ho Chi Minh. 
In the interest of democracy Eisenhower called off the elections. 
More recently, less than a decade ago, we gave a clear and unmis-
takable warning to the Palestinians of Gaza not to vote Hamas 
into office as their leadership. Once they’d ignored us and done 
so anyway, in July, 2014, our entire Congress rose as one person 
and encouraged the Israeli government to punish the misguided 
civilians of Gaza. The obliging Israelis did so, killing roughly four 
hundred Gazan children to make the important point that violence 
never pays. Recently, when Egyptians voted a less-than-moderate 
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Muslim party into office, we worked successfully with Egyptian 
dissidents to bring about a coup. More recently still, we acted simi-
larly in the Ukraine, assisting a coup in the Ukraine to reverse the 
election there and reduce Russian influence. We are now doing all 
we can to keep Putin from intruding into the stability we so art-
fully worked to establish. A decade ago, we destroyed the govern-
mental structure of Iraq lest Saddam Hussein develop weapons of 
mass destruction, and currently we’re naturally disappointed that 
the government we helped install in Saddam’s place hasn’t done 
better with the rich opportunity we provided— namely the oppor-
tunity to rebuild Iraq from the ground up. For all of this, we have 
never apologized; for after all, we’ve only been doing what comes 
naturally to us who bear responsibility for keeping the world free.
(OK, that’s almost the last time I’ll do that.)
We have always wanted to think, as one can observe, that in 
whatever we do, we’re simply acting in accord with common sense. 
Yet the premises out of which we’ve operated have been bizarre, 
peculiar, and inhumane. Throughout all that, we’ve never quite 
abandoned the principles of the Enlightenment; we’ve reserved 
them to demand—  often with threats and with violent force rain-
ing down from the sky— that our rivals and enemies abide by them. 
In particular, we want to teach them that opposition to us should 
always be non-violent. In order to teach from a position of power, 
we’re working night and day—  at tremendous cost to the American 
taxpayer— to refine still further our unrivaled nuclear arsenal.
Why is there today such general malaise (that word again!) 
among those who aspire to a reform of our actions “before it is too 
late”? It is not that it’s so hard to decide what we want. The general 
shape of the desired result of reform is not too obscure. FDR did 
a good job in formulating it in his vision of the Four Freedoms: 
(1)  freedom of speech, everywhere; (2)  freedom of religion, every-
where; (3) freedom from hunger and want (due to lack of healthy 
habitat, lack of shelter, lack of adequate clothing), everywhere; 
(4) freedom from war and the threat of war, everywhere.
The source of our malaise is we do not see how to get from A (our 
present situation) to B (the desired result of reform). Our malaise is 
well founded. For to get from A to B, we must first become aware 
of the way our lifestyle, and the ideology that justifies it, hold us 
back from the result we want. For this reason I started this book 
with a general discussion of our disinvestment— moral as well as 
monetary— regarding education. Other chapters on “convenient 
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skepticisms” and “false hopes” may have seemed extraneous; but 
really they too touch the heart of the matter. For here lie (in both 
senses) the strategic defenses for the mindset we hold. We hold 
these defenses with white knuckles, and we will not easily let 
them go.
Alternatives are not unimaginable. One can catch glimpses of 
opportunities for change in our past. Perhaps in the success of 
our Revolutionary War, we could have recognized that the noble 
premise we presented as motive for our revolt—  all men are cre-
ated equal— was ground not only for our assertions against Eng-
land but ground too for Indian and black assertions against us 
successful ex-colonial whites. We did not do this because it was 
not convenient. We let our noble profession get ground to dust 
beneath our feet.
In the years immediately following the furor of the War of 1812, 
during the administration of J. Q. Adams, we could have fol-
lowed Adams’ lead toward internal improvements and provision 
for decent lives of all Americans, while learning to live within the 
boundaries of that time and by discontinuing our unjust treat-
ment of black Americans. We chose Jackson instead.
Toward the end of the century, came the turbulent 1890s— never 
given the attention they deserve. Henry Adams reflects on this 
time in his autobiography, but demonstrates only how feckless he 
and the other intellectuals of the time had become. The time was 
the afterglow of the North’s victory. It was the age of the Rob-
ber Barons—  a time presaging the oligarchy we citizens united 
now endure. It was the Gilded Age. During this time we would 
celebrate the final cleansing of the Great Plains from savagery. It 
was a time in which we welcomed “Redemption” in the South, 
with Jim Crow laws restoring black Americans to their proper 
place —  an action enjoying the tacit approval of the North. Hav-
ing done what we could to subdue the people of color within our 
boundaries, we were now ready for Cubans and Filipinos. And 
after that, we were ready to extend our protection to the Chinese. 
Surprisingly, even as we congratulated ourselves amid so many 
successes, a time had come of frightening economic depression. 
The flaw in the economy was that the farmer and the industrial 
laborer often had insufficient funds to buy even ordinary goods 
amid the immense surpluses spewing from their farms and 
factories. 
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In other words, it was a time in which we were making all the 
wrong decisions.
Why rehash this? The intent is to emphasize how extensively 
we average Americans have been implicated in a disastrous com-
mitment to the Puritan project. Largely, the commitment was 
unexamined and unchallenged.
Here the ideological detectives (Perry Miller, Richard Hof-
stadter, and company) are on the right track. Money does not 
quite run the show, as Marx might claim it does. (Neither, for 
that matter, it would seem, does Freudian libido.) In the final 
analysis, ideology has the upper hand. When in the Civil War, 
hundreds of young white soldiers of the South hurled their bod-
ies into what was a virtual crematorium at Cemetery Ridge, it 
was not for money or economic advantage; neither, surely, was it 
for sex. It was pure ideology. Most of them neither owned slaves 
nor probably expected to. Rather, Virginia had been invaded! 
Georgia, for God’s sake, was threatened! Their culture and cus-
tom had been despised. It was too much to take. And the North 
was just as blinded by ideology as was the South. The commit-
ment to profit-taking at any cost was unyielding.
We charge Muslims with eccentricity and barbarism because 
they would sooner kill fellow human beings –and themselves into 
the bargain— than see their culture despised and changed. We 
should know better than to so charge them. We are very much 
cut from the same cloth. People will kill and be killed sooner 
than change their minds. In fact, this resistance to mind-change 
seems especially strong among us children of Puritans. 
And so the final question. Can we, in the face of a manifest 
need to do so, change our minds? Can we abandon an unexam-
ined and bankrupt ideology?
A concern for our children is perhaps our strongest motive to 
do so. If we insist, as we have been insisting, that anyone think-
ing and acting differently from the way we do is a threat to our 
national security, and if we continue trying to structure the poli-
tics and economics of the planet to accommodate a Puritan sense 
of economic rationality, and if we try to enforce this with the 
might of our military technology, we will end by declaring just 
about everyone in the world a terrorist. People everywhere will 
begin acting in accord with the label we have assigned them. Our 
grandchildren’s lives will be bleak beyond present imagination.
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I’ve argued that, while a terrible racism continues to cor-
rode our hearts, the best place to look for lessons toward relief 
is, ironically, to the history of homegrown white racism against 
blacks. Our attention to this history over the last half-century 
has already contributed to our liberation in a variety of meaning-
ful ways. The prejudices of parents and grandparents are happily 
becoming inexplicable to our young. Currently, when our police 
profile blacks, our very police — longtime emblems of security to 
white America—  are becoming inexplicable to young Americans 
of all races. 
Note that thousands of young blacks and young whites are 
marrying across the color line, and millions will follow. Even 
now multitudes of older white and black Americans stand with 
unstrained smiles to applaud and encourage the brides and 
grooms. Perhaps more importantly, parents who have absented 
themselves from attending such weddings are finding their 
grandchildren irresistible. The children of these unions are cher-
ished and will be cherished by all their relatives—  all sides recon-
ciled by the deepest urges of human nature. 
In addition to a blending of races, out of the successes of the 
civil-rights struggle have spun liberations of women, of Latinos, 
of the handicapped, and of gays and lesbians. (One can almost 
hear the shudder of American conservatives: “See! We warned 
you.”)
One must hope that from these successes there will come a 
mellowing and gradual leavening of our Puritan sensibility. One 
hopes too that, for the sake of our children, the sensibility that 
develops will lead to a fresh connection with habitat while habitat 
is still there. The choice for that must come in the first half of 
this century, and can happen only if a residual wholesomeness 
in the people is able to refuse the blandishments— recognize the 
insanity—  of a majority of those now leading our corporations.
History need not be a doom. It can liberate us. It can liberate 
us if we address it honestly. We have to admit that The American 
Story is an elaborate myth now in the process of crumbling. The 
cake of our Puritan custom is falling apart. While the Puritan 
myth has long been effective in providing some cohesion, it was 
always in fact a myth embedded in bigotry. The “America” of that 
myth, as it loses its creditability, is becoming altogether inad-
equate to hold things together—  either for us, or as the pivot of 
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the world. Whether we will abandon it in time to become an 
America that deserves our dedication is up to us. 
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Tom O’Neill has held many jobs. To recount some:
After he left the Jesuit Order— where he had the leisure to learn 
something of Aristotle’s thinking (a wonderful experience) — he 
became for a number of years a social worker in child welfare 
in Compton, California; after that he served as a more than 
ordinarily inept teacher of English to islanders in the western 
Pacific—  among whom he greatly enjoyed living for five years; 
later still, for a quarter of a century before his recent retirement, 
he was a sometimes adequate instructor in philosophy and reli-
gion at Las Positas College in Livermore, California. He is now 
retired and lives in Livermore. Until her recent death, he was 
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Why the Center Can’t Hold
A Diagnosis of Puritanized America
Tom O’Neill
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold. 
These words from W. B. Yeats’s poem “The Second Coming” 
provide Why the Center Can’t Hold with its organizing 
theme. Although Yeats was describing the grim atmosphere of 
post-World War I Europe, for Tom O’Neill the poem is eerily 
predictive of the state of the world today. The United States— 
the presumed “center”—brings chaos into the world: refugee 
and migrant crises, sophisticated and postmodern forms of 
terrorism and cyberterrorism, banking and monetary crises, 
environmental catastrophes and climate change, the defund-
ing of public higher education, the persistence of virulent 
forms of racism and intolerance, the concentration of wealth 
in fewer and fewer hands, the marginalisation and even out-
right elimination of human labor forces, etc. In this book, 
O’Neill provides historical analyses to illuminate why the 
United States has developed its particular force, and he also 
asks what changes in the United States — in its politics, in 
its socio-cultural formations, and in its beliefs and (suppos-
edly common) values — might help us to avoid the seemingly 
inevitable (and lamentable) destruction that lies ahead
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